Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise
Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.
Domain definition
What Banking Nexus studies
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.
Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.
| 용어 | 정의 |
|---|---|
| Basel III | The Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. |
| CET1 비율 | Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital. |
| 유동성 커버리지 비율 | High-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period. |
| Expected credit loss | The probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for. |
Financial system context
The parts of the financial system it covers
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신용 및 거래상대방 리스크
대출 장부와 거래 익스포저의 부도, 등급 이동과 집중, 그리고 손실이 거래 상대방 사이에서 어떻게 전달되는지.
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자본과 유동성
손실흡수 자본, 유동성 완충자본, 자금 조달 구조, 그리고 시장과 예금자가 스트레스를 받을 때 이들이 어떻게 움직이는지.
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운영 회복력
명시된 영향 허용 한도 안에서, 사이버 사고, 제3자 장애, 프로세스 붕괴 속에서도 중요 서비스를 지속하는 것.
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결제와 시장 인프라
Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.
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기후 및 자연 리스크
Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.
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모형과 AI
신용 평가, 충당금과 자본 모델, 그리고 기계학습이 이제 요구하는 검증과 거버넌스.
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은행업과 실물 경제
가계, 소기업, 주택과 필수 서비스에 대한 대출, 그리고 은행 스트레스가 어떻게 신용 경색이 되는지.
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거버넌스와 감독
이사회, 리스크 문화, 방어선, 감독 검토 및 정리 계획, 이슬람 은행업의 구조를 포함합니다.
리스크 분류 체계
Risks, topic by topic
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신용 및 거래상대방 리스크
신용 리스크는 차입자나 거래 상대방이 전액을 제때 상환하지 못할 가능성이며, 대부분의 은행에서 여전히 주된 손실 원천입니다.
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자본과 유동성
자본은 손실을 흡수하고, 유동성은 은행이 만기가 도래하는 채무를 계속 지급할 수 있게 합니다.
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은행 운영 회복력
운영 회복력이란 사이버 공격, 기술 변경 실패, 제3자 장애, 팬데믹 등 어떤 교란이 있더라도 은행이 핵심 서비스를 계속 제공하는 능력을 말합니다.
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Climate and nature bank risk
기후변화와 자연 손실은 차입자, 담보, 그리고 은행이 의존하는 시장을 통해 은행에 영향을 미칩니다.
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결제 의존 관계
모든 은행은 자금과 담보를 이동시키기 위해 지급 시스템, 중앙청산소, 증권결제시스템, 환거래 은행, 메시징 네트워크에 의존합니다.
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Model and ai risk
은행은 신용 공여, 충당금 설정, 상품 가격 결정, 자본 산출, 사기 탐지에 모형을 활용하며, 그 모형 중 머신러닝을 사용하는 비중이 늘고 있습니다.
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Banking and real economy
은행은 예금을 가계, 중소기업, 필수 서비스 제공자를 위한 대출로 전환합니다.
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은행 거버넌스
많은 은행 파산은 거버넌스에서 비롯됩니다. 감수하는 리스크를 이해하지 못한 이사회, 신중함보다 성장을 보상한 유인, 이의를 제기할 위상이 없는 통제 기능입니다.
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Housing property finance
Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.
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이슬람 은행업
이슬람 은행은 이슬람 상법을 준수하도록 설계된 계약 및 거버넌스 구조 아래 운영되며, 이자부 대출 대신 매매, 리스 및 파트너십 기반 상품을 사용합니다.
