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Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise

Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.

Go to the instrumentsBanking Nexus home

Domain definition

What Banking Nexus studies

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.

Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.

TermeDéfinition
Basel IIIThe Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks.
Ratio CET1Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital.
Ratio de couverture des besoins de liquiditéHigh-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period.
Expected credit lossThe probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for.

Financial system context

The parts of the financial system it covers

  • Risque de crédit et de contrepartie

    Défaut, migration et concentration dans les portefeuilles de prêts et les expositions de négociation, et manière dont les pertes passent d'une contrepartie à l'autre.

  • Capital et liquidité

    Capital d'absorption des pertes, coussins de liquidité et structures de financement, et leur comportement lorsque les marchés et les déposants subissent des tensions.

  • Résilience opérationnelle

    Continuité des services importants face aux incidents cyber, aux défaillances de tiers et aux ruptures de processus, dans des tolérances d'impact indiquées.

  • Infrastructures de paiement et de marché

    Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.

  • Risque climatique et de la nature

    Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.

  • Modèles et IA

    Modèles de notation de crédit, de provisionnement et de capital, ainsi que la validation et la gouvernance qu'exige désormais l'apprentissage automatique.

  • Banque et économie réelle

    Prêts aux ménages, aux petites entreprises, au logement et aux services essentiels, et manière dont la tension bancaire devient un resserrement du crédit.

  • Gouvernance et supervision

    Conseils d'administration, culture du risque, lignes de défense, examen prudentiel et planification de la résolution, y compris les structures de la banque islamique.

Taxonomie des risques

Risks, topic by topic

  • Risque de crédit et de contrepartie

    Le risque de crédit est la probabilité qu'un emprunteur ou une contrepartie ne paie pas intégralement et à temps ; il demeure la principale source de pertes pour la plupart des banques.

  • Capital et liquidité

    Les fonds propres absorbent les pertes et la liquidité permet à une banque d'honorer ses obligations à leur échéance.

  • Résilience opérationnelle bancaire

    La résilience opérationnelle est la capacité d'une banque à continuer de fournir ses services critiques en cas de perturbation, qu'il s'agisse d'une cyberattaque, de l'échec d'un changement technologique, de la panne d'un prestataire tiers ou d'une pandémie.

  • Climate and nature bank risk

    Le changement climatique et la perte de nature atteignent les banques par l'intermédiaire de leurs emprunteurs, de leurs garanties et des marchés dont elles dépendent.

  • Dépendances de paiement

    Chaque banque dépend des systèmes de paiement, des contreparties centrales, des systèmes de règlement de titres, des banques correspondantes et des réseaux de messagerie pour transférer des fonds et des garanties.

  • Model and ai risk

    Les banques s'appuient sur des modèles pour octroyer des crédits, constituer des provisions, tarifer des produits, calculer leurs fonds propres et détecter la fraude, et une part croissante de ces modèles fait appel à l'apprentissage automatique.

  • Banking and real economy

    Les banques transforment les dépôts en prêts aux ménages, aux petites et moyennes entreprises et aux fournisseurs de services essentiels.

  • Gouvernance bancaire

    De nombreuses faillites bancaires trouvent leur origine dans la gouvernance : des conseils d'administration qui ne comprenaient pas les risques pris, des incitations qui récompensaient la croissance plutôt que la prudence, ou des fonctions de contrôle dépourvues de l'autorité nécessaire pour contester.

  • Housing property finance

    Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.

  • Banque islamique

    Les banques islamiques opèrent selon des contrats et des structures de gouvernance conçus pour respecter le droit commercial islamique, en recourant à des instruments fondés sur la vente, le crédit-bail et le partenariat au lieu de prêts portant intérêt.

