Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise
Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.
Domain definition
What Banking Nexus studies
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.
Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.
| Terme | Définition |
|---|---|
| Basel III | The Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. |
| Ratio CET1 | Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital. |
| Ratio de couverture des besoins de liquidité | High-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period. |
| Expected credit loss | The probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for. |
Financial system context
The parts of the financial system it covers
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Risque de crédit et de contrepartie
Défaut, migration et concentration dans les portefeuilles de prêts et les expositions de négociation, et manière dont les pertes passent d'une contrepartie à l'autre.
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Capital et liquidité
Capital d'absorption des pertes, coussins de liquidité et structures de financement, et leur comportement lorsque les marchés et les déposants subissent des tensions.
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Résilience opérationnelle
Continuité des services importants face aux incidents cyber, aux défaillances de tiers et aux ruptures de processus, dans des tolérances d'impact indiquées.
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Infrastructures de paiement et de marché
Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.
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Risque climatique et de la nature
Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.
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Modèles et IA
Modèles de notation de crédit, de provisionnement et de capital, ainsi que la validation et la gouvernance qu'exige désormais l'apprentissage automatique.
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Banque et économie réelle
Prêts aux ménages, aux petites entreprises, au logement et aux services essentiels, et manière dont la tension bancaire devient un resserrement du crédit.
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Gouvernance et supervision
Conseils d'administration, culture du risque, lignes de défense, examen prudentiel et planification de la résolution, y compris les structures de la banque islamique.
Taxonomie des risques
Risks, topic by topic
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Risque de crédit et de contrepartie
Le risque de crédit est la probabilité qu'un emprunteur ou une contrepartie ne paie pas intégralement et à temps ; il demeure la principale source de pertes pour la plupart des banques.
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Capital et liquidité
Les fonds propres absorbent les pertes et la liquidité permet à une banque d'honorer ses obligations à leur échéance.
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Résilience opérationnelle bancaire
La résilience opérationnelle est la capacité d'une banque à continuer de fournir ses services critiques en cas de perturbation, qu'il s'agisse d'une cyberattaque, de l'échec d'un changement technologique, de la panne d'un prestataire tiers ou d'une pandémie.
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Climate and nature bank risk
Le changement climatique et la perte de nature atteignent les banques par l'intermédiaire de leurs emprunteurs, de leurs garanties et des marchés dont elles dépendent.
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Dépendances de paiement
Chaque banque dépend des systèmes de paiement, des contreparties centrales, des systèmes de règlement de titres, des banques correspondantes et des réseaux de messagerie pour transférer des fonds et des garanties.
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Model and ai risk
Les banques s'appuient sur des modèles pour octroyer des crédits, constituer des provisions, tarifer des produits, calculer leurs fonds propres et détecter la fraude, et une part croissante de ces modèles fait appel à l'apprentissage automatique.
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Banking and real economy
Les banques transforment les dépôts en prêts aux ménages, aux petites et moyennes entreprises et aux fournisseurs de services essentiels.
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Gouvernance bancaire
De nombreuses faillites bancaires trouvent leur origine dans la gouvernance : des conseils d'administration qui ne comprenaient pas les risques pris, des incitations qui récompensaient la croissance plutôt que la prudence, ou des fonctions de contrôle dépourvues de l'autorité nécessaire pour contester.
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Housing property finance
Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.
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Banque islamique
Les banques islamiques opèrent selon des contrats et des structures de gouvernance conçus pour respecter le droit commercial islamique, en recourant à des instruments fondés sur la vente, le crédit-bail et le partenariat au lieu de prêts portant intérêt.
