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Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise

Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.

Go to the instrumentsBanking Nexus home

Domain definition

What Banking Nexus studies

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.

Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.

TermDefinition
Basel IIIThe Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks.
CET1 ratioCommon equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital.
Liquidity coverage ratioHigh-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period.
Expected credit lossThe probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for.

Financial system context

The parts of the financial system it covers

  • Credit and counterparty risk

    Default, migration and concentration in loan books and trading exposures, and how losses pass between counterparties.

  • Capital and liquidity

    Loss-absorbing capital, liquidity buffers and funding structures, and how they behave when markets and depositors come under stress.

  • Operational resilience

    Continuity of important services through cyber incidents, third-party failures and process breakdowns, within stated impact tolerances.

  • Payments and market infrastructure

    Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.

  • Climate and nature risk

    Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.

  • Models and AI

    Credit scoring, provisioning and capital models, and the validation and governance that machine learning now demands.

  • Banking and the real economy

    Lending to households, small firms, housing and essential services, and how bank stress becomes a credit squeeze.

  • Governance and supervision

    Boards, risk culture, lines of defence, supervisory review and resolution planning, including the structures of Islamic banking.

Risk taxonomy

Risks, topic by topic

  • Credit and counterparty risk

    Credit risk is the chance that a borrower or counterparty fails to pay in full and on time, and it remains the main source of loss for most banks.

  • Capital and liquidity

    Capital absorbs losses and liquidity keeps a bank paying its obligations as they fall due.

  • Bank operational resilience

    Operational resilience is a bank's ability to keep delivering critical services through disruption, whether from a cyber attack, a failed technology change, a third-party outage or a pandemic.

  • Climate and nature bank risk

    Climate change and nature loss reach banks through their borrowers, their collateral and the markets they depend on.

  • Payment dependencies

    Every bank depends on payment systems, central counterparties, securities settlement systems, correspondent banks and messaging networks to move money and collateral.

  • Model and ai risk

    Banks rely on models to grant credit, set provisions, price products, compute capital and detect fraud, and a growing share of those models use machine learning.

  • Banking and real economy

    Banks turn deposits into loans for households, small and medium enterprises and the providers of essential services.

  • Bank governance

    Many bank failures trace back to governance: boards that did not understand the risks being taken, incentives that rewarded growth over prudence, or control functions without the standing to challenge.

  • Housing property finance

    Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.

  • Islamic banking

    Islamic banks operate under contracts and governance structures designed to comply with Islamic commercial law, using sale, lease and partnership-based instruments in place of interest-bearing loans.

Risk-transmission mechanisms

How these risks develop and spread

TopicMechanismHow it works
Credit and counterparty riskQuality erodes before defaultArrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised.
Credit and counterparty riskLosses concentrateExposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies.
Capital and liquidityLosses deplete capitalCredit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers.
Capital and liquidityFunding can run quicklyUninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing.
Bank operational resilienceDependencies are hiddenA single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.
Bank operational resilienceThird parties concentrate riskMany banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
Climate and nature bank riskPhysical risk hits collateral and incomeFloods, storms, heat and drought damage property and disrupt production. Uninsured losses fall on borrowers, raising default probabilities and loss given default, and insurance withdrawal can reprice whole regional mortgage books.
Climate and nature bank riskTransition risk reprices sectorsCarbon pricing, regulation, technology and shifting demand can strand assets and squeeze the margins of emissions-intensive borrowers. Timing matters: a late and abrupt transition produces sharper losses than an orderly one.
Payment dependenciesLiquidity is needed intradayReal-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours.
Payment dependenciesCentral counterparties concentrate riskClearing nets exposures and mutualises default losses. In stress, margin calls rise across members at the same time, and a member default draws on a default fund that all members share.
Model and ai riskDrift and regime changeModels learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it.
Model and ai riskOpacity weakens challengeComplex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does.
Banking and real economyCredit supply tightensWhen capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first.
Banking and real economyBorrower stress feeds backHigher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy.
Bank governanceBoard oversight sets the frameThe board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set.
Bank governanceIncentives shape behaviourRemuneration tied to short-term revenue encourages risk-taking whose costs appear later. Deferral, malus and clawback aim to align pay with the risk outcome as it is realised.
Housing property financeCredit and prices reinforce each otherEasier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs.
Housing property financeAffordability under rising ratesVariable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers.
Islamic bankingContract structure shapes riskMurabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label.
Islamic bankingInvestment accounts share returnsProfit-sharing investment account holders bear losses in principle. Competitive pressure can lead banks to smooth returns and absorb losses themselves, a transfer known as displaced commercial risk.

