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Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise

Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.

Go to the instrumentsBanking Nexus home

Domain definition

What Banking Nexus studies

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.

Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.

用語定義
Basel IIIThe Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks.
CET1 比率Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital.
流動性カバレッジ比率High-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period.
Expected credit lossThe probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for.

Financial system context

The parts of the financial system it covers

  • 信用リスクとカウンターパーティ・リスク

    融資ポートフォリオと取引エクスポージャーにおけるデフォルト、格付け遷移、集中と、損失が取引相手の間でどう伝わるか。

  • 資本と流動性

    損失吸収資本、流動性バッファー、資金調達構造、そして市場と預金者がストレスにさらされたときのそれらの挙動。

  • オペレーショナル・レジリエンス

    サイバー・インシデント、第三者の障害、プロセスの破綻を通じて、定められた影響許容度の範囲内で重要な業務を継続すること。

  • 決済と市場インフラ

    Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.

  • 気候と自然のリスク

    Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.

  • モデルと AI

    与信スコアリング、引当、資本のモデルと、機械学習が今や求める検証とガバナンス。

  • 銀行業と実体経済

    家計、小規模事業者、住宅、必須サービスへの貸出と、銀行のストレスがどう信用収縮になるか。

  • ガバナンスと監督

    取締役会、リスク文化、防衛線、監督上のレビュー、破綻処理計画。イスラム銀行業の構造を含みます。

リスク分類体系

Risks, topic by topic

  • 信用リスクとカウンターパーティ・リスク

    信用リスクとは、借り手や取引相手が期日どおりに全額を支払わない可能性であり、ほとんどの銀行にとって依然として主要な損失の源です。

  • 資本と流動性

    資本は損失を吸収し、流動性は銀行が期日どおりに債務を支払い続けられるようにします。

  • 銀行のオペレーショナル・レジリエンス

    オペレーショナル・レジリエンスとは、サイバー攻撃、技術変更の失敗、第三者の障害、パンデミックのいずれによるものであれ、途絶のもとでも重要なサービスを提供し続ける銀行の能力をいいます。

  • Climate and nature bank risk

    気候変動と自然の喪失は、借り手、担保、依存する市場を通じて銀行に及びます。

  • 決済の依存関係

    どの銀行も、資金と担保を移動させるために、決済システム、中央清算機関、証券決済システム、コルレス銀行、メッセージング・ネットワークに依存しています。

  • Model and ai risk

    銀行は、与信の付与、引当金の設定、商品の価格設定、資本の算出、不正の検知にモデルを利用しており、そのモデルのうち機械学習を使うものの割合が高まっています。

  • Banking and real economy

    銀行は預金を、家計、中小企業、不可欠なサービスの提供者への融資に変えます。

  • 銀行のガバナンス

    銀行破綻の多くはガバナンスに起因します。取締役会が引き受けているリスクを理解していなかったり、インセンティブが慎重さよりも成長を重視していたり、統制部門が異議を唱える立場を欠いていたりするためです。

  • Housing property finance

    Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.

  • イスラム銀行業務

    イスラム銀行は、イスラム商法に適合するよう設計された契約とガバナンス構造のもとで運営され、利付きの融資に代えて、売買、リース、パートナーシップに基づく手段を用います。

