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Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise

Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.

Go to the instrumentsBanking Nexus home

Domain definition

What Banking Nexus studies

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.

Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.

ТерминОпределение
Basel IIIThe Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks.
Коэффициент CET1Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital.
Норматив покрытия ликвидностиHigh-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period.
Expected credit lossThe probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for.

Financial system context

The parts of the financial system it covers

  • Кредитный риск и риск контрагента

    Дефолт, миграция и концентрация в кредитных портфелях и торговых позициях, а также то, как убытки переходят между контрагентами.

  • Капитал и ликвидность

    Капитал, способный поглощать убытки, буферы ликвидности и структуры фондирования, а также их поведение, когда рынки и вкладчики испытывают стресс.

  • Операционная устойчивость

    Непрерывность важных услуг при киберинцидентах, сбоях третьих сторон и нарушениях процессов в пределах заявленных допусков воздействия.

  • Платежи и рыночная инфраструктура

    Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.

  • Климатические и природные риски

    Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.

  • Модели и ИИ

    Модели кредитного скоринга, резервирования и капитала, а также валидация и управление, которых теперь требует машинное обучение.

  • Банковский сектор и реальная экономика

    Кредитование домохозяйств, малых предприятий, жилья и основных услуг, а также то, как стресс в банках превращается в сжатие кредита.

  • Управление и надзор

    Советы директоров, культура управления рисками, линии защиты, надзорная проверка и планирование урегулирования, включая структуры исламского банкинга.

Таксономия рисков

Risks, topic by topic

  • Кредитный риск и риск контрагента

    Кредитный риск представляет собой вероятность того, что заёмщик или контрагент не заплатит полностью и в срок, и он остаётся основным источником убытков для большинства банков.

  • Капитал и ликвидность

    Капитал поглощает убытки, а ликвидность позволяет банку выполнять свои обязательства по мере наступления сроков.

  • Операционная устойчивость банков

    Операционная устойчивость представляет собой способность банка продолжать предоставлять критически важные услуги во время нарушений, будь то кибератака, неудачное технологическое изменение, сбой третьей стороны или пандемия.

  • Climate and nature bank risk

    Изменение климата и утрата природы доходят до банков через их заёмщиков, залоги и рынки, от которых они зависят.

  • Платёжные зависимости

    Каждый банк зависит от платёжных систем, центральных контрагентов, систем расчётов по ценным бумагам, банков-корреспондентов и сетей сообщений для перемещения денег и залогов.

  • Model and ai risk

    Банки полагаются на модели для выдачи кредитов, формирования резервов, ценообразования продуктов, расчёта капитала и выявления мошенничества, и всё большая доля этих моделей использует машинное обучение.

  • Banking and real economy

    Банки превращают депозиты в кредиты домохозяйствам, малым и средним предприятиям и поставщикам жизненно важных услуг.

  • Корпоративное управление в банках

    Многие банкротства банков объясняются проблемами управления: советами директоров, не понимавшими принимаемых рисков, стимулами, поощрявшими рост в ущерб осмотрительности, или контрольными функциями, не имевшими веса для оспаривания решений.

  • Housing property finance

    Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.

  • Исламский банкинг

    Исламские банки работают на основе договоров и структур управления, разработанных в соответствии с исламским коммерческим правом, используя инструменты, основанные на купле-продаже, аренде и партнёрстве, вместо процентных кредитов.