Risk-transmission mechanisms

How these risks develop and spread

SujetMécanismeFonctionnement
Risque de crédit et de contrepartieLa qualité se dégrade avant le défautArrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised.
Risque de crédit et de contrepartieLes pertes sont concentréesExposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies.
Capital et liquiditéLes pertes érodent le capitalCredit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers.
Capital et liquiditéFunding can run quicklyLes dépôts non assurés, le financement de gros et les financements garantis peuvent être retirés en quelques jours, plus vite encore avec la banque numérique et la diffusion rapide de l'information. Des bases de dépôts concentrées et une asymétrie d'échéances rendent une ruée bancaire auto-entretenue.
Résilience opérationnelle bancaireLes dépendances sont masquéesUn seul service de paiement ou de prêt repose sur des personnes, des processus, des données, des technologies et des prestataires externes. Cartographier ces dépendances de bout en bout révèle souvent des points de défaillance uniques dont personne n'est clairement responsable.
Résilience opérationnelle bancaireLes tiers concentrent le risqueMany banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
Climate and nature bank riskPhysical risk hits collateral and incomeInondations, tempêtes, chaleur et sécheresse endommagent les biens et perturbent la production. Les pertes non assurées retombent sur les emprunteurs, ce qui accroît les probabilités de défaut et la perte en cas de défaut, et le retrait des assureurs peut entraîner une révision des prix de portefeuilles hypothécaires régionaux entiers.
Climate and nature bank riskLe risque de transition réévalue les secteursLa tarification du carbone, la réglementation, la technologie et l'évolution de la demande peuvent provoquer des actifs échoués et réduire les marges des emprunteurs à forte intensité d'émissions. Le calendrier compte : une transition tardive et brutale entraîne des pertes plus lourdes qu'une transition ordonnée.
Dépendances de paiementLa liquidité est nécessaire en cours de journéeReal-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours.
Dépendances de paiementLes contreparties centrales concentrent les risquesLa compensation réalise le netting des expositions et mutualise les pertes de défaut. En situation de stress, les appels de marge augmentent simultanément chez tous les membres, et la défaillance d'un membre fait appel à un fonds de défaillance que tous les membres partagent.
Model and ai riskDrift and regime changeModels learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it.
Model and ai riskL'opacité affaiblit la contestationLes modèles complexes d'apprentissage automatique peuvent être difficiles à expliquer aux analystes crédit, aux clients et aux superviseurs. La remise en cause effective, pilier de la gouvernance des modèles, est affaiblie lorsque personne ne peut dire pourquoi un modèle décide comme il le fait.
Banking and real economyCredit supply tightensWhen capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first.
Banking and real economyLe stress des emprunteurs se répercute en retourHigher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy.
Gouvernance bancaireBoard oversight sets the frameThe board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set.
Gouvernance bancaireIncentives shape behaviourUne rémunération liée aux revenus à court terme encourage une prise de risque dont les coûts n'apparaissent que plus tard. Le report, le malus et la récupération (clawback) visent à aligner la rémunération sur le résultat du risque tel qu'il se réalise.
Housing property financeLe crédit et les prix se renforcent mutuellementEasier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs.
Housing property financeAccessibilité financière en période de hausse des tauxVariable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers.
Banque islamiqueContract structure shapes riskMurabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label.
Banque islamiqueLes comptes d'investissement partagent les rendementsLes titulaires de comptes d'investissement avec partage des profits supportent en principe les pertes. La pression concurrentielle peut conduire les banques à lisser les rendements et à absorber elles-mêmes les pertes, un transfert connu sous le nom de risque commercial déplacé.

Questions de recherche

Who decides, and what they need to know

Decision holderQuestionEvidence the platform's pages describe
Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité des risques du conseilWhat credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to imposeConcentration measures, stage migration and stress losses by segment
Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité actif-passifWhat capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure fundingCapital and liquidity projections under internal and supervisory scenarios
Bank boardWhich business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryService maps, scenario test results and incident history
Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité des risques du conseilHow climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planningÉvaluation de la matérialité, résultats de scénarios et expositions sectorielles
La banque centrale comme superviseur et opérateurWhich systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meetAvailability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows
Bank board and model risk committeeQuel appétit pour le risque de modèle fixer et quels usages de l'IA sont acceptablesInventaire des modèles, hiérarchisation par niveaux et résultats de validation
Macroprudential authority or financial policy committeeFaut-il constituer ou libérer des volants de fonds propres et appliquer des mesures fondées sur les emprunteursÉcarts de crédit, ratios de service de la dette et enquêtes sur la distribution du crédit
Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité des nominationsSi les compétences, l'indépendance et l'information du conseil sont adaptées au profil de risque de la banqueBoard effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports
Autorité macroprudentielleWhether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measuresPrice-to-income, credit growth, lending standards and arrears
Bank boardWhat risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accountsDisplaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact

These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.