Research questions

Who decides, and what they need to know

Decision holderQuestionEvidence the platform's pages describe
Bank board and board risk committeeWhat credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to imposeConcentration measures, stage migration and stress losses by segment
Bank board and asset liability committeeWhat capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure fundingCapital and liquidity projections under internal and supervisory scenarios
Bank boardWhich business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryService maps, scenario test results and incident history
Bank board and board risk committeeHow climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planningMateriality assessment, scenario results and sector exposures
Central bank as overseer and operatorWhich systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meetAvailability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows
Bank board and model risk committeeWhat model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptableModel inventory, tiering and validation findings
Macroprudential authority or financial policy committeeWhether to set or release capital buffers and borrower-based measuresCredit gaps, debt service ratios and lending surveys
Bank board and nomination committeeWhether board skills, independence and information are adequate for the bank's risk profileBoard effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports
Macroprudential authorityWhether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measuresPrice-to-income, credit growth, lending standards and arrears
Bank boardWhat risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accountsDisplaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact

These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.

Key indicators

What is measured, in which unit, by whom

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeEvidence label
Non-performing loan ratiopercent of gross loansquarterlySupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresPublished statistics
Stage 2 and stage 3 loan sharepercent of gross loansquarterlyIFRS 9 financial statementsREPORTED
Common equity tier 1 ratiopercent of risk-weighted assetsquarterlySupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresPublished statistics
Leverage ratiopercent of total exposure measurequarterlySupervisory returnsPublished statistics
Important business services within impact tolerance in testingcount of services tested and count passingannualScenario testing recordsREPORTED
Major ICT-related incidentscount by severity classquarterlyIncident reports to supervisorsPublished statistics
Financed emissionstonnes of carbon dioxide equivalentannualPCAF methodology applied to loan and investment booksESTIMATED
Exposure to climate-policy-relevant sectorspercent of loan bookannualPillar 3 ESG disclosuresREPORTED
Value settled through large-value payment systemscurrency units per daydailySystem operator statisticsPublished statistics
Payment system availabilitypercent of operating hoursmonthlyOperator disclosuresREPORTED
Model inventory coveragecount of models by tier and validation statusquarterlyModel risk management recordsREPORTED
Discriminatory power of credit scorecardsGini coefficient or area under the curveannualModel validationMODELLED
Credit-to-GDP gappercentage pointsquarterlyBIS credit statisticsESTIMATED
Credit standards on loans to enterprisesnet percentage of banks reporting tighteningquarterlyBank lending surveysREPORTED
Board members with banking or risk expertiseshare of boardannualGovernance disclosuresDECLARED
Independent directorsshare of boardannualGovernance disclosuresDECLARED
Loan-to-value ratio at originationpercent of property valuequarterlyLoan-level and supervisory dataPublished statistics
Debt-service-to-income ratio at originationpercent of gross incomequarterlyLoan-level data, household surveysREPORTED
Capital adequacy ratio of Islamic bankspercent of risk-weighted assetsquarterlyIFSB prudential indicatorsPublished statistics
Non-performing financing ratiopercent of gross financingquarterlyIFSB prudential indicatorsPublished statistics

Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.

Methodology

The methods the platform's work rests on

  • Financial economics

    Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.

  • Probability statistics

    Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.

  • Network science

    Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.

  • Financial engineering

    Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.

  • Ai ml

    Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.

