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Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise

Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.

Go to the instrumentsBanking Nexus home

Domain definition

What Banking Nexus studies

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.

Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.

TermineDefinizione
Basel IIIThe Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks.
Coefficiente CET1Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital.
Indice di copertura della liquiditàHigh-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period.
Expected credit lossThe probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for.

Financial system context

The parts of the financial system it covers

  • Rischio di credito e di controparte

    Insolvenza, migrazione e concentrazione nei portafogli di prestiti e nelle esposizioni di negoziazione, e come le perdite passano tra le controparti.

  • Capitale e liquidità

    Capitale in grado di assorbire le perdite, riserve di liquidità e strutture di provvista, e come si comportano quando mercati e depositanti sono sotto stress.

  • Resilienza operativa

    Continuità dei servizi importanti in caso di incidenti cyber, guasti di terze parti e interruzioni dei processi, entro tolleranze d'impatto dichiarate.

  • Pagamenti e infrastrutture di mercato

    Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.

  • Rischio climatico e naturale

    Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.

  • Modelli e IA

    Modelli di credit scoring, accantonamento e capitale, e la validazione e governance che l'apprendimento automatico richiede oggi.

  • Settore bancario ed economia reale

    Prestiti a famiglie, piccole imprese, edilizia abitativa e servizi essenziali, e come lo stress bancario diventa una stretta creditizia.

  • Governance e vigilanza

    Consigli, cultura del rischio, linee di difesa, revisione prudenziale e pianificazione della risoluzione, incluse le strutture della banca islamica.

Tassonomia dei rischi

Risks, topic by topic

  • Rischio di credito e di controparte

    Il rischio di credito è la probabilità che un mutuatario o una controparte non paghi integralmente e puntualmente, e resta la principale fonte di perdite per la maggior parte delle banche.

  • Capitale e liquidità

    Il capitale assorbe le perdite e la liquidità consente a una banca di pagare i propri obblighi alla scadenza.

  • Resilienza operativa delle banche

    La resilienza operativa è la capacità di una banca di continuare a fornire servizi critici durante le perturbazioni, che derivino da un attacco informatico, da una modifica tecnologica non riuscita, da un'interruzione presso terzi o da una pandemia.

  • Climate and nature bank risk

    I cambiamenti climatici e la perdita di natura raggiungono le banche attraverso i loro mutuatari, le loro garanzie e i mercati da cui dipendono.

  • Dipendenze dei pagamenti

    Ogni banca dipende da sistemi di pagamento, controparti centrali, sistemi di regolamento titoli, banche corrispondenti e reti di messaggistica per trasferire denaro e garanzie.

  • Model and ai risk

    Le banche si affidano ai modelli per concedere credito, stabilire accantonamenti, prezzare prodotti, calcolare il capitale e individuare le frodi, e una quota crescente di questi modelli utilizza l'apprendimento automatico.

  • Banking and real economy

    Le banche trasformano i depositi in prestiti per famiglie, piccole e medie imprese e fornitori di servizi essenziali.

  • Governance bancaria

    Molti fallimenti bancari risalgono alla governance: consigli che non comprendevano i rischi assunti, incentivi che premiavano la crescita rispetto alla prudenza o funzioni di controllo prive dell'autorevolezza necessaria per contestare.

  • Housing property finance

    Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.

  • Finanza bancaria islamica

    Le banche islamiche operano con contratti e strutture di governance progettati per conformarsi al diritto commerciale islamico, utilizzando strumenti basati su vendita, locazione e partecipazione al posto dei prestiti fruttiferi di interessi.

