Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise
Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.
Domain definition
What Banking Nexus studies
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.
Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Basel III | The Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. |
| CET1 ratio | Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital. |
| Liquidity coverage ratio | High-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period. |
| Expected credit loss | The probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for. |
Financial system context
The parts of the financial system it covers
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Credit and counterparty risk
Default, migration and concentration in loan books and trading exposures, and how losses pass between counterparties.
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Capital and liquidity
Loss-absorbing capital, liquidity buffers and funding structures, and how they behave when markets and depositors come under stress.
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Operational resilience
Continuity of important services through cyber incidents, third-party failures and process breakdowns, within stated impact tolerances.
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Payments and market infrastructure
Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.
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Climate and nature risk
Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.
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Models and AI
Credit scoring, provisioning and capital models, and the validation and governance that machine learning now demands.
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Banking and the real economy
Lending to households, small firms, housing and essential services, and how bank stress becomes a credit squeeze.
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Governance and supervision
Boards, risk culture, lines of defence, supervisory review and resolution planning, including the structures of Islamic banking.
Risikotaksonomie
Risks, topic by topic
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Credit and counterparty risk
Credit risk is the chance that a borrower or counterparty fails to pay in full and on time, and it remains the main source of loss for most banks.
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Capital and liquidity
Capital absorbs losses and liquidity keeps a bank paying its obligations as they fall due.
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Bank operational resilience
Operational resilience is a bank's ability to keep delivering critical services through disruption, whether from a cyber attack, a failed technology change, a third-party outage or a pandemic.
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Climate and nature bank risk
Climate change and nature loss reach banks through their borrowers, their collateral and the markets they depend on.
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Payment dependencies
Every bank depends on payment systems, central counterparties, securities settlement systems, correspondent banks and messaging networks to move money and collateral.
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Model and ai risk
Banks rely on models to grant credit, set provisions, price products, compute capital and detect fraud, and a growing share of those models use machine learning.
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Banking and real economy
Banks turn deposits into loans for households, small and medium enterprises and the providers of essential services.
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Bank governance
Many bank failures trace back to governance: boards that did not understand the risks being taken, incentives that rewarded growth over prudence, or control functions without the standing to challenge.
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Housing property finance
Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.
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Islamic banking
Islamic banks operate under contracts and governance structures designed to comply with Islamic commercial law, using sale, lease and partnership-based instruments in place of interest-bearing loans.
Risk-transmission mechanisms
How these risks develop and spread
| Topic | Mechanism | Hoe dit werk |
|---|---|---|
| Credit and counterparty risk | Quality erodes before default | Arrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised. |
| Credit and counterparty risk | Losses concentrate | Exposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies. |
| Capital and liquidity | Losses deplete capital | Credit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers. |
| Capital and liquidity | Funding can run quickly | Uninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing. |
| Bank operational resilience | Dependencies are hidden | A single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns. |
| Bank operational resilience | Third parties concentrate risk | Many banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Physical risk hits collateral and income | Floods, storms, heat and drought damage property and disrupt production. Uninsured losses fall on borrowers, raising default probabilities and loss given default, and insurance withdrawal can reprice whole regional mortgage books. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Transition risk reprices sectors | Carbon pricing, regulation, technology and shifting demand can strand assets and squeeze the margins of emissions-intensive borrowers. Timing matters: a late and abrupt transition produces sharper losses than an orderly one. |
| Payment dependencies | Liquidity is needed intraday | Real-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours. |
| Payment dependencies | Central counterparties concentrate risk | Clearing nets exposures and mutualises default losses. In stress, margin calls rise across members at the same time, and a member default draws on a default fund that all members share. |
| Model and ai risk | Drift and regime change | Models learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it. |
| Model and ai risk | Opacity weakens challenge | Complex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does. |
| Banking and real economy | Credit supply tightens | When capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first. |
| Banking and real economy | Borrower stress feeds back | Higher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy. |
| Bank governance | Board oversight sets the frame | The board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set. |
| Bank governance | Incentives shape behaviour | Remuneration tied to short-term revenue encourages risk-taking whose costs appear later. Deferral, malus and clawback aim to align pay with the risk outcome as it is realised. |
| Housing property finance | Credit and prices reinforce each other | Easier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs. |
| Housing property finance | Affordability under rising rates | Variable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers. |
| Islamic banking | Contract structure shapes risk | Murabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label. |
| Islamic banking | Investment accounts share returns | Profit-sharing investment account holders bear losses in principle. Competitive pressure can lead banks to smooth returns and absorb losses themselves, a transfer known as displaced commercial risk. |
Research questions
Who decides, and what they need to know
| Decision holder | Vraag | Evidence the platform's pages describe |
|---|---|---|
| Bank board and board risk committee | What credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to impose | Concentration measures, stage migration and stress losses by segment |
| Bank board and asset liability committee | What capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure funding | Capital and liquidity projections under internal and supervisory scenarios |
| Bank board | Which business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carry | Service maps, scenario test results and incident history |
| Bank board and board risk committee | How climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planning | Materiality assessment, scenario results and sector exposures |
| Central bank as overseer and operator | Which systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meet | Availability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows |
| Bank board and model risk committee | What model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptable | Model inventory, tiering and validation findings |
| Macroprudential authority or financial policy committee | Whether to set or release capital buffers and borrower-based measures | Credit gaps, debt service ratios and lending surveys |
| Bank board and nomination committee | Whether board skills, independence and information are adequate for the bank's risk profile | Board effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports |
| Macroprudential authority | Whether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measures | Price-to-income, credit growth, lending standards and arrears |
| Bank board | What risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accounts | Displaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact |
These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.