Risk-transmission mechanisms

How these risks develop and spread

テーマメカニズム仕組み
信用リスクとカウンターパーティ・リスクQuality erodes before defaultArrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised.
信用リスクとカウンターパーティ・リスクLosses concentrateエクスポージャーは、セクター、地域、担保の種類、大口の単一名義に集中します。商業用不動産や輸出産業など 1 つのセグメントへのショックは、分散されたポートフォリオ・モデルが示唆する水準をはるかに超える損失をもたらすことがあります。
資本と流動性損失が資本を減少させるCredit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers.
資本と流動性資金は迅速に動くことがありますUninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing.
銀行のオペレーショナル・レジリエンス依存関係が見えないA single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.
銀行のオペレーショナル・レジリエンスThird parties concentrate riskMany banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
Climate and nature bank riskPhysical risk hits collateral and income洪水、暴風、猛暑、干ばつは、財産に損害を与え、生産を妨げます。保険でカバーされない損失は借り手に及び、債務不履行確率と債務不履行時損失率が上昇します。保険の撤退によって、地域全体の住宅ローン債権の価格が見直されることもあります。
Climate and nature bank risk移行リスクがセクターを再評価する炭素価格設定、規制、技術、需要の変化は、資産の座礁を招き、排出集約度の高い借り手の利幅を圧迫する可能性があります。時期が重要です。遅く急激な移行は、秩序ある移行よりも大きな損失をもたらします。
決済の依存関係日中に流動性が必要となる即時グロス決済では、銀行は各支払の実行時にその資金を用意する必要があります。大手参加者が流動性を温存するために支払を遅らせると、他の参加者も順に待機し、数時間のうちに決済の滞留が発生するおそれがあります。
決済の依存関係中央清算機関はリスクを集中させる清算はエクスポージャーを相殺し、債務不履行による損失を分担する。ストレス時には、証拠金の請求が全メンバーで同時に増加し、メンバーの債務不履行には全メンバーが共有する default fund が充てられる。
Model and ai riskDrift and regime changeモデルは過去のデータから学習する。経済、顧客行動、商品が変化すると関係性が変わり、精度は低下する。損失や苦情によって明らかになるまで、気づかれないことが多い。
Model and ai risk不透明性は異議申立てを弱めるComplex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does.
Banking and real economyCredit supply tightensWhen capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first.
Banking and real economyBorrower stress feeds backHigher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy.
銀行のガバナンスBoard oversight sets the frameThe board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set.
銀行のガバナンスIncentives shape behaviourRemuneration tied to short-term revenue encourages risk-taking whose costs appear later. Deferral, malus and clawback aim to align pay with the risk outcome as it is realised.
Housing property financeCredit and prices reinforce each otherEasier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs.
Housing property finance金利上昇下での返済負担能力Variable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers.
イスラム銀行業務契約の構造がリスクを左右するMurabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label.
イスラム銀行業務Investment accounts share returns利益分配型投資口座の保有者は、原則として損失を負担します。競争圧力により、銀行はリターンを平準化し、損失を自ら吸収することがあり、この移転は置換商業リスク(displaced commercial risk)と呼ばれます。

リサーチクエスチョン

Who decides, and what they need to know

Decision holder問いEvidence the platform's pages describe
Bank board and board risk committeeWhat credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to imposeConcentration measures, stage migration and stress losses by segment
Bank board and asset liability committeeWhat capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure funding内部シナリオおよび監督シナリオに基づく資本と流動性の予測
Bank boardWhich business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryService maps, scenario test results and incident history
Bank board and board risk committeeHow climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planningMateriality assessment, scenario results and sector exposures
監督者であり運営者でもある中央銀行Which systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meet可用性、インシデント、参加に関するデータ、およびフローの集中度
Bank board and model risk committeeWhat model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptableModel inventory, tiering and validation findings
マクロプルーデンス当局または金融政策委員会Whether to set or release capital buffers and borrower-based measures与信ギャップ、債務返済比率、貸出調査
Bank board and nomination committee取締役会のスキル、独立性、情報が、銀行のリスク・プロファイルに照らして十分かどうかBoard effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports
マクロプルーデンス当局融資比率(LTV)、債務返済比率(DSTI)、またはセクター別の資本措置を設定・調整するかどうかPrice-to-income, credit growth, lending standards and arrears
Bank boardWhat risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accountsDisplaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact

These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.