Risk-transmission mechanisms

How these risks develop and spread

ArgomentoMeccanismoCome funziona
Rischio di credito e di controparteQuality erodes before defaultArrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised.
Rischio di credito e di controparteLe perdite si concentranoLe esposizioni si concentrano in settori, regioni, tipi di garanzia e grandi singole controparti. Uno shock a un segmento, come l'immobiliare commerciale o un settore esportatore, può determinare perdite ben superiori a quelle implicite in un modello di portafoglio diversificato.
Capitale e liquiditàLosses deplete capitalCredit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers.
Capitale e liquiditàI finanziamenti possono essere erogati rapidamenteUninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing.
Resilienza operativa delle bancheLe dipendenze sono nascosteA single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.
Resilienza operativa delle bancheThird parties concentrate riskMany banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
Climate and nature bank riskIl rischio fisico colpisce garanzie e redditoAlluvioni, tempeste, ondate di calore e siccità danneggiano i beni e interrompono la produzione. Le perdite non assicurate ricadono sui debitori, aumentando le probabilità di insolvenza e la perdita in caso di insolvenza, e il ritiro delle coperture assicurative può far rivedere i prezzi di interi portafogli di mutui regionali.
Climate and nature bank riskIl rischio di transizione riprezza i settoriPrezzo del carbonio, regolamentazione, tecnologia e spostamenti della domanda possono rendere incagliate le attività e comprimere i margini dei debitori ad alta intensità di emissioni. I tempi contano: una transizione tardiva e brusca produce perdite più marcate di una ordinata.
Dipendenze dei pagamentiLa liquidità è necessaria nell'arco della giornataIl regolamento lordo in tempo reale richiede che le banche finanzino ciascun pagamento nel momento in cui viene effettuato. Se un partecipante di grandi dimensioni ritarda i pagamenti per conservare liquidità, gli altri attendono a loro volta e il blocco può formarsi nell'arco di poche ore.
Dipendenze dei pagamentiLe controparti centrali concentrano il rischioClearing nets exposures and mutualises default losses. In stress, margin calls rise across members at the same time, and a member default draws on a default fund that all members share.
Model and ai riskDrift and regime changeI modelli apprendono dai dati passati. Quando cambiano l'economia, il comportamento dei clienti o i prodotti, le relazioni si modificano e l'accuratezza si deteriora, spesso in modo silenzioso finché perdite o reclami non lo rivelano.
Model and ai riskL'opacità indebolisce la possibilità di contestazioneComplex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does.
Banking and real economyCredit supply tightensWhen capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first.
Banking and real economyLe tensioni dei debitori si ripercuotono a ritrosoHigher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy.
Governance bancariaBoard oversight sets the frameThe board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set.
Governance bancariaGli incentivi orientano i comportamentiUna remunerazione legata ai ricavi a breve termine incoraggia l'assunzione di rischi i cui costi emergono in seguito. Differimento, malus e clawback mirano ad allineare la retribuzione all'esito del rischio nel momento in cui si realizza.
Housing property financeCredit and prices reinforce each otherEasier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs.
Housing property financeAccessibilità economica con tassi in aumentoI mutui a tasso variabile e a breve fissazione trasferiscono rapidamente gli aumenti dei tassi ai mutuatari. Gli oneri del servizio del debito aumentano, gli arretrati seguono con ritardo e il rifinanziamento può diventare impossibile per i mutuatari in difficoltà.
Finanza bancaria islamicaContract structure shapes riskMurabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label.
Finanza bancaria islamicaI conti di investimento condividono i rendimentiIn linea di principio i titolari di conti di investimento con partecipazione agli utili sopportano le perdite. La pressione competitiva può indurre le banche a stabilizzare i rendimenti e ad assorbire esse stesse le perdite, un trasferimento noto come rischio commerciale spostato.