Risk-transmission mechanisms

How these risks develop and spread

ТемаМеханизмКак это работает
Кредитный риск и риск контрагентаQuality erodes before defaultArrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised.
Кредитный риск и риск контрагентаLosses concentrateExposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies.
Капитал и ликвидностьLosses deplete capitalCredit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers.
Капитал и ликвидностьFunding can run quicklyUninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing.
Операционная устойчивость банковЗависимости скрытыA single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.
Операционная устойчивость банковThird parties concentrate riskMany banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
Climate and nature bank riskPhysical risk hits collateral and incomeFloods, storms, heat and drought damage property and disrupt production. Uninsured losses fall on borrowers, raising default probabilities and loss given default, and insurance withdrawal can reprice whole regional mortgage books.
Climate and nature bank riskПереходный риск меняет оценку секторовCarbon pricing, regulation, technology and shifting demand can strand assets and squeeze the margins of emissions-intensive borrowers. Timing matters: a late and abrupt transition produces sharper losses than an orderly one.
Платёжные зависимостиЛиквидность нужна в течение дняReal-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours.
Платёжные зависимостиCentral counterparties concentrate riskClearing nets exposures and mutualises default losses. In stress, margin calls rise across members at the same time, and a member default draws on a default fund that all members share.
Model and ai riskDrift and regime changeModels learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it.
Model and ai riskOpacity weakens challengeComplex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does.
Banking and real economyCredit supply tightensWhen capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first.
Banking and real economyBorrower stress feeds backHigher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy.
Корпоративное управление в банкахBoard oversight sets the frameThe board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set.
Корпоративное управление в банкахIncentives shape behaviourRemuneration tied to short-term revenue encourages risk-taking whose costs appear later. Deferral, malus and clawback aim to align pay with the risk outcome as it is realised.
Housing property financeCredit and prices reinforce each otherEasier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs.
Housing property financeAffordability under rising ratesVariable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers.
Исламский банкингContract structure shapes riskMurabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label.
Исламский банкингInvestment accounts share returnsProfit-sharing investment account holders bear losses in principle. Competitive pressure can lead banks to smooth returns and absorb losses themselves, a transfer known as displaced commercial risk.

Вопросы исследований

Who decides, and what they need to know

Decision holderВопросEvidence the platform's pages describe
Bank board and board risk committeeWhat credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to imposeConcentration measures, stage migration and stress losses by segment
Bank board and asset liability committeeWhat capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure fundingCapital and liquidity projections under internal and supervisory scenarios
Совет директоров банкаWhich business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryService maps, scenario test results and incident history
Bank board and board risk committeeHow climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planningОценка существенности, результаты сценариев и отраслевая подверженность
Central bank as overseer and operatorWhich systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meetAvailability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows
Bank board and model risk committeeWhat model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptableModel inventory, tiering and validation findings
Macroprudential authority or financial policy committeeWhether to set or release capital buffers and borrower-based measuresCredit gaps, debt service ratios and lending surveys
Bank board and nomination committeeWhether board skills, independence and information are adequate for the bank's risk profileBoard effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports
Макропруденциальный органWhether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measuresPrice-to-income, credit growth, lending standards and arrears
Совет директоров банкаWhat risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accountsDisplaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact

These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.

Key indicators

What is measured, in which unit, by whom

ИндикаторЕдиницаПериодичностьТип источникаМетка: доказательная база
Доля проблемных кредитовпроцентов от валовых кредитовежеквартальноSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresОпубликованная статистика
Stage 2 and stage 3 loan shareпроцентов от валовых кредитовежеквартальноIFRS 9 financial statementsСООБЩЕНО
Common equity tier 1 ratioпроцент активов, взвешенных по рискуежеквартальноSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresОпубликованная статистика
Leverage ratiopercent of total exposure measureежеквартальноНадзорная отчётностьОпубликованная статистика
Important business services within impact tolerance in testingcount of services tested and count passingежегодноScenario testing recordsСООБЩЕНО
Крупные инциденты, связанные с ИКТчисло по классам тяжестиежеквартальноОтчёты об инцидентах для надзорных органовОпубликованная статистика
Финансируемые выбросытонны эквивалента диоксида углеродаежегодноPCAF methodology applied to loan and investment booksОЦЕНЕНО
Подверженность секторам, значимым для климатической политикиpercent of loan bookежегодноPillar 3 ESG disclosuresСООБЩЕНО
Value settled through large-value payment systemscurrency units per dayежедневноСтатистика системных операторовОпубликованная статистика
Доступность платёжных системпроцент рабочих часовежемесячноРаскрытие информации операторамиСООБЩЕНО
Model inventory coveragecount of models by tier and validation statusежеквартальноModel risk management recordsСООБЩЕНО
Discriminatory power of credit scorecardsGini coefficient or area under the curveежегодноВалидация моделиСМОДЕЛИРОВАНО
Разрыв «кредит/ВВП»процентных пунктовежеквартальноКредитная статистика BISОЦЕНЕНО
Credit standards on loans to enterprisesnet percentage of banks reporting tighteningежеквартальноОбследования банковского кредитованияСООБЩЕНО
Члены совета директоров с опытом в банковской сфере или управлении рискамиshare of boardежегодноGovernance disclosuresЗАДЕКЛАРИРОВАНО
Independent directorsshare of boardежегодноGovernance disclosuresЗАДЕКЛАРИРОВАНО
Отношение размера кредита к стоимости залога на момент выдачиpercent of property valueежеквартальноДанные на уровне кредитов и надзорные данныеОпубликованная статистика
Debt-service-to-income ratio at originationpercent of gross incomeежеквартальноLoan-level data, household surveysСООБЩЕНО
Коэффициент достаточности капитала исламских банковпроцент активов, взвешенных по рискуежеквартальноIFSB prudential indicatorsОпубликованная статистика
Non-performing financing ratiopercent of gross financingежеквартальноIFSB prudential indicatorsОпубликованная статистика

Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.

Методология

The methods the platform's work rests on

  • Финансовая экономика

    Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.

  • Probability statistics

    Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.

  • Наука о сетях

    Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.

  • Financial engineering

    Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.

  • Ai ml

    Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.

Источники данных

Откуда берётся доказательная база

ИсточникЧто он даётКласс лицензии
Показатели финансовой устойчивости МВФNon-performing loans, provisioning and sectoral loan distribution reported by national authoritiesБесплатно, условия использования МВФ
EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exerciseBank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banksБесплатно, с указанием авторства
Банковская статистика надзора ЕЦБAsset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro areaБесплатно, с указанием авторства
FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9CLoan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companiesОбщественное достояние
BIS consolidated banking statisticsBanks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basisБесплатно, условия использования BIS
Rating agency default and recovery studiesИсторические показатели дефолтов и возмещения по рейтинговым классам и секторамLicensed, subscription
National central credit registersBorrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysisОграниченный доступ для надзорных органов
BIS Basel III monitoring reportsAggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banksБесплатно, условия использования BIS
Federal Reserve supervisory stress test resultsScenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banksОбщественное достояние
Результаты стресс-тестирования Банка АнглииScenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banksБесплатно, условия использования Банка Англии
EBA EU-wide stress testBank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodologyБесплатно, с указанием авторства
Раскрытие информации по Компоненту 3 (Pillar 3)Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFRПубличные, условия банка
Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience ActRegisters of ICT third-party arrangements held by authorities and the public list of designated critical ICT providersRegisters restricted to authorities; designation list public
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publicationsSupervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilitiesБесплатно, с указанием авторства
Bank of England and PRA operational resilience publicationsPolicy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reportsБесплатно, условия использования Банка Англии
ORX operational risk loss dataPooled loss events by event type and business line from member banksПо лицензии, по членству
Ландшафт угроз ENISA для финансового сектораAnalysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutionsБесплатно, с указанием авторства
Pillar 3 operational risk disclosuresOperational risk capital and loss summaries published by banksПубличные, условия банка
Сценарии NGFSТраектории переходного и физического риска с макроэкономическими переменными для анализа сценариевБесплатно, с указанием авторства
ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicatorsSupervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposuresБесплатно, с указанием авторства
Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory ScenarioDesign and published results of the exploratory exercise for UK banks and insurersБесплатно, условия использования Банка Англии
Pillar 3 ESG disclosures under EBA standardsBank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignmentПубличные, условия банка
PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting StandardMethodology and data quality scores for financed emissionsFree standard; emission factor database by membership
Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard mapsСлои физических опасностей: наводнения, жара и засухаБесплатно и открыто, с указанием авторства

Instruments explained for research

Analytical instruments

Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.

кредитному риску

A credit portfolio's loss distribution

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.

02468 1 in 21 раз в 10 лет1 раз в 100 лет1 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Убыток портфеля
  • Expected loss

With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.