Risk-transmission mechanisms
How these risks develop and spread
| Sujet | Mécanisme | Fonctionnement |
|---|---|---|
| Risque de crédit et de contrepartie | La qualité se dégrade avant le défaut | Arrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised. |
| Risque de crédit et de contrepartie | Les pertes sont concentrées | Exposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies. |
| Capital et liquidité | Les pertes érodent le capital | Credit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers. |
| Capital et liquidité | Funding can run quickly | Les dépôts non assurés, le financement de gros et les financements garantis peuvent être retirés en quelques jours, plus vite encore avec la banque numérique et la diffusion rapide de l'information. Des bases de dépôts concentrées et une asymétrie d'échéances rendent une ruée bancaire auto-entretenue. |
| Résilience opérationnelle bancaire | Les dépendances sont masquées | Un seul service de paiement ou de prêt repose sur des personnes, des processus, des données, des technologies et des prestataires externes. Cartographier ces dépendances de bout en bout révèle souvent des points de défaillance uniques dont personne n'est clairement responsable. |
| Résilience opérationnelle bancaire | Les tiers concentrent le risque | Many banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Physical risk hits collateral and income | Inondations, tempêtes, chaleur et sécheresse endommagent les biens et perturbent la production. Les pertes non assurées retombent sur les emprunteurs, ce qui accroît les probabilités de défaut et la perte en cas de défaut, et le retrait des assureurs peut entraîner une révision des prix de portefeuilles hypothécaires régionaux entiers. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Le risque de transition réévalue les secteurs | La tarification du carbone, la réglementation, la technologie et l'évolution de la demande peuvent provoquer des actifs échoués et réduire les marges des emprunteurs à forte intensité d'émissions. Le calendrier compte : une transition tardive et brutale entraîne des pertes plus lourdes qu'une transition ordonnée. |
| Dépendances de paiement | La liquidité est nécessaire en cours de journée | Real-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours. |
| Dépendances de paiement | Les contreparties centrales concentrent les risques | La compensation réalise le netting des expositions et mutualise les pertes de défaut. En situation de stress, les appels de marge augmentent simultanément chez tous les membres, et la défaillance d'un membre fait appel à un fonds de défaillance que tous les membres partagent. |
| Model and ai risk | Drift and regime change | Models learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it. |
| Model and ai risk | L'opacité affaiblit la contestation | Les modèles complexes d'apprentissage automatique peuvent être difficiles à expliquer aux analystes crédit, aux clients et aux superviseurs. La remise en cause effective, pilier de la gouvernance des modèles, est affaiblie lorsque personne ne peut dire pourquoi un modèle décide comme il le fait. |
| Banking and real economy | Credit supply tightens | When capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first. |
| Banking and real economy | Le stress des emprunteurs se répercute en retour | Higher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy. |
| Gouvernance bancaire | Board oversight sets the frame | The board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set. |
| Gouvernance bancaire | Incentives shape behaviour | Une rémunération liée aux revenus à court terme encourage une prise de risque dont les coûts n'apparaissent que plus tard. Le report, le malus et la récupération (clawback) visent à aligner la rémunération sur le résultat du risque tel qu'il se réalise. |
| Housing property finance | Le crédit et les prix se renforcent mutuellement | Easier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs. |
| Housing property finance | Accessibilité financière en période de hausse des taux | Variable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers. |
| Banque islamique | Contract structure shapes risk | Murabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label. |
| Banque islamique | Les comptes d'investissement partagent les rendements | Les titulaires de comptes d'investissement avec partage des profits supportent en principe les pertes. La pression concurrentielle peut conduire les banques à lisser les rendements et à absorber elles-mêmes les pertes, un transfert connu sous le nom de risque commercial déplacé. |
Questions de recherche
Who decides, and what they need to know
| Decision holder | Question | Evidence the platform's pages describe |
|---|---|---|
| Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité des risques du conseil | What credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to impose | Concentration measures, stage migration and stress losses by segment |
| Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité actif-passif | What capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure funding | Capital and liquidity projections under internal and supervisory scenarios |
| Bank board | Which business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carry | Service maps, scenario test results and incident history |
| Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité des risques du conseil | How climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planning | Évaluation de la matérialité, résultats de scénarios et expositions sectorielles |
| La banque centrale comme superviseur et opérateur | Which systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meet | Availability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows |
| Bank board and model risk committee | Quel appétit pour le risque de modèle fixer et quels usages de l'IA sont acceptables | Inventaire des modèles, hiérarchisation par niveaux et résultats de validation |
| Macroprudential authority or financial policy committee | Faut-il constituer ou libérer des volants de fonds propres et appliquer des mesures fondées sur les emprunteurs | Écarts de crédit, ratios de service de la dette et enquêtes sur la distribution du crédit |
| Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité des nominations | Si les compétences, l'indépendance et l'information du conseil sont adaptées au profil de risque de la banque | Board effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports |
| Autorité macroprudentielle | Whether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measures | Price-to-income, credit growth, lending standards and arrears |
| Bank board | What risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accounts | Displaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact |
These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.