Domande di ricerca

Who decides, and what they need to know

Decision holderDomandaEvidence the platform's pages describe
Bank board and board risk committeeWhat credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to imposeMisure di concentrazione, migrazione tra stadi e perdite da stress per segmento
Consiglio di amministrazione della banca e comitato per la gestione di attività e passivitàWhat capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure fundingProiezioni di capitale e liquidità in scenari interni e di vigilanza
Bank boardWhich business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryMappe dei servizi, risultati dei test di scenario e storico degli incidenti
Bank board and board risk committeeHow climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planningValutazione di materialità, risultati degli scenari ed esposizioni settoriali
Central bank as overseer and operatorWhich systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meetAvailability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows
Bank board and model risk committeeWhat model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptableInventario dei modelli, classificazione per livelli e risultanze della validazione
Autorità macroprudenziale o comitato per la politica finanziariaSe fissare o rilasciare riserve di capitale e misure basate sul debitoreScarti di credito, rapporti di servizio del debito e indagini sul credito
Bank board and nomination committeeSe competenze, indipendenza e informazioni del consiglio sono adeguate al profilo di rischio della bancaValutazioni dell'efficacia del consiglio, matrici delle competenze e relazioni sui rischi
Autorità macroprudenzialeSe fissare o modificare misure sul rapporto prestito/valore, sul rapporto servizio del debito/reddito o misure patrimoniali settorialiRapporto prezzo-reddito, crescita del credito, criteri di concessione dei prestiti e arretrati
Bank boardWhat risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accountsDisplaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact

These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.

Key indicators

What is measured, in which unit, by whom

IndicatoreUnitàCadenzaTipo di fonteEtichetta di evidenza
Tasso di crediti deterioratipercentuale dei prestiti lorditrimestraleSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresStatistiche pubblicate
Quota dei prestiti di stadio 2 e stadio 3percentuale dei prestiti lorditrimestraleIFRS 9 financial statementsRIPORTATO
Coefficiente di capitale primario di classe 1percentuale delle attività ponderate per il rischiotrimestraleSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresStatistiche pubblicate
Leverage ratiopercentuale della misura di esposizione totaletrimestraleSegnalazioni di vigilanzaStatistiche pubblicate
Important business services within impact tolerance in testingcount of services tested and count passingannualeScenario testing recordsRIPORTATO
Incidenti rilevanti legati alle ICTconteggio per classe di gravitàtrimestraleSegnalazioni di incidenti alle autorità di vigilanzaStatistiche pubblicate
Emissioni finanziatetonnellate di anidride carbonica equivalenteannualePCAF methodology applied to loan and investment booksSTIMATO
Esposizione ai settori rilevanti per la politica climaticapercent of loan bookannualePillar 3 ESG disclosuresRIPORTATO
Value settled through large-value payment systemscurrency units per daygiornalieroStatistiche dei gestori di sistemaStatistiche pubblicate
Disponibilità del sistema di pagamentopercentuale delle ore di eserciziomensileInformative degli operatoriRIPORTATO
Model inventory coveragecount of models by tier and validation statustrimestraleModel risk management recordsRIPORTATO
Potere discriminante degli scorecard di creditoCoefficiente di Gini o area sotto la curvaannualeValidazione dei modelliMODELLATO
Divario credito/PILpunti percentualitrimestraleStatistiche BIS sul creditoSTIMATO
Standard di credito sui prestiti alle impresepercentuale netta di banche che segnalano un irrigidimentotrimestraleIndagini sul credito bancarioRIPORTATO
Membri del consiglio con competenze bancarie o di rischioshare of boardannualeInformative sulla governanceDICHIARATO
Independent directorsshare of boardannualeInformative sulla governanceDICHIARATO
Rapporto prestito/valore all'erogazionepercent of property valuetrimestraleLoan-level and supervisory dataStatistiche pubblicate
Debt-service-to-income ratio at originationpercent of gross incometrimestraleDati a livello di prestito, indagini sulle famiglieRIPORTATO
Coefficiente di adeguatezza patrimoniale delle banche islamichepercentuale delle attività ponderate per il rischiotrimestraleIFSB prudential indicatorsStatistiche pubblicate
Non-performing financing ratiopercentuale del finanziamento lordotrimestraleIFSB prudential indicatorsStatistiche pubblicate

Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.

