Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise
Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.
Domain definition
What Banking Nexus studies
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.
Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.
| Termo | Definição |
|---|---|
| Basel III | The Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. |
| Rácio CET1 | Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital. |
| Índice de cobertura de liquidez | High-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period. |
| Expected credit loss | The probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for. |
Financial system context
The parts of the financial system it covers
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Risco de crédito e de contraparte
Inadimplência, migração e concentração em carteiras de empréstimos e exposições de negociação, e como as perdas passam entre contrapartes.
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Capital e liquidez
Capital com capacidade de absorção de perdas, colchões de liquidez e estruturas de financiamento, e como se comportam quando mercados e depositantes sofrem estresse.
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Resiliência operacional
Continuidade dos serviços importantes diante de incidentes cibernéticos, falhas de terceiros e rupturas de processos, dentro de tolerâncias a impactos declaradas.
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Pagamentos e infraestruturas de mercado
Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.
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Risco climático e da natureza
Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.
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Modelos e IA
Modelos de pontuação de crédito, de provisionamento e de capital, e a validação e a governança que o aprendizado de máquina agora exige.
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Setor bancário e economia real
Empréstimos a famílias, pequenas empresas, habitação e serviços essenciais, e como o estresse bancário se torna uma restrição de crédito.
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Governança e supervisão
Conselhos, cultura de riscos, linhas de defesa, revisão de supervisão e planejamento da resolução, incluindo as estruturas dos bancos islâmicos.
Taxonomia de riscos
Risks, topic by topic
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Risco de crédito e de contraparte
O risco de crédito é a possibilidade de que um tomador ou contraparte não pague integralmente e no prazo, e continua sendo a principal fonte de perdas para a maioria dos bancos.
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Capital e liquidez
O capital absorve as perdas e a liquidez mantém um banco honrando suas obrigações à medida que vencem.
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Resiliência operacional bancária
A resiliência operacional é a capacidade de um banco de continuar prestando serviços críticos durante perturbações, sejam elas um ataque cibernético, uma mudança tecnológica malsucedida, uma interrupção de terceiros ou uma pandemia.
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Climate and nature bank risk
A mudança do clima e a perda de natureza chegam aos bancos por meio dos seus tomadores, das suas garantias e dos mercados de que dependem.
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Dependências de pagamento
Todo banco depende de sistemas de pagamento, contrapartes centrais, sistemas de liquidação de valores mobiliários, bancos correspondentes e redes de mensageria para movimentar dinheiro e garantias.
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Model and ai risk
Os bancos dependem de modelos para conceder crédito, constituir provisões, precificar produtos, calcular o capital e detectar fraudes, e uma parcela crescente desses modelos usa aprendizado de máquina.
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Banking and real economy
Os bancos transformam depósitos em empréstimos para famílias, pequenas e médias empresas e prestadores de serviços essenciais.
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Governança bancária
Muitas falências bancárias remontam à governança: conselhos que não compreendiam os riscos assumidos, incentivos que recompensavam o crescimento em detrimento da prudência ou funções de controle sem autoridade para contestar.
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Housing property finance
Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.
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Bancos islâmicos
Os bancos islâmicos operam com contratos e estruturas de governança concebidos para cumprir o direito comercial islâmico, utilizando instrumentos baseados em venda, arrendamento e parceria em vez de empréstimos com juros.
