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Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise

Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.

Go to the instrumentsBanking Nexus home

Domain definition

What Banking Nexus studies

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.

Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.

IstilahDefinisi
Basel IIIThe Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks.
Rasio CET1Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital.
Rasio kecukupan likuiditasHigh-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period.
Expected credit lossThe probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for.

Financial system context

The parts of the financial system it covers

  • Risiko kredit dan pihak lawan

    Gagal bayar, migrasi, dan konsentrasi dalam portofolio pinjaman dan eksposur perdagangan, serta bagaimana kerugian berpindah antarpihak lawan.

  • Modal dan likuiditas

    Modal penyerap kerugian, penyangga likuiditas, dan struktur pendanaan, serta perilakunya ketika pasar dan deposan mengalami tekanan.

  • Ketahanan operasional

    Kesinambungan layanan penting selama insiden siber, kegagalan pihak ketiga, dan gangguan proses, dalam batas toleransi dampak yang dinyatakan.

  • Pembayaran dan infrastruktur pasar

    Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.

  • Risiko iklim dan alam

    Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.

  • Model dan AI

    Model penilaian kredit, pencadangan, dan modal, serta validasi dan tata kelola yang kini dituntut oleh pembelajaran mesin.

  • Perbankan dan ekonomi riil

    Pinjaman kepada rumah tangga, usaha kecil, perumahan, dan layanan esensial, serta bagaimana tekanan perbankan berubah menjadi pengetatan kredit.

  • Tata kelola dan pengawasan

    Dewan, budaya risiko, lini pertahanan, tinjauan pengawasan, dan perencanaan resolusi, termasuk struktur perbankan syariah.

Taksonomi risiko

Risks, topic by topic

  • Risiko kredit dan pihak lawan

    Risiko kredit adalah kemungkinan debitur atau pihak lawan gagal membayar secara penuh dan tepat waktu, dan tetap menjadi sumber kerugian utama bagi sebagian besar bank.

  • Modal dan likuiditas

    Modal menyerap kerugian dan likuiditas menjaga bank tetap membayar kewajibannya saat jatuh tempo.

  • Ketahanan operasional bank

    Ketahanan operasional adalah kemampuan bank untuk terus memberikan layanan kritis selama terjadi gangguan, baik akibat serangan siber, perubahan teknologi yang gagal, gangguan layanan pihak ketiga, maupun pandemi.

  • Climate and nature bank risk

    Perubahan iklim dan hilangnya alam menjangkau bank melalui debitur, agunan, dan pasar yang menjadi sandarannya.

  • Ketergantungan pembayaran

    Setiap bank bergantung pada sistem pembayaran, lembaga kliring sentral (central counterparty), sistem penyelesaian efek, bank koresponden, dan jaringan pesan untuk memindahkan uang dan agunan.

  • Model and ai risk

    Bank mengandalkan model untuk memberikan kredit, menetapkan pencadangan, menetapkan harga produk, menghitung modal, dan mendeteksi penipuan, dan semakin banyak model tersebut menggunakan pembelajaran mesin.

  • Banking and real economy

    Bank mengubah simpanan menjadi pinjaman bagi rumah tangga, usaha kecil dan menengah, dan penyedia layanan esensial.

  • Tata kelola bank

    Banyak kegagalan bank berakar pada tata kelola: dewan yang tidak memahami risiko yang diambil, insentif yang lebih menghargai pertumbuhan daripada kehati-hatian, atau fungsi pengendalian yang tidak memiliki kedudukan untuk menantang.

  • Housing property finance

    Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.

  • Perbankan syariah

    Bank syariah beroperasi berdasarkan akad dan struktur tata kelola yang dirancang untuk mematuhi hukum dagang Islam, dengan menggunakan instrumen berbasis jual beli, sewa, dan kemitraan sebagai pengganti pinjaman berbunga.

