Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise
Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.
Domain definition
What Banking Nexus studies
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.
Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.
| Terim | Tanım |
|---|---|
| Basel III | The Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. |
| CET1 oranı | Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital. |
| Likidite karşılama oranı | High-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period. |
| Expected credit loss | The probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for. |
Financial system context
The parts of the financial system it covers
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Kredi ve karşı taraf riski
Kredi portföylerinde ve alım satım maruziyetlerinde temerrüt, geçiş ve yoğunlaşma ile kayıpların karşı taraflar arasında nasıl geçtiği.
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Sermaye ve likidite
Kayıp emici sermaye, likidite tamponları ve fonlama yapıları ile piyasalar ve mevduat sahipleri strese girdiğinde bunların nasıl davrandığı.
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Operasyonel dayanıklılık
Siber olaylar, üçüncü taraf arızaları ve süreç aksaklıkları sırasında, belirtilen etki toleransları içinde önemli hizmetlerin sürekliliği.
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Ödemeler ve piyasa altyapısı
Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.
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İklim ve doğa riski
Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.
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Modeller ve yapay zekâ
Kredi skorlama, karşılık ve sermaye modelleri ile makine öğreniminin artık gerektirdiği doğrulama ve yönetişim.
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Bankacılık ve reel ekonomi
Hanelere, küçük firmalara, konuta ve temel hizmetlere verilen krediler ile banka stresinin nasıl kredi daralmasına dönüştüğü.
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Yönetişim ve denetim
Yönetim kurulları, risk kültürü, savunma hatları, denetim incelemesi ve çözümleme planlaması, İslami bankacılığın yapıları dahil.
Risk taksonomisi
Risks, topic by topic
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Kredi ve karşı taraf riski
Kredi riski, bir borçlunun veya karşı tarafın tam ve zamanında ödeme yapamama olasılığıdır ve çoğu banka için başlıca kayıp kaynağı olmaya devam eder.
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Sermaye ve likidite
Sermaye zararları karşılar, likidite ise bankanın yükümlülüklerini vadesi geldikçe ödemeye devam etmesini sağlar.
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Banka operasyonel dayanıklılığı
Operasyonel dayanıklılık, bir bankanın siber saldırı, başarısız bir teknoloji değişikliği, üçüncü taraf kesintisi veya pandemi gibi aksaklıklar boyunca kritik hizmetleri sunmaya devam edebilme yeteneğidir.
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Climate and nature bank risk
İklim değişikliği ve doğa kaybı bankalara borçluları, teminatları ve dayandıkları piyasalar aracılığıyla ulaşır.
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Ödeme bağımlılıkları
Her banka, para ve teminat aktarmak için ödeme sistemlerine, merkezi karşı taraflara, menkul kıymet takas sistemlerine, muhabir bankalara ve mesajlaşma ağlarına bağımlıdır.
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Model and ai risk
Bankalar kredi vermek, karşılık ayırmak, ürünleri fiyatlamak, sermaye hesaplamak ve dolandırıcılığı tespit etmek için modellere dayanır ve bu modellerin giderek artan bir kısmı makine öğrenimi kullanır.
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Banking and real economy
Bankalar mevduatları hanehalkları, küçük ve orta ölçekli işletmeler ve temel hizmet sağlayıcıları için kredilere dönüştürür.
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Banka yönetişimi
Pek çok banka başarısızlığı yönetişime dayanır: üstlenilen riskleri anlamayan yönetim kurulları, ihtiyatlılık yerine büyümeyi ödüllendiren teşvikler veya itiraz edecek konumdan yoksun kontrol işlevleri.
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Housing property finance
Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.
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İslami bankacılık
İslami bankalar, faizli krediler yerine satış, kira ve ortaklığa dayalı araçlar kullanarak İslam ticaret hukukuna uygun olacak şekilde tasarlanmış sözleşmeler ve yönetişim yapıları çerçevesinde faaliyet gösterir.
