Skip to content

Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise

Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.

Go to the instrumentsBanking Nexus home

Domain definition

What Banking Nexus studies

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.

Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.

术语定义
Basel IIIThe Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks.
CET1 比率Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital.
流动性覆盖率High-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period.
Expected credit lossThe probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for.

Financial system context

The parts of the financial system it covers

  • 信用与交易对手风险

    贷款账簿和交易风险暴露中的违约、迁移和集中度,以及损失如何在交易对手之间传递。

  • 资本与流动性

    损失吸收资本、流动性缓冲和融资结构,以及它们在市场和存款人承压时的表现。

  • 运营韧性

    在网络事件、第三方故障和流程中断期间,于既定影响容忍度以内保持重要服务的连续性。

  • 支付与市场基础设施

    Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.

  • 气候与自然风险

    Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.

  • 模型与 AI

    信用评分、拨备和资本模型,以及机器学习现在所要求的验证和治理。

  • 银行业与实体经济

    对家庭、小企业、住房和基本服务的贷款,以及银行压力如何变成信贷紧缩。

  • 治理与监督

    董事会、风险文化、防线、监管审查和处置规划,包括伊斯兰银行业的结构。

风险分类体系

Risks, topic by topic

  • 信用与交易对手风险

    信用风险是指借款人或交易对手未能按时足额付款的可能性,它仍是大多数银行的主要损失来源。

  • 资本与流动性

    资本吸收损失,流动性则使银行能够按期履行其义务。

  • 银行运营韧性

    运营韧性是银行在中断(无论是网络攻击、技术变更失败、第三方中断还是大流行)中持续提供关键服务的能力。

  • Climate and nature bank risk

    气候变化和自然丧失通过借款人、抵押品以及银行所依赖的市场影响银行。

  • 支付依赖关系

    每家银行都依赖支付系统、中央对手方、证券结算系统、代理行和报文网络来转移资金和抵押品。

  • Model and ai risk

    银行依靠模型发放贷款、计提拨备、为产品定价、计算资本和发现欺诈,而且越来越多的模型使用机器学习。

  • Banking and real economy

    银行将存款转化为面向家庭、中小企业以及基本服务提供方的贷款。

  • 银行治理

    许多银行倒闭都可以追溯到治理问题:董事会不了解所承担的风险,激励机制奖励增长而非审慎,或控制职能缺乏提出质疑的地位。

  • Housing property finance

    Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.

  • 伊斯兰银行业务

    伊斯兰银行在旨在符合伊斯兰商法的合同和治理结构下运营,使用基于销售、租赁和合伙的工具取代计息贷款。

Risk-transmission mechanisms

How these risks develop and spread

主题机制运作方式
信用与交易对手风险质量在违约之前就已下降Arrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised.
信用与交易对手风险Losses concentrateExposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies.
资本与流动性损失消耗资本Credit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers.
资本与流动性资金可以快速到位无保险存款、批发融资和有担保融资可在数日内被撤出,在数字银行和信息快速传播的情况下更快。存款基础集中与期限错配使挤兑自我强化。
银行运营韧性依赖关系被隐藏A single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.
银行运营韧性Third parties concentrate riskMany banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
Climate and nature bank risk实体风险冲击抵押品和收入洪水、风暴、高温和干旱会损坏财产并扰乱生产。未投保的损失由借款人承担,从而提高违约概率和违约损失率,而保险退出可能导致整个区域抵押贷款组合重新定价。
Climate and nature bank risk转型风险使各行业重新定价碳定价、监管、技术和需求变化可能使资产搁浅,并挤压高排放借款人的利润空间。时机很重要:晚而突然的转型造成的损失比有序转型更为严重。
支付依赖关系日内需要流动性Real-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours.
支付依赖关系Central counterparties concentrate risk清算对风险暴露进行轧差,并将违约损失共同分担。在压力情形下,各成员的保证金追缴同时上升,成员违约将动用全体成员共有的违约基金。
Model and ai riskDrift and regime changeModels learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it.
Model and ai risk不透明削弱质疑Complex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does.
Banking and real economyCredit supply tightens当资本或资金短缺时,银行会提高贷款标准和利差,削减信贷额度,并偏向更安全的借款人。选择更少的小型企业和低收入家庭首当其冲。
Banking and real economyBorrower stress feeds backHigher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy.
银行治理董事会监督设定框架The board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set.
银行治理激励塑造行为与短期收入挂钩的薪酬会鼓励冒险行为,而其代价往往在日后才显现。递延支付、扣减和追回机制旨在使薪酬与已实现的风险结果相一致。
Housing property financeCredit and prices reinforce each otherEasier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs.
Housing property finance利率上升下的可负担性Variable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers.
伊斯兰银行业务Contract structure shapes riskMurabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label.
伊斯兰银行业务Investment accounts share returns利润分享投资账户持有人原则上承担损失。竞争压力可能促使银行平滑收益并自行吸收损失,这种转移称为置换商业风险。

