Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise
Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.
Domain definition
What Banking Nexus studies
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.
Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.
| Istilah | Definisi |
|---|---|
| Basel III | The Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. |
| Rasio CET1 | Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital. |
| Rasio kecukupan likuiditas | High-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period. |
| Expected credit loss | The probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for. |
Financial system context
The parts of the financial system it covers
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Risiko kredit dan pihak lawan
Gagal bayar, migrasi, dan konsentrasi dalam portofolio pinjaman dan eksposur perdagangan, serta bagaimana kerugian berpindah antarpihak lawan.
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Modal dan likuiditas
Modal penyerap kerugian, penyangga likuiditas, dan struktur pendanaan, serta perilakunya ketika pasar dan deposan mengalami tekanan.
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Ketahanan operasional
Kesinambungan layanan penting selama insiden siber, kegagalan pihak ketiga, dan gangguan proses, dalam batas toleransi dampak yang dinyatakan.
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Pembayaran dan infrastruktur pasar
Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.
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Risiko iklim dan alam
Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.
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Model dan AI
Model penilaian kredit, pencadangan, dan modal, serta validasi dan tata kelola yang kini dituntut oleh pembelajaran mesin.
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Perbankan dan ekonomi riil
Pinjaman kepada rumah tangga, usaha kecil, perumahan, dan layanan esensial, serta bagaimana tekanan perbankan berubah menjadi pengetatan kredit.
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Tata kelola dan pengawasan
Dewan, budaya risiko, lini pertahanan, tinjauan pengawasan, dan perencanaan resolusi, termasuk struktur perbankan syariah.
Taksonomi risiko
Risks, topic by topic
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Risiko kredit dan pihak lawan
Risiko kredit adalah kemungkinan debitur atau pihak lawan gagal membayar secara penuh dan tepat waktu, dan tetap menjadi sumber kerugian utama bagi sebagian besar bank.
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Modal dan likuiditas
Modal menyerap kerugian dan likuiditas menjaga bank tetap membayar kewajibannya saat jatuh tempo.
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Ketahanan operasional bank
Ketahanan operasional adalah kemampuan bank untuk terus memberikan layanan kritis selama terjadi gangguan, baik akibat serangan siber, perubahan teknologi yang gagal, gangguan layanan pihak ketiga, maupun pandemi.
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Climate and nature bank risk
Perubahan iklim dan hilangnya alam menjangkau bank melalui debitur, agunan, dan pasar yang menjadi sandarannya.
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Ketergantungan pembayaran
Setiap bank bergantung pada sistem pembayaran, lembaga kliring sentral (central counterparty), sistem penyelesaian efek, bank koresponden, dan jaringan pesan untuk memindahkan uang dan agunan.
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Model and ai risk
Bank mengandalkan model untuk memberikan kredit, menetapkan pencadangan, menetapkan harga produk, menghitung modal, dan mendeteksi penipuan, dan semakin banyak model tersebut menggunakan pembelajaran mesin.
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Banking and real economy
Bank mengubah simpanan menjadi pinjaman bagi rumah tangga, usaha kecil dan menengah, dan penyedia layanan esensial.
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Tata kelola bank
Banyak kegagalan bank berakar pada tata kelola: dewan yang tidak memahami risiko yang diambil, insentif yang lebih menghargai pertumbuhan daripada kehati-hatian, atau fungsi pengendalian yang tidak memiliki kedudukan untuk menantang.
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Housing property finance
Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.
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Perbankan syariah
Bank syariah beroperasi berdasarkan akad dan struktur tata kelola yang dirancang untuk mematuhi hukum dagang Islam, dengan menggunakan instrumen berbasis jual beli, sewa, dan kemitraan sebagai pengganti pinjaman berbunga.