Metodologia

The methods the platform's work rests on

  • Economia finanziaria

    Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.

  • Probability statistics

    Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.

  • Scienza delle reti

    Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.

  • Financial engineering

    Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.

  • Ai ml

    Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.

Fonti di dati

Da dove provengono le evidenze

FonteCosa fornisceClasse di licenza
Indicatori di solidità finanziaria del FMICrediti deteriorati, accantonamenti e distribuzione settoriale dei prestiti comunicati dalle autorità nazionaliGratuito, termini d'uso del FMI
EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exerciseDati a livello di singola banca su qualità degli attivi, concessioni (forbearance) e stadi IFRS 9 per le banche dell'UEGratuito, attribuzione
ECB Supervisory Banking StatisticsAsset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro areaGratuito, attribuzione
FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9CLoan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companiesPubblico dominio
BIS consolidated banking statisticsCrediti esteri delle banche per paese e settore della controparte su base di rischio ultimoGratuito, condizioni d'uso della BIS
Rating agency default and recovery studiesTassi storici di insolvenza e di recupero per classe di rating e settoreSu licenza, in abbonamento
Registri nazionali centrali del creditoBorrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysisRestricted, supervisory access
Rapporti di monitoraggio Basilea III della BRIAggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banksGratuito, condizioni d'uso della BIS
Federal Reserve supervisory stress test resultsScenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banksPubblico dominio
Bank of England stress testing resultsScenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banksGratuito, condizioni d'uso della Bank of England
Stress test a livello dell'UE dell'EBAProiezioni del capitale a livello di singola banca in condizioni di stress secondo una metodologia comuneGratuito, attribuzione
Informativa del Pilastro 3Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFRPubblico, condizioni bancarie
Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience ActRegistri degli accordi con terze parti ICT detenuti dalle autorità ed elenco pubblico dei fornitori ICT critici designatiRegistri riservati alle autorità; elenco di designazione pubblico
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publicationsSupervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilitiesGratuito, attribuzione
Pubblicazioni della Bank of England e della PRA sulla resilienza operativaPolicy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reportsGratuito, condizioni d'uso della Bank of England
ORX operational risk loss dataPooled loss events by event type and business line from member banksCon licenza, abbonamento
Panorama delle minacce dell'ENISA per il settore finanziarioAnalysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutionsGratuito, attribuzione
Informative sul rischio operativo del Pilastro 3Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banksPubblico, condizioni bancarie
Scenari NGFSPercorsi di rischio di transizione e di rischio fisico con variabili macroeconomiche per l'analisi di scenarioGratuito, attribuzione
ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicatorsMetodologia dell'esercizio di vigilanza e indicatori sperimentali sulle esposizioni delle banche dell'area dell'euroGratuito, attribuzione
Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory ScenarioImpostazione e risultati pubblicati dell'esercizio esplorativo per banche e compagnie assicurative del Regno UnitoGratuito, condizioni d'uso della Bank of England
Informativa ESG del Pilastro 3 secondo gli standard dell'EBABank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignmentPubblico, condizioni bancarie
PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting StandardMethodology and data quality scores for financed emissionsStandard gratuito; database dei fattori di emissione su abbonamento
Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard mapsLivelli di pericolo fisico per alluvioni, caldo e siccitàGratuito e aperto, attribuzione

Instruments explained for research

Analytical instruments

Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.

Il rischio di credito

A credit portfolio's loss distribution

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.

02468 1 in 21 su 101 su 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Perdita di portafoglio
  • Expected loss

With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.

Comandi

Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Perdita in caso di insolvenza
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Risultati

Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
0.45
Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
2.36
Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
4.06
Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
3.61
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period
Tempo di ritorno (anni)Loss (% of exposure)
20.30
40.59
80.91
171.28
341.68
702.13
1412.60
2883.11
5853.64
1,1894.20
2,4184.79
4,9185.41
10,0006.04
Fonte
This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
Ambito
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Unità
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Stato
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modello
gra.credit.one-factor
Versione
1.0.0
Titolare
GRA platforms lane
Finalità
To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
Risk domain
Rischio di credito e di controparte
Ipotesi
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Input
Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Dati
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Metodi
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
Validazione
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limiti
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Incertezza
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Concentrazione

One large exposure and the tail

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.