Key indicators
What is measured, in which unit, by whom
| Indicateur | Unité | Fréquence | Type de source | Étiquette de données probantes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ratio de prêts non performants | pour cent des prêts bruts | trimestriel | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Statistiques publiées |
| Part des prêts de stade 2 et de stade 3 | pour cent des prêts bruts | trimestriel | États financiers IFRS 9 | DÉCLARÉ |
| Common equity tier 1 ratio | pour cent des actifs pondérés en fonction des risques | trimestriel | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Statistiques publiées |
| Leverage ratio | mesure en pourcentage de l'exposition totale | trimestriel | États réglementaires de surveillance | Statistiques publiées |
| Important business services within impact tolerance in testing | nombre de services testés et nombre de services ayant réussi | annuel | Scenario testing records | DÉCLARÉ |
| Major ICT-related incidents | nombre par classe de gravité | trimestriel | Rapports d'incident aux autorités de supervision | Statistiques publiées |
| Émissions financées | tonnes d'équivalent dioxyde de carbone | annuel | Méthodologie du PCAF appliquée aux portefeuilles de prêts et d'investissements | ESTIMÉ |
| Exposition aux secteurs pertinents pour la politique climatique | percent of loan book | annuel | Divulgations ESG du pilier 3 | DÉCLARÉ |
| Value settled through large-value payment systems | currency units per day | quotidien | Statistiques des gestionnaires de réseau | Statistiques publiées |
| Disponibilité des systèmes de paiement | pourcentage des heures de fonctionnement | mensuel | Déclarations des opérateurs | DÉCLARÉ |
| Model inventory coverage | nombre de modèles par niveau et par statut de validation | trimestriel | Model risk management records | DÉCLARÉ |
| Pouvoir discriminant des scores de crédit | Coefficient de Gini ou aire sous la courbe | annuel | Validation des modèles | MODÉLISÉ |
| Écart crédit/PIB | points de pourcentage | trimestriel | Statistiques de crédit de la BRI | ESTIMÉ |
| Normes d'octroi de crédit aux entreprises | net percentage of banks reporting tightening | trimestriel | Enquêtes sur les conditions de crédit bancaire | DÉCLARÉ |
| Membres du conseil d'administration ayant une expertise bancaire ou en gestion des risques | share of board | annuel | Informations sur la gouvernance | DÉCLARÉ |
| Administrateurs indépendants | share of board | annuel | Informations sur la gouvernance | DÉCLARÉ |
| Ratio prêt/valeur à l'octroi | percent of property value | trimestriel | Loan-level and supervisory data | Statistiques publiées |
| Ratio service de la dette/revenu à l'octroi | pour cent du revenu brut | trimestriel | Loan-level data, household surveys | DÉCLARÉ |
| Ratio de adéquation des fonds propres des banques islamiques | pour cent des actifs pondérés en fonction des risques | trimestriel | IFSB prudential indicators | Statistiques publiées |
| Non-performing financing ratio | pourcentage du financement brut | trimestriel | IFSB prudential indicators | Statistiques publiées |
Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.
Méthodologie
The methods the platform's work rests on
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Économie financière
Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.
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Probability statistics
Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.