Risk-transmission mechanisms
How these risks develop and spread
| Topik | Mekanisme | Cara kerjanya |
|---|---|---|
| Risiko kredit dan pihak lawan | Quality erodes before default | Arrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised. |
| Risiko kredit dan pihak lawan | Losses concentrate | Eksposur menggumpal pada sektor, wilayah, jenis agunan dan debitur tunggal besar. Guncangan pada satu segmen, seperti properti komersial atau industri ekspor, dapat menimbulkan kerugian yang jauh melampaui perkiraan model portofolio yang terdiversifikasi. |
| Modal dan likuiditas | Kerugian menggerus modal | Credit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers. |
| Modal dan likuiditas | Funding can run quickly | Simpanan tidak terjamin, pendanaan grosir, dan pembiayaan beragun dapat ditarik dalam hitungan hari, bahkan lebih cepat dengan perbankan digital dan penyebaran informasi yang cepat. Basis simpanan yang terkonsentrasi dan ketidaksesuaian jatuh tempo membuat penarikan dana massal saling menguatkan. |
| Ketahanan operasional bank | Ketergantungan tersembunyi | A single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns. |
| Ketahanan operasional bank | Pihak ketiga memusatkan risiko | Many banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Physical risk hits collateral and income | Floods, storms, heat and drought damage property and disrupt production. Uninsured losses fall on borrowers, raising default probabilities and loss given default, and insurance withdrawal can reprice whole regional mortgage books. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Transition risk reprices sectors | Carbon pricing, regulation, technology and shifting demand can strand assets and squeeze the margins of emissions-intensive borrowers. Timing matters: a late and abrupt transition produces sharper losses than an orderly one. |
| Ketergantungan pembayaran | Likuiditas dibutuhkan dalam hari yang sama | Real-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours. |
| Ketergantungan pembayaran | Central counterparties concentrate risk | Clearing nets exposures and mutualises default losses. In stress, margin calls rise across members at the same time, and a member default draws on a default fund that all members share. |
| Model and ai risk | Drift and regime change | Models learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it. |
| Model and ai risk | Opacity weakens challenge | Model pembelajaran mesin yang kompleks dapat sulit dijelaskan kepada petugas kredit, nasabah, dan pengawas. Tantangan yang efektif, salah satu pilar tata kelola model, menjadi lebih lemah ketika tidak ada yang dapat menjelaskan mengapa sebuah model mengambil keputusan tertentu. |
| Banking and real economy | Credit supply tightens | When capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first. |
| Banking and real economy | Borrower stress feeds back | Higher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy. |
| Tata kelola bank | Pengawasan dewan menetapkan kerangka | The board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set. |
| Tata kelola bank | Incentives shape behaviour | Remuneration tied to short-term revenue encourages risk-taking whose costs appear later. Deferral, malus and clawback aim to align pay with the risk outcome as it is realised. |
| Housing property finance | Credit and prices reinforce each other | Easier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs. |
| Housing property finance | Affordability under rising rates | Variable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers. |
| Perbankan syariah | Struktur kontrak membentuk risiko | Murabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label. |
| Perbankan syariah | Investment accounts share returns | Profit-sharing investment account holders bear losses in principle. Competitive pressure can lead banks to smooth returns and absorb losses themselves, a transfer known as displaced commercial risk. |
Pertanyaan penelitian
Who decides, and what they need to know
| Decision holder | Pertanyaan | Evidence the platform's pages describe |
|---|---|---|
| Bank board and board risk committee | What credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to impose | Ukuran konsentrasi, migrasi tahap, dan kerugian uji ketahanan per segmen |
| Bank board and asset liability committee | What capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure funding | Proyeksi modal dan likuiditas dalam skenario internal dan pengawasan |
| Dewan direksi bank | Which business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carry | Peta layanan, hasil uji skenario, dan riwayat insiden |
| Bank board and board risk committee | How climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planning | Penilaian materialitas, hasil skenario, dan keterpaparan sektoral |
| Central bank as overseer and operator | Which systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meet | Data ketersediaan, insiden, dan partisipasi; konsentrasi arus |
| Bank board and model risk committee | What model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptable | Inventaris model, penjenjangan, dan temuan validasi |
| Otoritas makroprudensial atau komite kebijakan keuangan | Whether to set or release capital buffers and borrower-based measures | Credit gaps, debt service ratios and lending surveys |
| Bank board and nomination committee | Whether board skills, independence and information are adequate for the bank's risk profile | Board effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports |
| Otoritas makroprudensial | Apakah akan menetapkan atau menyesuaikan rasio pinjaman terhadap nilai agunan, rasio cicilan utang terhadap pendapatan, atau ukuran modal sektoral | Rasio harga terhadap pendapatan, pertumbuhan kredit, standar pemberian kredit, dan tunggakan |
| Dewan direksi bank | What risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accounts | Displaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact |
These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.
