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Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise

Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.

Go to the instrumentsBanking Nexus home

Domain definition

What Banking Nexus studies

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.

Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.

TermoDefinição
Basel IIIThe Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks.
Rácio CET1Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital.
Índice de cobertura de liquidezHigh-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period.
Expected credit lossThe probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for.

Financial system context

The parts of the financial system it covers

  • Risco de crédito e de contraparte

    Inadimplência, migração e concentração em carteiras de empréstimos e exposições de negociação, e como as perdas passam entre contrapartes.

  • Capital e liquidez

    Capital com capacidade de absorção de perdas, colchões de liquidez e estruturas de financiamento, e como se comportam quando mercados e depositantes sofrem estresse.

  • Resiliência operacional

    Continuidade dos serviços importantes diante de incidentes cibernéticos, falhas de terceiros e rupturas de processos, dentro de tolerâncias a impactos declaradas.

  • Pagamentos e infraestruturas de mercado

    Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.

  • Risco climático e da natureza

    Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.

  • Modelos e IA

    Modelos de pontuação de crédito, de provisionamento e de capital, e a validação e a governança que o aprendizado de máquina agora exige.

  • Setor bancário e economia real

    Empréstimos a famílias, pequenas empresas, habitação e serviços essenciais, e como o estresse bancário se torna uma restrição de crédito.

  • Governança e supervisão

    Conselhos, cultura de riscos, linhas de defesa, revisão de supervisão e planejamento da resolução, incluindo as estruturas dos bancos islâmicos.

Taxonomia de riscos

Risks, topic by topic

  • Risco de crédito e de contraparte

    O risco de crédito é a possibilidade de que um tomador ou contraparte não pague integralmente e no prazo, e continua sendo a principal fonte de perdas para a maioria dos bancos.

  • Capital e liquidez

    O capital absorve as perdas e a liquidez mantém um banco honrando suas obrigações à medida que vencem.

  • Resiliência operacional bancária

    A resiliência operacional é a capacidade de um banco de continuar prestando serviços críticos durante perturbações, sejam elas um ataque cibernético, uma mudança tecnológica malsucedida, uma interrupção de terceiros ou uma pandemia.

  • Climate and nature bank risk

    A mudança do clima e a perda de natureza chegam aos bancos por meio dos seus tomadores, das suas garantias e dos mercados de que dependem.

  • Dependências de pagamento

    Todo banco depende de sistemas de pagamento, contrapartes centrais, sistemas de liquidação de valores mobiliários, bancos correspondentes e redes de mensageria para movimentar dinheiro e garantias.

  • Model and ai risk

    Os bancos dependem de modelos para conceder crédito, constituir provisões, precificar produtos, calcular o capital e detectar fraudes, e uma parcela crescente desses modelos usa aprendizado de máquina.

  • Banking and real economy

    Os bancos transformam depósitos em empréstimos para famílias, pequenas e médias empresas e prestadores de serviços essenciais.

  • Governança bancária

    Muitas falências bancárias remontam à governança: conselhos que não compreendiam os riscos assumidos, incentivos que recompensavam o crescimento em detrimento da prudência ou funções de controle sem autoridade para contestar.

  • Housing property finance

    Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.

  • Bancos islâmicos

    Os bancos islâmicos operam com contratos e estruturas de governança concebidos para cumprir o direito comercial islâmico, utilizando instrumentos baseados em venda, arrendamento e parceria em vez de empréstimos com juros.