Key indicators

What is measured, in which unit, by whom

IndicateurUnitéFréquenceType de sourceÉtiquette de données probantes
Ratio de prêts non performantspour cent des prêts brutstrimestrielSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresStatistiques publiées
Part des prêts de stade 2 et de stade 3pour cent des prêts brutstrimestrielÉtats financiers IFRS 9DÉCLARÉ
Common equity tier 1 ratiopour cent des actifs pondérés en fonction des risquestrimestrielSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresStatistiques publiées
Leverage ratiomesure en pourcentage de l'exposition totaletrimestrielÉtats réglementaires de surveillanceStatistiques publiées
Important business services within impact tolerance in testingnombre de services testés et nombre de services ayant réussiannuelScenario testing recordsDÉCLARÉ
Major ICT-related incidentsnombre par classe de gravitétrimestrielRapports d'incident aux autorités de supervisionStatistiques publiées
Émissions financéestonnes d'équivalent dioxyde de carboneannuelMéthodologie du PCAF appliquée aux portefeuilles de prêts et d'investissementsESTIMÉ
Exposition aux secteurs pertinents pour la politique climatiquepercent of loan bookannuelDivulgations ESG du pilier 3DÉCLARÉ
Value settled through large-value payment systemscurrency units per dayquotidienStatistiques des gestionnaires de réseauStatistiques publiées
Disponibilité des systèmes de paiementpourcentage des heures de fonctionnementmensuelDéclarations des opérateursDÉCLARÉ
Model inventory coveragenombre de modèles par niveau et par statut de validationtrimestrielModel risk management recordsDÉCLARÉ
Pouvoir discriminant des scores de créditCoefficient de Gini ou aire sous la courbeannuelValidation des modèlesMODÉLISÉ
Écart crédit/PIBpoints de pourcentagetrimestrielStatistiques de crédit de la BRIESTIMÉ
Normes d'octroi de crédit aux entreprisesnet percentage of banks reporting tighteningtrimestrielEnquêtes sur les conditions de crédit bancaireDÉCLARÉ
Membres du conseil d'administration ayant une expertise bancaire ou en gestion des risquesshare of boardannuelInformations sur la gouvernanceDÉCLARÉ
Administrateurs indépendantsshare of boardannuelInformations sur la gouvernanceDÉCLARÉ
Ratio prêt/valeur à l'octroipercent of property valuetrimestrielLoan-level and supervisory dataStatistiques publiées
Ratio service de la dette/revenu à l'octroipour cent du revenu bruttrimestrielLoan-level data, household surveysDÉCLARÉ
Ratio de adéquation des fonds propres des banques islamiquespour cent des actifs pondérés en fonction des risquestrimestrielIFSB prudential indicatorsStatistiques publiées
Non-performing financing ratiopourcentage du financement bruttrimestrielIFSB prudential indicatorsStatistiques publiées

Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.

Méthodologie

The methods the platform's work rests on

  • Économie financière

    Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.

  • Probability statistics

    Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.

  • Science des réseaux

    Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.

  • Financial engineering

    Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.

  • Ai ml

    Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.

Sources de données

D'où viennent les données probantes

SourcesCe qu'elle apporteCatégorie de licence
Indicateurs de solidité financière du FMIPrêts non performants, provisionnement et répartition sectorielle des prêts déclarés par les autorités nationalesGratuit, conditions d'utilisation du FMI
EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exerciseQualité des actifs au niveau des banques, mesures de tolérance et données par stade IFRS 9 pour les banques de l'UEGratuit, attribution
Statistiques bancaires de surveillance de la BCEAsset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro areaGratuit, attribution
FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9CLoan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companiesDomaine public
BIS consolidated banking statisticsBanks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basisGratuit, conditions d'utilisation de la BRI
Études des agences de notation sur les défauts et les recouvrementsTaux historiques de défaut et de recouvrement par note et par secteurLicensed, subscription
National central credit registersBorrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysisRestricted, supervisory access
Rapports de suivi de Bâle III de la BRIAggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banksGratuit, conditions d'utilisation de la BRI
Federal Reserve supervisory stress test resultsScenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banksDomaine public
Bank of England stress testing resultsScenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banksGratuit, conditions d'utilisation de la Bank of England
Test de résistance de l'ABE à l'échelle de l'UEProjections de fonds propres sous stress au niveau des banques selon une méthodologie communeGratuit, attribution
Informations au titre du pilier 3Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFRPublic, conditions bancaires
Registres et désignations des prestataires critiques au titre du règlement européen sur la résilience opérationnelle numériqueRegistres des accords avec des tiers fournisseurs de TIC détenus par les autorités et liste publique des prestataires de TIC critiques désignésRegisters restricted to authorities; designation list public
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publicationsSupervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilitiesGratuit, attribution
Publications de la Banque d'Angleterre et de la PRA sur la résilience opérationnellePolicy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reportsGratuit, conditions d'utilisation de la Bank of England
ORX operational risk loss dataÉvénements de perte regroupés par type d'événement et ligne d'activité, issus des banques membresSous licence, adhésion
Panorama des menaces de l'ENISA pour le secteur financierAnalysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutionsGratuit, attribution
Pillar 3 operational risk disclosuresOperational risk capital and loss summaries published by banksPublic, conditions bancaires
Scénarios du NGFSTrajectoires de risque de transition et de risque physique avec variables macroéconomiques pour l'analyse de scénariosGratuit, attribution
ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicatorsSupervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposuresGratuit, attribution
Scénario exploratoire biennal sur le climat de la Banque d'AngleterreDesign and published results of the exploratory exercise for UK banks and insurersGratuit, conditions d'utilisation de la Bank of England
Informations ESG du pilier 3 selon les normes de l'ABEBank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignmentPublic, conditions bancaires
PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting StandardMethodology and data quality scores for financed emissionsNorme gratuite ; base de données de facteurs d'émission réservée aux membres
Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard mapsCouches d'aléas physiques pour les inondations, la chaleur et la sécheresseLibre et ouvert, attribution