Key indicators

What is measured, in which unit, by whom

指標単位周期出典の種類エビデンス・ラベル
不良債権比率貸出総額に占める割合(%)四半期ごとSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures公表統計
ステージ 2 とステージ 3 の貸出比率貸出総額に占める割合(%)四半期ごとIFRS 9 財務諸表報告値
Common equity tier 1 ratioリスク・アセットに対する比率四半期ごとSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures公表統計
Leverage ratio総エクスポージャー指標に対する割合(パーセント)四半期ごと監督当局への報告公表統計
Important business services within impact tolerance in testingcount of services tested and count passing年次シナリオ・テストの記録報告値
ICT に関連する重大インシデント重大度区分別の件数四半期ごと監督当局へのインシデント報告公表統計
ファイナンスド・エミッション二酸化炭素換算トン年次融資および投資ブックに適用される PCAF 方法論推定
気候政策に関連する部門へのエクスポージャーpercent of loan book年次Pillar 3 ESG disclosures報告値
Value settled through large-value payment systemscurrency units per day日次System operator statistics公表統計
決済システムの可用性percent of operating hours月次事業者による開示報告値
Model inventory coverage段階別および検証状況別のモデル数四半期ごとModel risk management records報告値
信用スコアカードの識別力ジニ係数または曲線下面積年次モデル検証モデル推計
信用・GDP ギャップパーセントポイント四半期ごとBIS の信用統計推定
Credit standards on loans to enterprises貸出基準を厳格化したと回答した銀行の純比率四半期ごと銀行貸出調査報告値
Board members with banking or risk expertise取締役会に占める割合年次ガバナンスに関する開示申告済み
独立取締役取締役会に占める割合年次ガバナンスに関する開示申告済み
組成時のローン・トゥ・バリュー比率percent of property value四半期ごとLoan-level and supervisory data公表統計
組成時の債務返済負担率(元利返済額対所得比率)総所得に対する割合(パーセント)四半期ごと融資レベルのデータ、家計調査報告値
Capital adequacy ratio of Islamic banksリスク・アセットに対する比率四半期ごとIFSB prudential indicators公表統計
Non-performing financing ratio総資金調達額に占める割合(パーセント)四半期ごとIFSB prudential indicators公表統計

Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.

方法論

The methods the platform's work rests on

  • 金融経済学

    金融経済学とマクロ金融は、銀行のバランスシート、信用、資産価格が、生産、雇用、公的財政とどのように相互作用するかを説明します。銀行リスクの分野では、シナリオを損失と資本に結びつけ、銀行のストレスが経済にどう跳ね返るかを示し、マクロプルーデンス政策と金融政策の判断を検証済みの関係に基づかせます。

  • Probability statistics

    Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.

  • ネットワーク科学

    Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.

  • Financial engineering

    Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.

  • Ai ml

    Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.

データソース

エビデンスの出どころ

出典提供するものライセンス区分
IMF 金融健全性指標各国当局が報告する不良債権、貸倒引当金、部門別の貸出分布無料、IMF 利用規約
EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exerciseEU 銀行の銀行別資産の質、フォーベアランス、IFRS 9 ステージのデータ無料、帰属表示
ECB 銀行監督統計Asset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro area無料、帰属表示
FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9CLoan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companiesパブリックドメイン
BIS consolidated banking statisticsBanks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basis無料、BIS 利用条件
Rating agency default and recovery studiesHistorical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sectorライセンス制、購読型
各国の中央信用情報登録簿Borrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysisRestricted, supervisory access
BIS バーゼル III モニタリング報告書国際的に活動する銀行の資本、レバレッジ、流動性の総合的なポジション無料、BIS 利用条件
Federal Reserve supervisory stress test resultsScenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banksパブリックドメイン
Bank of England stress testing resultsScenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banks無料、Bank of England の利用条件
EBA EU-wide stress testBank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodology無料、帰属表示
第 3 の柱の開示銀行が公表する資本構成、リスク加重資産、LCR、NSFR公開、銀行の条件
Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act当局が保有する ICT サードパーティ取決めの登録簿と、指定された重要 ICT プロバイダーの公開リスト登録簿は当局に限定され、指定リストは公開
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publicationsSupervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilities無料、帰属表示
イングランド銀行および PRA のオペレーショナル・レジリエンスに関する刊行物Policy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports無料、Bank of England の利用条件
ORX operational risk loss dataPooled loss events by event type and business line from member banksライセンス制、会員制
金融セクターに関する ENISA の脅威ランドスケープAnalysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutions無料、帰属表示
Pillar 3 operational risk disclosures銀行が公表するオペレーショナルリスク資本および損失の要約公開、銀行の条件
NGFS シナリオTransition and physical risk pathways with macroeconomic variables for scenario analysis無料、帰属表示
ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicatorsユーロ圏銀行のエクスポージャーに関する監督演習の方法論と実験的指標無料、帰属表示
Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario英国の銀行・保険会社向け探索的演習の設計と公表結果無料、Bank of England の利用条件
EBA 基準に基づく第 3 の柱の ESG 開示Bank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignment公開、銀行の条件
PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting StandardMethodology and data quality scores for financed emissions標準は無料。排出係数データベースは会員制
Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard maps洪水、猛暑、干ばつの物理的ハザード・レイヤー無料かつオープン、帰属表示

Instruments explained for research

Analytical instruments

Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.