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Science des réseaux
Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.
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Financial engineering
Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.
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Ai ml
Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.
Sources de données
D'où viennent les données probantes
| Sources | Ce qu'elle apporte | Catégorie de licence |
|---|---|---|
| Indicateurs de solidité financière du FMI | Prêts non performants, provisionnement et répartition sectorielle des prêts déclarés par les autorités nationales | Gratuit, conditions d'utilisation du FMI |
| EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exercise | Qualité des actifs au niveau des banques, mesures de tolérance et données par stade IFRS 9 pour les banques de l'UE | Gratuit, attribution |
| Statistiques bancaires de surveillance de la BCE | Asset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro area | Gratuit, attribution |
| FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9C | Loan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companies | Domaine public |
| BIS consolidated banking statistics | Banks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basis | Gratuit, conditions d'utilisation de la BRI |
| Études des agences de notation sur les défauts et les recouvrements | Taux historiques de défaut et de recouvrement par note et par secteur | Licensed, subscription |
| National central credit registers | Borrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysis | Restricted, supervisory access |
| Rapports de suivi de Bâle III de la BRI | Aggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banks | Gratuit, conditions d'utilisation de la BRI |
| Federal Reserve supervisory stress test results | Scenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banks | Domaine public |
| Bank of England stress testing results | Scenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banks | Gratuit, conditions d'utilisation de la Bank of England |
| Test de résistance de l'ABE à l'échelle de l'UE | Projections de fonds propres sous stress au niveau des banques selon une méthodologie commune | Gratuit, attribution |
| Informations au titre du pilier 3 | Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFR | Public, conditions bancaires |
| Registres et désignations des prestataires critiques au titre du règlement européen sur la résilience opérationnelle numérique | Registres des accords avec des tiers fournisseurs de TIC détenus par les autorités et liste publique des prestataires de TIC critiques désignés | Registers restricted to authorities; designation list public |
| ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publications | Supervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilities | Gratuit, attribution |
| Publications de la Banque d'Angleterre et de la PRA sur la résilience opérationnelle | Policy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports | Gratuit, conditions d'utilisation de la Bank of England |
| ORX operational risk loss data | Événements de perte regroupés par type d'événement et ligne d'activité, issus des banques membres | Sous licence, adhésion |
| Panorama des menaces de l'ENISA pour le secteur financier | Analysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutions | Gratuit, attribution |
| Pillar 3 operational risk disclosures | Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banks | Public, conditions bancaires |
| Scénarios du NGFS | Trajectoires de risque de transition et de risque physique avec variables macroéconomiques pour l'analyse de scénarios | Gratuit, attribution |
| ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicators | Supervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposures | Gratuit, attribution |
| Scénario exploratoire biennal sur le climat de la Banque d'Angleterre | Design and published results of the exploratory exercise for UK banks and insurers | Gratuit, conditions d'utilisation de la Bank of England |
| Informations ESG du pilier 3 selon les normes de l'ABE | Bank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignment | Public, conditions bancaires |
| PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting Standard | Methodology and data quality scores for financed emissions | Norme gratuite ; base de données de facteurs d'émission réservée aux membres |
| Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard maps | Couches d'aléas physiques pour les inondations, la chaleur et la sécheresse | Libre et ouvert, attribution |
Instruments explained for research
Analytical instruments
Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.
risque de crédit
A credit portfolio's loss distribution
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.
- Perte du portefeuille
- Expected loss
With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.
Commandes
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Perte en cas de défaut
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Résultats
- Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
- 0.45
- Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
- 2.36
- Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 3.61
Data, source and model record
| Période de retour (années) | Loss (% of exposure) |
|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 |
| 4 | 0.59 |
| 8 | 0.91 |
| 17 | 1.28 |
| 34 | 1.68 |
| 70 | 2.13 |
| 141 | 2.60 |
| 288 | 3.11 |
| 585 | 3.64 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 |
- Sources
- This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
- Périmètre
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Unités
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Statut
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modèle
- gra.credit.one-factor
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Propriétaire
- GRA platforms lane
- Objet
- To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
- Risk domain
- Risque de crédit et de contrepartie
- Hypothèses
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Entrées
- Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Données
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Méthodes
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
- Validation
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Limites
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Incertitude
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Concentration
One large exposure and the tail
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.