Меры контроля

Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Потери при дефолте
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Результаты

Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
0.45
Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
2.36
Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
4.06
Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
3.61
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period
Период повторяемости (лет)Loss (% of exposure)
20.30
40.59
80.91
171.28
341.68
702.13
1412.60
2883.11
5853.64
1,1894.20
2,4184.79
4,9185.41
10,0006.04
Источник
This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
Дата
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
Охват
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Единицы
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Статус
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Модель
gra.credit.one-factor
Версия
1.0.0
Владелец
GRA platforms lane
Цель
To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
Risk domain
Кредитный риск и риск контрагента
Допущения
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Исходные данные
Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Данные
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Методы
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
Валидация
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Ограничения
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Неопределённость
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Концентрация

One large exposure and the tail

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.

02468 1 in 21 раз в 10 лет1 раз в 100 лет1 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Granular portfolio
  • With the large exposure

Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.

Меры контроля

Share of the largest exposure
5.0 % of the portfolio
Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Потери при дефолте
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Результаты

Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
4.06
Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
4.55
Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
0.49
Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
400
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period, granular and concentrated
Период повторяемости (лет)Granular (%)With the large exposure (%)
20.300.28
40.590.56
80.910.89
171.281.29
341.681.81
702.132.53
1412.603.06
2883.113.57
5853.644.12
1,1894.204.69
2,4184.795.29
4,9185.415.91
10,0006.046.56
Источник
This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
Дата
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
Охват
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Единицы
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Статус
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Модель
gra.credit.concentration
Версия
1.0.0
Владелец
GRA platforms lane
Цель
To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
Risk domain
Кредитный риск и риск контрагента
Допущения
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Исходные данные
Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Данные
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Методы
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
Валидация
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Ограничения
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Неопределённость
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Ликвидность

The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.

  • Stable retail 1.50
  • Less stable retail 2.00
  • Operational deposits 3.75
  • Corporate, non-operational 6.00
  • Финансовые институты 10.0
  • Net outflows 18.3
  • Liquid assets (HQLA) 15.0
  • Outflow over 30 days by funding class
  • Net outflows after capped inflows
  • Stock of high-quality liquid assets

Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.

Меры контроля

High-quality liquid assets
15.0 % of total funding
Stable retail deposits
30 % of total funding
Less stable retail deposits
20 % of total funding
Operational deposits
15 % of total funding
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
15 % of total funding
Unsecured funding from financial institutions
10 % of total funding
Contractual inflows over 30 days
5.0 % of total funding
Stress on run-off rates
1.00 times the baseline

Результаты

Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
23.3
Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
5.00
Net outflows (% of total funding)
18.3
Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
82
Data, source and model record
Outflows by funding class and the stock of liquid assets
Funding classBalance (% of funding)Run-off rate (%)Outflow (% of funding)
Stable retail deposits30.051.50
Less stable retail deposits20.0102.00
Operational deposits15.0253.75
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates15.0406.00
Unsecured funding from financial institutions10.010010.0
Источник
Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
Дата
BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
Охват
A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
Единицы
Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Статус
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Модель
gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
Версия
1.0.0
Владелец
GRA platforms lane
Цель
To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
Risk domain
Liquidity risk
Допущения
Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
Исходные данные
High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
Данные
BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
Методы
Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
Валидация
Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
Ограничения
Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
Неопределённость
None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
Approved use
Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
Prohibited use
Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.

Сеть взаимных позиций

Как шок для активов превращается в потери системы

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.

0255075100 051015202530 Contagion round Потерянный капитал системы (%)
  • System equity lost

Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.

