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Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise

Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.

Go to the instrumentsBanking Nexus home

Domain definition

What Banking Nexus studies

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.

Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.

TérminoDefinición
Basel IIIThe Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks.
Ratio CET1Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital.
Ratio de cobertura de liquidezHigh-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period.
Expected credit lossThe probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for.

Financial system context

The parts of the financial system it covers

  • Riesgo de crédito y de contraparte

    Impago, migración y concentración en las carteras de préstamos y las exposiciones de negociación, y cómo pasan las pérdidas entre contrapartes.

  • Capital y liquidez

    Capital con capacidad de absorción de pérdidas, colchones de liquidez y estructuras de financiación, y cómo se comportan cuando los mercados y los depositantes sufren estrés.

  • Resiliencia operativa

    Continuidad de los servicios importantes ante incidentes cibernéticos, fallos de terceros y fallos de procesos, dentro de tolerancias al impacto declaradas.

  • Pagos e infraestructuras de mercado

    Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.

  • Riesgo climático y de la naturaleza

    Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.

  • Modelos e IA

    Modelos de calificación crediticia, de provisiones y de capital, y la validación y la gobernanza que ahora exige el aprendizaje automático.

  • Banca y economía real

    Préstamos a hogares, pequeñas empresas, vivienda y servicios esenciales, y cómo el estrés bancario se convierte en una restricción del crédito.

  • Gobernanza y supervisión

    Consejos, cultura de riesgos, líneas de defensa, revisión supervisora y planificación de la resolución, incluidas las estructuras de la banca islámica.

Taxonomía de riesgos

Risks, topic by topic

  • Riesgo de crédito y de contraparte

    El riesgo de crédito es la probabilidad de que un prestatario o una contraparte no pague íntegramente y a tiempo, y sigue siendo la principal fuente de pérdidas de la mayoría de los bancos.

  • Capital y liquidez

    El capital absorbe las pérdidas y la liquidez permite a un banco pagar sus obligaciones a su vencimiento.

  • Resiliencia operativa bancaria

    La resiliencia operativa es la capacidad de un banco para seguir prestando servicios críticos durante una perturbación, ya se deba a un ciberataque, a un cambio tecnológico fallido, a una interrupción de un tercero o a una pandemia.

  • Climate and nature bank risk

    El cambio climático y la pérdida de naturaleza llegan a los bancos a través de sus prestatarios, sus garantías y los mercados de los que dependen.

  • Dependencias de pago

    Todo banco depende de los sistemas de pago, las entidades de contrapartida central, los sistemas de liquidación de valores, los bancos corresponsales y las redes de mensajería para mover dinero y garantías.

  • Model and ai risk

    Los bancos dependen de modelos para conceder crédito, constituir provisiones, tarificar productos, calcular el capital y detectar el fraude, y una parte creciente de esos modelos usa aprendizaje automático.

  • Banking and real economy

    Los bancos convierten los depósitos en préstamos para los hogares, las pequeñas y medianas empresas y los proveedores de servicios esenciales.

  • Gobernanza bancaria

    Muchas quiebras bancarias tienen su origen en la gobernanza: consejos que no comprendían los riesgos asumidos, incentivos que recompensaban el crecimiento por encima de la prudencia o funciones de control sin autoridad para cuestionar.

  • Housing property finance

    Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.

  • Banca islámica

    Los bancos islámicos operan con contratos y estructuras de gobernanza diseñados para cumplir el derecho mercantil islámico, y emplean instrumentos basados en la compraventa, el arrendamiento y la asociación en lugar de préstamos con intereses.