- Granular portfolio
- With the large exposure
Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.
Commandes
- Share of the largest exposure
- 5.0 % of the portfolio
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Perte en cas de défaut
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Résultats
- Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
- 4.55
- Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
- 0.49
- Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
- 400
Data, source and model record
| Période de retour (années) | Granular (%) | With the large exposure (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 | 0.28 |
| 4 | 0.59 | 0.56 |
| 8 | 0.91 | 0.89 |
| 17 | 1.28 | 1.29 |
| 34 | 1.68 | 1.81 |
| 70 | 2.13 | 2.53 |
| 141 | 2.60 | 3.06 |
| 288 | 3.11 | 3.57 |
| 585 | 3.64 | 4.12 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 | 4.69 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 | 5.29 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 | 5.91 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 | 6.56 |
- Sources
- This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
- Périmètre
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Unités
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Statut
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modèle
- gra.credit.concentration
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Propriétaire
- GRA platforms lane
- Objet
- To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
- Risk domain
- Risque de crédit et de contrepartie
- Hypothèses
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Entrées
- Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Données
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Méthodes
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
- Validation
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Limites
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Incertitude
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Liquidité
The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.
- Outflow over 30 days by funding class
- Net outflows after capped inflows
- Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.
Commandes
- High-quality liquid assets
- 15.0 % of total funding
- Stable retail deposits
- 30 % of total funding
- Less stable retail deposits
- 20 % of total funding
- Operational deposits
- 15 % of total funding
- Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
- 15 % of total funding
- Unsecured funding from financial institutions
- 10 % of total funding
- Contractual inflows over 30 days
- 5.0 % of total funding
- Stress on run-off rates
- 1.00 times the baseline
Résultats
- Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
- 23.3
- Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
- 5.00
- Net outflows (% of total funding)
- 18.3
- Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
- 82
Data, source and model record
| Funding class | Balance (% of funding) | Run-off rate (%) | Outflow (% of funding) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stable retail deposits | 30.0 | 5 | 1.50 |
| Less stable retail deposits | 20.0 | 10 | 2.00 |
| Operational deposits | 15.0 | 25 | 3.75 |
| Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates | 15.0 | 40 | 6.00 |
| Unsecured funding from financial institutions | 10.0 | 100 | 10.0 |
- Sources
- Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
- Date
- BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
- Périmètre
- A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
- Unités
- Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Statut
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modèle
- gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Propriétaire
- GRA platforms lane
- Objet
- To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Risk domain
- Liquidity risk
- Hypothèses
- Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
- Entrées
- High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
- Données
- BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
- Méthodes
- Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
- Validation
- Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
- Limites
- Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
- Incertitude
- None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
- Approved use
- Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Prohibited use
- Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Réseau d'exposition
Comment un choc sur les actifs devient une perte pour le système
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.
- System equity lost
Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.
Commandes
- Baisse des actifs extérieurs
- 2.0 %
Résultats
- Baisse des actifs extérieurs (%)
- 2.0
- System equity lost in the first round (%)
- 18.0
- System equity lost after contagion (%)
- 45.0
- Amplification by the network (percentage points)
- 27.0
- Banks in default (of 20)
- 0
Data, source and model record
| Tour | Équité du système perdue (%) | Banques en défaut |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.0 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.8 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.3 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.2 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.5 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.9 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.7 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.2 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.5 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.7 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.8 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 13 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 14 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 15 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 16 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.0 | 0 |
- Sources
- Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
- Périmètre
- A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
- Unités
- Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Statut
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modèle
- gra.network.debtrank
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Propriétaire
- GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
- Objet
- To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
- Risk domain
- Systemic and contagion risk
- Hypothèses
- Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
- Entrées
- Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
- Données
- None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
- Méthodes
- DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
- Validation
- The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
- Limites
- No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
- Incertitude
- Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
- Approved use
- Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
- Prohibited use
- Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Analyse de scénarios
Scenarios, not forecasts
A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.