Risk-transmission mechanisms
How these risks develop and spread
| Tema | Mecanismo | Como funciona |
|---|---|---|
| Risco de crédito e de contraparte | A qualidade se deteriora antes da inadimplência | Arrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised. |
| Risco de crédito e de contraparte | Losses concentrate | Exposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies. |
| Capital e liquidez | As perdas esgotam o capital | Credit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers. |
| Capital e liquidez | O financiamento pode ser liberado rapidamente | Uninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing. |
| Resiliência operacional bancária | As dependências estão ocultas | A single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns. |
| Resiliência operacional bancária | Third parties concentrate risk | Many banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Physical risk hits collateral and income | Inundações, tempestades, calor e seca danificam imóveis e interrompem a produção. As perdas não seguradas recaem sobre os tomadores, elevando as probabilidades de inadimplência e a perda em caso de inadimplência, e a retirada de seguros pode reprecificar carteiras inteiras de hipotecas regionais. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | O risco de transição reprecifica os setores | Precificação de carbono, regulação, tecnologia e mudanças na demanda podem transformar ativos em ativos encalhados e comprimir as margens de tomadores intensivos em emissões. O momento importa: uma transição tardia e abrupta produz perdas mais acentuadas do que uma transição ordenada. |
| Dependências de pagamento | A liquidez é necessária ao longo do dia | Real-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours. |
| Dependências de pagamento | Central counterparties concentrate risk | A compensação reduz as exposições a saldos líquidos e mutualiza as perdas por inadimplência. Em situação de estresse, as chamadas de margem aumentam ao mesmo tempo para todos os membros, e a inadimplência de um membro recorre a um fundo de garantia compartilhado por todos. |
| Model and ai risk | Drift and regime change | Models learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it. |
| Model and ai risk | A opacidade enfraquece o questionamento | Complex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does. |
| Banking and real economy | Credit supply tightens | When capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first. |
| Banking and real economy | Borrower stress feeds back | Higher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy. |
| Governança bancária | Board oversight sets the frame | The board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set. |
| Governança bancária | Incentives shape behaviour | A remuneração vinculada à receita de curto prazo estimula a assunção de riscos cujos custos só aparecem depois. Diferimento, malus e clawback buscam alinhar a remuneração ao resultado do risco à medida que ele se realiza. |
| Housing property finance | Credit and prices reinforce each other | Easier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs. |
| Housing property finance | Acessibilidade financeira sob juros em alta | Variable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers. |
| Bancos islâmicos | A estrutura do contrato molda o risco | Murabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label. |
| Bancos islâmicos | Investment accounts share returns | Os titulares de contas de investimento com participação nos lucros arcam, em princípio, com as perdas. A pressão competitiva pode levar os bancos a suavizar os retornos e a absorver eles mesmos as perdas, uma transferência conhecida como risco comercial deslocado. |
Questões de pesquisa
Who decides, and what they need to know
| Decision holder | Questão | Evidence the platform's pages describe |
|---|---|---|
| Conselho do banco e comitê de riscos do conselho | What credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to impose | Medidas de concentração, migração de estágio e perdas sob estresse por segmento |
| Bank board and asset liability committee | What capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure funding | Projeções de capital e liquidez sob cenários internos e de supervisão |
| Bank board | Which business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carry | Service maps, scenario test results and incident history |
| Conselho do banco e comitê de riscos do conselho | How climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planning | Avaliação de materialidade, resultados de cenários e exposições setoriais |
| Banco central como supervisor e operador | Which systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meet | Dados de disponibilidade, incidentes e participação; concentração de fluxos |
| Bank board and model risk committee | What model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptable | Inventário de modelos, classificação em níveis e achados de validação |
| Autoridade macroprudencial ou comitê de política financeira | Se devem ser constituídos ou liberados colchões de capital e medidas baseadas no tomador | Hiatos de crédito, índices de serviço da dívida e pesquisas de crédito |
| Conselho do banco e comitê de nomeação | Se as competências, a independência e as informações do conselho são adequadas ao perfil de risco do banco | Revisões da eficácia do conselho, matrizes de competências e relatórios de risco |
| Autoridade macroprudencial | Whether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measures | Relação preço/renda, crescimento do crédito, padrões de concessão e inadimplência |
| Bank board | What risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accounts | Displaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact |
These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.