Risk-transmission mechanisms

How these risks develop and spread

TemaMecanismoCómo funciona
Riesgo de crédito y de contraparteQuality erodes before defaultArrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised.
Riesgo de crédito y de contraparteLas pérdidas se concentranExposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies.
Capital y liquidezLas pérdidas reducen el capitalCredit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers.
Capital y liquidezLa financiación puede desembolsarse con rapidezUninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing.
Resiliencia operativa bancariaLas dependencias están ocultasA single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.
Resiliencia operativa bancariaThird parties concentrate riskMany banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
Climate and nature bank riskPhysical risk hits collateral and incomeLas inundaciones, las tormentas, el calor y la sequía dañan las propiedades e interrumpen la producción. Las pérdidas no aseguradas recaen en los prestatarios, lo que aumenta las probabilidades de impago y la pérdida en caso de impago, y la retirada de los seguros puede reajustar el precio de carteras hipotecarias regionales enteras.
Climate and nature bank riskEl riesgo de transición revalúa los sectoresLa fijación de precios del carbono, la regulación, la tecnología y los cambios en la demanda pueden dejar activos varados y reducir los márgenes de los prestatarios con altas emisiones. El momento importa: una transición tardía y abrupta produce pérdidas más acusadas que una ordenada.
Dependencias de pagoSe necesita liquidez intradíaReal-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours.
Dependencias de pagoLas contrapartes centrales concentran el riesgoLa compensación netea las exposiciones y mutualiza las pérdidas por impago. En situaciones de tensión, las llamadas de margen aumentan al mismo tiempo en todos los miembros, y el impago de un miembro recurre a un fondo de garantía que todos comparten.
Model and ai riskDrift and regime changeModels learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it.
Model and ai riskOpacity weakens challengeComplex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does.
Banking and real economyCredit supply tightensCuando el capital o la financiación escasean, los bancos endurecen los criterios y aumentan los márgenes de los préstamos, recortan las líneas de crédito y favorecen a los prestatarios más seguros. Las pequeñas empresas y los hogares de menores ingresos, con menos alternativas, lo notan primero.
Banking and real economyBorrower stress feeds backHigher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy.
Gobernanza bancariaLa supervisión del consejo de administración establece el marcoThe board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set.
Gobernanza bancariaIncentives shape behaviourLa remuneración vinculada a los ingresos a corto plazo incentiva una asunción de riesgos cuyos costes aparecen más tarde. El diferimiento, el malus y la recuperación (clawback) buscan alinear la retribución con el resultado del riesgo a medida que se materializa.
Housing property financeCredit and prices reinforce each otherEasier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs.
Housing property financeAsequibilidad con tipos de interés al alzaVariable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers.
Banca islámicaLa estructura del contrato condiciona el riesgoMurabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label.
Banca islámicaInvestment accounts share returnsProfit-sharing investment account holders bear losses in principle. Competitive pressure can lead banks to smooth returns and absorb losses themselves, a transfer known as displaced commercial risk.

Preguntas de investigación

Who decides, and what they need to know

Decision holderPreguntaEvidence the platform's pages describe
Bank board and board risk committeeWhat credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to imposeMedidas de concentración, migración de etapas y pérdidas bajo tensión por segmento
Consejo de administración del banco y comité de activos y pasivosWhat capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure fundingProyecciones de capital y liquidez según escenarios internos y supervisores
Bank boardWhich business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryMapas de servicios, resultados de pruebas de escenarios e historial de incidentes
Bank board and board risk committeeHow climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planningEvaluación de materialidad, resultados de escenarios y exposiciones sectoriales
El banco central como supervisor y operadorWhich systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meetDatos de disponibilidad, incidentes y participación; concentración de flujos
Bank board and model risk committeeQué apetito de riesgo de modelo fijar y qué usos de la IA son aceptablesInventario de modelos, clasificación por niveles y hallazgos de validación
Autoridad macroprudencial o comité de política financieraSi se deben establecer o liberar colchones de capital y medidas basadas en el prestatarioBrechas de crédito, ratios de servicio de la deuda y encuestas de préstamos
Consejo de administración del banco y comité de nombramientosSi las competencias, la independencia y la información del consejo son adecuadas para el perfil de riesgo del bancoBoard effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports
Autoridad macroprudencialWhether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measuresRelación precio-ingresos, crecimiento del crédito, criterios de concesión de préstamos y morosidad
Bank boardWhat risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accountsDisplaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact

These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.