Key indicators
What is measured, in which unit, by whom
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Evidence label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-performing loan ratio | percent of gross loans | quarterly | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Published statistics |
| Stage 2 and stage 3 loan share | percent of gross loans | quarterly | IFRS 9 financial statements | GERAPPORTEER |
| Common equity tier 1 ratio | percent of risk-weighted assets | quarterly | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Published statistics |
| Leverage ratio | percent of total exposure measure | quarterly | Supervisory returns | Published statistics |
| Important business services within impact tolerance in testing | count of services tested and count passing | annual | Scenario testing records | GERAPPORTEER |
| Major ICT-related incidents | count by severity class | quarterly | Incident reports to supervisors | Published statistics |
| Financed emissions | tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent | annual | PCAF methodology applied to loan and investment books | GESKAT |
| Exposure to climate-policy-relevant sectors | percent of loan book | annual | Pillar 3 ESG disclosures | GERAPPORTEER |
| Value settled through large-value payment systems | currency units per day | daily | System operator statistics | Published statistics |
| Payment system availability | percent of operating hours | monthly | Operator disclosures | GERAPPORTEER |
| Model inventory coverage | count of models by tier and validation status | quarterly | Model risk management records | GERAPPORTEER |
| Discriminatory power of credit scorecards | Gini coefficient or area under the curve | annual | Model validation | GEMODELLEER |
| Credit-to-GDP gap | percentage points | quarterly | BIS credit statistics | GESKAT |
| Credit standards on loans to enterprises | net percentage of banks reporting tightening | quarterly | Bank lending surveys | GERAPPORTEER |
| Board members with banking or risk expertise | share of board | annual | Governance disclosures | DECLARED |
| Independent directors | share of board | annual | Governance disclosures | DECLARED |
| Loan-to-value ratio at origination | percent of property value | quarterly | Loan-level and supervisory data | Published statistics |
| Debt-service-to-income ratio at origination | percent of gross income | quarterly | Loan-level data, household surveys | GERAPPORTEER |
| Capital adequacy ratio of Islamic banks | percent of risk-weighted assets | quarterly | IFSB prudential indicators | Published statistics |
| Non-performing financing ratio | percent of gross financing | quarterly | IFSB prudential indicators | Published statistics |
Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.
Metodologie
The methods the platform's work rests on
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Financial economics
Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.
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Probability statistics
Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.
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Netwerkwetenskap
Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.
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Financial engineering
Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.
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Ai ml
Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.