Risk-transmission mechanisms

How these risks develop and spread

TopikMekanismeCara kerjanya
Risiko kredit dan pihak lawanQuality erodes before defaultArrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised.
Risiko kredit dan pihak lawanLosses concentrateEksposur menggumpal pada sektor, wilayah, jenis agunan dan debitur tunggal besar. Guncangan pada satu segmen, seperti properti komersial atau industri ekspor, dapat menimbulkan kerugian yang jauh melampaui perkiraan model portofolio yang terdiversifikasi.
Modal dan likuiditasKerugian menggerus modalCredit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers.
Modal dan likuiditasFunding can run quicklySimpanan tidak terjamin, pendanaan grosir, dan pembiayaan beragun dapat ditarik dalam hitungan hari, bahkan lebih cepat dengan perbankan digital dan penyebaran informasi yang cepat. Basis simpanan yang terkonsentrasi dan ketidaksesuaian jatuh tempo membuat penarikan dana massal saling menguatkan.
Ketahanan operasional bankKetergantungan tersembunyiA single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.
Ketahanan operasional bankPihak ketiga memusatkan risikoMany banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
Climate and nature bank riskPhysical risk hits collateral and incomeFloods, storms, heat and drought damage property and disrupt production. Uninsured losses fall on borrowers, raising default probabilities and loss given default, and insurance withdrawal can reprice whole regional mortgage books.
Climate and nature bank riskTransition risk reprices sectorsCarbon pricing, regulation, technology and shifting demand can strand assets and squeeze the margins of emissions-intensive borrowers. Timing matters: a late and abrupt transition produces sharper losses than an orderly one.
Ketergantungan pembayaranLikuiditas dibutuhkan dalam hari yang samaReal-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours.
Ketergantungan pembayaranCentral counterparties concentrate riskClearing nets exposures and mutualises default losses. In stress, margin calls rise across members at the same time, and a member default draws on a default fund that all members share.
Model and ai riskDrift and regime changeModels learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it.
Model and ai riskOpacity weakens challengeModel pembelajaran mesin yang kompleks dapat sulit dijelaskan kepada petugas kredit, nasabah, dan pengawas. Tantangan yang efektif, salah satu pilar tata kelola model, menjadi lebih lemah ketika tidak ada yang dapat menjelaskan mengapa sebuah model mengambil keputusan tertentu.
Banking and real economyCredit supply tightensWhen capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first.
Banking and real economyBorrower stress feeds backHigher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy.
Tata kelola bankPengawasan dewan menetapkan kerangkaThe board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set.
Tata kelola bankIncentives shape behaviourRemuneration tied to short-term revenue encourages risk-taking whose costs appear later. Deferral, malus and clawback aim to align pay with the risk outcome as it is realised.
Housing property financeCredit and prices reinforce each otherEasier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs.
Housing property financeAffordability under rising ratesVariable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers.
Perbankan syariahStruktur kontrak membentuk risikoMurabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label.
Perbankan syariahInvestment accounts share returnsProfit-sharing investment account holders bear losses in principle. Competitive pressure can lead banks to smooth returns and absorb losses themselves, a transfer known as displaced commercial risk.

Pertanyaan penelitian

Who decides, and what they need to know

Decision holderPertanyaanEvidence the platform's pages describe
Bank board and board risk committeeWhat credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to imposeUkuran konsentrasi, migrasi tahap, dan kerugian uji ketahanan per segmen
Bank board and asset liability committeeWhat capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure fundingProyeksi modal dan likuiditas dalam skenario internal dan pengawasan
Dewan direksi bankWhich business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryPeta layanan, hasil uji skenario, dan riwayat insiden
Bank board and board risk committeeHow climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planningPenilaian materialitas, hasil skenario, dan keterpaparan sektoral
Central bank as overseer and operatorWhich systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meetData ketersediaan, insiden, dan partisipasi; konsentrasi arus
Bank board and model risk committeeWhat model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptableInventaris model, penjenjangan, dan temuan validasi
Otoritas makroprudensial atau komite kebijakan keuanganWhether to set or release capital buffers and borrower-based measuresCredit gaps, debt service ratios and lending surveys
Bank board and nomination committeeWhether board skills, independence and information are adequate for the bank's risk profileBoard effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports
Otoritas makroprudensialApakah akan menetapkan atau menyesuaikan rasio pinjaman terhadap nilai agunan, rasio cicilan utang terhadap pendapatan, atau ukuran modal sektoralRasio harga terhadap pendapatan, pertumbuhan kredit, standar pemberian kredit, dan tunggakan
Dewan direksi bankWhat risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accountsDisplaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact

These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.