Key indicators
What is measured, in which unit, by whom
| Indikator | Unit | Kadensi | Jenis sumber | Label bukti |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-performing loan ratio | persen dari total pinjaman | setiap kuartal | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Statistik yang diterbitkan |
| Pangsa pinjaman tahap 2 dan tahap 3 | persen dari total pinjaman | setiap kuartal | Laporan keuangan IFRS 9 | DILAPORKAN |
| Common equity tier 1 ratio | persen aset tertimbang menurut risiko | setiap kuartal | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Statistik yang diterbitkan |
| Rasio leverage | percent of total exposure measure | setiap kuartal | Laporan pengawasan | Statistik yang diterbitkan |
| Layanan bisnis penting dalam batas toleransi dampak pada pengujian | count of services tested and count passing | tahunan | Catatan pengujian skenario | DILAPORKAN |
| Insiden besar terkait TIK | jumlah menurut kelas keparahan | setiap kuartal | Incident reports to supervisors | Statistik yang diterbitkan |
| Emisi yang dibiayai | ton setara karbon dioksida | tahunan | PCAF methodology applied to loan and investment books | ESTIMASI |
| Exposure to climate-policy-relevant sectors | percent of loan book | tahunan | Pillar 3 ESG disclosures | DILAPORKAN |
| Value settled through large-value payment systems | currency units per day | setiap hari | Statistik operator sistem | Statistik yang diterbitkan |
| Ketersediaan sistem pembayaran | persen jam operasi | setiap bulan | Pengungkapan operator | DILAPORKAN |
| Model inventory coverage | count of models by tier and validation status | setiap kuartal | Model risk management records | DILAPORKAN |
| Discriminatory power of credit scorecards | Gini coefficient or area under the curve | tahunan | Validasi model | DIMODELKAN |
| Kesenjangan kredit terhadap PDB | poin persentase | setiap kuartal | Statistik kredit BIS | ESTIMASI |
| Credit standards on loans to enterprises | net percentage of banks reporting tightening | setiap kuartal | Survei pinjaman bank | DILAPORKAN |
| Anggota dewan dengan keahlian perbankan atau risiko | share of board | tahunan | Governance disclosures | DINYATAKAN |
| Direktur independen | share of board | tahunan | Governance disclosures | DINYATAKAN |
| Rasio pinjaman terhadap nilai pada saat pemberian | percent of property value | setiap kuartal | Data tingkat pinjaman dan data pengawasan | Statistik yang diterbitkan |
| Rasio cicilan utang terhadap pendapatan saat pemberian kredit | persen dari pendapatan kotor | setiap kuartal | Loan-level data, household surveys | DILAPORKAN |
| Rasio kecukupan modal bank syariah | persen aset tertimbang menurut risiko | setiap kuartal | IFSB prudential indicators | Statistik yang diterbitkan |
| Non-performing financing ratio | persen dari pembiayaan bruto | setiap kuartal | IFSB prudential indicators | Statistik yang diterbitkan |
Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.
Metodologi
The methods the platform's work rests on
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Ekonomi keuangan
Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.
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Probability statistics
Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.
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Ilmu jaringan
Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.
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Financial engineering
Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.
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Ai ml
Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.