Key indicators

What is measured, in which unit, by whom

IndicadorUnidadCadenciaTipo de fuenteEtiqueta de evidencia
Ratio de préstamos dudososporcentaje de la cartera bruta de préstamostrimestralSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresEstadísticas publicadas
Proporción de préstamos de la fase 2 y la fase 3porcentaje de la cartera bruta de préstamostrimestralIFRS 9 financial statementsNOTIFICADO
Ratio de capital ordinario de nivel 1porcentaje de los activos ponderados por riesgotrimestralSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresEstadísticas publicadas
Leverage ratiopercent of total exposure measuretrimestralInformes de supervisiónEstadísticas publicadas
Important business services within impact tolerance in testingcount of services tested and count passinganualRegistros de pruebas de escenariosNOTIFICADO
Incidentes graves relacionados con las TICrecuento por clase de gravedadtrimestralInformes de incidentes a los supervisoresEstadísticas publicadas
Emisiones financiadastoneladas de dióxido de carbono equivalenteanualPCAF methodology applied to loan and investment booksESTIMADO
Exposición a sectores relevantes para la política climáticaporcentaje de la cartera de préstamosanualPillar 3 ESG disclosuresNOTIFICADO
Value settled through large-value payment systemscurrency units per daydiarioSystem operator statisticsEstadísticas publicadas
Disponibilidad del sistema de pagosporcentaje de horas de operaciónmensualDivulgaciones de los operadoresNOTIFICADO
Model inventory coveragecount of models by tier and validation statustrimestralModel risk management recordsNOTIFICADO
Poder discriminante de los modelos de puntuación crediticiaCoeficiente de Gini o área bajo la curvaanualValidación de modelosMODELIZADO
Brecha crédito/PIBpuntos porcentualestrimestralEstadísticas de crédito del BPIESTIMADO
Credit standards on loans to enterprisesporcentaje neto de bancos que informan de un endurecimientotrimestralEncuestas sobre préstamos bancariosNOTIFICADO
Board members with banking or risk expertiseshare of boardanualDivulgaciones de gobernanzaDECLARADO
Independent directorsshare of boardanualDivulgaciones de gobernanzaDECLARADO
Relación préstamo-valor en el momento de la originaciónpercent of property valuetrimestralLoan-level and supervisory dataEstadísticas publicadas
Ratio de servicio de la deuda sobre ingresos en la originaciónpercent of gross incometrimestralLoan-level data, household surveysNOTIFICADO
Capital adequacy ratio of Islamic banksporcentaje de los activos ponderados por riesgotrimestralIFSB prudential indicatorsEstadísticas publicadas
Ratio de financiación morosaporcentaje de la financiación brutatrimestralIFSB prudential indicatorsEstadísticas publicadas

Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.

Metodología

The methods the platform's work rests on

  • Economía financiera

    La economía financiera y la macrofinanza explican cómo interactúan los balances bancarios, el crédito y los precios de los activos con la producción, el empleo y las finanzas públicas. En el riesgo bancario, conectan un escenario con las pérdidas y el capital, muestran cómo la tensión bancaria repercute en la economía y fundamentan las decisiones macroprudenciales y monetarias en relaciones contrastadas.

  • Probability statistics

    Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.

  • Ciencia de redes

    Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.

  • Financial engineering

    Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.

  • Ai ml

    Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.

Fuentes de datos

De dónde proviene la evidencia

FuenteLo que aportaTipo de licencia
Indicadores de solidez financiera del FMIPréstamos morosos, provisiones y distribución sectorial de los préstamos, notificados por las autoridades nacionalesGratuito, condiciones de uso del FMI
EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exerciseBank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banksGratuita, con atribución
Estadísticas bancarias de supervisión del BCEAsset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro areaGratuita, con atribución
FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9CLoan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companiesDominio público
BIS consolidated banking statisticsBanks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basisGratuito, condiciones de uso del BIS
Estudios de las agencias de calificación sobre impago y recuperaciónHistorical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sectorCon licencia, por suscripción
National central credit registersExposiciones a nivel de prestatario para el análisis de concentración e interconexiónAcceso restringido, de supervisión
Informes de seguimiento de Basilea III del BPIPosiciones agregadas de capital, apalancamiento y liquidez de los bancos con actividad internacionalGratuito, condiciones de uso del BIS
Federal Reserve supervisory stress test resultsScenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banksDominio público
Bank of England stress testing resultsDiseño de escenarios y resultados de las pruebas de resistencia simultáneas y exploratorias de los principales bancos del Reino UnidoGratuito, condiciones de uso del Bank of England
Prueba de resistencia a escala de la UE de la EBABank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodologyGratuita, con atribución
Divulgaciones del Pilar 3Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFRPúblico, condiciones bancarias
Registros y designaciones de proveedores críticos con arreglo a la Ley de Resiliencia Operativa Digital de la UERegistros de acuerdos con terceros de TIC en poder de las autoridades y la lista pública de proveedores críticos de TIC designadosRegisters restricted to authorities; designation list public
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publicationsSupervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilitiesGratuita, con atribución
Publicaciones del Banco de Inglaterra y la PRA sobre resiliencia operativaPolicy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reportsGratuito, condiciones de uso del Bank of England
ORX operational risk loss dataPooled loss events by event type and business line from member banksLicensed, membership
Panorama de amenazas de ENISA para el sector financieroAnálisis de las ciberamenazas y de los patrones de incidentes que afectan a las instituciones financierasGratuita, con atribución
Pillar 3 operational risk disclosuresOperational risk capital and loss summaries published by banksPúblico, condiciones bancarias
Escenarios del NGFSVías de riesgo de transición y riesgo físico con variables macroeconómicas para el análisis de escenariosGratuita, con atribución
ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicatorsSupervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposuresGratuita, con atribución
Escenario exploratorio bienal sobre el clima del Banco de InglaterraDiseño y resultados publicados del ejercicio exploratorio para bancos y aseguradoras del Reino UnidoGratuito, condiciones de uso del Bank of England
Divulgaciones ESG del Pilar 3 conforme a las normas de la EBABank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignmentPúblico, condiciones bancarias
Norma Global de Contabilidad y Reporte de GEI de PCAFMethodology and data quality scores for financed emissionsNorma gratuita; base de datos de factores de emisión mediante suscripción
Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard mapsCapas de amenazas físicas de inundación, calor y sequíaLibre y abierta, con atribución