Меры контроля

Снижение внешних активов
2.0 %

Результаты

Снижение внешних активов (%)
2.0
System equity lost in the first round (%)
18.0
System equity lost after contagion (%)
45.0
Amplification by the network (percentage points)
27.0
Banks in default (of 20)
0
Data, source and model record
System equity lost, round by round
РаундПотерянный капитал системы (%)Банки в состоянии дефолта
018.00
128.80
235.30
339.20
441.50
542.90
643.70
744.20
844.50
944.70
1044.80
1144.90
1244.90
1345.00
1445.00
1545.00
1645.00
1745.00
1845.00
1945.00
2045.00
2145.00
2245.00
2345.00
2445.00
2545.00
2645.00
2745.00
2845.00
2945.00
3045.00
Источник
Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
Дата
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
Охват
A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
Единицы
Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Статус
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Модель
gra.network.debtrank
Версия
1.0.0
Владелец
GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
Цель
To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
Risk domain
Systemic and contagion risk
Допущения
Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
Исходные данные
Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
Данные
None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
Методы
DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
Валидация
The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
Ограничения
No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
Неопределённость
Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
Approved use
Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
Prohibited use
Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.

Сценарный анализ

Scenarios, not forecasts

A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.

Regulatory context and related standards

The frameworks this work is read against

СистемаОрганЧто устанавливаетEdition or dateWhere it applies
Система «Базель III»Базельский комитет по банковскому надзоруМинимальные требования к капиталу, левериджу, покрытию ликвидности и стабильному фондированию, а также буферы капитала сверх нихDecember 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel FrameworkBasel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables
Основополагающие принципы эффективного банковского надзораБазельский комитет по банковскому надзоруБазовые стандарты надзорных полномочий, лицензирования, управления рисками и корпоративного управления, оцениваемые в рамках FSAP МВФ и Всемирного банкаRevised April 2024International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs
Принципы эффективного управления финансовыми рисками, связанными с климатом, и надзора за нимиБазельский комитет по банковскому надзоруОжидания в отношении корпоративного управления в банках, управления рисками и сценарного анализа климатических рисков, а также их надзорной проверкиJune 2022Basel Committee members, through national supervisors
Ключевые характеристики эффективных режимов урегулирования для финансовых учрежденийСовет по финансовой стабильностиПолномочия по урегулированию, планирование восстановления и урегулирования и трансграничное сотрудничество, чтобы банк мог обанкротиться без поддержки налогоплательщиковOctober 2011, updated October 2014FSB member jurisdictions
IFRS 9 «Финансовые инструменты»Совет по международным стандартам финансовой отчётностиКлассификация финансовых активов и прогнозное резервирование под ожидаемые кредитные убытки в три стадииIssued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead)
Климатические сценарии NGFSСеть по экологизации финансовой системыЭталонные траектории переходного и физического риска, используемые центральными банками и надзорными органами для анализа климатических сценариевPhase V, November 2024Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding
IFRS S2 Раскрытие информации, связанной с климатомСовет по международным стандартам устойчивого развитияРаскрытие связанных с климатом рисков и возможностей, включая финансируемые выбросы и климатическую устойчивостьIssued June 2023, amended December 2025Where a jurisdiction adopts it
Процесс надзорной проверки и оценки (SREP)Европейская банковская служба и Банковский надзор ЕЦБНадзорный процесс, оценивающий бизнес-модель, управление и риски для капитала и ликвидности и устанавливающий требования и рекомендации Компонента 2 (Pillar 2)EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022)European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks
Комплексный анализ и проверка капитала (CCAR) и надзорное стресс-тестированиеСовет управляющих Федеральной резервной системыНадзорный процесс проверки стресс-сценариев и планов капитала, определяющий стрессовый буфер капитала для крупных банков СШАAnnual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020United States, large bank holding companies
ISO 31000 «Менеджмент риска. Руководящие указания»Международная организация по стандартизацииПринципы, рамочная основа и процесс управления рисками в масштабах всей организацииISO 31000:2018International, voluntary

Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.

Institutional counterparts

The institutions this work speaks to

  • Bank board and board risk committee
  • Директор по рискам и кредитный комитет
  • Пруденциальный надзорный орган
  • Макропруденциальный орган
  • Bank board and asset liability committee
  • Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
  • Центральный банк
  • Совет директоров банка
  • Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
  • Authorities overseeing critical third parties
  • Credit risk function
  • Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
  • Central bank as overseer and operator
  • Bank treasury
  • Central counterparty board and risk committee
  • Resolution authority

Readiness workflows

Готовность к финансированию

Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.

Граница

What this page is not

Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.