Risk-transmission mechanisms

How these risks develop and spread

TemaMecanismoComo funciona
Risco de crédito e de contraparteA qualidade se deteriora antes da inadimplênciaArrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised.
Risco de crédito e de contraparteLosses concentrateExposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies.
Capital e liquidezAs perdas esgotam o capitalCredit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers.
Capital e liquidezO financiamento pode ser liberado rapidamenteUninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing.
Resiliência operacional bancáriaAs dependências estão ocultasA single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.
Resiliência operacional bancáriaThird parties concentrate riskMany banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
Climate and nature bank riskPhysical risk hits collateral and incomeInundações, tempestades, calor e seca danificam imóveis e interrompem a produção. As perdas não seguradas recaem sobre os tomadores, elevando as probabilidades de inadimplência e a perda em caso de inadimplência, e a retirada de seguros pode reprecificar carteiras inteiras de hipotecas regionais.
Climate and nature bank riskO risco de transição reprecifica os setoresPrecificação de carbono, regulação, tecnologia e mudanças na demanda podem transformar ativos em ativos encalhados e comprimir as margens de tomadores intensivos em emissões. O momento importa: uma transição tardia e abrupta produz perdas mais acentuadas do que uma transição ordenada.
Dependências de pagamentoA liquidez é necessária ao longo do diaReal-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours.
Dependências de pagamentoCentral counterparties concentrate riskA compensação reduz as exposições a saldos líquidos e mutualiza as perdas por inadimplência. Em situação de estresse, as chamadas de margem aumentam ao mesmo tempo para todos os membros, e a inadimplência de um membro recorre a um fundo de garantia compartilhado por todos.
Model and ai riskDrift and regime changeModels learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it.
Model and ai riskA opacidade enfraquece o questionamentoComplex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does.
Banking and real economyCredit supply tightensWhen capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first.
Banking and real economyBorrower stress feeds backHigher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy.
Governança bancáriaBoard oversight sets the frameThe board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set.
Governança bancáriaIncentives shape behaviourA remuneração vinculada à receita de curto prazo estimula a assunção de riscos cujos custos só aparecem depois. Diferimento, malus e clawback buscam alinhar a remuneração ao resultado do risco à medida que ele se realiza.
Housing property financeCredit and prices reinforce each otherEasier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs.
Housing property financeAcessibilidade financeira sob juros em altaVariable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers.
Bancos islâmicosA estrutura do contrato molda o riscoMurabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label.
Bancos islâmicosInvestment accounts share returnsOs titulares de contas de investimento com participação nos lucros arcam, em princípio, com as perdas. A pressão competitiva pode levar os bancos a suavizar os retornos e a absorver eles mesmos as perdas, uma transferência conhecida como risco comercial deslocado.

Questões de pesquisa

Who decides, and what they need to know

Decision holderQuestãoEvidence the platform's pages describe
Conselho do banco e comitê de riscos do conselhoWhat credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to imposeMedidas de concentração, migração de estágio e perdas sob estresse por segmento
Bank board and asset liability committeeWhat capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure fundingProjeções de capital e liquidez sob cenários internos e de supervisão
Bank boardWhich business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryService maps, scenario test results and incident history
Conselho do banco e comitê de riscos do conselhoHow climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planningAvaliação de materialidade, resultados de cenários e exposições setoriais
Banco central como supervisor e operadorWhich systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meetDados de disponibilidade, incidentes e participação; concentração de fluxos
Bank board and model risk committeeWhat model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptableInventário de modelos, classificação em níveis e achados de validação
Autoridade macroprudencial ou comitê de política financeiraSe devem ser constituídos ou liberados colchões de capital e medidas baseadas no tomadorHiatos de crédito, índices de serviço da dívida e pesquisas de crédito
Conselho do banco e comitê de nomeaçãoSe as competências, a independência e as informações do conselho são adequadas ao perfil de risco do bancoRevisões da eficácia do conselho, matrizes de competências e relatórios de risco
Autoridade macroprudencialWhether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measuresRelação preço/renda, crescimento do crédito, padrões de concessão e inadimplência
Bank boardWhat risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accountsDisplaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact

These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.

