Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise
Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.
Domain definition
What Banking Nexus studies
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.
Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.
| Termine | Definizione |
|---|---|
| Basel III | The Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. |
| Coefficiente CET1 | Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital. |
| Indice di copertura della liquidità | High-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period. |
| Expected credit loss | The probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for. |
Financial system context
The parts of the financial system it covers
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Rischio di credito e di controparte
Insolvenza, migrazione e concentrazione nei portafogli di prestiti e nelle esposizioni di negoziazione, e come le perdite passano tra le controparti.
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Capitale e liquidità
Capitale in grado di assorbire le perdite, riserve di liquidità e strutture di provvista, e come si comportano quando mercati e depositanti sono sotto stress.
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Resilienza operativa
Continuità dei servizi importanti in caso di incidenti cyber, guasti di terze parti e interruzioni dei processi, entro tolleranze d'impatto dichiarate.
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Pagamenti e infrastrutture di mercato
Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.
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Rischio climatico e naturale
Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.
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Modelli e IA
Modelli di credit scoring, accantonamento e capitale, e la validazione e governance che l'apprendimento automatico richiede oggi.
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Settore bancario ed economia reale
Prestiti a famiglie, piccole imprese, edilizia abitativa e servizi essenziali, e come lo stress bancario diventa una stretta creditizia.
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Governance e vigilanza
Consigli, cultura del rischio, linee di difesa, revisione prudenziale e pianificazione della risoluzione, incluse le strutture della banca islamica.
Tassonomia dei rischi
Risks, topic by topic
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Rischio di credito e di controparte
Il rischio di credito è la probabilità che un mutuatario o una controparte non paghi integralmente e puntualmente, e resta la principale fonte di perdite per la maggior parte delle banche.
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Capitale e liquidità
Il capitale assorbe le perdite e la liquidità consente a una banca di pagare i propri obblighi alla scadenza.
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Resilienza operativa delle banche
La resilienza operativa è la capacità di una banca di continuare a fornire servizi critici durante le perturbazioni, che derivino da un attacco informatico, da una modifica tecnologica non riuscita, da un'interruzione presso terzi o da una pandemia.
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Climate and nature bank risk
I cambiamenti climatici e la perdita di natura raggiungono le banche attraverso i loro mutuatari, le loro garanzie e i mercati da cui dipendono.
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Dipendenze dei pagamenti
Ogni banca dipende da sistemi di pagamento, controparti centrali, sistemi di regolamento titoli, banche corrispondenti e reti di messaggistica per trasferire denaro e garanzie.
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Model and ai risk
Le banche si affidano ai modelli per concedere credito, stabilire accantonamenti, prezzare prodotti, calcolare il capitale e individuare le frodi, e una quota crescente di questi modelli utilizza l'apprendimento automatico.
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Banking and real economy
Le banche trasformano i depositi in prestiti per famiglie, piccole e medie imprese e fornitori di servizi essenziali.
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Governance bancaria
Molti fallimenti bancari risalgono alla governance: consigli che non comprendevano i rischi assunti, incentivi che premiavano la crescita rispetto alla prudenza o funzioni di controllo prive dell'autorevolezza necessaria per contestare.
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Housing property finance
Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.
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Finanza bancaria islamica
Le banche islamiche operano con contratti e strutture di governance progettati per conformarsi al diritto commerciale islamico, utilizzando strumenti basati su vendita, locazione e partecipazione al posto dei prestiti fruttiferi di interessi.