Data sources

Where the evidence comes from

SourceWhat it givesLicence class
IMF Financial Soundness IndicatorsNon-performing loans, provisioning and sectoral loan distribution reported by national authoritiesFree, IMF terms of use
EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exerciseBank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banksFree, attribution
ECB Supervisory Banking StatisticsAsset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro areaFree, attribution
FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9CLoan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companiesPublic domain
BIS consolidated banking statisticsBanks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basisFree, BIS terms of use
Rating agency default and recovery studiesHistorical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sectorLicensed, subscription
National central credit registersBorrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysisRestricted, supervisory access
BIS Basel III monitoring reportsAggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banksFree, BIS terms of use
Federal Reserve supervisory stress test resultsScenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banksPublic domain
Bank of England stress testing resultsScenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banksFree, Bank of England terms of use
EBA EU-wide stress testBank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodologyFree, attribution
Pillar 3 disclosuresBank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFRPublic, bank terms
Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience ActRegisters of ICT third-party arrangements held by authorities and the public list of designated critical ICT providersRegisters restricted to authorities; designation list public
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publicationsSupervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilitiesFree, attribution
Bank of England and PRA operational resilience publicationsPolicy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reportsFree, Bank of England terms of use
ORX operational risk loss dataPooled loss events by event type and business line from member banksLicensed, membership
ENISA threat landscape for the finance sectorAnalysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutionsFree, attribution
Pillar 3 operational risk disclosuresOperational risk capital and loss summaries published by banksPublic, bank terms
NGFS scenariosTransition and physical risk pathways with macroeconomic variables for scenario analysisFree, attribution
ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicatorsSupervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposuresFree, attribution
Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory ScenarioDesign and published results of the exploratory exercise for UK banks and insurersFree, Bank of England terms of use
Pillar 3 ESG disclosures under EBA standardsBank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignmentPublic, bank terms
PCAF Global GHG Accounting and Reporting StandardMethodology and data quality scores for financed emissionsFree standard; emission factor database by membership
Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard mapsPhysical hazard layers for flood, heat and droughtFree and open, attribution

Instruments explained for research

Analytical instruments

Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.

Credit risk

A credit portfolio's loss distribution

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.

02468 1 in 21 in 101 in 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Portfolio loss
  • Expected loss

With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.

Controls

Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Loss given default
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Results

Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
0.45
Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
2.36
Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
4.06
Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
3.61
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period
Return period (years)Loss (% of exposure)
20.30
40.59
80.91
171.28
341.68
702.13
1412.60
2883.11
5853.64
1,1894.20
2,4184.79
4,9185.41
10,0006.04
Source
This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
Scope
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Units
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Status
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Model
gra.credit.one-factor
Version
1.0.0
Owner
GRA platforms lane
Purpose
To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
Risk domain
Credit and counterparty risk
Assumptions
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Inputs
Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Data
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Methods
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
Validation
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limitations
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Uncertainty
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Concentration

One large exposure and the tail

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.

02468 1 in 21 in 101 in 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Granular portfolio
  • With the large exposure

Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.

Controls

Share of the largest exposure
5.0 % of the portfolio
Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Loss given default
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Results

Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
4.06
Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
4.55
Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
0.49
Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
400
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period, granular and concentrated
Return period (years)Granular (%)With the large exposure (%)
20.300.28
40.590.56
80.910.89
171.281.29
341.681.81
702.132.53
1412.603.06
2883.113.57
5853.644.12
1,1894.204.69
2,4184.795.29
4,9185.415.91
10,0006.046.56
Source
This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
Scope
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Units
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Status
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Model
gra.credit.concentration
Version
1.0.0
Owner
GRA platforms lane
Purpose
To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
Risk domain
Credit and counterparty risk
Assumptions
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Inputs
Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Data
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Methods
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
Validation
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limitations
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Uncertainty
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Liquidity

The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.

  • Stable retail 1.50
  • Less stable retail 2.00
  • Operational deposits 3.75
  • Corporate, non-operational 6.00
  • Financial institutions 10.0
  • Net outflows 18.3
  • Liquid assets (HQLA) 15.0
  • Outflow over 30 days by funding class
  • Net outflows after capped inflows
  • Stock of high-quality liquid assets

Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.

Controls

High-quality liquid assets
15.0 % of total funding
Stable retail deposits
30 % of total funding
Less stable retail deposits
20 % of total funding
Operational deposits
15 % of total funding
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
15 % of total funding
Unsecured funding from financial institutions
10 % of total funding
Contractual inflows over 30 days
5.0 % of total funding
Stress on run-off rates
1.00 times the baseline

Results

Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
23.3
Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
5.00
Net outflows (% of total funding)
18.3
Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
82
Data, source and model record
Outflows by funding class and the stock of liquid assets
Funding classBalance (% of funding)Run-off rate (%)Outflow (% of funding)
Stable retail deposits30.051.50
Less stable retail deposits20.0102.00
Operational deposits15.0253.75
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates15.0406.00
Unsecured funding from financial institutions10.010010.0
Source
Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
Date
BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
Scope
A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
Units
Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Status
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Model
gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
Version
1.0.0
Owner
GRA platforms lane
Purpose
To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
Risk domain
Liquidity risk
Assumptions
Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
Inputs
High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
Data
BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
Methods
Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
Validation
Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
Limitations
Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
Uncertainty
None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
Approved use
Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
Prohibited use
Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.