研究问题

Who decides, and what they need to know

Decision holder提问Evidence the platform's pages describe
银行董事会和董事会风险委员会What credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to impose按细分领域划分的集中度指标、阶段迁移和压力损失
银行董事会和资产负债委员会应持有何种资本目标和管理缓冲,以及如何安排融资结构内部情景和监管情景下的资本与流动性预测
银行董事会Which business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryService maps, scenario test results and incident history
银行董事会和董事会风险委员会How climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planningMateriality assessment, scenario results and sector exposures
央行兼任监督者与运营者Which systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meetAvailability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows
Bank board and model risk committeeWhat model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptableModel inventory, tiering and validation findings
宏观审慎当局或金融政策委员会是否设定或释放资本缓冲和基于借款人的措施信贷缺口、偿债比率和贷款调查
Bank board and nomination committee董事会的技能、独立性和信息是否与银行的风险状况相适应Board effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports
宏观审慎主管机构Whether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measures价格收入比、信贷增长、放贷标准与拖欠
银行董事会What risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accountsDisplaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact

These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.

Key indicators

What is measured, in which unit, by whom

指标单位节奏来源类型证据标签
不良贷款率占贷款总额的百分比每季度Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures已发布统计
第 2 阶段和第 3 阶段贷款占比占贷款总额的百分比每季度IFRS 9 财务报表已报告
Common equity tier 1 ratio占风险加权资产的百分比每季度Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures已发布统计
杠杆率占总风险暴露度量的百分比每季度监管报表已发布统计
Important business services within impact tolerance in testing已测试的服务数量及通过数量年度情景测试记录已报告
Major ICT-related incidents按严重程度类别统计的数量每季度向监管机构报送的事件报告已发布统计
融资排放二氧化碳当量吨年度适用于贷款和投资账簿的 PCAF 方法估算
对气候政策相关行业的风险暴露percent of loan book年度Pillar 3 ESG disclosures已报告
Value settled through large-value payment systems每天的货币单位数每日System operator statistics已发布统计
支付系统可用性percent of operating hours每月运营方披露已报告
Model inventory coveragecount of models by tier and validation status每季度Model risk management records已报告
信用评分卡的区分能力基尼系数或曲线下面积年度模型验证模型估算
信贷与 GDP 之比缺口百分点每季度国际清算银行(BIS)信贷统计估算
企业贷款的信贷标准报告收紧的银行净占比每季度银行贷款调查已报告
Board members with banking or risk expertise占董事会比例年度治理披露已声明
独立董事占董事会比例年度治理披露已声明
发放时的贷款价值比占财产价值的百分比每季度贷款层面数据和监管数据已发布统计
发放时的债务偿还收入比percent of gross income每季度Loan-level data, household surveys已报告
伊斯兰银行的资本充足率占风险加权资产的百分比每季度IFSB 审慎指标已发布统计
Non-performing financing ratio占融资总额的百分比每季度IFSB 审慎指标已发布统计

Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.

方法论

The methods the platform's work rests on

  • 金融经济学

    金融经济学与宏观金融解释银行资产负债表、信贷和资产价格如何与产出、就业和公共财政相互作用。在银行风险中,它们将情景与损失和资本联系起来,说明银行压力如何反馈至经济,并使宏观审慎和货币决策建立在经检验的关系之上。

  • Probability statistics

    Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.

  • 网络科学

    Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.

  • Financial engineering

    Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.

  • Ai ml

    Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.