Risk-transmission mechanisms
How these risks develop and spread
| Argomento | Meccanismo | Come funziona |
|---|---|---|
| Rischio di credito e di controparte | Quality erodes before default | Arrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised. |
| Rischio di credito e di controparte | Le perdite si concentrano | Le esposizioni si concentrano in settori, regioni, tipi di garanzia e grandi singole controparti. Uno shock a un segmento, come l'immobiliare commerciale o un settore esportatore, può determinare perdite ben superiori a quelle implicite in un modello di portafoglio diversificato. |
| Capitale e liquidità | Losses deplete capital | Credit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers. |
| Capitale e liquidità | I finanziamenti possono essere erogati rapidamente | Uninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing. |
| Resilienza operativa delle banche | Le dipendenze sono nascoste | A single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns. |
| Resilienza operativa delle banche | Third parties concentrate risk | Many banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Il rischio fisico colpisce garanzie e reddito | Alluvioni, tempeste, ondate di calore e siccità danneggiano i beni e interrompono la produzione. Le perdite non assicurate ricadono sui debitori, aumentando le probabilità di insolvenza e la perdita in caso di insolvenza, e il ritiro delle coperture assicurative può far rivedere i prezzi di interi portafogli di mutui regionali. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Il rischio di transizione riprezza i settori | Prezzo del carbonio, regolamentazione, tecnologia e spostamenti della domanda possono rendere incagliate le attività e comprimere i margini dei debitori ad alta intensità di emissioni. I tempi contano: una transizione tardiva e brusca produce perdite più marcate di una ordinata. |
| Dipendenze dei pagamenti | La liquidità è necessaria nell'arco della giornata | Il regolamento lordo in tempo reale richiede che le banche finanzino ciascun pagamento nel momento in cui viene effettuato. Se un partecipante di grandi dimensioni ritarda i pagamenti per conservare liquidità, gli altri attendono a loro volta e il blocco può formarsi nell'arco di poche ore. |
| Dipendenze dei pagamenti | Le controparti centrali concentrano il rischio | Clearing nets exposures and mutualises default losses. In stress, margin calls rise across members at the same time, and a member default draws on a default fund that all members share. |
| Model and ai risk | Drift and regime change | I modelli apprendono dai dati passati. Quando cambiano l'economia, il comportamento dei clienti o i prodotti, le relazioni si modificano e l'accuratezza si deteriora, spesso in modo silenzioso finché perdite o reclami non lo rivelano. |
| Model and ai risk | L'opacità indebolisce la possibilità di contestazione | Complex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does. |
| Banking and real economy | Credit supply tightens | When capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first. |
| Banking and real economy | Le tensioni dei debitori si ripercuotono a ritroso | Higher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy. |
| Governance bancaria | Board oversight sets the frame | The board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set. |
| Governance bancaria | Gli incentivi orientano i comportamenti | Una remunerazione legata ai ricavi a breve termine incoraggia l'assunzione di rischi i cui costi emergono in seguito. Differimento, malus e clawback mirano ad allineare la retribuzione all'esito del rischio nel momento in cui si realizza. |
| Housing property finance | Credit and prices reinforce each other | Easier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs. |
| Housing property finance | Accessibilità economica con tassi in aumento | I mutui a tasso variabile e a breve fissazione trasferiscono rapidamente gli aumenti dei tassi ai mutuatari. Gli oneri del servizio del debito aumentano, gli arretrati seguono con ritardo e il rifinanziamento può diventare impossibile per i mutuatari in difficoltà. |
| Finanza bancaria islamica | Contract structure shapes risk | Murabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label. |
| Finanza bancaria islamica | I conti di investimento condividono i rendimenti | In linea di principio i titolari di conti di investimento con partecipazione agli utili sopportano le perdite. La pressione competitiva può indurre le banche a stabilizzare i rendimenti e ad assorbire esse stesse le perdite, un trasferimento noto come rischio commerciale spostato. |
Domande di ricerca
Who decides, and what they need to know
| Decision holder | Domanda | Evidence the platform's pages describe |
|---|---|---|
| Bank board and board risk committee | What credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to impose | Misure di concentrazione, migrazione tra stadi e perdite da stress per segmento |
| Consiglio di amministrazione della banca e comitato per la gestione di attività e passività | What capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure funding | Proiezioni di capitale e liquidità in scenari interni e di vigilanza |
| Bank board | Which business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carry | Mappe dei servizi, risultati dei test di scenario e storico degli incidenti |
| Bank board and board risk committee | How climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planning | Valutazione di materialità, risultati degli scenari ed esposizioni settoriali |
| Central bank as overseer and operator | Which systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meet | Availability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows |
| Bank board and model risk committee | What model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptable | Inventario dei modelli, classificazione per livelli e risultanze della validazione |
| Autorità macroprudenziale o comitato per la politica finanziaria | Se fissare o rilasciare riserve di capitale e misure basate sul debitore | Scarti di credito, rapporti di servizio del debito e indagini sul credito |
| Bank board and nomination committee | Se competenze, indipendenza e informazioni del consiglio sono adeguate al profilo di rischio della banca | Valutazioni dell'efficacia del consiglio, matrici delle competenze e relazioni sui rischi |
| Autorità macroprudenziale | Se fissare o modificare misure sul rapporto prestito/valore, sul rapporto servizio del debito/reddito o misure patrimoniali settoriali | Rapporto prezzo-reddito, crescita del credito, criteri di concessione dei prestiti e arretrati |
| Bank board | What risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accounts | Displaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact |
These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.