Key indicators
What is measured, in which unit, by whom
| Indicador | Unidade | Cadência | Tipo de fonte | Rótulo de evidência |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Índice de crédito inadimplente | percentual da carteira de crédito bruta | trimestral | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Estatísticas publicadas |
| Participação dos empréstimos dos estágios 2 e 3 | percentual da carteira de crédito bruta | trimestral | Demonstrações financeiras conforme a IFRS 9 | REPORTADO |
| Índice de capital principal de nível 1 | percentual dos ativos ponderados pelo risco | trimestral | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Estatísticas publicadas |
| Leverage ratio | medida em percentual da exposição total | trimestral | Relatórios de supervisão | Estatísticas publicadas |
| Important business services within impact tolerance in testing | número de serviços testados e número aprovado | anual | Registros de testes de cenários | REPORTADO |
| Incidentes graves relacionados a TIC | contagem por classe de gravidade | trimestral | Relatórios de incidentes aos supervisores | Estatísticas publicadas |
| Emissões financiadas | toneladas de dióxido de carbono equivalente | anual | PCAF methodology applied to loan and investment books | ESTIMADO |
| Exposição a setores relevantes para a política climática | percent of loan book | anual | Pillar 3 ESG disclosures | REPORTADO |
| Value settled through large-value payment systems | unidades monetárias por dia | diário | System operator statistics | Estatísticas publicadas |
| Disponibilidade do sistema de pagamentos | percentual das horas de operação | mensal | Divulgações dos operadores | REPORTADO |
| Model inventory coverage | count of models by tier and validation status | trimestral | Model risk management records | REPORTADO |
| Poder discriminatório de scorecards de crédito | Coeficiente de Gini ou área sob a curva | anual | Validação de modelos | MODELADO |
| Hiato crédito/PIB | pontos percentuais | trimestral | Estatísticas de crédito do BIS | ESTIMADO |
| Credit standards on loans to enterprises | percentual líquido de bancos que relatam endurecimento | trimestral | Pesquisas sobre concessão de crédito bancário | REPORTADO |
| Board members with banking or risk expertise | share of board | anual | Divulgações de governança | DECLARADO |
| Independent directors | share of board | anual | Divulgações de governança | DECLARADO |
| Razão empréstimo/valor na originação | percent of property value | trimestral | Dados em nível de empréstimo e de supervisão | Estatísticas publicadas |
| Debt-service-to-income ratio at origination | percent of gross income | trimestral | Dados em nível de empréstimo, pesquisas domiciliares | REPORTADO |
| Capital adequacy ratio of Islamic banks | percentual dos ativos ponderados pelo risco | trimestral | IFSB prudential indicators | Estatísticas publicadas |
| Non-performing financing ratio | percentual do financiamento bruto | trimestral | IFSB prudential indicators | Estatísticas publicadas |
Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.
Metodologia
The methods the platform's work rests on
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Economia financeira
Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.
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Probability statistics
Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.
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Ciência de redes
Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.
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Financial engineering
Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.
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Ai ml
Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.
Fontes de dados
De onde vêm as evidências
| Fonte | O que oferece | Classe de licença |
|---|---|---|
| Indicadores de Solidez Financeira do FMI | Empréstimos inadimplentes, provisionamento e distribuição setorial de empréstimos informados pelas autoridades nacionais | Gratuito, termos de uso do FMI |
| EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exercise | Bank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banks | Gratuito, atribuição |
| Estatísticas Bancárias de Supervisão do BCE | Asset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro area | Gratuito, atribuição |
| FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9C | Loan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companies | Domínio público |
| BIS consolidated banking statistics | Banks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basis | Gratuito, termos de uso do BIS |
| Rating agency default and recovery studies | Historical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sector | Licenciado, por assinatura |
| Registros nacionais centrais de crédito | Borrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysis | Restricted, supervisory access |
| Relatórios de monitoramento de Basileia III do BIS | Aggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banks | Gratuito, termos de uso do BIS |
| Federal Reserve supervisory stress test results | Scenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banks | Domínio público |
| Bank of England stress testing results | Concepção e resultados de testes de estresse simultâneos e exploratórios para os principais bancos do Reino Unido | Gratuito, termos de uso do Bank of England |
| Teste de estresse da EBA em toda a UE | Bank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodology | Gratuito, atribuição |
| Divulgações do Pilar 3 | Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFR | Público, termos bancários |
| Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act | Registros de acordos com terceiros de TIC mantidos por autoridades e a lista pública de provedores críticos de TIC designados | Registers restricted to authorities; designation list public |
| ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publications | Supervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilities | Gratuito, atribuição |
| Publicações do Bank of England e da PRA sobre resiliência operacional | Policy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports | Gratuito, termos de uso do Bank of England |
| ORX operational risk loss data | Eventos de perda agrupados por tipo de evento e linha de negócio, de bancos membros | Licenciado, associação |
| Panorama de ameaças da ENISA para o setor financeiro | Analysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutions | Gratuito, atribuição |
| Divulgações de risco operacional do Pilar 3 | Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banks | Público, termos bancários |
| Cenários do NGFS | Trajetórias de risco de transição e de risco físico com variáveis macroeconômicas para análise de cenários | Gratuito, atribuição |
| ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicators | Supervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposures | Gratuito, atribuição |
| Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario | Desenho e resultados publicados do exercício exploratório para bancos e seguradoras do Reino Unido | Gratuito, termos de uso do Bank of England |
| Divulgações ESG do Pilar 3 segundo as normas da EBA | Bank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignment | Público, termos bancários |
| PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting Standard | Methodology and data quality scores for financed emissions | Norma gratuita; base de dados de fatores de emissão mediante adesão |
| Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard maps | Camadas de ameaças físicas para inundação, calor e seca | Livre e aberto, atribuição |
Instruments explained for research
Analytical instruments
Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.
risco de crédito
A credit portfolio's loss distribution
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.