Exposure network

How a shock to assets becomes a system loss

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.

0255075100 051015202530 Contagion round System equity lost (%)
  • System equity lost

Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.

Controls

Fall in external assets
2.0 %

Results

Fall in external assets (%)
2.0
System equity lost in the first round (%)
18.0
System equity lost after contagion (%)
45.0
Amplification by the network (percentage points)
27.0
Banks in default (of 20)
0
Data, source and model record
System equity lost, round by round
RoundSystem equity lost (%)Banks in default
018.00
128.80
235.30
339.20
441.50
542.90
643.70
744.20
844.50
944.70
1044.80
1144.90
1244.90
1345.00
1445.00
1545.00
1645.00
1745.00
1845.00
1945.00
2045.00
2145.00
2245.00
2345.00
2445.00
2545.00
2645.00
2745.00
2845.00
2945.00
3045.00
Source
Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
Scope
A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
Units
Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Status
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Model
gra.network.debtrank
Version
1.0.0
Owner
GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
Purpose
To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
Risk domain
Systemic and contagion risk
Assumptions
Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
Inputs
Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
Data
None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
Methods
DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
Validation
The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
Limitations
No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
Uncertainty
Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
Approved use
Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
Prohibited use
Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.

Scenario analysis

Scenarios, not forecasts

A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.

Regulatory context and related standards

The frameworks this work is read against

FrameworkBodyWhat it setsEdition or dateWhere it applies
Basel III frameworkBasel Committee on Banking SupervisionMinimum capital, leverage, liquidity coverage and stable funding requirements and the capital buffers above themDecember 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel FrameworkBasel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables
Core Principles for Effective Banking SupervisionBasel Committee on Banking SupervisionBaseline standards for supervisory powers, licensing, risk management and governance, assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPsRevised April 2024International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs
Principles for the effective management and supervision of climate-related financial risksBasel Committee on Banking SupervisionExpectations for bank governance, risk management and scenario analysis of climate-related risk, and for its supervisory reviewJune 2022Basel Committee members, through national supervisors
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial InstitutionsFinancial Stability BoardResolution powers, recovery and resolution planning and cross-border cooperation so a bank can fail without taxpayer supportOctober 2011, updated October 2014FSB member jurisdictions
IFRS 9 Financial InstrumentsInternational Accounting Standards BoardClassification of financial assets and forward-looking expected credit loss provisioning in three stagesIssued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead)
NGFS climate scenariosNetwork for Greening the Financial SystemReference transition and physical risk pathways used by central banks and supervisors for climate scenario analysisPhase V, November 2024Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding
IFRS S2 Climate-related DisclosuresInternational Sustainability Standards BoardDisclosure of climate-related risks and opportunities, including financed emissions and climate resilienceIssued June 2023, amended December 2025Where a jurisdiction adopts it
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP)European Banking Authority and ECB Banking SupervisionSupervisory process assessing business model, governance and risks to capital and liquidity, setting Pillar 2 requirements and guidanceEBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022)European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and supervisory stress testingBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemSupervisory process of stress scenarios and capital plan review that sets the stress capital buffer for large US banksAnnual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020United States, large bank holding companies
ISO 31000 Risk management guidelinesInternational Organization for StandardizationPrinciples, framework and process for managing risk across an organisationISO 31000:2018International, voluntary

Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.

Institutional counterparts

The institutions this work speaks to

  • Bank board and board risk committee
  • Chief risk officer and credit committee
  • Prudential supervisor
  • Macroprudential authority
  • Bank board and asset liability committee
  • Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
  • Central bank
  • Bank board
  • Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
  • Authorities overseeing critical third parties
  • Credit risk function
  • Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
  • Central bank as overseer and operator
  • Bank treasury
  • Central counterparty board and risk committee
  • Resolution authority

Readiness workflows

Finance readiness

Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.

Boundary

What this page is not

Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.