Instruments explained for research

Analytical instruments

Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.

risque de crédit

A credit portfolio's loss distribution

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.

02468 1 in 21 sur 101 sur 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Perte du portefeuille
  • Expected loss

With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.

Commandes

Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Perte en cas de défaut
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Résultats

Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
0.45
Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
2.36
Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
4.06
Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
3.61
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period
Période de retour (années)Loss (% of exposure)
20.30
40.59
80.91
171.28
341.68
702.13
1412.60
2883.11
5853.64
1,1894.20
2,4184.79
4,9185.41
10,0006.04
Sources
This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
Périmètre
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Unités
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Statut
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modèle
gra.credit.one-factor
Version
1.0.0
Propriétaire
GRA platforms lane
Objet
To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
Risk domain
Risque de crédit et de contrepartie
Hypothèses
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Entrées
Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Données
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Méthodes
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
Validation
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limites
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Incertitude
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Concentration

One large exposure and the tail

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.

02468 1 in 21 sur 101 sur 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Granular portfolio
  • With the large exposure

Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.

Commandes

Share of the largest exposure
5.0 % of the portfolio
Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Perte en cas de défaut
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Résultats

Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
4.06
Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
4.55
Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
0.49
Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
400
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period, granular and concentrated
Période de retour (années)Granular (%)With the large exposure (%)
20.300.28
40.590.56
80.910.89
171.281.29
341.681.81
702.132.53
1412.603.06
2883.113.57
5853.644.12
1,1894.204.69
2,4184.795.29
4,9185.415.91
10,0006.046.56
Sources
This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
Périmètre
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Unités
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Statut
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modèle
gra.credit.concentration
Version
1.0.0
Propriétaire
GRA platforms lane
Objet
To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
Risk domain
Risque de crédit et de contrepartie
Hypothèses
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Entrées
Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Données
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Méthodes
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
Validation
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limites
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Incertitude
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Liquidité

The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.

  • Stable retail 1.50
  • Less stable retail 2.00
  • Operational deposits 3.75
  • Corporate, non-operational 6.00
  • Institutions financières 10.0
  • Net outflows 18.3
  • Liquid assets (HQLA) 15.0
  • Outflow over 30 days by funding class
  • Net outflows after capped inflows
  • Stock of high-quality liquid assets

Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.

Commandes

High-quality liquid assets
15.0 % of total funding
Stable retail deposits
30 % of total funding
Less stable retail deposits
20 % of total funding
Operational deposits
15 % of total funding
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
15 % of total funding
Unsecured funding from financial institutions
10 % of total funding
Contractual inflows over 30 days
5.0 % of total funding
Stress on run-off rates
1.00 times the baseline

Résultats

Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
23.3
Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
5.00
Net outflows (% of total funding)
18.3
Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
82
Data, source and model record
Outflows by funding class and the stock of liquid assets
Funding classBalance (% of funding)Run-off rate (%)Outflow (% of funding)
Stable retail deposits30.051.50
Less stable retail deposits20.0102.00
Operational deposits15.0253.75
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates15.0406.00
Unsecured funding from financial institutions10.010010.0
Sources
Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
Date
BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
Périmètre
A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
Unités
Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Statut
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modèle
gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
Version
1.0.0
Propriétaire
GRA platforms lane
Objet
To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
Risk domain
Liquidity risk
Hypothèses
Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
Entrées
High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
Données
BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
Méthodes
Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
Validation
Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
Limites
Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
Incertitude
None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
Approved use
Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
Prohibited use
Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.

Réseau d'exposition

Comment un choc sur les actifs devient une perte pour le système

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.

0255075100 051015202530 Contagion round Équité du système perdue (%)
  • System equity lost

Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.