Instruments explained for research

Analytical instruments

Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.

riesgo de crédito

A credit portfolio's loss distribution

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.

02468 1 in 21 en 101 en 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Pérdida de la cartera
  • Expected loss

With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.

Controles

Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Pérdida en caso de incumplimiento
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Resultados

Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
0.45
Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
2.36
Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
4.06
Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
3.61
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period
Período de retorno (años)Loss (% of exposure)
20.30
40.59
80.91
171.28
341.68
702.13
1412.60
2883.11
5853.64
1,1894.20
2,4184.79
4,9185.41
10,0006.04
Fuente
This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
Alcance
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Unidades
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Estado
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modelo
gra.credit.one-factor
Versión
1.0.0
Propietario
GRA platforms lane
Finalidad
To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
Risk domain
Riesgo de crédito y de contraparte
Supuestos
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Entradas
Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Datos
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Métodos
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
Validación
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limitaciones
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Incertidumbre
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Concentración

One large exposure and the tail

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.

02468 1 in 21 en 101 en 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Granular portfolio
  • With the large exposure

Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.

Controles

Share of the largest exposure
5.0 % of the portfolio
Probability of default
1.00 % a year
Pérdida en caso de incumplimiento
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

Resultados

Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
4.06
Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
4.55
Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
0.49
Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
400
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period, granular and concentrated
Período de retorno (años)Granular (%)With the large exposure (%)
20.300.28
40.590.56
80.910.89
171.281.29
341.681.81
702.132.53
1412.603.06
2883.113.57
5853.644.12
1,1894.204.69
2,4184.795.29
4,9185.415.91
10,0006.046.56
Fuente
This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
Alcance
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Unidades
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Estado
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modelo
gra.credit.concentration
Versión
1.0.0
Propietario
GRA platforms lane
Finalidad
To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
Risk domain
Riesgo de crédito y de contraparte
Supuestos
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
Entradas
Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
Datos
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
Métodos
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
Validación
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limitaciones
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
Incertidumbre
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

Liquidez

The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.

  • Stable retail 1.50
  • Less stable retail 2.00
  • Operational deposits 3.75
  • Corporate, non-operational 6.00
  • Instituciones financieras 10.0
  • Net outflows 18.3
  • Liquid assets (HQLA) 15.0
  • Outflow over 30 days by funding class
  • Net outflows after capped inflows
  • Stock of high-quality liquid assets

Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.

Controles

High-quality liquid assets
15.0 % of total funding
Stable retail deposits
30 % of total funding
Less stable retail deposits
20 % of total funding
Operational deposits
15 % of total funding
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
15 % of total funding
Unsecured funding from financial institutions
10 % of total funding
Contractual inflows over 30 days
5.0 % of total funding
Stress on run-off rates
1.00 times the baseline

Resultados

Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
23.3
Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
5.00
Net outflows (% of total funding)
18.3
Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
82
Data, source and model record
Outflows by funding class and the stock of liquid assets
Funding classBalance (% of funding)Run-off rate (%)Outflow (% of funding)
Stable retail deposits30.051.50
Less stable retail deposits20.0102.00
Operational deposits15.0253.75
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates15.0406.00
Unsecured funding from financial institutions10.010010.0
Fuente
Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
Date
BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
Alcance
A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
Unidades
Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Estado
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modelo
gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
Versión
1.0.0
Propietario
GRA platforms lane
Finalidad
To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
Risk domain
riesgo de liquidez
Supuestos
Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
Entradas
High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
Datos
BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
Métodos
Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
Validación
Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
Limitaciones
Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
Incertidumbre
None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
Approved use
Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
Prohibited use
Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.

Red de exposición

Cómo una perturbación en los activos se convierte en una pérdida del sistema

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.

0255075100 051015202530 Contagion round Patrimonio del sistema perdido (%)
  • System equity lost

Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.