信用リスク

A credit portfolio's loss distribution

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.

02468 1 in 210 年に 1 度100 年に 1 度1 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • ポートフォリオの損失
  • Expected loss

With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.

管理策

Probability of default
1.00 % a year
デフォルト時損失率
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

結果

Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
0.45
Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
2.36
Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
4.06
Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
3.61
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period
再現期間(年)Loss (% of exposure)
20.30
40.59
80.91
171.28
341.68
702.13
1412.60
2883.11
5853.64
1,1894.20
2,4184.79
4,9185.41
10,0006.04
出典
This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
日付
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
対象範囲
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
単位
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
ステータス
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

モデル化する
gra.credit.one-factor
バージョン
1.0.0
オーナー
GRA platforms lane
目的
To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
Risk domain
信用リスクとカウンターパーティ・リスク
前提
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
入力
Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
データ
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
手法
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
検証
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
制約事項
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
不確実性
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

集中度

One large exposure and the tail

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.

02468 1 in 210 年に 1 度100 年に 1 度1 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Granular portfolio
  • With the large exposure

Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.

管理策

Share of the largest exposure
5.0 % of the portfolio
Probability of default
1.00 % a year
デフォルト時損失率
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

結果

Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
4.06
Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
4.55
Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
0.49
Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
400
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period, granular and concentrated
再現期間(年)Granular (%)With the large exposure (%)
20.300.28
40.590.56
80.910.89
171.281.29
341.681.81
702.132.53
1412.603.06
2883.113.57
5853.644.12
1,1894.204.69
2,4184.795.29
4,9185.415.91
10,0006.046.56
出典
This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
日付
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
対象範囲
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
単位
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
ステータス
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

モデル化する
gra.credit.concentration
バージョン
1.0.0
オーナー
GRA platforms lane
目的
To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
Risk domain
信用リスクとカウンターパーティ・リスク
前提
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
入力
Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
データ
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
手法
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
検証
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
制約事項
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
不確実性
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

流動性

The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.

  • Stable retail 1.50
  • Less stable retail 2.00
  • Operational deposits 3.75
  • Corporate, non-operational 6.00
  • 金融機関 10.0
  • Net outflows 18.3
  • Liquid assets (HQLA) 15.0
  • Outflow over 30 days by funding class
  • Net outflows after capped inflows
  • Stock of high-quality liquid assets

Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.

管理策

High-quality liquid assets
15.0 % of total funding
Stable retail deposits
30 % of total funding
Less stable retail deposits
20 % of total funding
Operational deposits
15 % of total funding
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
15 % of total funding
Unsecured funding from financial institutions
10 % of total funding
Contractual inflows over 30 days
5.0 % of total funding
Stress on run-off rates
1.00 times the baseline

結果

Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
23.3
Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
5.00
Net outflows (% of total funding)
18.3
Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
82
Data, source and model record
Outflows by funding class and the stock of liquid assets
Funding classBalance (% of funding)Run-off rate (%)Outflow (% of funding)
Stable retail deposits30.051.50
Less stable retail deposits20.0102.00
Operational deposits15.0253.75
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates15.0406.00
Unsecured funding from financial institutions10.010010.0
出典
Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
日付
BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
対象範囲
A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
単位
Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
ステータス
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

モデル化する
gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
バージョン
1.0.0
オーナー
GRA platforms lane
目的
To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
Risk domain
流動性リスク
前提
Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
入力
High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
データ
BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
手法
Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
検証
Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
制約事項
Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
不確実性
None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
Approved use
Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
Prohibited use
Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.

エクスポージャー・ネットワーク

資産へのショックが、システム全体の損失になる仕組み

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.

0255075100 051015202530 Contagion round システム資本の喪失(%)
  • System equity lost

Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.