数据来源

证据的来源

来源它提供什么许可类别
国际货币基金组织金融稳健指标各国主管部门报告的不良贷款、拨备和行业贷款分布免费,适用 IMF 使用条款
EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exercise欧盟银行层面的资产质量、宽限措施和国际财务报告准则第 9 号阶段数据免费,须署名
ECB Supervisory Banking StatisticsAsset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro area免费,须署名
FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9CLoan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companies公有领域
BIS consolidated banking statisticsBanks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basis免费,须遵守 BIS 使用条款
Rating agency default and recovery studiesHistorical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sector许可授权,订阅
国家中央信贷登记系统Borrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysisRestricted, supervisory access
BIS 巴塞尔 III 监测报告国际活跃银行的资本、杠杆和流动性汇总头寸免费,须遵守 BIS 使用条款
Federal Reserve supervisory stress test resultsScenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banks公有领域
Bank of England stress testing results英国主要银行同步压力测试和探索性压力测试的情景设计与结果免费,英格兰银行使用条款
EBA 欧盟范围压力测试Bank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodology免费,须署名
第 3 支柱披露银行公布的资本构成、风险加权资产、LCR 和 NSFR公开,银行条款
Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act主管机构持有的信息通信技术第三方安排登记册,以及已指定关键信息通信技术服务提供方的公开名单登记册仅限主管部门查阅;指定名单公开
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publications关于网络响应和恢复能力的监管发现免费,须署名
Bank of England and PRA operational resilience publicationsPolicy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports免费,英格兰银行使用条款
ORX operational risk loss dataPooled loss events by event type and business line from member banksLicensed, membership
ENISA 金融部门威胁态势Analysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutions免费,须署名
Pillar 3 operational risk disclosuresOperational risk capital and loss summaries published by banks公开,银行条款
NGFS 情景Transition and physical risk pathways with macroeconomic variables for scenario analysis免费,须署名
ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicatorsSupervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposures免费,须署名
Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario针对英国银行和保险公司的探索性演练的设计与已发布结果免费,英格兰银行使用条款
依据 EBA 标准的第 3 支柱 ESG 披露银行报告的对高碳强度行业的风险暴露、实体风险和分类标准一致性公开,银行条款
PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting StandardMethodology and data quality scores for financed emissions标准免费;排放因子数据库按会员资格提供
Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard maps针对洪水、高温和干旱的物理危害图层免费开放,须署名

Instruments explained for research

Analytical instruments

Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.

信用风险

A credit portfolio's loss distribution

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.

02468 1 in 21/10(10 年一遇)1/100(100 年一遇)1 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • 投资组合损失
  • Expected loss

With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.

控制措施

Probability of default
1.00 % a year
违约损失率
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

结果

Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
0.45
Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
2.36
Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
4.06
Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
3.61
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period
重现期(年)Loss (% of exposure)
20.30
40.59
80.91
171.28
341.68
702.13
1412.60
2883.11
5853.64
1,1894.20
2,4184.79
4,9185.41
10,0006.04
来源
This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
日期
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
范围
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
单位
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
状态
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

建模
gra.credit.one-factor
版本
1.0.0
负责人
GRA platforms lane
目的
To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
Risk domain
信用与交易对手风险
假设
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
输入
Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
数据
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
方法
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
验证
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
局限性
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
不确定性
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

集中度

One large exposure and the tail

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.

02468 1 in 21/10(10 年一遇)1/100(100 年一遇)1 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Granular portfolio
  • With the large exposure

Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.

控制措施

Share of the largest exposure
5.0 % of the portfolio
Probability of default
1.00 % a year
违约损失率
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

结果

Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
4.06
Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
4.55
Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
0.49
Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
400
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period, granular and concentrated
重现期(年)Granular (%)With the large exposure (%)
20.300.28
40.590.56
80.910.89
171.281.29
341.681.81
702.132.53
1412.603.06
2883.113.57
5853.644.12
1,1894.204.69
2,4184.795.29
4,9185.415.91
10,0006.046.56
来源
This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
日期
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
范围
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
单位
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
状态
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

建模
gra.credit.concentration
版本
1.0.0
负责人
GRA platforms lane
目的
To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
Risk domain
信用与交易对手风险
假设
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
输入
Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
数据
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
方法
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
验证
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
局限性
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
不确定性
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

流动性

The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.

  • Stable retail 1.50
  • Less stable retail 2.00
  • Operational deposits 3.75
  • Corporate, non-operational 6.00
  • 金融机构 10.0
  • Net outflows 18.3
  • Liquid assets (HQLA) 15.0
  • Outflow over 30 days by funding class
  • Net outflows after capped inflows
  • Stock of high-quality liquid assets

Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.

控制措施

High-quality liquid assets
15.0 % of total funding
Stable retail deposits
30 % of total funding
Less stable retail deposits
20 % of total funding
Operational deposits
15 % of total funding
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
15 % of total funding
Unsecured funding from financial institutions
10 % of total funding
Contractual inflows over 30 days
5.0 % of total funding
Stress on run-off rates
1.00 times the baseline

结果

Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
23.3
Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
5.00
Net outflows (% of total funding)
18.3
Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
82
Data, source and model record
Outflows by funding class and the stock of liquid assets
Funding classBalance (% of funding)Run-off rate (%)Outflow (% of funding)
Stable retail deposits30.051.50
Less stable retail deposits20.0102.00
Operational deposits15.0253.75
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates15.0406.00
Unsecured funding from financial institutions10.010010.0
来源
Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
日期
BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
范围
A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
单位
Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
状态
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

建模
gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
版本
1.0.0
负责人
GRA platforms lane
目的
To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
Risk domain
流动性风险
假设
Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
输入
High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
数据
BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
方法
Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
验证
Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
局限性
Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
不确定性
None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
Approved use
Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
Prohibited use
Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.