Sumber data
Dari mana bukti berasal
| Sumber | Apa yang diberikannya | Kelas lisensi |
|---|---|---|
| Indikator Kesehatan Sektor Keuangan IMF | Kredit bermasalah, pencadangan, dan distribusi kredit sektoral yang dilaporkan oleh otoritas nasional | Gratis, ketentuan penggunaan IMF |
| EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exercise | Bank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banks | Gratis, dengan atribusi |
| Statistik Pengawasan Perbankan ECB | Asset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro area | Gratis, dengan atribusi |
| FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9C | Loan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companies | Domain publik |
| Statistik perbankan konsolidasi BIS | Klaim luar negeri bank menurut negara dan sektor pihak lawan berdasarkan risiko akhir | Gratis, dengan ketentuan penggunaan BIS |
| Rating agency default and recovery studies | Historical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sector | Berlisensi, berlangganan |
| National central credit registers | Borrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysis | Akses terbatas untuk pengawasan |
| BIS Basel III monitoring reports | Aggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banks | Gratis, dengan ketentuan penggunaan BIS |
| Federal Reserve supervisory stress test results | Scenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banks | Domain publik |
| Hasil uji ketahanan Bank of England | Scenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banks | Gratis, ketentuan penggunaan Bank of England |
| Uji ketahanan EBA se-Uni Eropa | Proyeksi modal bank dalam kondisi tekanan dengan metodologi bersama | Gratis, dengan atribusi |
| Pengungkapan Pilar 3 | Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFR | Publik, ketentuan bank |
| Register dan penetapan penyedia kritis berdasarkan Digital Operational Resilience Act Uni Eropa | Register pengaturan pihak ketiga TIK yang dipegang otoritas dan daftar publik penyedia TIK kritis yang ditetapkan | Registers restricted to authorities; designation list public |
| ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publications | Supervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilities | Gratis, dengan atribusi |
| Bank of England and PRA operational resilience publications | Policy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports | Gratis, ketentuan penggunaan Bank of England |
| ORX operational risk loss data | Pooled loss events by event type and business line from member banks | Berlisensi, keanggotaan |
| ENISA threat landscape for the finance sector | Analysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutions | Gratis, dengan atribusi |
| Pillar 3 operational risk disclosures | Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banks | Publik, ketentuan bank |
| Skenario NGFS | Jalur risiko transisi dan risiko fisik dengan variabel makroekonomi untuk analisis skenario | Gratis, dengan atribusi |
| ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicators | Supervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposures | Gratis, dengan atribusi |
| Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario | Rancangan dan hasil yang dipublikasikan dari latihan eksploratori bagi bank dan perusahaan asuransi di Inggris | Gratis, ketentuan penggunaan Bank of England |
| Pillar 3 ESG disclosures under EBA standards | Bank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignment | Publik, ketentuan bank |
| PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting Standard | Methodology and data quality scores for financed emissions | Free standard; emission factor database by membership |
| Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard maps | Physical hazard layers for flood, heat and drought | Gratis dan terbuka, dengan atribusi |
Instruments explained for research
Analytical instruments
Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.
risiko kredit
A credit portfolio's loss distribution
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.
- Kerugian portofolio
- Expected loss
With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.
Kendali
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Kerugian jika terjadi gagal bayar
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Hasil
- Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
- 0.45
- Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
- 2.36
- Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 3.61
Data, source and model record
| Periode ulang (tahun) | Loss (% of exposure) |
|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 |
| 4 | 0.59 |
| 8 | 0.91 |
| 17 | 1.28 |
| 34 | 1.68 |
| 70 | 2.13 |
| 141 | 2.60 |
| 288 | 3.11 |
| 585 | 3.64 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 |
- Sumber
- This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
- Tanggal
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
- Lingkup
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Unit
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Status
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.credit.one-factor
- Versi
- 1.0.0
- Pemilik
- GRA platforms lane
- Tujuan
- To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
- Risk domain
- Risiko kredit dan pihak lawan
- Asumsi
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Masukan
- Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Data
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Metode
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
- Validasi
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Keterbatasan
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Ketidakpastian
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Konsentrasi
One large exposure and the tail
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.