Key indicators

What is measured, in which unit, by whom

IndicadorUnidadeCadênciaTipo de fonteRótulo de evidência
Índice de crédito inadimplentepercentual da carteira de crédito brutatrimestralSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresEstatísticas publicadas
Participação dos empréstimos dos estágios 2 e 3percentual da carteira de crédito brutatrimestralDemonstrações financeiras conforme a IFRS 9REPORTADO
Índice de capital principal de nível 1percentual dos ativos ponderados pelo riscotrimestralSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresEstatísticas publicadas
Leverage ratiomedida em percentual da exposição totaltrimestralRelatórios de supervisãoEstatísticas publicadas
Important business services within impact tolerance in testingnúmero de serviços testados e número aprovadoanualRegistros de testes de cenáriosREPORTADO
Incidentes graves relacionados a TICcontagem por classe de gravidadetrimestralRelatórios de incidentes aos supervisoresEstatísticas publicadas
Emissões financiadastoneladas de dióxido de carbono equivalenteanualPCAF methodology applied to loan and investment booksESTIMADO
Exposição a setores relevantes para a política climáticapercent of loan bookanualPillar 3 ESG disclosuresREPORTADO
Value settled through large-value payment systemsunidades monetárias por diadiárioSystem operator statisticsEstatísticas publicadas
Disponibilidade do sistema de pagamentospercentual das horas de operaçãomensalDivulgações dos operadoresREPORTADO
Model inventory coveragecount of models by tier and validation statustrimestralModel risk management recordsREPORTADO
Poder discriminatório de scorecards de créditoCoeficiente de Gini ou área sob a curvaanualValidação de modelosMODELADO
Hiato crédito/PIBpontos percentuaistrimestralEstatísticas de crédito do BISESTIMADO
Credit standards on loans to enterprisespercentual líquido de bancos que relatam endurecimentotrimestralPesquisas sobre concessão de crédito bancárioREPORTADO
Board members with banking or risk expertiseshare of boardanualDivulgações de governançaDECLARADO
Independent directorsshare of boardanualDivulgações de governançaDECLARADO
Razão empréstimo/valor na originaçãopercent of property valuetrimestralDados em nível de empréstimo e de supervisãoEstatísticas publicadas
Debt-service-to-income ratio at originationpercent of gross incometrimestralDados em nível de empréstimo, pesquisas domiciliaresREPORTADO
Capital adequacy ratio of Islamic bankspercentual dos ativos ponderados pelo riscotrimestralIFSB prudential indicatorsEstatísticas publicadas
Non-performing financing ratiopercentual do financiamento brutotrimestralIFSB prudential indicatorsEstatísticas publicadas

Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.

Metodologia

The methods the platform's work rests on

  • Economia financeira

    Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.

  • Probability statistics

    Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.

  • Ciência de redes

    Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.

  • Financial engineering

    Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.

  • Ai ml

    Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.

Fontes de dados

De onde vêm as evidências

FonteO que ofereceClasse de licença
Indicadores de Solidez Financeira do FMIEmpréstimos inadimplentes, provisionamento e distribuição setorial de empréstimos informados pelas autoridades nacionaisGratuito, termos de uso do FMI
EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exerciseBank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banksGratuito, atribuição
Estatísticas Bancárias de Supervisão do BCEAsset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro areaGratuito, atribuição
FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9CLoan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companiesDomínio público
BIS consolidated banking statisticsBanks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basisGratuito, termos de uso do BIS
Rating agency default and recovery studiesHistorical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sectorLicenciado, por assinatura
Registros nacionais centrais de créditoBorrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysisRestricted, supervisory access
Relatórios de monitoramento de Basileia III do BISAggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banksGratuito, termos de uso do BIS
Federal Reserve supervisory stress test resultsScenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banksDomínio público
Bank of England stress testing resultsConcepção e resultados de testes de estresse simultâneos e exploratórios para os principais bancos do Reino UnidoGratuito, termos de uso do Bank of England
Teste de estresse da EBA em toda a UEBank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodologyGratuito, atribuição
Divulgações do Pilar 3Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFRPúblico, termos bancários
Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience ActRegistros de acordos com terceiros de TIC mantidos por autoridades e a lista pública de provedores críticos de TIC designadosRegisters restricted to authorities; designation list public
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publicationsSupervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilitiesGratuito, atribuição
Publicações do Bank of England e da PRA sobre resiliência operacionalPolicy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reportsGratuito, termos de uso do Bank of England
ORX operational risk loss dataEventos de perda agrupados por tipo de evento e linha de negócio, de bancos membrosLicenciado, associação
Panorama de ameaças da ENISA para o setor financeiroAnalysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutionsGratuito, atribuição
Divulgações de risco operacional do Pilar 3Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banksPúblico, termos bancários
Cenários do NGFSTrajetórias de risco de transição e de risco físico com variáveis macroeconômicas para análise de cenáriosGratuito, atribuição
ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicatorsSupervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposuresGratuito, atribuição
Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory ScenarioDesenho e resultados publicados do exercício exploratório para bancos e seguradoras do Reino UnidoGratuito, termos de uso do Bank of England
Divulgações ESG do Pilar 3 segundo as normas da EBABank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignmentPúblico, termos bancários
PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting StandardMethodology and data quality scores for financed emissionsNorma gratuita; base de dados de fatores de emissão mediante adesão
Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard mapsCamadas de ameaças físicas para inundação, calor e secaLivre e aberto, atribuição

Instruments explained for research

Analytical instruments

Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.

risco de crédito

A credit portfolio's loss distribution

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.