02468 1 in 21 su 101 su 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Granular portfolio
  • With the large exposure

Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.

Comandi

Share of the largest exposure
5.0 % of the portfolio
Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Perdita in caso di insolvenza
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Risultati

Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
4.06
Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
4.55
Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
0.49
Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
400
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period, granular and concentrated
Tempo di ritorno (anni)Granular (%)With the large exposure (%)
20.300.28
40.590.56
80.910.89
171.281.29
341.681.81
702.132.53
1412.603.06
2883.113.57
5853.644.12
1,1894.204.69
2,4184.795.29
4,9185.415.91
10,0006.046.56
Fonte
This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
Ambito
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Unità
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Stato
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modello
gra.credit.concentration
Versione
1.0.0
Titolare
GRA platforms lane
Finalità
To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
Risk domain
Rischio di credito e di controparte
Ipotesi
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Input
Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Dati
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Metodi
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
Validazione
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limiti
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Incertezza
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Liquidità

The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.

  • Stable retail 1.50
  • Less stable retail 2.00
  • Operational deposits 3.75
  • Corporate, non-operational 6.00
  • Istituzioni finanziarie 10.0
  • Net outflows 18.3
  • Liquid assets (HQLA) 15.0
  • Outflow over 30 days by funding class
  • Net outflows after capped inflows
  • Stock of high-quality liquid assets

Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.

Comandi

High-quality liquid assets
15.0 % of total funding
Stable retail deposits
30 % of total funding
Less stable retail deposits
20 % of total funding
Operational deposits
15 % of total funding
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
15 % of total funding
Unsecured funding from financial institutions
10 % of total funding
Contractual inflows over 30 days
5.0 % of total funding
Stress on run-off rates
1.00 times the baseline

Risultati

Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
23.3
Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
5.00
Net outflows (% of total funding)
18.3
Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
82
Data, source and model record
Outflows by funding class and the stock of liquid assets
Funding classBalance (% of funding)Run-off rate (%)Outflow (% of funding)
Stable retail deposits30.051.50
Less stable retail deposits20.0102.00
Operational deposits15.0253.75
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates15.0406.00
Unsecured funding from financial institutions10.010010.0
Fonte
Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
Date
BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
Ambito
A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
Unità
Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Stato
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modello
gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
Versione
1.0.0
Titolare
GRA platforms lane
Finalità
To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
Risk domain
rischio di liquidità
Ipotesi
Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
Input
High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
Dati
BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
Metodi
Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
Validazione
Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
Limiti
Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
Incertezza
None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
Approved use
Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
Prohibited use
Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.

Rete di esposizione

Come uno shock sui beni diventa una perdita di sistema

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.

0255075100 051015202530 Contagion round Patrimonio del sistema perso (%)
  • System equity lost

Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.

Comandi

Calo delle attività esterne
2.0 %

Risultati

Calo delle attività esterne (%)
2.0
System equity lost in the first round (%)
18.0
System equity lost after contagion (%)
45.0
Amplification by the network (percentage points)
27.0
Banks in default (of 20)
0
Data, source and model record
System equity lost, round by round
RoundPatrimonio del sistema perso (%)Banche in default
018.00
128.80
235.30
339.20
441.50
542.90
643.70
744.20
844.50
944.70
1044.80
1144.90
1244.90
1345.00
1445.00
1545.00
1645.00
1745.00
1845.00
1945.00
2045.00
2145.00
2245.00
2345.00
2445.00
2545.00
2645.00
2745.00
2845.00
2945.00
3045.00
Fonte
Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
Ambito
A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
Unità
Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Stato
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modello
gra.network.debtrank
Versione
1.0.0
Titolare
GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
Finalità
To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
Risk domain
Systemic and contagion risk
Ipotesi
Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
Input
Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
Dati
None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
Metodi
DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
Validazione
The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
Limiti
No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
Incertezza
Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
Approved use
Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
Prohibited use
Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.