- Granular portfolio
- With the large exposure
Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.
Kendali
- Share of the largest exposure
- 5.0 % of the portfolio
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Kerugian jika terjadi gagal bayar
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Hasil
- Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
- 4.55
- Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
- 0.49
- Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
- 400
Data, source and model record
| Periode ulang (tahun) | Granular (%) | With the large exposure (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 | 0.28 |
| 4 | 0.59 | 0.56 |
| 8 | 0.91 | 0.89 |
| 17 | 1.28 | 1.29 |
| 34 | 1.68 | 1.81 |
| 70 | 2.13 | 2.53 |
| 141 | 2.60 | 3.06 |
| 288 | 3.11 | 3.57 |
| 585 | 3.64 | 4.12 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 | 4.69 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 | 5.29 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 | 5.91 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 | 6.56 |
- Sumber
- This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
- Tanggal
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
- Lingkup
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Unit
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Status
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.credit.concentration
- Versi
- 1.0.0
- Pemilik
- GRA platforms lane
- Tujuan
- To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
- Risk domain
- Risiko kredit dan pihak lawan
- Asumsi
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Masukan
- Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Data
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Metode
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
- Validasi
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Keterbatasan
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Ketidakpastian
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Likuiditas
The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.
- Outflow over 30 days by funding class
- Net outflows after capped inflows
- Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.
Kendali
- High-quality liquid assets
- 15.0 % of total funding
- Stable retail deposits
- 30 % of total funding
- Less stable retail deposits
- 20 % of total funding
- Operational deposits
- 15 % of total funding
- Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
- 15 % of total funding
- Unsecured funding from financial institutions
- 10 % of total funding
- Contractual inflows over 30 days
- 5.0 % of total funding
- Stress on run-off rates
- 1.00 times the baseline
Hasil
- Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
- 23.3
- Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
- 5.00
- Net outflows (% of total funding)
- 18.3
- Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
- 82
Data, source and model record
| Funding class | Balance (% of funding) | Run-off rate (%) | Outflow (% of funding) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stable retail deposits | 30.0 | 5 | 1.50 |
| Less stable retail deposits | 20.0 | 10 | 2.00 |
| Operational deposits | 15.0 | 25 | 3.75 |
| Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates | 15.0 | 40 | 6.00 |
| Unsecured funding from financial institutions | 10.0 | 100 | 10.0 |
- Sumber
- Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
- Tanggal
- BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
- Lingkup
- A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
- Unit
- Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Status
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
- Versi
- 1.0.0
- Pemilik
- GRA platforms lane
- Tujuan
- To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Risk domain
- risiko likuiditas
- Asumsi
- Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
- Masukan
- High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
- Data
- BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
- Metode
- Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
- Validasi
- Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
- Keterbatasan
- Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
- Ketidakpastian
- None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
- Approved use
- Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Prohibited use
- Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Jaringan eksposur
Bagaimana guncangan pada aset menjadi kerugian sistem
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.
- System equity lost
Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.
Kendali
- Penurunan aset eksternal
- 2.0 %
Hasil
- Penurunan aset eksternal (%)
- 2.0
- System equity lost in the first round (%)
- 18.0
- System equity lost after contagion (%)
- 45.0
- Amplification by the network (percentage points)
- 27.0
- Banks in default (of 20)
- 0
Data, source and model record
| Putaran | Ekuitas sistem yang hilang (%) | Bank yang gagal bayar |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.0 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.8 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.3 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.2 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.5 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.9 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.7 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.2 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.5 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.7 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.8 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 13 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 14 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 15 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 16 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.0 | 0 |
- Sumber
- Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
- Tanggal
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
- Lingkup
- A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
- Unit
- Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Status
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.network.debtrank
- Versi
- 1.0.0
- Pemilik
- GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
- Tujuan
- To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
- Risk domain
- Systemic and contagion risk
- Asumsi
- Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
- Masukan
- Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
- Data
- None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
- Metode
- DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
- Validasi
- The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
- Keterbatasan
- No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
- Ketidakpastian
- Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
- Approved use
- Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
- Prohibited use
- Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Analisis skenario
Scenarios, not forecasts
A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.