Risk-transmission mechanisms
How these risks develop and spread
| 주제 | 메커니즘 | 운영 방식 |
|---|---|---|
| 신용 및 거래상대방 리스크 | Quality erodes before default | Arrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised. |
| 신용 및 거래상대방 리스크 | 손실이 집중됨 | Exposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies. |
| 자본과 유동성 | Losses deplete capital | Credit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers. |
| 자본과 유동성 | Funding can run quickly | Uninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing. |
| 은행 운영 회복력 | 의존 관계가 드러나지 않음 | A single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns. |
| 은행 운영 회복력 | Third parties concentrate risk | 많은 은행이 동일한 클라우드, 소프트웨어, 데이터 제공업체에 의존합니다. 한 제공업체의 장애나 침해가 여러 기관에 동시에 영향을 미쳐, 한 회사의 운영 사건이 업계 전체의 사건으로 번질 수 있습니다. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Physical risk hits collateral and income | 홍수, 폭풍, 폭염, 가뭄은 재산에 피해를 주고 생산을 중단시킵니다. 보험에 가입되지 않은 손실은 차입자에게 돌아가 부도 확률과 부도 시 손실률을 높이며, 보험 철수는 지역 전체의 주택담보대출 포트폴리오 가격을 재조정할 수 있습니다. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | 전환 리스크가 업종을 재평가함 | 탄소 가격제, 규제, 기술, 수요 변화는 자산을 좌초시키고 배출 집약적 차입자의 마진을 압박할 수 있다. 시점이 중요하다. 늦고 급작스러운 전환은 질서 있는 전환보다 더 큰 손실을 낳는다. |
| 결제 의존 관계 | Liquidity is needed intraday | Real-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours. |
| 결제 의존 관계 | 중앙청산소는 리스크를 집중시킵니다 | Clearing nets exposures and mutualises default losses. In stress, margin calls rise across members at the same time, and a member default draws on a default fund that all members share. |
| Model and ai risk | Drift and regime change | Models learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it. |
| Model and ai risk | Opacity weakens challenge | Complex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does. |
| Banking and real economy | Credit supply tightens | 자본이나 자금이 부족해지면 은행은 대출 기준과 마진을 높이고, 신용 한도를 줄이며, 더 안전한 차입자를 선호합니다. 대안이 적은 소규모 기업과 저소득 가구가 가장 먼저 영향을 받습니다. |
| Banking and real economy | Borrower stress feeds back | Higher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy. |
| 은행 거버넌스 | Board oversight sets the frame | The board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set. |
| 은행 거버넌스 | Incentives shape behaviour | Remuneration tied to short-term revenue encourages risk-taking whose costs appear later. Deferral, malus and clawback aim to align pay with the risk outcome as it is realised. |
| Housing property finance | Credit and prices reinforce each other | Easier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs. |
| Housing property finance | Affordability under rising rates | Variable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers. |
| 이슬람 은행업 | 계약 구조가 리스크를 좌우합니다 | Murabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label. |
| 이슬람 은행업 | Investment accounts share returns | Profit-sharing investment account holders bear losses in principle. Competitive pressure can lead banks to smooth returns and absorb losses themselves, a transfer known as displaced commercial risk. |
연구 질문
Who decides, and what they need to know
| Decision holder | 질문 | Evidence the platform's pages describe |
|---|---|---|
| Bank board and board risk committee | What credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to impose | Concentration measures, stage migration and stress losses by segment |
| Bank board and asset liability committee | What capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure funding | Capital and liquidity projections under internal and supervisory scenarios |
| Bank board | Which business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carry | Service maps, scenario test results and incident history |
| Bank board and board risk committee | How climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planning | Materiality assessment, scenario results and sector exposures |
| 감독자이자 운영자로서의 중앙은행 | Which systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meet | Availability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows |
| Bank board and model risk committee | What model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptable | Model inventory, tiering and validation findings |
| Macroprudential authority or financial policy committee | 자본 버퍼와 차입자 기반 조치를 설정하거나 해제할지 여부 | Credit gaps, debt service ratios and lending surveys |
| Bank board and nomination committee | Whether board skills, independence and information are adequate for the bank's risk profile | Board effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports |
| 거시건전성 당국 | Whether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measures | Price-to-income, credit growth, lending standards and arrears |
| Bank board | What risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accounts | Displaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact |
These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.