Key indicators

What is measured, in which unit, by whom

IndikatorUnitKadensiJenis sumberLabel bukti
Non-performing loan ratiopersen dari total pinjamansetiap kuartalSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresStatistik yang diterbitkan
Pangsa pinjaman tahap 2 dan tahap 3persen dari total pinjamansetiap kuartalLaporan keuangan IFRS 9DILAPORKAN
Common equity tier 1 ratiopersen aset tertimbang menurut risikosetiap kuartalSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresStatistik yang diterbitkan
Rasio leveragepercent of total exposure measuresetiap kuartalLaporan pengawasanStatistik yang diterbitkan
Layanan bisnis penting dalam batas toleransi dampak pada pengujiancount of services tested and count passingtahunanCatatan pengujian skenarioDILAPORKAN
Insiden besar terkait TIKjumlah menurut kelas keparahansetiap kuartalIncident reports to supervisorsStatistik yang diterbitkan
Emisi yang dibiayaiton setara karbon dioksidatahunanPCAF methodology applied to loan and investment booksESTIMASI
Exposure to climate-policy-relevant sectorspercent of loan booktahunanPillar 3 ESG disclosuresDILAPORKAN
Value settled through large-value payment systemscurrency units per daysetiap hariStatistik operator sistemStatistik yang diterbitkan
Ketersediaan sistem pembayaranpersen jam operasisetiap bulanPengungkapan operatorDILAPORKAN
Model inventory coveragecount of models by tier and validation statussetiap kuartalModel risk management recordsDILAPORKAN
Discriminatory power of credit scorecardsGini coefficient or area under the curvetahunanValidasi modelDIMODELKAN
Kesenjangan kredit terhadap PDBpoin persentasesetiap kuartalStatistik kredit BISESTIMASI
Credit standards on loans to enterprisesnet percentage of banks reporting tighteningsetiap kuartalSurvei pinjaman bankDILAPORKAN
Anggota dewan dengan keahlian perbankan atau risikoshare of boardtahunanGovernance disclosuresDINYATAKAN
Direktur independenshare of boardtahunanGovernance disclosuresDINYATAKAN
Rasio pinjaman terhadap nilai pada saat pemberianpercent of property valuesetiap kuartalData tingkat pinjaman dan data pengawasanStatistik yang diterbitkan
Rasio cicilan utang terhadap pendapatan saat pemberian kreditpersen dari pendapatan kotorsetiap kuartalLoan-level data, household surveysDILAPORKAN
Rasio kecukupan modal bank syariahpersen aset tertimbang menurut risikosetiap kuartalIFSB prudential indicatorsStatistik yang diterbitkan
Non-performing financing ratiopersen dari pembiayaan brutosetiap kuartalIFSB prudential indicatorsStatistik yang diterbitkan

Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.

Metodologi

The methods the platform's work rests on

  • Ekonomi keuangan

    Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.

  • Probability statistics

    Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.

  • Ilmu jaringan

    Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.

  • Financial engineering

    Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.

  • Ai ml

    Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.

Sumber data

Dari mana bukti berasal

SumberApa yang diberikannyaKelas lisensi
Indikator Kesehatan Sektor Keuangan IMFKredit bermasalah, pencadangan, dan distribusi kredit sektoral yang dilaporkan oleh otoritas nasionalGratis, ketentuan penggunaan IMF
EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exerciseBank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banksGratis, dengan atribusi
Statistik Pengawasan Perbankan ECBAsset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro areaGratis, dengan atribusi
FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9CLoan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companiesDomain publik
Statistik perbankan konsolidasi BISKlaim luar negeri bank menurut negara dan sektor pihak lawan berdasarkan risiko akhirGratis, dengan ketentuan penggunaan BIS
Rating agency default and recovery studiesHistorical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sectorBerlisensi, berlangganan
National central credit registersBorrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysisAkses terbatas untuk pengawasan
BIS Basel III monitoring reportsAggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banksGratis, dengan ketentuan penggunaan BIS
Federal Reserve supervisory stress test resultsScenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banksDomain publik
Hasil uji ketahanan Bank of EnglandScenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banksGratis, ketentuan penggunaan Bank of England
Uji ketahanan EBA se-Uni EropaProyeksi modal bank dalam kondisi tekanan dengan metodologi bersamaGratis, dengan atribusi
Pengungkapan Pilar 3Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFRPublik, ketentuan bank
Register dan penetapan penyedia kritis berdasarkan Digital Operational Resilience Act Uni EropaRegister pengaturan pihak ketiga TIK yang dipegang otoritas dan daftar publik penyedia TIK kritis yang ditetapkanRegisters restricted to authorities; designation list public
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publicationsSupervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilitiesGratis, dengan atribusi
Bank of England and PRA operational resilience publicationsPolicy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reportsGratis, ketentuan penggunaan Bank of England
ORX operational risk loss dataPooled loss events by event type and business line from member banksBerlisensi, keanggotaan
ENISA threat landscape for the finance sectorAnalysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutionsGratis, dengan atribusi
Pillar 3 operational risk disclosuresOperational risk capital and loss summaries published by banksPublik, ketentuan bank
Skenario NGFSJalur risiko transisi dan risiko fisik dengan variabel makroekonomi untuk analisis skenarioGratis, dengan atribusi
ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicatorsSupervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposuresGratis, dengan atribusi
Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory ScenarioRancangan dan hasil yang dipublikasikan dari latihan eksploratori bagi bank dan perusahaan asuransi di InggrisGratis, ketentuan penggunaan Bank of England
Pillar 3 ESG disclosures under EBA standardsBank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignmentPublik, ketentuan bank
PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting StandardMethodology and data quality scores for financed emissionsFree standard; emission factor database by membership
Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard mapsPhysical hazard layers for flood, heat and droughtGratis dan terbuka, dengan atribusi