Key indicators
What is measured, in which unit, by whom
| Indicatore | Unità | Cadenza | Tipo di fonte | Etichetta di evidenza |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tasso di crediti deteriorati | percentuale dei prestiti lordi | trimestrale | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Statistiche pubblicate |
| Quota dei prestiti di stadio 2 e stadio 3 | percentuale dei prestiti lordi | trimestrale | IFRS 9 financial statements | RIPORTATO |
| Coefficiente di capitale primario di classe 1 | percentuale delle attività ponderate per il rischio | trimestrale | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Statistiche pubblicate |
| Leverage ratio | percentuale della misura di esposizione totale | trimestrale | Segnalazioni di vigilanza | Statistiche pubblicate |
| Important business services within impact tolerance in testing | count of services tested and count passing | annuale | Scenario testing records | RIPORTATO |
| Incidenti rilevanti legati alle ICT | conteggio per classe di gravità | trimestrale | Segnalazioni di incidenti alle autorità di vigilanza | Statistiche pubblicate |
| Emissioni finanziate | tonnellate di anidride carbonica equivalente | annuale | PCAF methodology applied to loan and investment books | STIMATO |
| Esposizione ai settori rilevanti per la politica climatica | percent of loan book | annuale | Pillar 3 ESG disclosures | RIPORTATO |
| Value settled through large-value payment systems | currency units per day | giornaliero | Statistiche dei gestori di sistema | Statistiche pubblicate |
| Disponibilità del sistema di pagamento | percentuale delle ore di esercizio | mensile | Informative degli operatori | RIPORTATO |
| Model inventory coverage | count of models by tier and validation status | trimestrale | Model risk management records | RIPORTATO |
| Potere discriminante degli scorecard di credito | Coefficiente di Gini o area sotto la curva | annuale | Validazione dei modelli | MODELLATO |
| Divario credito/PIL | punti percentuali | trimestrale | Statistiche BIS sul credito | STIMATO |
| Standard di credito sui prestiti alle imprese | percentuale netta di banche che segnalano un irrigidimento | trimestrale | Indagini sul credito bancario | RIPORTATO |
| Membri del consiglio con competenze bancarie o di rischio | share of board | annuale | Informative sulla governance | DICHIARATO |
| Independent directors | share of board | annuale | Informative sulla governance | DICHIARATO |
| Rapporto prestito/valore all'erogazione | percent of property value | trimestrale | Loan-level and supervisory data | Statistiche pubblicate |
| Debt-service-to-income ratio at origination | percent of gross income | trimestrale | Dati a livello di prestito, indagini sulle famiglie | RIPORTATO |
| Coefficiente di adeguatezza patrimoniale delle banche islamiche | percentuale delle attività ponderate per il rischio | trimestrale | IFSB prudential indicators | Statistiche pubblicate |
| Non-performing financing ratio | percentuale del finanziamento lordo | trimestrale | IFSB prudential indicators | Statistiche pubblicate |
Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.
Metodologia
The methods the platform's work rests on
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Economia finanziaria
Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.
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Probability statistics
Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.
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Scienza delle reti
Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.
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Financial engineering
Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.