风险暴露网络

资产冲击如何演变为系统性损失

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.

0255075100 051015202530 Contagion round 系统权益损失(%)
  • System equity lost

Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.

控制措施

外部资产下降
2.0 %

结果

外部资产下降 (%)
2.0
System equity lost in the first round (%)
18.0
System equity lost after contagion (%)
45.0
Amplification by the network (percentage points)
27.0
Banks in default (of 20)
0
Data, source and model record
System equity lost, round by round
轮次系统权益损失(%)违约银行
018.00
128.80
235.30
339.20
441.50
542.90
643.70
744.20
844.50
944.70
1044.80
1144.90
1244.90
1345.00
1445.00
1545.00
1645.00
1745.00
1845.00
1945.00
2045.00
2145.00
2245.00
2345.00
2445.00
2545.00
2645.00
2745.00
2845.00
2945.00
3045.00
来源
Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
日期
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
范围
A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
单位
Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
状态
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

建模
gra.network.debtrank
版本
1.0.0
负责人
GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
目的
To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
Risk domain
Systemic and contagion risk
假设
Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
输入
Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
数据
None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
方法
DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
验证
The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
局限性
No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
不确定性
Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
Approved use
Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
Prohibited use
Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.

情景分析

Scenarios, not forecasts

A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.

Regulatory context and related standards

The frameworks this work is read against

框架机构它规定了什么Edition or dateWhere it applies
巴塞尔 III 框架巴塞尔银行监管委员会最低资本、杠杆、流动性覆盖和稳定资金要求,以及在此之上的资本缓冲December 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel FrameworkBasel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables
有效银行监管核心原则巴塞尔银行监管委员会关于监管权力、许可、风险管理和治理的基准标准,在国际货币基金组织和世界银行的金融部门评估规划(FSAP)中进行评估Revised April 2024International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs
有效管理和监督气候相关金融风险的原则巴塞尔银行监管委员会对银行治理、气候相关风险管理和情景分析及其监督审查的期望June 2022Basel Committee members, through national supervisors
金融机构有效处置机制的关键属性金融稳定理事会处置权力、恢复与处置计划以及跨境合作,使银行能够在无需纳税人支持的情况下倒闭October 2011, updated October 2014FSB member jurisdictions
国际财务报告准则第 9 号:金融工具国际会计准则理事会金融资产的分类与三阶段前瞻性预期信用损失计提Issued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead)
NGFS 气候情景央行与监管机构绿色金融网络央行和监管机构用于气候情景分析的参考转型和实体风险路径Phase V, November 2024Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding
IFRS S2 气候相关披露国际可持续准则理事会气候相关风险和机遇的披露,包括融资排放和气候韧性Issued June 2023, amended December 2025Where a jurisdiction adopts it
监管审查与评估流程(SREP)欧洲银行管理局和欧洲央行银行监管评估商业模式、治理以及资本和流动性风险的监管流程,据此设定第 2 支柱要求和指引EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022)European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks
综合资本分析与审查(CCAR)和监管压力测试美国联邦储备系统理事会针对美国大型银行的压力情景和资本计划审查监管流程,据此设定压力资本缓冲Annual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020United States, large bank holding companies
ISO 31000 风险管理指南国际标准化组织在整个组织内管理风险的原则、框架和流程ISO 31000:2018International, voluntary

Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.

Institutional counterparts

The institutions this work speaks to

  • 银行董事会和董事会风险委员会
  • Chief risk officer and credit committee
  • 审慎监管机构
  • 宏观审慎主管机构
  • 银行董事会和资产负债委员会
  • 通过 SREP 或 CCAR 开展工作的审慎监管机构
  • 中央银行
  • 银行董事会
  • 首席运营官和首席信息安全官
  • 监督关键第三方的机构
  • Credit risk function
  • NGFS 中的央行和监管机构
  • 央行兼任监督者与运营者
  • Bank treasury
  • 中央对手方董事会和风险委员会
  • Resolution authority

Readiness workflows

金融准备度

Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.

边界

What this page is not

Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.