Instruments explained for research

Analytical instruments

Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.

risiko kredit

A credit portfolio's loss distribution

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.

02468 1 in 21 dalam 10 tahun1 dalam 100 tahun1 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Kerugian portofolio
  • Expected loss

With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.

Kendali

Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Kerugian jika terjadi gagal bayar
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Hasil

Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
0.45
Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
2.36
Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
4.06
Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
3.61
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period
Periode ulang (tahun)Loss (% of exposure)
20.30
40.59
80.91
171.28
341.68
702.13
1412.60
2883.11
5853.64
1,1894.20
2,4184.79
4,9185.41
10,0006.04
Sumber
This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
Tanggal
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
Lingkup
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Unit
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Status
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Model
gra.credit.one-factor
Versi
1.0.0
Pemilik
GRA platforms lane
Tujuan
To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
Risk domain
Risiko kredit dan pihak lawan
Asumsi
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Masukan
Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Data
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Metode
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
Validasi
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Keterbatasan
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Ketidakpastian
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Konsentrasi

One large exposure and the tail

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.

02468 1 in 21 dalam 10 tahun1 dalam 100 tahun1 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Granular portfolio
  • With the large exposure

Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.

Kendali

Share of the largest exposure
5.0 % of the portfolio
Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Kerugian jika terjadi gagal bayar
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Hasil

Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
4.06
Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
4.55
Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
0.49
Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
400
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period, granular and concentrated
Periode ulang (tahun)Granular (%)With the large exposure (%)
20.300.28
40.590.56
80.910.89
171.281.29
341.681.81
702.132.53
1412.603.06
2883.113.57
5853.644.12
1,1894.204.69
2,4184.795.29
4,9185.415.91
10,0006.046.56
Sumber
This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
Tanggal
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
Lingkup
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Unit
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Status
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Model
gra.credit.concentration
Versi
1.0.0
Pemilik
GRA platforms lane
Tujuan
To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
Risk domain
Risiko kredit dan pihak lawan
Asumsi
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Masukan
Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Data
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Metode
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
Validasi
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Keterbatasan
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Ketidakpastian
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Likuiditas

The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.

  • Stable retail 1.50
  • Less stable retail 2.00
  • Operational deposits 3.75
  • Corporate, non-operational 6.00
  • Lembaga keuangan 10.0
  • Net outflows 18.3
  • Liquid assets (HQLA) 15.0
  • Outflow over 30 days by funding class
  • Net outflows after capped inflows
  • Stock of high-quality liquid assets

Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.

Kendali

High-quality liquid assets
15.0 % of total funding
Stable retail deposits
30 % of total funding
Less stable retail deposits
20 % of total funding
Operational deposits
15 % of total funding
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
15 % of total funding
Unsecured funding from financial institutions
10 % of total funding
Contractual inflows over 30 days
5.0 % of total funding
Stress on run-off rates
1.00 times the baseline

Hasil

Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
23.3
Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
5.00
Net outflows (% of total funding)
18.3
Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
82
Data, source and model record
Outflows by funding class and the stock of liquid assets
Funding classBalance (% of funding)Run-off rate (%)Outflow (% of funding)
Stable retail deposits30.051.50
Less stable retail deposits20.0102.00
Operational deposits15.0253.75
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates15.0406.00
Unsecured funding from financial institutions10.010010.0
Sumber
Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
Tanggal
BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
Lingkup
A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
Unit
Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Status
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Model
gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
Versi
1.0.0
Pemilik
GRA platforms lane
Tujuan
To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
Risk domain
risiko likuiditas
Asumsi
Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
Masukan
High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
Data
BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
Metode
Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
Validasi
Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
Keterbatasan
Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
Ketidakpastian
None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
Approved use
Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
Prohibited use
Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.

Jaringan eksposur

Bagaimana guncangan pada aset menjadi kerugian sistem

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.

0255075100 051015202530 Contagion round Ekuitas sistem yang hilang (%)
  • System equity lost

Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.