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Ai ml
Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.
Fonti di dati
Da dove provengono le evidenze
| Fonte | Cosa fornisce | Classe di licenza |
|---|---|---|
| Indicatori di solidità finanziaria del FMI | Crediti deteriorati, accantonamenti e distribuzione settoriale dei prestiti comunicati dalle autorità nazionali | Gratuito, termini d'uso del FMI |
| EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exercise | Dati a livello di singola banca su qualità degli attivi, concessioni (forbearance) e stadi IFRS 9 per le banche dell'UE | Gratuito, attribuzione |
| ECB Supervisory Banking Statistics | Asset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro area | Gratuito, attribuzione |
| FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9C | Loan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companies | Pubblico dominio |
| BIS consolidated banking statistics | Crediti esteri delle banche per paese e settore della controparte su base di rischio ultimo | Gratuito, condizioni d'uso della BIS |
| Rating agency default and recovery studies | Tassi storici di insolvenza e di recupero per classe di rating e settore | Su licenza, in abbonamento |
| Registri nazionali centrali del credito | Borrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysis | Restricted, supervisory access |
| Rapporti di monitoraggio Basilea III della BRI | Aggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banks | Gratuito, condizioni d'uso della BIS |
| Federal Reserve supervisory stress test results | Scenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banks | Pubblico dominio |
| Bank of England stress testing results | Scenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banks | Gratuito, condizioni d'uso della Bank of England |
| Stress test a livello dell'UE dell'EBA | Proiezioni del capitale a livello di singola banca in condizioni di stress secondo una metodologia comune | Gratuito, attribuzione |
| Informativa del Pilastro 3 | Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFR | Pubblico, condizioni bancarie |
| Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act | Registri degli accordi con terze parti ICT detenuti dalle autorità ed elenco pubblico dei fornitori ICT critici designati | Registri riservati alle autorità; elenco di designazione pubblico |
| ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publications | Supervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilities | Gratuito, attribuzione |
| Pubblicazioni della Bank of England e della PRA sulla resilienza operativa | Policy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports | Gratuito, condizioni d'uso della Bank of England |
| ORX operational risk loss data | Pooled loss events by event type and business line from member banks | Con licenza, abbonamento |
| Panorama delle minacce dell'ENISA per il settore finanziario | Analysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutions | Gratuito, attribuzione |
| Informative sul rischio operativo del Pilastro 3 | Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banks | Pubblico, condizioni bancarie |
| Scenari NGFS | Percorsi di rischio di transizione e di rischio fisico con variabili macroeconomiche per l'analisi di scenario | Gratuito, attribuzione |
| ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicators | Metodologia dell'esercizio di vigilanza e indicatori sperimentali sulle esposizioni delle banche dell'area dell'euro | Gratuito, attribuzione |
| Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario | Impostazione e risultati pubblicati dell'esercizio esplorativo per banche e compagnie assicurative del Regno Unito | Gratuito, condizioni d'uso della Bank of England |
| Informativa ESG del Pilastro 3 secondo gli standard dell'EBA | Bank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignment | Pubblico, condizioni bancarie |
| PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting Standard | Methodology and data quality scores for financed emissions | Standard gratuito; database dei fattori di emissione su abbonamento |
| Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard maps | Livelli di pericolo fisico per alluvioni, caldo e siccità | Gratuito e aperto, attribuzione |
Instruments explained for research
Analytical instruments
Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.
Il rischio di credito
A credit portfolio's loss distribution
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.
- Perdita di portafoglio
- Expected loss
With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.
Comandi
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Perdita in caso di insolvenza
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Risultati
- Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
- 0.45
- Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
- 2.36
- Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 3.61
Data, source and model record
| Tempo di ritorno (anni) | Loss (% of exposure) |
|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 |
| 4 | 0.59 |
| 8 | 0.91 |
| 17 | 1.28 |
| 34 | 1.68 |
| 70 | 2.13 |
| 141 | 2.60 |
| 288 | 3.11 |
| 585 | 3.64 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 |
- Fonte
- This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
- Ambito
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Unità
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Stato
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modello
- gra.credit.one-factor
- Versione
- 1.0.0
- Titolare
- GRA platforms lane
- Finalità
- To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
- Risk domain
- Rischio di credito e di controparte
- Ipotesi
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Input
- Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Dati
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Metodi
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
- Validazione
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Limiti
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Incertezza
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Concentrazione
One large exposure and the tail
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.