Data sources
Where the evidence comes from
| Bron | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| IMF Financial Soundness Indicators | Non-performing loans, provisioning and sectoral loan distribution reported by national authorities | Free, IMF terms of use |
| EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exercise | Bank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banks | Free, attribution |
| ECB Supervisory Banking Statistics | Asset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro area | Free, attribution |
| FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9C | Loan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companies | Openbare domein |
| BIS consolidated banking statistics | Banks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basis | Free, BIS terms of use |
| Rating agency default and recovery studies | Historical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sector | Licensed, subscription |
| National central credit registers | Borrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysis | Restricted, supervisory access |
| BIS Basel III monitoring reports | Aggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banks | Free, BIS terms of use |
| Federal Reserve supervisory stress test results | Scenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banks | Openbare domein |
| Bank of England stress testing results | Scenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banks | Free, Bank of England terms of use |
| EBA EU-wide stress test | Bank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodology | Free, attribution |
| Pillar 3 disclosures | Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFR | Public, bank terms |
| Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act | Registers of ICT third-party arrangements held by authorities and the public list of designated critical ICT providers | Registers restricted to authorities; designation list public |
| ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publications | Supervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilities | Free, attribution |
| Bank of England and PRA operational resilience publications | Policy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports | Free, Bank of England terms of use |
| ORX operational risk loss data | Pooled loss events by event type and business line from member banks | Licensed, membership |
| ENISA threat landscape for the finance sector | Analysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutions | Free, attribution |
| Pillar 3 operational risk disclosures | Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banks | Public, bank terms |
| NGFS-scenario's | Transition and physical risk pathways with macroeconomic variables for scenario analysis | Free, attribution |
| ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicators | Supervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposures | Free, attribution |
| Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario | Design and published results of the exploratory exercise for UK banks and insurers | Free, Bank of England terms of use |
| Pillar 3 ESG disclosures under EBA standards | Bank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignment | Public, bank terms |
| PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting Standard | Methodology and data quality scores for financed emissions | Free standard; emission factor database by membership |
| Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard maps | Physical hazard layers for flood, heat and drought | Free and open, attribution |
Instruments explained for research
Analytical instruments
Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.
Credit risk
A credit portfolio's loss distribution
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.
- Portfolio loss
- Expected loss
With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.
Controls
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Loss given default
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Results
- Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
- 0.45
- Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
- 2.36
- Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 3.61
Data, source and model record
| Return period (years) | Loss (% of exposure) |
|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 |
| 4 | 0.59 |
| 8 | 0.91 |
| 17 | 1.28 |
| 34 | 1.68 |
| 70 | 2.13 |
| 141 | 2.60 |
| 288 | 3.11 |
| 585 | 3.64 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 |
- Bron
- This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
- Omvang
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Units
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Status
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.credit.one-factor
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Owner
- GRA platforms lane
- Doel
- To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
- Risk domain
- Credit and counterparty risk
- Assumptions
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Inputs
- Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Data
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Metodes
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
- Validation
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Limitations
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Onsekerheid
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Concentration
One large exposure and the tail
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.
- Granular portfolio
- With the large exposure
Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.
Controls
- Share of the largest exposure
- 5.0 % of the portfolio
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Loss given default
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Results
- Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
- 4.55
- Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
- 0.49
- Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
- 400
Data, source and model record
| Return period (years) | Granular (%) | With the large exposure (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 | 0.28 |
| 4 | 0.59 | 0.56 |
| 8 | 0.91 | 0.89 |
| 17 | 1.28 | 1.29 |
| 34 | 1.68 | 1.81 |
| 70 | 2.13 | 2.53 |
| 141 | 2.60 | 3.06 |
| 288 | 3.11 | 3.57 |
| 585 | 3.64 | 4.12 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 | 4.69 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 | 5.29 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 | 5.91 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 | 6.56 |
- Bron
- This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
- Omvang
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Units
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Status
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.credit.concentration
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Owner
- GRA platforms lane
- Doel
- To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
- Risk domain
- Credit and counterparty risk
- Assumptions
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Inputs
- Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Data
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Metodes
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
- Validation
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Limitations
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Onsekerheid
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Liquidity
The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.
- Outflow over 30 days by funding class
- Net outflows after capped inflows
- Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.
Controls
- High-quality liquid assets
- 15.0 % of total funding
- Stable retail deposits
- 30 % of total funding
- Less stable retail deposits
- 20 % of total funding
- Operational deposits
- 15 % of total funding
- Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
- 15 % of total funding
- Unsecured funding from financial institutions
- 10 % of total funding
- Contractual inflows over 30 days
- 5.0 % of total funding
- Stress on run-off rates
- 1.00 times the baseline
Results
- Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
- 23.3
- Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
- 5.00
- Net outflows (% of total funding)
- 18.3
- Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
- 82
Data, source and model record
| Funding class | Balance (% of funding) | Run-off rate (%) | Outflow (% of funding) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stable retail deposits | 30.0 | 5 | 1.50 |
| Less stable retail deposits | 20.0 | 10 | 2.00 |
| Operational deposits | 15.0 | 25 | 3.75 |
| Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates | 15.0 | 40 | 6.00 |
| Unsecured funding from financial institutions | 10.0 | 100 | 10.0 |
- Bron
- Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
- Date
- BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
- Omvang
- A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
- Units
- Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Status
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Owner
- GRA platforms lane
- Doel
- To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Risk domain
- Liquidity risk
- Assumptions
- Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
- Inputs
- High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
- Data
- BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
- Metodes
- Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
- Validation
- Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
- Limitations
- Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
- Onsekerheid
- None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
- Approved use
- Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Prohibited use
- Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Exposure network
How a shock to assets becomes a system loss
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.