Regulatory context and related standards
The frameworks this work is read against
| Cadre | Organe | Ce qu'il fixe | Edition or date | Where it applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cadre de Bâle III | Comité de Bâle sur le contrôle bancaire | Exigences minimales de capital, de levier, de ratio de liquidité à court terme et de financement stable, et coussins de fonds propres au-dessus | December 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel Framework | Basel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables |
| Principes fondamentaux pour un contrôle bancaire efficace | Comité de Bâle sur le contrôle bancaire | Normes de référence sur les pouvoirs de supervision, l'agrément, la gestion des risques et la gouvernance, évaluées dans les FSAP du FMI et de la Banque mondiale | Revised April 2024 | International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs |
| Principes pour la gestion et la supervision efficaces des risques financiers liés au climat | Comité de Bâle sur le contrôle bancaire | Attentes envers la gouvernance, la gestion des risques et l'analyse de scénarios des banques face au risque climatique, et envers son examen prudentiel | June 2022 | Basel Committee members, through national supervisors |
| Caractéristiques essentielles des régimes de résolution efficaces pour les établissements financiers | Conseil de stabilité financière | Pouvoirs de résolution, planification du redressement et de la résolution et coopération transfrontalière pour qu'une banque puisse faire faillite sans soutien des contribuables | October 2011, updated October 2014 | FSB member jurisdictions |
| IFRS 9 Instruments financiers | Conseil des normes comptables internationales | Classification des actifs financiers et provisionnement prospectif des pertes de crédit attendues en trois étapes | Issued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018 | Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead) |
| Scénarios climatiques du NGFS | Réseau pour le verdissement du système financier | Trajectoires de référence de risque de transition et de risque physique utilisées par les banques centrales et les superviseurs pour l'analyse de scénarios climatiques | Phase V, November 2024 | Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding |
| IFRS S2 Informations à fournir en lien avec les changements climatiques | Conseil des normes internationales d'information sur la durabilité | Divulgation des risques et opportunités liés au climat, y compris les émissions financées et la résilience climatique | Issued June 2023, amended December 2025 | Where a jurisdiction adopts it |
| Processus de contrôle et d'évaluation prudentiels (SREP) | Autorité bancaire européenne et supervision bancaire de la BCE | Processus prudentiel évaluant le modèle économique, la gouvernance et les risques pour le capital et la liquidité, fixant les exigences et orientations du pilier 2 | EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022) | European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks |
| Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) et tests de résistance prudentiels | Conseil des gouverneurs du Système de réserve fédérale | Processus prudentiel d'examen des scénarios de crise et du plan de capital qui fixe le coussin de capital de crise des grandes banques américaines | Annual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020 | United States, large bank holding companies |
| ISO 31000 Management du risque - Lignes directrices | Organisation internationale de normalisation | Principes, cadre et processus de gestion des risques à l'échelle d'une organisation | ISO 31000:2018 | International, voluntary |
Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.
Geographic dimensions
Global, regional and country programmes
Institutional counterparts
The institutions this work speaks to
- Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité des risques du conseil
- Chief risk officer and credit committee
- Superviseur prudentiel
- Autorité macroprudentielle
- Conseil d'administration de la banque et comité actif-passif
- Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
- Banque centrale
- Bank board
- Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
- Authorities overseeing critical third parties
- Credit risk function
- Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
- La banque centrale comme superviseur et opérateur
- Bank treasury
- Conseil d'administration et comité des risques de la contrepartie centrale
- Autorité de résolution
Publications de recherche
Research, methods and sources
Educational resources
Learn the methods
Readiness workflows
Préparation financière
Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.
Contribution mechanisms
Participer
Limite
What this page is not
Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.