- Granular portfolio
- With the large exposure
Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.
Comandi
- Share of the largest exposure
- 5.0 % of the portfolio
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Perdita in caso di insolvenza
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Risultati
- Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
- 4.55
- Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
- 0.49
- Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
- 400
Data, source and model record
| Tempo di ritorno (anni) | Granular (%) | With the large exposure (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 | 0.28 |
| 4 | 0.59 | 0.56 |
| 8 | 0.91 | 0.89 |
| 17 | 1.28 | 1.29 |
| 34 | 1.68 | 1.81 |
| 70 | 2.13 | 2.53 |
| 141 | 2.60 | 3.06 |
| 288 | 3.11 | 3.57 |
| 585 | 3.64 | 4.12 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 | 4.69 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 | 5.29 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 | 5.91 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 | 6.56 |
- Fonte
- This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
- Ambito
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Unità
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Stato
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modello
- gra.credit.concentration
- Versione
- 1.0.0
- Titolare
- GRA platforms lane
- Finalità
- To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
- Risk domain
- Rischio di credito e di controparte
- Ipotesi
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Input
- Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Dati
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Metodi
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
- Validazione
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Limiti
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Incertezza
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Liquidità
The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.
- Outflow over 30 days by funding class
- Net outflows after capped inflows
- Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.
Comandi
- High-quality liquid assets
- 15.0 % of total funding
- Stable retail deposits
- 30 % of total funding
- Less stable retail deposits
- 20 % of total funding
- Operational deposits
- 15 % of total funding
- Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
- 15 % of total funding
- Unsecured funding from financial institutions
- 10 % of total funding
- Contractual inflows over 30 days
- 5.0 % of total funding
- Stress on run-off rates
- 1.00 times the baseline
Risultati
- Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
- 23.3
- Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
- 5.00
- Net outflows (% of total funding)
- 18.3
- Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
- 82
Data, source and model record
| Funding class | Balance (% of funding) | Run-off rate (%) | Outflow (% of funding) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stable retail deposits | 30.0 | 5 | 1.50 |
| Less stable retail deposits | 20.0 | 10 | 2.00 |
| Operational deposits | 15.0 | 25 | 3.75 |
| Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates | 15.0 | 40 | 6.00 |
| Unsecured funding from financial institutions | 10.0 | 100 | 10.0 |
- Fonte
- Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
- Date
- BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
- Ambito
- A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
- Unità
- Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Stato
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modello
- gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
- Versione
- 1.0.0
- Titolare
- GRA platforms lane
- Finalità
- To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Risk domain
- rischio di liquidità
- Ipotesi
- Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
- Input
- High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
- Dati
- BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
- Metodi
- Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
- Validazione
- Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
- Limiti
- Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
- Incertezza
- None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
- Approved use
- Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Prohibited use
- Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Rete di esposizione
Come uno shock sui beni diventa una perdita di sistema
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.
- System equity lost
Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.
Comandi
- Calo delle attività esterne
- 2.0 %
Risultati
- Calo delle attività esterne (%)
- 2.0
- System equity lost in the first round (%)
- 18.0
- System equity lost after contagion (%)
- 45.0
- Amplification by the network (percentage points)
- 27.0
- Banks in default (of 20)
- 0
Data, source and model record
| Round | Patrimonio del sistema perso (%) | Banche in default |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.0 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.8 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.3 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.2 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.5 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.9 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.7 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.2 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.5 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.7 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.8 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 13 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 14 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 15 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 16 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.0 | 0 |
- Fonte
- Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
- Ambito
- A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
- Unità
- Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Stato
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modello
- gra.network.debtrank
- Versione
- 1.0.0
- Titolare
- GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
- Finalità
- To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
- Risk domain
- Systemic and contagion risk
- Ipotesi
- Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
- Input
- Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
- Dati
- None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
- Metodi
- DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
- Validazione
- The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
- Limiti
- No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
- Incertezza
- Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
- Approved use
- Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
- Prohibited use
- Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Analisi di scenario
Scenarios, not forecasts
A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.