Analisi di scenario

Scenarios, not forecasts

A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.

Regulatory context and related standards

The frameworks this work is read against

QuadroOrganoChe cosa stabilisceEdition or dateWhere it applies
Quadro di Basilea IIIComitato di Basilea per la vigilanza bancariaRequisiti minimi di capitale, leva finanziaria, copertura della liquidità e provvista stabile, e le riserve di capitale aggiuntiveDecember 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel FrameworkBasel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables
Principi fondamentali per un'efficace vigilanza bancariaComitato di Basilea per la vigilanza bancariaStandard di base per poteri di vigilanza, autorizzazioni, gestione del rischio e governance, valutati negli FSAP del FMI e della Banca mondialeRevised April 2024International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs
Principi per la gestione e la vigilanza efficaci dei rischi finanziari legati al climaComitato di Basilea per la vigilanza bancariaAspettative sulla governance, sulla gestione del rischio e sull'analisi di scenario del rischio legato al clima da parte delle banche, e sulla relativa revisione di vigilanzaJune 2022Basel Committee members, through national supervisors
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial InstitutionsConsiglio per la stabilità finanziariaPoteri di risoluzione, pianificazione del risanamento e della risoluzione e cooperazione transfrontaliera affinché una banca possa fallire senza il sostegno dei contribuentiOctober 2011, updated October 2014FSB member jurisdictions
IFRS 9 Strumenti finanziariInternational Accounting Standards BoardClassificazione delle attività finanziarie e accantonamenti per perdite attese su crediti in ottica prospettica, in tre stadiIssued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead)
Scenari climatici NGFSNetwork for Greening the Financial SystemPercorsi di riferimento del rischio di transizione e del rischio fisico usati da banche centrali e autorità di vigilanza per l'analisi di scenari climaticiPhase V, November 2024Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding
IFRS S2 Informativa sul climaInternational Sustainability Standards BoardInformativa su rischi e opportunità legati al clima, incluse le emissioni finanziate e la resilienza climaticaIssued June 2023, amended December 2025Where a jurisdiction adopts it
Processo di revisione e valutazione prudenziale (SREP)Autorità bancaria europea e Vigilanza bancaria della BCEProcesso di vigilanza che valuta modello di business, governance e rischi per capitale e liquidità, e fissa requisiti e orientamenti di Pilastro 2EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022)European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) e stress test di vigilanzaBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemProcesso di vigilanza su scenari di stress e revisione dei piani patrimoniali che fissa la riserva di capitale per lo stress delle grandi banche statunitensiAnnual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020United States, large bank holding companies
ISO 31000 Gestione del rischio - Linee guidaOrganizzazione internazionale per la normazionePrincipi, quadro di riferimento e processo per la gestione del rischio in un'organizzazioneISO 31000:2018International, voluntary

Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.

Institutional counterparts

The institutions this work speaks to

  • Bank board and board risk committee
  • Chief risk officer and credit committee
  • Autorità di vigilanza prudenziale
  • Autorità macroprudenziale
  • Consiglio di amministrazione della banca e comitato per la gestione di attività e passività
  • Autorità di vigilanza prudenziale tramite SREP o CCAR
  • Banca centrale
  • Bank board
  • Direttore operativo e responsabile della sicurezza delle informazioni
  • Autorità che vigilano sui fornitori terzi critici
  • Credit risk function
  • Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
  • Central bank as overseer and operator
  • Bank treasury
  • Central counterparty board and risk committee
  • Autorità di risoluzione

Readiness workflows

Preparazione finanziaria

Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.

Confine

What this page is not

Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.