Regulatory context and related standards
The frameworks this work is read against
| Kerangka | Badan | Apa yang ditetapkan | Edition or date | Where it applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kerangka Basel III | Komite Basel untuk Pengawasan Perbankan | Persyaratan modal minimum, leverage, cakupan likuiditas, dan pendanaan stabil serta penyangga modal di atasnya | December 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel Framework | Basel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables |
| Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision | Komite Basel untuk Pengawasan Perbankan | Standar dasar untuk kewenangan pengawasan, perizinan, manajemen risiko, dan tata kelola, yang dinilai dalam FSAP IMF dan Bank Dunia | Revised April 2024 | International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs |
| Prinsip pengelolaan dan pengawasan yang efektif atas risiko keuangan terkait iklim | Komite Basel untuk Pengawasan Perbankan | Ekspektasi untuk tata kelola bank, manajemen risiko, dan analisis skenario risiko terkait iklim, serta untuk tinjauan pengawasannya | June 2022 | Basel Committee members, through national supervisors |
| Atribut Utama Rezim Resolusi yang Efektif bagi Lembaga Keuangan | Dewan Stabilitas Keuangan (Financial Stability Board) | Kewenangan resolusi, perencanaan pemulihan dan resolusi, serta kerja sama lintas batas agar bank dapat gagal tanpa dukungan pembayar pajak | October 2011, updated October 2014 | FSB member jurisdictions |
| IFRS 9 Instrumen Keuangan | International Accounting Standards Board | Klasifikasi aset keuangan dan pencadangan kerugian kredit ekspektasian yang berwawasan ke depan dalam tiga tahap | Issued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018 | Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead) |
| Skenario iklim NGFS | Network for Greening the Financial System | Jalur risiko transisi dan fisik acuan yang digunakan bank sentral dan pengawas untuk analisis skenario iklim | Phase V, November 2024 | Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding |
| IFRS S2 Pengungkapan terkait Iklim | International Sustainability Standards Board | Pengungkapan risiko dan peluang terkait iklim, termasuk emisi yang dibiayai dan ketahanan iklim | Issued June 2023, amended December 2025 | Where a jurisdiction adopts it |
| Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) | European Banking Authority dan ECB Banking Supervision | Proses pengawasan yang menilai model bisnis, tata kelola, dan risiko terhadap modal dan likuiditas, serta menetapkan persyaratan dan panduan Pilar 2 | EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022) | European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks |
| Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) dan uji tekanan pengawasan | Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System | Proses pengawasan atas skenario tekanan dan tinjauan rencana permodalan yang menetapkan penyangga modal tekanan bagi bank besar di AS | Annual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020 | United States, large bank holding companies |
| Pedoman manajemen risiko ISO 31000 | Organisasi Internasional untuk Standardisasi | Prinsip, kerangka, dan proses untuk mengelola risiko di seluruh organisasi | ISO 31000:2018 | International, voluntary |
Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.
Geographic dimensions
Global, regional and country programmes
Institutional counterparts
The institutions this work speaks to
- Bank board and board risk committee
- Kepala manajemen risiko dan komite kredit
- Pengawas prudensial
- Otoritas makroprudensial
- Bank board and asset liability committee
- Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
- Bank sentral
- Dewan direksi bank
- Kepala operasional dan kepala keamanan informasi
- Authorities overseeing critical third parties
- Credit risk function
- Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
- Central bank as overseer and operator
- Bank treasury
- Central counterparty board and risk committee
- Resolution authority
Research publications
Research, methods and sources
Educational resources
Learn the methods
Readiness workflows
Kesiapan pembiayaan
Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.
Contribution mechanisms
Ikut serta
Batas wilayah
What this page is not
Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.