Controles

Caída de los activos externos
2.0 %

Resultados

Caída de los activos externos (%)
2.0
System equity lost in the first round (%)
18.0
System equity lost after contagion (%)
45.0
Amplification by the network (percentage points)
27.0
Banks in default (of 20)
0
Data, source and model record
System equity lost, round by round
RondaPatrimonio del sistema perdido (%)Bancos en impago
018.00
128.80
235.30
339.20
441.50
542.90
643.70
744.20
844.50
944.70
1044.80
1144.90
1244.90
1345.00
1445.00
1545.00
1645.00
1745.00
1845.00
1945.00
2045.00
2145.00
2245.00
2345.00
2445.00
2545.00
2645.00
2745.00
2845.00
2945.00
3045.00
Fuente
Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
Date
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
Alcance
A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
Unidades
Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
Estado
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

Modelo
gra.network.debtrank
Versión
1.0.0
Propietario
GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
Finalidad
To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
Risk domain
Systemic and contagion risk
Supuestos
Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
Entradas
Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
Datos
None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
Métodos
DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
Validación
The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
Limitaciones
No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
Incertidumbre
Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
Approved use
Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
Prohibited use
Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.

Análisis de escenarios

Scenarios, not forecasts

A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.

Regulatory context and related standards

The frameworks this work is read against

MarcoÓrganoQué estableceEdition or dateWhere it applies
Marco de Basilea IIIComité de Supervisión Bancaria de BasileaRequisitos mínimos de capital, apalancamiento, cobertura de liquidez y financiación estable, y los colchones de capital por encimaDecember 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel FrameworkBasel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables
Principios Básicos para una Supervisión Bancaria EficazComité de Supervisión Bancaria de BasileaNormas de referencia sobre facultades de supervisión, licencias, gestión de riesgos y gobernanza, evaluadas en los FSAP del FMI y del Banco MundialRevised April 2024International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs
Principios para la gestión y supervisión eficaces de los riesgos financieros relacionados con el climaComité de Supervisión Bancaria de BasileaExpectativas sobre la gobernanza, la gestión de riesgos y el análisis de escenarios de los bancos ante el riesgo climático, y sobre su revisión supervisoraJune 2022Basel Committee members, through national supervisors
Atributos clave de los regímenes de resolución eficaces para las instituciones financierasConsejo de Estabilidad FinancieraFacultades de resolución, planificación de la recuperación y la resolución y cooperación transfronteriza para que un banco pueda quebrar sin apoyo de los contribuyentesOctober 2011, updated October 2014FSB member jurisdictions
NIIF 9 Instrumentos financierosConsejo de Normas Internacionales de ContabilidadClasificación de los activos financieros y dotación prospectiva de provisiones por pérdidas crediticias esperadas en tres etapasIssued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead)
Escenarios climáticos de la NGFSRed para la Ecologización del Sistema FinancieroTrayectorias de referencia de riesgo de transición y físico utilizadas por bancos centrales y supervisores para el análisis de escenarios climáticosPhase V, November 2024Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding
IFRS S2 Información a revelar relacionada con el climaConsejo de Normas Internacionales de SostenibilidadDivulgación de riesgos y oportunidades relacionados con el clima, incluidas las emisiones financiadas y la resiliencia climáticaIssued June 2023, amended December 2025Where a jurisdiction adopts it
Proceso de Revisión y Evaluación Supervisora (SREP)Autoridad Bancaria Europea y Supervisión Bancaria del BCEProceso supervisor que evalúa el modelo de negocio, la gobernanza y los riesgos para el capital y la liquidez, y fija los requisitos y orientaciones del Pilar 2EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022)European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) y pruebas de estrés supervisorasJunta de Gobernadores del Sistema de la Reserva FederalProceso supervisor de revisión de escenarios de estrés y del plan de capital que fija el colchón de capital de estrés de los grandes bancos estadounidensesAnnual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020United States, large bank holding companies
ISO 31000 Gestión del riesgo - DirectricesOrganización Internacional de NormalizaciónPrincipios, marco y proceso para gestionar el riesgo en toda una organizaciónISO 31000:2018International, voluntary

Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.

Institutional counterparts

The institutions this work speaks to

  • Bank board and board risk committee
  • Director de riesgos y comité de crédito
  • Supervisor prudencial
  • Autoridad macroprudencial
  • Consejo de administración del banco y comité de activos y pasivos
  • Supervisor prudencial mediante SREP o CCAR
  • Banco central
  • Bank board
  • Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
  • Authorities overseeing critical third parties
  • Credit risk function
  • Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
  • El banco central como supervisor y operador
  • Bank treasury
  • Consejo de administración y comité de riesgos de la contraparte central
  • Autoridad de resolución

Readiness workflows

Preparación financiera

Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.

Límite

What this page is not

Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.