- Perda da carteira
- Expected loss
With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.
Controles
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Perda dado o inadimplemento
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Resultados
- Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
- 0.45
- Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
- 2.36
- Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 3.61
Data, source and model record
| Período de retorno (anos) | Loss (% of exposure) |
|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 |
| 4 | 0.59 |
| 8 | 0.91 |
| 17 | 1.28 |
| 34 | 1.68 |
| 70 | 2.13 |
| 141 | 2.60 |
| 288 | 3.11 |
| 585 | 3.64 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 |
- Fonte
- This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
- Escopo
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Unidades
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Situação
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modelo
- gra.credit.one-factor
- Versão
- 1.0.0
- Proprietário
- GRA platforms lane
- Finalidade
- To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
- Risk domain
- Risco de crédito e de contraparte
- Premissas
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Entradas
- Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Dados
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Métodos
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
- Validação
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Limitações
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Incerteza
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Concentração
One large exposure and the tail
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.
- Granular portfolio
- With the large exposure
Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.
Controles
- Share of the largest exposure
- 5.0 % of the portfolio
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Perda dado o inadimplemento
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Resultados
- Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
- 4.55
- Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
- 0.49
- Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
- 400
Data, source and model record
| Período de retorno (anos) | Granular (%) | With the large exposure (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 | 0.28 |
| 4 | 0.59 | 0.56 |
| 8 | 0.91 | 0.89 |
| 17 | 1.28 | 1.29 |
| 34 | 1.68 | 1.81 |
| 70 | 2.13 | 2.53 |
| 141 | 2.60 | 3.06 |
| 288 | 3.11 | 3.57 |
| 585 | 3.64 | 4.12 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 | 4.69 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 | 5.29 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 | 5.91 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 | 6.56 |
- Fonte
- This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
- Escopo
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Unidades
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Situação
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modelo
- gra.credit.concentration
- Versão
- 1.0.0
- Proprietário
- GRA platforms lane
- Finalidade
- To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
- Risk domain
- Risco de crédito e de contraparte
- Premissas
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Entradas
- Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Dados
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Métodos
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
- Validação
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Limitações
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Incerteza
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Liquidez
The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.
- Outflow over 30 days by funding class
- Net outflows after capped inflows
- Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.
Controles
- High-quality liquid assets
- 15.0 % of total funding
- Stable retail deposits
- 30 % of total funding
- Less stable retail deposits
- 20 % of total funding
- Operational deposits
- 15 % of total funding
- Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
- 15 % of total funding
- Unsecured funding from financial institutions
- 10 % of total funding
- Contractual inflows over 30 days
- 5.0 % of total funding
- Stress on run-off rates
- 1.00 times the baseline
Resultados
- Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
- 23.3
- Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
- 5.00
- Net outflows (% of total funding)
- 18.3
- Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
- 82
Data, source and model record
| Funding class | Balance (% of funding) | Run-off rate (%) | Outflow (% of funding) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stable retail deposits | 30.0 | 5 | 1.50 |
| Less stable retail deposits | 20.0 | 10 | 2.00 |
| Operational deposits | 15.0 | 25 | 3.75 |
| Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates | 15.0 | 40 | 6.00 |
| Unsecured funding from financial institutions | 10.0 | 100 | 10.0 |
- Fonte
- Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
- Date
- BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
- Escopo
- A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
- Unidades
- Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Situação
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modelo
- gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
- Versão
- 1.0.0
- Proprietário
- GRA platforms lane
- Finalidade
- To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Risk domain
- risco de liquidez
- Premissas
- Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
- Entradas
- High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
- Dados
- BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
- Métodos
- Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
- Validação
- Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
- Limitações
- Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
- Incerteza
- None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
- Approved use
- Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Prohibited use
- Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Rede de exposição
Como um choque nos ativos se torna uma perda do sistema
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.
- System equity lost
Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.