Kendali

Penurunan aset eksternal
2.0 %

Hasil

Penurunan aset eksternal (%)
2.0
System equity lost in the first round (%)
18.0
System equity lost after contagion (%)
45.0
Amplification by the network (percentage points)
27.0
Banks in default (of 20)
0
Data, source and model record
System equity lost, round by round
PutaranEkuitas sistem yang hilang (%)Bank yang gagal bayar
018.00
128.80
235.30
339.20
441.50
542.90
643.70
744.20
844.50
944.70
1044.80
1144.90
1244.90
1345.00
1445.00
1545.00
1645.00
1745.00
1845.00
1945.00
2045.00
2145.00
2245.00
2345.00
2445.00
2545.00
2645.00
2745.00
2845.00
2945.00
3045.00
Sumber
Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
Tanggal
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
Lingkup
A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
Unit
Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Status
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Model
gra.network.debtrank
Versi
1.0.0
Pemilik
GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
Tujuan
To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
Risk domain
Systemic and contagion risk
Asumsi
Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
Masukan
Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
Data
None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
Metode
DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
Validasi
The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
Keterbatasan
No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
Ketidakpastian
Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
Approved use
Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
Prohibited use
Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.

Analisis skenario

Scenarios, not forecasts

A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.

Regulatory context and related standards

The frameworks this work is read against

KerangkaBadanApa yang ditetapkanEdition or dateWhere it applies
Kerangka Basel IIIKomite Basel untuk Pengawasan PerbankanPersyaratan modal minimum, leverage, cakupan likuiditas, dan pendanaan stabil serta penyangga modal di atasnyaDecember 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel FrameworkBasel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables
Core Principles for Effective Banking SupervisionKomite Basel untuk Pengawasan PerbankanStandar dasar untuk kewenangan pengawasan, perizinan, manajemen risiko, dan tata kelola, yang dinilai dalam FSAP IMF dan Bank DuniaRevised April 2024International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs
Prinsip pengelolaan dan pengawasan yang efektif atas risiko keuangan terkait iklimKomite Basel untuk Pengawasan PerbankanEkspektasi untuk tata kelola bank, manajemen risiko, dan analisis skenario risiko terkait iklim, serta untuk tinjauan pengawasannyaJune 2022Basel Committee members, through national supervisors
Atribut Utama Rezim Resolusi yang Efektif bagi Lembaga KeuanganDewan Stabilitas Keuangan (Financial Stability Board)Kewenangan resolusi, perencanaan pemulihan dan resolusi, serta kerja sama lintas batas agar bank dapat gagal tanpa dukungan pembayar pajakOctober 2011, updated October 2014FSB member jurisdictions
IFRS 9 Instrumen KeuanganInternational Accounting Standards BoardKlasifikasi aset keuangan dan pencadangan kerugian kredit ekspektasian yang berwawasan ke depan dalam tiga tahapIssued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead)
Skenario iklim NGFSNetwork for Greening the Financial SystemJalur risiko transisi dan fisik acuan yang digunakan bank sentral dan pengawas untuk analisis skenario iklimPhase V, November 2024Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding
IFRS S2 Pengungkapan terkait IklimInternational Sustainability Standards BoardPengungkapan risiko dan peluang terkait iklim, termasuk emisi yang dibiayai dan ketahanan iklimIssued June 2023, amended December 2025Where a jurisdiction adopts it
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP)European Banking Authority dan ECB Banking SupervisionProses pengawasan yang menilai model bisnis, tata kelola, dan risiko terhadap modal dan likuiditas, serta menetapkan persyaratan dan panduan Pilar 2EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022)European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) dan uji tekanan pengawasanBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemProses pengawasan atas skenario tekanan dan tinjauan rencana permodalan yang menetapkan penyangga modal tekanan bagi bank besar di ASAnnual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020United States, large bank holding companies
Pedoman manajemen risiko ISO 31000Organisasi Internasional untuk StandardisasiPrinsip, kerangka, dan proses untuk mengelola risiko di seluruh organisasiISO 31000:2018International, voluntary

Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.

Institutional counterparts

The institutions this work speaks to

  • Bank board and board risk committee
  • Kepala manajemen risiko dan komite kredit
  • Pengawas prudensial
  • Otoritas makroprudensial
  • Bank board and asset liability committee
  • Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
  • Bank sentral
  • Dewan direksi bank
  • Kepala operasional dan kepala keamanan informasi
  • Authorities overseeing critical third parties
  • Credit risk function
  • Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
  • Central bank as overseer and operator
  • Bank treasury
  • Central counterparty board and risk committee
  • Resolution authority

Readiness workflows

Kesiapan pembiayaan

Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.

Batas wilayah

What this page is not

Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.