Risk-transmission mechanisms
How these risks develop and spread
| Konu | Mekanizma | Nasıl çalışır |
|---|---|---|
| Kredi ve karşı taraf riski | Quality erodes before default | Arrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised. |
| Kredi ve karşı taraf riski | Losses concentrate | Exposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies. |
| Sermaye ve likidite | Losses deplete capital | Credit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers. |
| Sermaye ve likidite | Funding can run quickly | Uninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing. |
| Banka operasyonel dayanıklılığı | Bağımlılıklar gizlidir | A single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns. |
| Banka operasyonel dayanıklılığı | Third parties concentrate risk | Many banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Physical risk hits collateral and income | Floods, storms, heat and drought damage property and disrupt production. Uninsured losses fall on borrowers, raising default probabilities and loss given default, and insurance withdrawal can reprice whole regional mortgage books. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Transition risk reprices sectors | Carbon pricing, regulation, technology and shifting demand can strand assets and squeeze the margins of emissions-intensive borrowers. Timing matters: a late and abrupt transition produces sharper losses than an orderly one. |
| Ödeme bağımlılıkları | Likidite gün içinde gereklidir | Real-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours. |
| Ödeme bağımlılıkları | Central counterparties concentrate risk | Clearing nets exposures and mutualises default losses. In stress, margin calls rise across members at the same time, and a member default draws on a default fund that all members share. |
| Model and ai risk | Drift and regime change | Models learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it. |
| Model and ai risk | Opacity weakens challenge | Complex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does. |
| Banking and real economy | Credit supply tightens | When capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first. |
| Banking and real economy | Borrower stress feeds back | Higher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy. |
| Banka yönetişimi | Board oversight sets the frame | The board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set. |
| Banka yönetişimi | Incentives shape behaviour | Remuneration tied to short-term revenue encourages risk-taking whose costs appear later. Deferral, malus and clawback aim to align pay with the risk outcome as it is realised. |
| Housing property finance | Credit and prices reinforce each other | Easier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs. |
| Housing property finance | Affordability under rising rates | Değişken faizli ve kısa sabitlemeli konut kredileri faiz artışlarını borçlulara hızla yansıtır. Borç servisi yükleri artar, temerrütler gecikmeyle izler ve zorlanan borçlular için yeniden finansman imkânsız hale gelebilir. |
| İslami bankacılık | Contract structure shapes risk | Murabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label. |
| İslami bankacılık | Investment accounts share returns | Profit-sharing investment account holders bear losses in principle. Competitive pressure can lead banks to smooth returns and absorb losses themselves, a transfer known as displaced commercial risk. |
Araştırma soruları
Who decides, and what they need to know
| Decision holder | Soru | Evidence the platform's pages describe |
|---|---|---|
| Bank board and board risk committee | What credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to impose | Concentration measures, stage migration and stress losses by segment |
| Bank board and asset liability committee | What capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure funding | Capital and liquidity projections under internal and supervisory scenarios |
| Banka yönetim kurulu | Which business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carry | Hizmet haritaları, senaryo test sonuçları ve olay geçmişi |
| Bank board and board risk committee | How climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planning | Önemlilik değerlendirmesi, senaryo sonuçları ve sektör maruziyetleri |
| Central bank as overseer and operator | Which systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meet | Availability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows |
| Bank board and model risk committee | What model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptable | Model inventory, tiering and validation findings |
| Macroprudential authority or financial policy committee | Whether to set or release capital buffers and borrower-based measures | Credit gaps, debt service ratios and lending surveys |
| Bank board and nomination committee | Whether board skills, independence and information are adequate for the bank's risk profile | Board effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports |
| Makro ihtiyati otorite | Kredi teminat oranı, borç servisi gelir oranı veya sektörel sermaye önlemlerinin belirlenip belirlenmeyeceği ya da ayarlanıp ayarlanmayacağı | Fiyat/gelir oranı, kredi büyümesi, kredi verme standartları ve gecikmiş ödemeler |
| Banka yönetim kurulu | What risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accounts | Displaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact |
These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.