管理策

対外資産の減少
2.0 %

結果

対外資産の減少 (%)
2.0
System equity lost in the first round (%)
18.0
System equity lost after contagion (%)
45.0
Amplification by the network (percentage points)
27.0
Banks in default (of 20)
0
Data, source and model record
System equity lost, round by round
ラウンドシステム資本の喪失(%)デフォルトに陥った銀行
018.00
128.80
235.30
339.20
441.50
542.90
643.70
744.20
844.50
944.70
1044.80
1144.90
1244.90
1345.00
1445.00
1545.00
1645.00
1745.00
1845.00
1945.00
2045.00
2145.00
2245.00
2345.00
2445.00
2545.00
2645.00
2745.00
2845.00
2945.00
3045.00
出典
Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
日付
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
対象範囲
A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
単位
Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
ステータス
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

モデル化する
gra.network.debtrank
バージョン
1.0.0
オーナー
GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
目的
To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
Risk domain
Systemic and contagion risk
前提
Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
入力
Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
データ
None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
手法
DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
検証
The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
制約事項
No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
不確実性
Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
Approved use
Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
Prohibited use
Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.

シナリオ分析

Scenarios, not forecasts

A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.

Regulatory context and related standards

The frameworks this work is read against

枠組み機関定めていることEdition or dateWhere it applies
バーゼル III の枠組みバーゼル銀行監督委員会最低所要資本、レバレッジ、流動性カバレッジ、安定調達の要件と、それらを上回る資本バッファーDecember 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel FrameworkBasel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables
実効的な銀行監督のためのコア・プリンシプルバーゼル銀行監督委員会IMF と世界銀行の FSAP で評価される、監督権限、免許、リスク管理、ガバナンスに関する基本基準Revised April 2024International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs
気候関連金融リスクの実効的な管理と監督のための諸原則バーゼル銀行監督委員会気候関連リスクに関する銀行のガバナンス、リスク管理、シナリオ分析と、その監督上のレビューへの期待June 2022Basel Committee members, through national supervisors
金融機関の実効的な破綻処理の枠組みの主要な特性金融安定理事会銀行が納税者の支援なしに破綻できるようにするための、破綻処理権限、再建・破綻処理計画、国境を越えた協力October 2011, updated October 2014FSB member jurisdictions
IFRS 第 9 号「金融商品」国際会計基準審議会金融資産の分類と、三つのステージによる将来予測的な予想信用損失の引当Issued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead)
NGFS 気候シナリオ気候変動リスクに係る金融当局ネットワーク中央銀行と監督当局が気候シナリオ分析に用いる、移行リスクと物理的リスクの参照経路Phase V, November 2024Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding
IFRS S2 気候関連開示国際サステナビリティ基準審議会融資に伴う排出量と気候レジリエンスを含む、気候関連のリスクと機会の開示Issued June 2023, amended December 2025Where a jurisdiction adopts it
監督上の検証・評価プロセス(SREP)欧州銀行監督機構と ECB 銀行監督ビジネスモデル、ガバナンス、資本と流動性に対するリスクを評価し、第 2 の柱の要件とガイダンスを定める監督プロセスEBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022)European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks
包括的資本分析・レビュー(CCAR)と監督上のストレステスト連邦準備制度理事会(FRB)米国の大手銀行のストレス資本バッファーを定める、ストレス・シナリオと資本計画の審査からなる監督プロセスAnnual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020United States, large bank holding companies
ISO 31000 リスクマネジメント-指針国際標準化機構組織全体のリスクを管理するための原則、枠組み、プロセスISO 31000:2018International, voluntary

Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.

Institutional counterparts

The institutions this work speaks to

  • Bank board and board risk committee
  • Chief risk officer and credit committee
  • プルーデンス監督当局
  • マクロプルーデンス当局
  • Bank board and asset liability committee
  • Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
  • 中央銀行
  • Bank board
  • 最高執行責任者および最高情報セキュリティ責任者
  • Authorities overseeing critical third parties
  • Credit risk function
  • NGFS における中央銀行と監督当局
  • 監督者であり運営者でもある中央銀行
  • Bank treasury
  • Central counterparty board and risk committee
  • Resolution authority

Readiness workflows

金融準備状況

Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.

境界

What this page is not

Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.