Regulatory context and related standards
The frameworks this work is read against
| Quadro | Organo | Che cosa stabilisce | Edition or date | Where it applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quadro di Basilea III | Comitato di Basilea per la vigilanza bancaria | Requisiti minimi di capitale, leva finanziaria, copertura della liquidità e provvista stabile, e le riserve di capitale aggiuntive | December 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel Framework | Basel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables |
| Principi fondamentali per un'efficace vigilanza bancaria | Comitato di Basilea per la vigilanza bancaria | Standard di base per poteri di vigilanza, autorizzazioni, gestione del rischio e governance, valutati negli FSAP del FMI e della Banca mondiale | Revised April 2024 | International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs |
| Principi per la gestione e la vigilanza efficaci dei rischi finanziari legati al clima | Comitato di Basilea per la vigilanza bancaria | Aspettative sulla governance, sulla gestione del rischio e sull'analisi di scenario del rischio legato al clima da parte delle banche, e sulla relativa revisione di vigilanza | June 2022 | Basel Committee members, through national supervisors |
| Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions | Consiglio per la stabilità finanziaria | Poteri di risoluzione, pianificazione del risanamento e della risoluzione e cooperazione transfrontaliera affinché una banca possa fallire senza il sostegno dei contribuenti | October 2011, updated October 2014 | FSB member jurisdictions |
| IFRS 9 Strumenti finanziari | International Accounting Standards Board | Classificazione delle attività finanziarie e accantonamenti per perdite attese su crediti in ottica prospettica, in tre stadi | Issued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018 | Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead) |
| Scenari climatici NGFS | Network for Greening the Financial System | Percorsi di riferimento del rischio di transizione e del rischio fisico usati da banche centrali e autorità di vigilanza per l'analisi di scenari climatici | Phase V, November 2024 | Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding |
| IFRS S2 Informativa sul clima | International Sustainability Standards Board | Informativa su rischi e opportunità legati al clima, incluse le emissioni finanziate e la resilienza climatica | Issued June 2023, amended December 2025 | Where a jurisdiction adopts it |
| Processo di revisione e valutazione prudenziale (SREP) | Autorità bancaria europea e Vigilanza bancaria della BCE | Processo di vigilanza che valuta modello di business, governance e rischi per capitale e liquidità, e fissa requisiti e orientamenti di Pilastro 2 | EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022) | European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks |
| Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) e stress test di vigilanza | Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System | Processo di vigilanza su scenari di stress e revisione dei piani patrimoniali che fissa la riserva di capitale per lo stress delle grandi banche statunitensi | Annual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020 | United States, large bank holding companies |
| ISO 31000 Gestione del rischio - Linee guida | Organizzazione internazionale per la normazione | Principi, quadro di riferimento e processo per la gestione del rischio in un'organizzazione | ISO 31000:2018 | International, voluntary |
Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.
Geographic dimensions
Global, regional and country programmes
Institutional counterparts
The institutions this work speaks to
- Bank board and board risk committee
- Chief risk officer and credit committee
- Autorità di vigilanza prudenziale
- Autorità macroprudenziale
- Consiglio di amministrazione della banca e comitato per la gestione di attività e passività
- Autorità di vigilanza prudenziale tramite SREP o CCAR
- Banca centrale
- Bank board
- Direttore operativo e responsabile della sicurezza delle informazioni
- Autorità che vigilano sui fornitori terzi critici
- Credit risk function
- Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
- Central bank as overseer and operator
- Bank treasury
- Central counterparty board and risk committee
- Autorità di risoluzione
Pubblicazioni di ricerca
Research, methods and sources
Educational resources
Learn the methods
Readiness workflows
Preparazione finanziaria
Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.
Contribution mechanisms
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What this page is not
Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.