Key indicators
What is measured, in which unit, by whom
| 지표 | 단위 | 주기 | 출처 유형 | 근거 표시 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-performing loan ratio | 총대출 대비 비율(%) | 분기별 | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | 공표 통계 |
| 2단계 및 3단계 대출 비중 | 총대출 대비 비율(%) | 분기별 | IFRS 9 재무제표 | 보고됨 |
| Common equity tier 1 ratio | 위험가중자산 대비 비율(%) | 분기별 | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | 공표 통계 |
| Leverage ratio | 총 노출 측정값의 백분율 | 분기별 | 감독 보고서 | 공표 통계 |
| Important business services within impact tolerance in testing | count of services tested and count passing | 연간 | Scenario testing records | 보고됨 |
| Major ICT-related incidents | 심각도 등급별 건수 | 분기별 | Incident reports to supervisors | 공표 통계 |
| 금융 배출량 | 이산화탄소 환산 톤 | 연간 | PCAF methodology applied to loan and investment books | 추정 |
| 기후 정책 관련 부문에 대한 노출 | percent of loan book | 연간 | Pillar 3 ESG disclosures | 보고됨 |
| Value settled through large-value payment systems | currency units per day | 일별 | System operator statistics | 공표 통계 |
| 결제 시스템 가용성 | percent of operating hours | 월별 | 운영자 공시 | 보고됨 |
| Model inventory coverage | count of models by tier and validation status | 분기별 | Model risk management records | 보고됨 |
| Discriminatory power of credit scorecards | Gini coefficient or area under the curve | 연간 | 모델 검증 | 모델 추정 |
| 신용 대 GDP 갭 | 퍼센트포인트 | 분기별 | BIS 신용 통계 | 추정 |
| Credit standards on loans to enterprises | net percentage of banks reporting tightening | 분기별 | 은행 대출 설문조사 | 보고됨 |
| Board members with banking or risk expertise | 이사회 비중 | 연간 | Governance disclosures | 신고됨 |
| Independent directors | 이사회 비중 | 연간 | Governance disclosures | 신고됨 |
| Loan-to-value ratio at origination | percent of property value | 분기별 | Loan-level and supervisory data | 공표 통계 |
| Debt-service-to-income ratio at origination | percent of gross income | 분기별 | Loan-level data, household surveys | 보고됨 |
| Capital adequacy ratio of Islamic banks | 위험가중자산 대비 비율(%) | 분기별 | IFSB prudential indicators | 공표 통계 |
| Non-performing financing ratio | 총 조달액 대비 비율(퍼센트) | 분기별 | IFSB prudential indicators | 공표 통계 |
Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.
방법론
The methods the platform's work rests on
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금융경제학
Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.
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Probability statistics
Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.
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네트워크 과학
Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.
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Financial engineering
Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.
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Ai ml
Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.
데이터 출처
근거의 출처
| 출처 | 제공하는 것 | 라이선스 등급 |
|---|---|---|
| IMF 금융건전성지표 | Non-performing loans, provisioning and sectoral loan distribution reported by national authorities | 무료, IMF 이용 약관 |
| EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exercise | Bank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banks | 무료, 출처 표시 |
| ECB Supervisory Banking Statistics | Asset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro area | 무료, 출처 표시 |
| FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9C | Loan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companies | 퍼블릭 도메인 |
| BIS consolidated banking statistics | Banks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basis | 무료, BIS 이용 약관 |
| Rating agency default and recovery studies | Historical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sector | Licensed, subscription |
| National central credit registers | Borrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysis | Restricted, supervisory access |
| BIS Basel III monitoring reports | Aggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banks | 무료, BIS 이용 약관 |
| Federal Reserve supervisory stress test results | Scenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banks | 퍼블릭 도메인 |
| Bank of England stress testing results | Scenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banks | 무료, 영란은행(Bank of England) 이용 약관 |
| EBA EU 전역 스트레스 테스트 | Bank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodology | 무료, 출처 표시 |
| 필라 3 공시 | Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFR | 공개, 은행 조건 |
| Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act | Registers of ICT third-party arrangements held by authorities and the public list of designated critical ICT providers | Registers restricted to authorities; designation list public |
| ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publications | Supervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilities | 무료, 출처 표시 |
| Bank of England and PRA operational resilience publications | Policy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports | 무료, 영란은행(Bank of England) 이용 약관 |
| ORX operational risk loss data | Pooled loss events by event type and business line from member banks | 라이선스 방식, 회원제 |
| 금융 부문에 대한 ENISA 위협 현황 | Analysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutions | 무료, 출처 표시 |
| Pillar 3 operational risk disclosures | Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banks | 공개, 은행 조건 |
| NGFS 시나리오 | Transition and physical risk pathways with macroeconomic variables for scenario analysis | 무료, 출처 표시 |
| ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicators | Supervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposures | 무료, 출처 표시 |
| Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario | Design and published results of the exploratory exercise for UK banks and insurers | 무료, 영란은행(Bank of England) 이용 약관 |
| Pillar 3 ESG disclosures under EBA standards | Bank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignment | 공개, 은행 조건 |
| PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting Standard(PCAF 글로벌 온실가스 회계 및 보고 표준) | Methodology and data quality scores for financed emissions | Free standard; emission factor database by membership |
| Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard maps | 홍수, 폭염, 가뭄에 대한 물리적 재해 레이어 | 무료 공개, 출처 표시 |
Instruments explained for research
Analytical instruments
Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.