Key indicators
What is measured, in which unit, by whom
| Gösterge | Birim | Sıklık | Kaynak türü | Kanıt etiketi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-performing loan ratio | brüt kredilerin yüzdesi | üç ayda bir | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Yayımlanmış istatistikler |
| Stage 2 and stage 3 loan share | brüt kredilerin yüzdesi | üç ayda bir | IFRS 9 financial statements | BİLDİRİLMİŞ |
| Common equity tier 1 ratio | risk ağırlıklı varlıkların yüzdesi | üç ayda bir | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Yayımlanmış istatistikler |
| Leverage ratio | percent of total exposure measure | üç ayda bir | Gözetim bildirimleri | Yayımlanmış istatistikler |
| Testte etki toleransı dahilindeki önemli iş hizmetleri | count of services tested and count passing | yıllık | Scenario testing records | BİLDİRİLMİŞ |
| BİT ile ilgili büyük olaylar | count by severity class | üç ayda bir | Incident reports to supervisors | Yayımlanmış istatistikler |
| Finanse edilen emisyonlar | ton karbondioksit eşdeğeri | yıllık | PCAF methodology applied to loan and investment books | TAHMİNİ |
| İklim politikasıyla ilgili sektörlere maruziyet | percent of loan book | yıllık | Pillar 3 ESG disclosures | BİLDİRİLMİŞ |
| Value settled through large-value payment systems | currency units per day | günlük | System operator statistics | Yayımlanmış istatistikler |
| Ödeme sistemlerinin kullanılabilirliği | işletme saatlerinin yüzdesi | aylık | İşletmeci beyanları | BİLDİRİLMİŞ |
| Model inventory coverage | count of models by tier and validation status | üç ayda bir | Model risk management records | BİLDİRİLMİŞ |
| Discriminatory power of credit scorecards | Gini coefficient or area under the curve | yıllık | Model doğrulama | MODELLENMİŞ |
| Kredi/GSYH açığı | yüzde puanı | üç ayda bir | BIS kredi istatistikleri | TAHMİNİ |
| Credit standards on loans to enterprises | net percentage of banks reporting tightening | üç ayda bir | Banka kredi anketleri | BİLDİRİLMİŞ |
| Board members with banking or risk expertise | share of board | yıllık | Governance disclosures | BEYAN EDİLDİ |
| Bağımsız yönetim kurulu üyeleri | share of board | yıllık | Governance disclosures | BEYAN EDİLDİ |
| Kredi kullandırım anında kredi/teminat değeri oranı | percent of property value | üç ayda bir | Kredi düzeyinde veriler ve gözetim verileri | Yayımlanmış istatistikler |
| Debt-service-to-income ratio at origination | percent of gross income | üç ayda bir | Kredi düzeyinde veriler, hane halkı anketleri | BİLDİRİLMİŞ |
| Capital adequacy ratio of Islamic banks | risk ağırlıklı varlıkların yüzdesi | üç ayda bir | IFSB prudential indicators | Yayımlanmış istatistikler |
| Non-performing financing ratio | percent of gross financing | üç ayda bir | IFSB prudential indicators | Yayımlanmış istatistikler |
Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.
Metodoloji
The methods the platform's work rests on
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Finansal ekonomi
Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.
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Probability statistics
Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.
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Ağ bilimi
Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.
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Financial engineering
Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.
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Ai ml
Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.