02468 1 in 21 em 101 em 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Perda da carteira
  • Expected loss

With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.

Controles

Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Perda dado o inadimplemento
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Resultados

Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
0.45
Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
2.36
Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
4.06
Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
3.61
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period
Período de retorno (anos)Loss (% of exposure)
20.30
40.59
80.91
171.28
341.68
702.13
1412.60
2883.11
5853.64
1,1894.20
2,4184.79
4,9185.41
10,0006.04
Fonte
This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
Escopo
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Unidades
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Situação
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modelo
gra.credit.one-factor
Versão
1.0.0
Proprietário
GRA platforms lane
Finalidade
To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
Risk domain
Risco de crédito e de contraparte
Premissas
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Entradas
Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Dados
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Métodos
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
Validação
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limitações
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Incerteza
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Concentração

One large exposure and the tail

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.

02468 1 in 21 em 101 em 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Granular portfolio
  • With the large exposure

Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.

Controles

Share of the largest exposure
5.0 % of the portfolio
Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Perda dado o inadimplemento
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Resultados

Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
4.06
Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
4.55
Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
0.49
Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
400
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period, granular and concentrated
Período de retorno (anos)Granular (%)With the large exposure (%)
20.300.28
40.590.56
80.910.89
171.281.29
341.681.81
702.132.53
1412.603.06
2883.113.57
5853.644.12
1,1894.204.69
2,4184.795.29
4,9185.415.91
10,0006.046.56
Fonte
This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
Escopo
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Unidades
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Situação
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modelo
gra.credit.concentration
Versão
1.0.0
Proprietário
GRA platforms lane
Finalidade
To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
Risk domain
Risco de crédito e de contraparte
Premissas
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Entradas
Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Dados
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Métodos
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
Validação
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limitações
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Incerteza
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Liquidez

The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.

  • Stable retail 1.50
  • Less stable retail 2.00
  • Operational deposits 3.75
  • Corporate, non-operational 6.00
  • Instituições financeiras 10.0
  • Net outflows 18.3
  • Liquid assets (HQLA) 15.0
  • Outflow over 30 days by funding class
  • Net outflows after capped inflows
  • Stock of high-quality liquid assets

Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.

Controles

High-quality liquid assets
15.0 % of total funding
Stable retail deposits
30 % of total funding
Less stable retail deposits
20 % of total funding
Operational deposits
15 % of total funding
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
15 % of total funding
Unsecured funding from financial institutions
10 % of total funding
Contractual inflows over 30 days
5.0 % of total funding
Stress on run-off rates
1.00 times the baseline

Resultados

Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
23.3
Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
5.00
Net outflows (% of total funding)
18.3
Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
82
Data, source and model record
Outflows by funding class and the stock of liquid assets
Funding classBalance (% of funding)Run-off rate (%)Outflow (% of funding)
Stable retail deposits30.051.50
Less stable retail deposits20.0102.00
Operational deposits15.0253.75
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates15.0406.00
Unsecured funding from financial institutions10.010010.0
Fonte
Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
Date
BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
Escopo
A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
Unidades
Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Situação
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modelo
gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
Versão
1.0.0
Proprietário
GRA platforms lane
Finalidade
To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
Risk domain
risco de liquidez
Premissas
Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
Entradas
High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
Dados
BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
Métodos
Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
Validação
Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
Limitações
Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
Incerteza
None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
Approved use
Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
Prohibited use
Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.

Rede de exposição

Como um choque nos ativos se torna uma perda do sistema

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.

0255075100 051015202530 Contagion round Capital próprio do sistema perdido (%)
  • System equity lost

Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.