신용 리스크
A credit portfolio's loss distribution
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.
- 포트폴리오 손실
- Expected loss
With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.
통제 수단
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- 부도 시 손실률
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
결과
- Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
- 0.45
- Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
- 2.36
- Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 3.61
Data, source and model record
| 재현 기간(년) | Loss (% of exposure) |
|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 |
| 4 | 0.59 |
| 8 | 0.91 |
| 17 | 1.28 |
| 34 | 1.68 |
| 70 | 2.13 |
| 141 | 2.60 |
| 288 | 3.11 |
| 585 | 3.64 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 |
- 출처
- This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
- 날짜
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
- 범위
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- 단위
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- 상태
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- 모델링
- gra.credit.one-factor
- 버전
- 1.0.0
- 소유자
- GRA platforms lane
- 목적
- To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
- Risk domain
- 신용 및 거래상대방 리스크
- 가정
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- 투입 자료
- Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- 데이터
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- 방법
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
- 검증
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- 한계
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- 불확실성
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
집중도
One large exposure and the tail
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.
- Granular portfolio
- With the large exposure
Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.
통제 수단
- Share of the largest exposure
- 5.0 % of the portfolio
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- 부도 시 손실률
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
결과
- Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
- 4.55
- Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
- 0.49
- Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
- 400
Data, source and model record
| 재현 기간(년) | Granular (%) | With the large exposure (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 | 0.28 |
| 4 | 0.59 | 0.56 |
| 8 | 0.91 | 0.89 |
| 17 | 1.28 | 1.29 |
| 34 | 1.68 | 1.81 |
| 70 | 2.13 | 2.53 |
| 141 | 2.60 | 3.06 |
| 288 | 3.11 | 3.57 |
| 585 | 3.64 | 4.12 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 | 4.69 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 | 5.29 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 | 5.91 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 | 6.56 |
- 출처
- This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
- 날짜
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
- 범위
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- 단위
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- 상태
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- 모델링
- gra.credit.concentration
- 버전
- 1.0.0
- 소유자
- GRA platforms lane
- 목적
- To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
- Risk domain
- 신용 및 거래상대방 리스크
- 가정
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- 투입 자료
- Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- 데이터
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- 방법
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
- 검증
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- 한계
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- 불확실성
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
유동성
The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.
- Outflow over 30 days by funding class
- Net outflows after capped inflows
- Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.
통제 수단
- High-quality liquid assets
- 15.0 % of total funding
- Stable retail deposits
- 30 % of total funding
- Less stable retail deposits
- 20 % of total funding
- Operational deposits
- 15 % of total funding
- Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
- 15 % of total funding
- Unsecured funding from financial institutions
- 10 % of total funding
- Contractual inflows over 30 days
- 5.0 % of total funding
- Stress on run-off rates
- 1.00 times the baseline
결과
- Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
- 23.3
- Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
- 5.00
- Net outflows (% of total funding)
- 18.3
- Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
- 82
Data, source and model record
| Funding class | Balance (% of funding) | Run-off rate (%) | Outflow (% of funding) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stable retail deposits | 30.0 | 5 | 1.50 |
| Less stable retail deposits | 20.0 | 10 | 2.00 |
| Operational deposits | 15.0 | 25 | 3.75 |
| Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates | 15.0 | 40 | 6.00 |
| Unsecured funding from financial institutions | 10.0 | 100 | 10.0 |
- 출처
- Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
- 날짜
- BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
- 범위
- A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
- 단위
- Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- 상태
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- 모델링
- gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
- 버전
- 1.0.0
- 소유자
- GRA platforms lane
- 목적
- To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Risk domain
- 유동성 리스크
- 가정
- Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
- 투입 자료
- High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
- 데이터
- BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
- 방법
- Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
- 검증
- Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
- 한계
- Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
- 불확실성
- None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
- Approved use
- Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Prohibited use
- Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
노출 네트워크
자산에 대한 충격이 시스템 손실로 전환되는 과정
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.
- System equity lost
Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.