Veri kaynakları
Kanıtın nereden geldiği
| Kaynak | Sağladıkları | Lisans sınıfı |
|---|---|---|
| IMF Finansal Sağlamlık Göstergeleri | Non-performing loans, provisioning and sectoral loan distribution reported by national authorities | Ücretsiz, IMF kullanım koşulları |
| EBA risk panosu ve AB genelinde şeffaflık tatbikatı | Bank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banks | Ücretsiz, atıf |
| ECB Supervisory Banking Statistics | Asset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro area | Ücretsiz, atıf |
| FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9C | Loan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companies | Kamu malı |
| BIS consolidated banking statistics | Banks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basis | Ücretsiz, BIS kullanım koşulları |
| Rating agency default and recovery studies | Historical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sector | Licensed, subscription |
| National central credit registers | Borrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysis | Restricted, supervisory access |
| BIS Basel III monitoring reports | Aggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banks | Ücretsiz, BIS kullanım koşulları |
| Federal Reserve supervisory stress test results | Scenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banks | Kamu malı |
| Bank of England stres testi sonuçları | Scenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banks | Ücretsiz, Bank of England kullanım koşulları |
| EBA EU-wide stress test | Bank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodology | Ücretsiz, atıf |
| Sütun 3 açıklamaları | Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFR | Kamuya açık, banka koşulları |
| AB Dijital Operasyonel Dayanıklılık Yasası kapsamında kayıtlar ve kritik hizmet sağlayıcı tanımlamaları | Registers of ICT third-party arrangements held by authorities and the public list of designated critical ICT providers | Registers restricted to authorities; designation list public |
| ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publications | Siber müdahale ve toparlanma kapasitelerine ilişkin denetim bulguları | Ücretsiz, atıf |
| Bank of England ve PRA operasyonel dayanıklılık yayınları | Policy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports | Ücretsiz, Bank of England kullanım koşulları |
| ORX operational risk loss data | Pooled loss events by event type and business line from member banks | Licensed, membership |
| Finans sektörü için ENISA tehdit görünümü | Analysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutions | Ücretsiz, atıf |
| Pillar 3 operational risk disclosures | Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banks | Kamuya açık, banka koşulları |
| NGFS senaryoları | Transition and physical risk pathways with macroeconomic variables for scenario analysis | Ücretsiz, atıf |
| ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicators | Supervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposures | Ücretsiz, atıf |
| Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario | Design and published results of the exploratory exercise for UK banks and insurers | Ücretsiz, Bank of England kullanım koşulları |
| Pillar 3 ESG disclosures under EBA standards | Bank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignment | Kamuya açık, banka koşulları |
| PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting Standard | Methodology and data quality scores for financed emissions | Free standard; emission factor database by membership |
| Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard maps | Sel, sıcak hava dalgası ve kuraklık için fiziksel tehlike katmanları | Ücretsiz ve açık, atıf |
Instruments explained for research
Analytical instruments
Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.
Kredi riski
A credit portfolio's loss distribution
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.
- Portföy kaybı
- Expected loss
With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.
Kontroller
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Temerrüt halinde kayıp
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Sonuçlar
- Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
- 0.45
- Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
- 2.36
- Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 3.61
Data, source and model record
| Dönüş süresi (yıl) | Loss (% of exposure) |
|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 |
| 4 | 0.59 |
| 8 | 0.91 |
| 17 | 1.28 |
| 34 | 1.68 |
| 70 | 2.13 |
| 141 | 2.60 |
| 288 | 3.11 |
| 585 | 3.64 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 |
- Kaynak
- This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
- Tarih
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
- Kapsam
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Birimler
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Durum
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.credit.one-factor
- Sürüm
- 1.0.0
- Sahip
- GRA platforms lane
- Amaç
- To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
- Risk domain
- Kredi ve karşı taraf riski
- Varsayımlar
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Girdiler
- Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Veri
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Yöntemler
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
- Doğrulama
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Sınırlamalar
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Belirsizlik
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Konsantrasyon
One large exposure and the tail
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.
- Granular portfolio
- With the large exposure
Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.