Commandes

Baisse des actifs extérieurs
2.0 %

Résultats

Baisse des actifs extérieurs (%)
2.0
System equity lost in the first round (%)
18.0
System equity lost after contagion (%)
45.0
Amplification by the network (percentage points)
27.0
Banks in default (of 20)
0
Data, source and model record
System equity lost, round by round
TourÉquité du système perdue (%)Banques en défaut
018.00
128.80
235.30
339.20
441.50
542.90
643.70
744.20
844.50
944.70
1044.80
1144.90
1244.90
1345.00
1445.00
1545.00
1645.00
1745.00
1845.00
1945.00
2045.00
2145.00
2245.00
2345.00
2445.00
2545.00
2645.00
2745.00
2845.00
2945.00
3045.00
Sources
Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
Périmètre
A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
Unités
Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Statut
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modèle
gra.network.debtrank
Version
1.0.0
Propriétaire
GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
Objet
To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
Risk domain
Systemic and contagion risk
Hypothèses
Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
Entrées
Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
Données
None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
Méthodes
DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
Validation
The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
Limites
No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
Incertitude
Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
Approved use
Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
Prohibited use
Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.

Analyse de scénarios

Scenarios, not forecasts

A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.

Regulatory context and related standards

The frameworks this work is read against

CadreOrganeCe qu'il fixeEdition or dateWhere it applies
Cadre de Bâle IIIComité de Bâle sur le contrôle bancaireExigences minimales de capital, de levier, de ratio de liquidité à court terme et de financement stable, et coussins de fonds propres au-dessusDecember 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel FrameworkBasel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables
Principes fondamentaux pour un contrôle bancaire efficaceComité de Bâle sur le contrôle bancaireNormes de référence sur les pouvoirs de supervision, l'agrément, la gestion des risques et la gouvernance, évaluées dans les FSAP du FMI et de la Banque mondialeRevised April 2024International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs
Principes pour la gestion et la supervision efficaces des risques financiers liés au climatComité de Bâle sur le contrôle bancaireAttentes envers la gouvernance, la gestion des risques et l'analyse de scénarios des banques face au risque climatique, et envers son examen prudentielJune 2022Basel Committee members, through national supervisors
Caractéristiques essentielles des régimes de résolution efficaces pour les établissements financiersConseil de stabilité financièrePouvoirs de résolution, planification du redressement et de la résolution et coopération transfrontalière pour qu'une banque puisse faire faillite sans soutien des contribuablesOctober 2011, updated October 2014FSB member jurisdictions
IFRS 9 Instruments financiersConseil des normes comptables internationalesClassification des actifs financiers et provisionnement prospectif des pertes de crédit attendues en trois étapesIssued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead)
Scénarios climatiques du NGFSRéseau pour le verdissement du système financierTrajectoires de référence de risque de transition et de risque physique utilisées par les banques centrales et les superviseurs pour l'analyse de scénarios climatiquesPhase V, November 2024Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding
IFRS S2 Informations à fournir en lien avec les changements climatiquesConseil des normes internationales d'information sur la durabilitéDivulgation des risques et opportunités liés au climat, y compris les émissions financées et la résilience climatiqueIssued June 2023, amended December 2025Where a jurisdiction adopts it
Processus de contrôle et d'évaluation prudentiels (SREP)Autorité bancaire européenne et supervision bancaire de la BCEProcessus prudentiel évaluant le modèle économique, la gouvernance et les risques pour le capital et la liquidité, fixant les exigences et orientations du pilier 2EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022)European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) et tests de résistance prudentielsConseil des gouverneurs du Système de réserve fédéraleProcessus prudentiel d'examen des scénarios de crise et du plan de capital qui fixe le coussin de capital de crise des grandes banques américainesAnnual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020United States, large bank holding companies
ISO 31000 Management du risque - Lignes directricesOrganisation internationale de normalisationPrincipes, cadre et processus de gestion des risques à l'échelle d'une organisationISO 31000:2018International, voluntary

Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.

Institutional counterparts

The institutions this work speaks to

  • Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité des risques du conseil
  • Chief risk officer and credit committee
  • Superviseur prudentiel
  • Autorité macroprudentielle
  • Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité actif-passif
  • Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
  • Banque centrale
  • Bank board
  • Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
  • Authorities overseeing critical third parties
  • Credit risk function
  • Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
  • La banque centrale comme superviseur et opérateur
  • Bank treasury
  • Conseil d'administration et comité des risques de la contrepartie centrale
  • Autorité de résolution

Readiness workflows

Préparation financière

Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.

Limite

What this page is not

Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.