통제 수단
- 대외 자산 감소
- 2.0 %
결과
- 대외 자산 감소 (%)
- 2.0
- System equity lost in the first round (%)
- 18.0
- System equity lost after contagion (%)
- 45.0
- Amplification by the network (percentage points)
- 27.0
- Banks in default (of 20)
- 0
Data, source and model record
| 라운드 | 시스템 자기자본 손실(%) | 부도 은행 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.0 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.8 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.3 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.2 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.5 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.9 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.7 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.2 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.5 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.7 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.8 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 13 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 14 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 15 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 16 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.0 | 0 |
- 출처
- Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
- 날짜
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
- 범위
- A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
- 단위
- Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- 상태
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- 모델링
- gra.network.debtrank
- 버전
- 1.0.0
- 소유자
- GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
- 목적
- To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
- Risk domain
- Systemic and contagion risk
- 가정
- Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
- 투입 자료
- Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
- 데이터
- None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
- 방법
- DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
- 검증
- The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
- 한계
- No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
- 불확실성
- Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
- Approved use
- Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
- Prohibited use
- Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
시나리오 분석
Scenarios, not forecasts
A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.
Regulatory context and related standards
The frameworks this work is read against
| 프레임워크 | 기구 | 정하는 것 | Edition or date | Where it applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 바젤 III 체계 | 바젤 은행감독위원회 | 최소 자본, 레버리지, 유동성 커버리지, 안정적 자금 조달 요건과 그 위의 자본 완충자본 | December 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel Framework | Basel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables |
| 효과적인 은행 감독을 위한 핵심 원칙 | 바젤 은행감독위원회 | IMF와 세계은행의 FSAP에서 평가되는, 감독 권한, 인가, 리스크 관리, 지배구조에 관한 기본 기준 | Revised April 2024 | International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs |
| 기후 관련 금융 리스크의 효과적 관리와 감독을 위한 원칙 | 바젤 은행감독위원회 | 기후 관련 리스크에 대한 은행의 거버넌스, 리스크 관리 및 시나리오 분석과 그에 대한 감독 검토의 기대 | June 2022 | Basel Committee members, through national supervisors |
| 금융기관 효과적 정리체계의 핵심 요소 | 금융안정위원회 | 은행이 납세자 지원 없이 실패할 수 있도록 하는 정리 권한, 회생 및 정리 계획, 국경 간 협력 | October 2011, updated October 2014 | FSB member jurisdictions |
| IFRS 9 금융상품 | 국제회계기준위원회 | 금융자산의 분류와 3단계 미래전망 기대신용손실 충당 | Issued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018 | Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead) |
| NGFS 기후 시나리오 | 금융 녹색화 네트워크 | 중앙은행과 감독 당국이 기후 시나리오 분석에 사용하는 전환 및 물리적 리스크 기준 경로 | Phase V, November 2024 | Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding |
| IFRS S2 기후 관련 공시 | 국제지속가능성기준위원회 | 기후 관련 리스크와 기회의 공시, 금융 배출량과 기후 회복력 포함 | Issued June 2023, amended December 2025 | Where a jurisdiction adopts it |
| 감독 검토 및 평가 절차(SREP) | 유럽은행감독청과 ECB 은행감독기구 | 사업 모델, 지배구조, 자본과 유동성에 대한 리스크를 평가하고 필라 2 요건과 지침을 정하는 감독 절차 | EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022) | European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks |
| 종합자본분석검토(CCAR)와 감독 스트레스 테스트 | 연방준비제도이사회 | 미국 대형 은행의 스트레스 자본 완충자본을 정하는, 스트레스 시나리오와 자본 계획 검토의 감독 절차 | Annual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020 | United States, large bank holding companies |
| ISO 31000 위험 관리 지침 | 국제표준화기구 | 조직 전반의 리스크 관리를 위한 원칙, 프레임워크, 프로세스 | ISO 31000:2018 | International, voluntary |
Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.
Institutional counterparts
The institutions this work speaks to
- Bank board and board risk committee
- Chief risk officer and credit committee
- 건전성 감독기관
- 거시건전성 당국
- Bank board and asset liability committee
- Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
- 중앙은행
- Bank board
- 최고운영책임자 및 최고정보보안책임자
- Authorities overseeing critical third parties
- Credit risk function
- Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
- 감독자이자 운영자로서의 중앙은행
- Bank treasury
- Central counterparty board and risk committee
- 정리 당국
연구 간행물
Research, methods and sources
Educational resources
Learn the methods
Readiness workflows
금융 준비도
Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.
Contribution mechanisms
참여하기
경계
What this page is not
Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.