Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise
Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.
Domain definition
What Banking Nexus studies
Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.
Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.
| Término | Definición |
|---|---|
| Basel III | The Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. |
| Ratio CET1 | Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital. |
| Ratio de cobertura de liquidez | High-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period. |
| Expected credit loss | The probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for. |
Financial system context
The parts of the financial system it covers
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Riesgo de crédito y de contraparte
Impago, migración y concentración en las carteras de préstamos y las exposiciones de negociación, y cómo pasan las pérdidas entre contrapartes.
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Capital y liquidez
Capital con capacidad de absorción de pérdidas, colchones de liquidez y estructuras de financiación, y cómo se comportan cuando los mercados y los depositantes sufren estrés.
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Resiliencia operativa
Continuidad de los servicios importantes ante incidentes cibernéticos, fallos de terceros y fallos de procesos, dentro de tolerancias al impacto declaradas.
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Pagos e infraestructuras de mercado
Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.
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Riesgo climático y de la naturaleza
Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.
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Modelos e IA
Modelos de calificación crediticia, de provisiones y de capital, y la validación y la gobernanza que ahora exige el aprendizaje automático.
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Banca y economía real
Préstamos a hogares, pequeñas empresas, vivienda y servicios esenciales, y cómo el estrés bancario se convierte en una restricción del crédito.
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Gobernanza y supervisión
Consejos, cultura de riesgos, líneas de defensa, revisión supervisora y planificación de la resolución, incluidas las estructuras de la banca islámica.
Taxonomía de riesgos
Risks, topic by topic
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Riesgo de crédito y de contraparte
El riesgo de crédito es la probabilidad de que un prestatario o una contraparte no pague íntegramente y a tiempo, y sigue siendo la principal fuente de pérdidas de la mayoría de los bancos.
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Capital y liquidez
El capital absorbe las pérdidas y la liquidez permite a un banco pagar sus obligaciones a su vencimiento.
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Resiliencia operativa bancaria
La resiliencia operativa es la capacidad de un banco para seguir prestando servicios críticos durante una perturbación, ya se deba a un ciberataque, a un cambio tecnológico fallido, a una interrupción de un tercero o a una pandemia.
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Climate and nature bank risk
El cambio climático y la pérdida de naturaleza llegan a los bancos a través de sus prestatarios, sus garantías y los mercados de los que dependen.
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Dependencias de pago
Todo banco depende de los sistemas de pago, las entidades de contrapartida central, los sistemas de liquidación de valores, los bancos corresponsales y las redes de mensajería para mover dinero y garantías.
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Model and ai risk
Los bancos dependen de modelos para conceder crédito, constituir provisiones, tarificar productos, calcular el capital y detectar el fraude, y una parte creciente de esos modelos usa aprendizaje automático.
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Banking and real economy
Los bancos convierten los depósitos en préstamos para los hogares, las pequeñas y medianas empresas y los proveedores de servicios esenciales.
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Gobernanza bancaria
Muchas quiebras bancarias tienen su origen en la gobernanza: consejos que no comprendían los riesgos asumidos, incentivos que recompensaban el crecimiento por encima de la prudencia o funciones de control sin autoridad para cuestionar.
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Housing property finance
Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.
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Banca islámica
Los bancos islámicos operan con contratos y estructuras de gobernanza diseñados para cumplir el derecho mercantil islámico, y emplean instrumentos basados en la compraventa, el arrendamiento y la asociación en lugar de préstamos con intereses.