- System equity lost
Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.
Controls
- Fall in external assets
- 2.0 %
Results
- Fall in external assets (%)
- 2.0
- System equity lost in the first round (%)
- 18.0
- System equity lost after contagion (%)
- 45.0
- Amplification by the network (percentage points)
- 27.0
- Banks in default (of 20)
- 0
Data, source and model record
| Round | System equity lost (%) | Banks in default |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.0 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.8 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.3 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.2 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.5 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.9 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.7 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.2 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.5 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.7 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.8 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 13 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 14 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 15 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 16 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.0 | 0 |
- Bron
- Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
- Omvang
- A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
- Units
- Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Status
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Model
- gra.network.debtrank
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Owner
- GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
- Doel
- To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
- Risk domain
- Systemic and contagion risk
- Assumptions
- Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
- Inputs
- Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
- Data
- None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
- Metodes
- DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
- Validation
- The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
- Limitations
- No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
- Onsekerheid
- Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
- Approved use
- Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
- Prohibited use
- Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Scenario analysis
Scenarios, not forecasts
A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.
Regulatory context and related standards
The frameworks this work is read against
| Framework | Body | What it sets | Edition or date | Where it applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Basel III framework | Basel Committee on Banking Supervision | Minimum capital, leverage, liquidity coverage and stable funding requirements and the capital buffers above them | December 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel Framework | Basel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables |
| Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision | Basel Committee on Banking Supervision | Baseline standards for supervisory powers, licensing, risk management and governance, assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs | Revised April 2024 | International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs |
| Principles for the effective management and supervision of climate-related financial risks | Basel Committee on Banking Supervision | Expectations for bank governance, risk management and scenario analysis of climate-related risk, and for its supervisory review | June 2022 | Basel Committee members, through national supervisors |
| Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions | Financial Stability Board | Resolution powers, recovery and resolution planning and cross-border cooperation so a bank can fail without taxpayer support | October 2011, updated October 2014 | FSB member jurisdictions |
| IFRS 9 Financial Instruments | International Accounting Standards Board | Classification of financial assets and forward-looking expected credit loss provisioning in three stages | Issued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018 | Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead) |
| NGFS climate scenarios | Network for Greening the Financial System | Reference transition and physical risk pathways used by central banks and supervisors for climate scenario analysis | Phase V, November 2024 | Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding |
| IFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures | International Sustainability Standards Board | Disclosure of climate-related risks and opportunities, including financed emissions and climate resilience | Issued June 2023, amended December 2025 | Where a jurisdiction adopts it |
| Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) | European Banking Authority and ECB Banking Supervision | Supervisory process assessing business model, governance and risks to capital and liquidity, setting Pillar 2 requirements and guidance | EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022) | European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks |
| Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and supervisory stress testing | Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System | Supervisory process of stress scenarios and capital plan review that sets the stress capital buffer for large US banks | Annual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020 | United States, large bank holding companies |
| ISO 31000 Risk management guidelines | International Organization for Standardization | Principles, framework and process for managing risk across an organisation | ISO 31000:2018 | International, voluntary |
Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.
Geographic dimensions
Global, regional and country programmes
Institutional counterparts
The institutions this work speaks to
- Bank board and board risk committee
- Chief risk officer and credit committee
- Prudential supervisor
- Macroprudential authority
- Bank board and asset liability committee
- Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
- Central bank
- Bank board
- Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
- Authorities overseeing critical third parties
- Credit risk function
- Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
- Central bank as overseer and operator
- Bank treasury
- Central counterparty board and risk committee
- Resolution authority
Research publications
Research, methods and sources
Educational resources
Learn the methods
Readiness workflows
Finansieringsgereedheid
Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.
Contribution mechanisms
Neem deel
Grens
What this page is not
Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.