Kontroller
- Share of the largest exposure
- 5.0 % of the portfolio
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Temerrüt halinde kayıp
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Sonuçlar
- Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
- 4.55
- Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
- 0.49
- Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
- 400
Data, source and model record
| Dönüş süresi (yıl) | Granular (%) | With the large exposure (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 | 0.28 |
| 4 | 0.59 | 0.56 |
| 8 | 0.91 | 0.89 |
| 17 | 1.28 | 1.29 |
| 34 | 1.68 | 1.81 |
| 70 | 2.13 | 2.53 |
| 141 | 2.60 | 3.06 |
| 288 | 3.11 | 3.57 |
| 585 | 3.64 | 4.12 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 | 4.69 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 | 5.29 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 | 5.91 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 | 6.56 |
- Kaynak
- This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
- Tarih
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
- Kapsam
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Birimler
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Durum
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.credit.concentration
- Sürüm
- 1.0.0
- Sahip
- GRA platforms lane
- Amaç
- To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
- Risk domain
- Kredi ve karşı taraf riski
- Varsayımlar
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Girdiler
- Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Veri
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Yöntemler
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
- Doğrulama
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Sınırlamalar
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Belirsizlik
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Likidite
The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.
- Outflow over 30 days by funding class
- Net outflows after capped inflows
- Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.
Kontroller
- High-quality liquid assets
- 15.0 % of total funding
- Stable retail deposits
- 30 % of total funding
- Less stable retail deposits
- 20 % of total funding
- Operational deposits
- 15 % of total funding
- Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
- 15 % of total funding
- Unsecured funding from financial institutions
- 10 % of total funding
- Contractual inflows over 30 days
- 5.0 % of total funding
- Stress on run-off rates
- 1.00 times the baseline
Sonuçlar
- Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
- 23.3
- Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
- 5.00
- Net outflows (% of total funding)
- 18.3
- Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
- 82
Data, source and model record
| Funding class | Balance (% of funding) | Run-off rate (%) | Outflow (% of funding) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stable retail deposits | 30.0 | 5 | 1.50 |
| Less stable retail deposits | 20.0 | 10 | 2.00 |
| Operational deposits | 15.0 | 25 | 3.75 |
| Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates | 15.0 | 40 | 6.00 |
| Unsecured funding from financial institutions | 10.0 | 100 | 10.0 |
- Kaynak
- Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
- Tarih
- BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
- Kapsam
- A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
- Birimler
- Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Durum
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
- Sürüm
- 1.0.0
- Sahip
- GRA platforms lane
- Amaç
- To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Risk domain
- Liquidity risk
- Varsayımlar
- Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
- Girdiler
- High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
- Veri
- BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
- Yöntemler
- Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
- Doğrulama
- Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
- Sınırlamalar
- Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
- Belirsizlik
- None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
- Approved use
- Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Prohibited use
- Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Maruziyet ağı
Varlıklara gelen bir şok nasıl sistem kaybına dönüşür
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.
- System equity lost
Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.
Kontroller
- Dış varlıklarda düşüş
- 2.0 %
Sonuçlar
- Dış varlıklarda düşüş (%)
- 2.0
- System equity lost in the first round (%)
- 18.0
- System equity lost after contagion (%)
- 45.0
- Amplification by the network (percentage points)
- 27.0
- Banks in default (of 20)
- 0
Data, source and model record
| Tur | Kaybedilen sistem özkaynağı (%) | Temerrüde düşen bankalar |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.0 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.8 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.3 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.2 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.5 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.9 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.7 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.2 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.5 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.7 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.8 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 13 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 14 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 15 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 16 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.0 | 0 |
- Kaynak
- Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
- Tarih
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
- Kapsam
- A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
- Birimler
- Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Durum
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.network.debtrank
- Sürüm
- 1.0.0
- Sahip
- GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
- Amaç
- To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
- Risk domain
- Systemic and contagion risk
- Varsayımlar
- Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
- Girdiler
- Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
- Veri
- None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
- Yöntemler
- DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
- Doğrulama
- The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
- Sınırlamalar
- No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
- Belirsizlik
- Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
- Approved use
- Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
- Prohibited use
- Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Senaryo analizi
Scenarios, not forecasts
A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.