Controles
- Queda dos ativos externos
- 2.0 %
Resultados
- Queda dos ativos externos (%)
- 2.0
- System equity lost in the first round (%)
- 18.0
- System equity lost after contagion (%)
- 45.0
- Amplification by the network (percentage points)
- 27.0
- Banks in default (of 20)
- 0
Data, source and model record
| Rodada | Capital próprio do sistema perdido (%) | Bancos inadimplentes |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.0 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.8 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.3 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.2 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.5 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.9 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.7 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.2 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.5 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.7 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.8 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 13 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 14 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 15 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 16 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.0 | 0 |
- Fonte
- Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
- Escopo
- A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
- Unidades
- Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Situação
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modelo
- gra.network.debtrank
- Versão
- 1.0.0
- Proprietário
- GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
- Finalidade
- To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
- Risk domain
- Systemic and contagion risk
- Premissas
- Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
- Entradas
- Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
- Dados
- None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
- Métodos
- DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
- Validação
- The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
- Limitações
- No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
- Incerteza
- Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
- Approved use
- Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
- Prohibited use
- Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Análise de cenários
Scenarios, not forecasts
A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.
Regulatory context and related standards
The frameworks this work is read against
| Quadro de referência | Órgão | O que estabelece | Edition or date | Where it applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Estrutura de Basileia III | Comitê de Supervisão Bancária de Basileia | Requisitos mínimos de capital, alavancagem, cobertura de liquidez e financiamento estável, e os colchões de capital acima deles | December 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel Framework | Basel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables |
| Princípios Fundamentais para uma Supervisão Bancária Eficaz | Comitê de Supervisão Bancária de Basileia | Normas de referência sobre poderes de supervisão, licenciamento, gestão de riscos e governança, avaliadas nos FSAPs do FMI e do Banco Mundial | Revised April 2024 | International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs |
| Princípios para a gestão e a supervisão eficazes dos riscos financeiros relacionados ao clima | Comitê de Supervisão Bancária de Basileia | Expectativas sobre a governança, a gestão de riscos e a análise de cenários dos bancos diante do risco climático, e sobre sua revisão de supervisão | June 2022 | Basel Committee members, through national supervisors |
| Atributos essenciais de regimes de resolução eficazes para instituições financeiras | Conselho de Estabilidade Financeira | Poderes de resolução, planejamento de recuperação e resolução e cooperação transfronteiriça para que um banco possa falir sem apoio dos contribuintes | October 2011, updated October 2014 | FSB member jurisdictions |
| IFRS 9 Instrumentos financeiros | Conselho de Normas Internacionais de Contabilidade | Classificação dos ativos financeiros e provisionamento prospectivo de perdas de crédito esperadas em três estágios | Issued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018 | Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead) |
| Cenários climáticos da NGFS | Rede para o Esverdeamento do Sistema Financeiro | Trajetórias de referência de risco de transição e físico usadas por bancos centrais e supervisores para a análise de cenários climáticos | Phase V, November 2024 | Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding |
| IFRS S2 Divulgações relacionadas com o clima | Conselho de Normas Internacionais de Sustentabilidade | Divulgação de riscos e oportunidades relacionados ao clima, incluindo emissões financiadas e resiliência climática | Issued June 2023, amended December 2025 | Where a jurisdiction adopts it |
| Processo de Revisão e Avaliação Supervisora (SREP) | Autoridade Bancária Europeia e Supervisão Bancária do BCE | Processo de supervisão que avalia o modelo de negócios, a governança e os riscos para o capital e a liquidez, definindo os requisitos e orientações do Pilar 2 | EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022) | European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks |
| Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) e testes de estresse de supervisão | Conselho de Governadores do Sistema da Reserva Federal | Processo de supervisão de revisão dos cenários de estresse e do plano de capital que define o colchão de capital de estresse dos grandes bancos norte-americanos | Annual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020 | United States, large bank holding companies |
| ISO 31000 Gestão de riscos - Diretrizes | Organização Internacional de Normalização | Princípios, estrutura e processo para gerir o risco em toda uma organização | ISO 31000:2018 | International, voluntary |
Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.
Geographic dimensions
Global, regional and country programmes
Institutional counterparts
The institutions this work speaks to
- Conselho do banco e comitê de riscos do conselho
- Chief risk officer and credit committee
- Supervisor prudencial
- Autoridade macroprudencial
- Bank board and asset liability committee
- Supervisor prudencial por meio de SREP ou CCAR
- Banco central
- Bank board
- Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
- Authorities overseeing critical third parties
- Credit risk function
- Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
- Banco central como supervisor e operador
- Bank treasury
- Conselho e comitê de risco da contraparte central
- Autoridade de resolução
Publicações de pesquisa
Research, methods and sources
Educational resources
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Readiness workflows
Prontidão financeira
Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.
Contribution mechanisms
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What this page is not
Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.