Controles

Queda dos ativos externos
2.0 %

Resultados

Queda dos ativos externos (%)
2.0
System equity lost in the first round (%)
18.0
System equity lost after contagion (%)
45.0
Amplification by the network (percentage points)
27.0
Banks in default (of 20)
0
Data, source and model record
System equity lost, round by round
RodadaCapital próprio do sistema perdido (%)Bancos inadimplentes
018.00
128.80
235.30
339.20
441.50
542.90
643.70
744.20
844.50
944.70
1044.80
1144.90
1244.90
1345.00
1445.00
1545.00
1645.00
1745.00
1845.00
1945.00
2045.00
2145.00
2245.00
2345.00
2445.00
2545.00
2645.00
2745.00
2845.00
2945.00
3045.00
Fonte
Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
Escopo
A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
Unidades
Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Situação
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modelo
gra.network.debtrank
Versão
1.0.0
Proprietário
GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
Finalidade
To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
Risk domain
Systemic and contagion risk
Premissas
Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
Entradas
Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
Dados
None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
Métodos
DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
Validação
The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
Limitações
No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
Incerteza
Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
Approved use
Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
Prohibited use
Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.

Análise de cenários

Scenarios, not forecasts

A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.

Regulatory context and related standards

The frameworks this work is read against

Quadro de referênciaÓrgãoO que estabeleceEdition or dateWhere it applies
Estrutura de Basileia IIIComitê de Supervisão Bancária de BasileiaRequisitos mínimos de capital, alavancagem, cobertura de liquidez e financiamento estável, e os colchões de capital acima delesDecember 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel FrameworkBasel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables
Princípios Fundamentais para uma Supervisão Bancária EficazComitê de Supervisão Bancária de BasileiaNormas de referência sobre poderes de supervisão, licenciamento, gestão de riscos e governança, avaliadas nos FSAPs do FMI e do Banco MundialRevised April 2024International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs
Princípios para a gestão e a supervisão eficazes dos riscos financeiros relacionados ao climaComitê de Supervisão Bancária de BasileiaExpectativas sobre a governança, a gestão de riscos e a análise de cenários dos bancos diante do risco climático, e sobre sua revisão de supervisãoJune 2022Basel Committee members, through national supervisors
Atributos essenciais de regimes de resolução eficazes para instituições financeirasConselho de Estabilidade FinanceiraPoderes de resolução, planejamento de recuperação e resolução e cooperação transfronteiriça para que um banco possa falir sem apoio dos contribuintesOctober 2011, updated October 2014FSB member jurisdictions
IFRS 9 Instrumentos financeirosConselho de Normas Internacionais de ContabilidadeClassificação dos ativos financeiros e provisionamento prospectivo de perdas de crédito esperadas em três estágiosIssued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead)
Cenários climáticos da NGFSRede para o Esverdeamento do Sistema FinanceiroTrajetórias de referência de risco de transição e físico usadas por bancos centrais e supervisores para a análise de cenários climáticosPhase V, November 2024Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding
IFRS S2 Divulgações relacionadas com o climaConselho de Normas Internacionais de SustentabilidadeDivulgação de riscos e oportunidades relacionados ao clima, incluindo emissões financiadas e resiliência climáticaIssued June 2023, amended December 2025Where a jurisdiction adopts it
Processo de Revisão e Avaliação Supervisora (SREP)Autoridade Bancária Europeia e Supervisão Bancária do BCEProcesso de supervisão que avalia o modelo de negócios, a governança e os riscos para o capital e a liquidez, definindo os requisitos e orientações do Pilar 2EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022)European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) e testes de estresse de supervisãoConselho de Governadores do Sistema da Reserva FederalProcesso de supervisão de revisão dos cenários de estresse e do plano de capital que define o colchão de capital de estresse dos grandes bancos norte-americanosAnnual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020United States, large bank holding companies
ISO 31000 Gestão de riscos - DiretrizesOrganização Internacional de NormalizaçãoPrincípios, estrutura e processo para gerir o risco em toda uma organizaçãoISO 31000:2018International, voluntary

Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.

Institutional counterparts

The institutions this work speaks to

  • Conselho do banco e comitê de riscos do conselho
  • Chief risk officer and credit committee
  • Supervisor prudencial
  • Autoridade macroprudencial
  • Bank board and asset liability committee
  • Supervisor prudencial por meio de SREP ou CCAR
  • Banco central
  • Bank board
  • Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
  • Authorities overseeing critical third parties
  • Credit risk function
  • Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
  • Banco central como supervisor e operador
  • Bank treasury
  • Conselho e comitê de risco da contraparte central
  • Autoridade de resolução

Readiness workflows

Prontidão financeira

Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.

Limite

What this page is not

Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.