Regulatory context and related standards
The frameworks this work is read against
| Çerçeve | Kuruluş | Belirledikleri | Edition or date | Where it applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Basel III çerçevesi | Basel Bankacılık Denetim Komitesi | Asgari sermaye, kaldıraç, likidite karşılama ve istikrarlı fonlama gereksinimleri ile bunların üzerindeki sermaye tamponları | December 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel Framework | Basel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables |
| Etkin Bankacılık Denetimi için Temel İlkeler | Basel Bankacılık Denetim Komitesi | IMF ve Dünya Bankası FSAP'lerinde değerlendirilen, denetim yetkileri, lisanslama, risk yönetimi ve yönetişime ilişkin temel standartlar | Revised April 2024 | International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs |
| İklimle ilgili finansal risklerin etkin yönetimi ve denetimine ilişkin ilkeler | Basel Bankacılık Denetim Komitesi | Banka yönetişimi, risk yönetimi ve iklimle ilgili riskin senaryo analizine ve bunun denetim incelemesine ilişkin beklentiler | June 2022 | Basel Committee members, through national supervisors |
| Finansal Kurumlar için Etkin Çözümleme Rejimlerinin Temel Nitelikleri | Finansal İstikrar Kurulu (Financial Stability Board) | Bir bankanın vergi mükelleflerinin desteği olmadan batabilmesi için çözümleme yetkileri, kurtarma ve çözümleme planlaması ve sınır ötesi iş birliği | October 2011, updated October 2014 | FSB member jurisdictions |
| IFRS 9 Finansal Araçlar | Uluslararası Muhasebe Standartları Kurulu | Finansal varlıkların sınıflandırılması ve üç aşamada ileriye dönük beklenen kredi zararı karşılığı | Issued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018 | Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead) |
| NGFS iklim senaryoları | Finansal Sistemi Yeşillendirme Ağı | Merkez bankaları ve denetim otoriteleri tarafından iklim senaryosu analizinde kullanılan referans geçiş ve fiziksel risk patikaları | Phase V, November 2024 | Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding |
| IFRS S2 İklimle İlgili Açıklamalar | Uluslararası Sürdürülebilirlik Standartları Kurulu | Finanse edilen emisyonlar ve iklim dayanıklılığı dahil, iklimle ilgili risk ve fırsatların açıklanması | Issued June 2023, amended December 2025 | Where a jurisdiction adopts it |
| Denetimsel İnceleme ve Değerlendirme Süreci (SREP) | Avrupa Bankacılık Otoritesi ve ECB Bankacılık Denetimi | İş modelini, yönetişimi ve sermaye ve likiditeye yönelik riskleri değerlendiren ve Pillar 2 gereksinimlerini ve rehberliğini belirleyen denetim süreci | EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022) | European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks |
| Kapsamlı Sermaye Analizi ve İncelemesi (CCAR) ve denetim stres testleri | Federal Rezerv Sistemi Guvernörler Kurulu | ABD'deki büyük bankalar için stres sermaye tamponunu belirleyen, stres senaryoları ve sermaye planı incelemesine yönelik denetim süreci | Annual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020 | United States, large bank holding companies |
| ISO 31000 Risk yönetimi kılavuzu | Uluslararası Standardizasyon Örgütü | Bir kuruluş genelinde riski yönetmeye yönelik ilkeler, çerçeve ve süreç | ISO 31000:2018 | International, voluntary |
Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.
Geographic dimensions
Global, regional and country programmes
Institutional counterparts
The institutions this work speaks to
- Bank board and board risk committee
- Chief risk officer and credit committee
- İhtiyati denetim otoritesi
- Makro ihtiyati otorite
- Bank board and asset liability committee
- Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
- Merkez bankası
- Banka yönetim kurulu
- Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
- Kritik üçüncü tarafları denetleyen otoriteler
- Credit risk function
- Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
- Central bank as overseer and operator
- Bank treasury
- Central counterparty board and risk committee
- Resolution authority
Araştırma yayınları
Research, methods and sources
Educational resources
Learn the methods
Readiness workflows
Finansmana hazırlık
Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.
Contribution mechanisms
Katılın
Sınır
What this page is not
Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.