Risk-transmission mechanisms
How these risks develop and spread
| Tema | Mecanismo | Cómo funciona |
|---|---|---|
| Riesgo de crédito y de contraparte | Quality erodes before default | Arrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised. |
| Riesgo de crédito y de contraparte | Las pérdidas se concentran | Exposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies. |
| Capital y liquidez | Las pérdidas reducen el capital | Credit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers. |
| Capital y liquidez | La financiación puede desembolsarse con rapidez | Uninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing. |
| Resiliencia operativa bancaria | Las dependencias están ocultas | A single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns. |
| Resiliencia operativa bancaria | Third parties concentrate risk | Many banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | Physical risk hits collateral and income | Las inundaciones, las tormentas, el calor y la sequía dañan las propiedades e interrumpen la producción. Las pérdidas no aseguradas recaen en los prestatarios, lo que aumenta las probabilidades de impago y la pérdida en caso de impago, y la retirada de los seguros puede reajustar el precio de carteras hipotecarias regionales enteras. |
| Climate and nature bank risk | El riesgo de transición revalúa los sectores | La fijación de precios del carbono, la regulación, la tecnología y los cambios en la demanda pueden dejar activos varados y reducir los márgenes de los prestatarios con altas emisiones. El momento importa: una transición tardía y abrupta produce pérdidas más acusadas que una ordenada. |
| Dependencias de pago | Se necesita liquidez intradía | Real-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours. |
| Dependencias de pago | Las contrapartes centrales concentran el riesgo | La compensación netea las exposiciones y mutualiza las pérdidas por impago. En situaciones de tensión, las llamadas de margen aumentan al mismo tiempo en todos los miembros, y el impago de un miembro recurre a un fondo de garantía que todos comparten. |
| Model and ai risk | Drift and regime change | Models learn from past data. When the economy, customer behaviour or products change, relationships shift and accuracy decays, often quietly until losses or complaints reveal it. |
| Model and ai risk | Opacity weakens challenge | Complex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does. |
| Banking and real economy | Credit supply tightens | Cuando el capital o la financiación escasean, los bancos endurecen los criterios y aumentan los márgenes de los préstamos, recortan las líneas de crédito y favorecen a los prestatarios más seguros. Las pequeñas empresas y los hogares de menores ingresos, con menos alternativas, lo notan primero. |
| Banking and real economy | Borrower stress feeds back | Higher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy. |
| Gobernanza bancaria | La supervisión del consejo de administración establece el marco | The board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set. |
| Gobernanza bancaria | Incentives shape behaviour | La remuneración vinculada a los ingresos a corto plazo incentiva una asunción de riesgos cuyos costes aparecen más tarde. El diferimiento, el malus y la recuperación (clawback) buscan alinear la retribución con el resultado del riesgo a medida que se materializa. |
| Housing property finance | Credit and prices reinforce each other | Easier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs. |
| Housing property finance | Asequibilidad con tipos de interés al alza | Variable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers. |
| Banca islámica | La estructura del contrato condiciona el riesgo | Murabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label. |
| Banca islámica | Investment accounts share returns | Profit-sharing investment account holders bear losses in principle. Competitive pressure can lead banks to smooth returns and absorb losses themselves, a transfer known as displaced commercial risk. |
Preguntas de investigación
Who decides, and what they need to know
| Decision holder | Pregunta | Evidence the platform's pages describe |
|---|---|---|
| Bank board and board risk committee | What credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to impose | Medidas de concentración, migración de etapas y pérdidas bajo tensión por segmento |
| Consejo de administración del banco y comité de activos y pasivos | What capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure funding | Proyecciones de capital y liquidez según escenarios internos y supervisores |
| Bank board | Which business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carry | Mapas de servicios, resultados de pruebas de escenarios e historial de incidentes |
| Bank board and board risk committee | How climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planning | Evaluación de materialidad, resultados de escenarios y exposiciones sectoriales |
| El banco central como supervisor y operador | Which systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meet | Datos de disponibilidad, incidentes y participación; concentración de flujos |
| Bank board and model risk committee | Qué apetito de riesgo de modelo fijar y qué usos de la IA son aceptables | Inventario de modelos, clasificación por niveles y hallazgos de validación |
| Autoridad macroprudencial o comité de política financiera | Si se deben establecer o liberar colchones de capital y medidas basadas en el prestatario | Brechas de crédito, ratios de servicio de la deuda y encuestas de préstamos |
| Consejo de administración del banco y comité de nombramientos | Si las competencias, la independencia y la información del consejo son adecuadas para el perfil de riesgo del banco | Board effectiveness reviews, skills matrices and risk reports |
| Autoridad macroprudencial | Whether to set or adjust loan-to-value, debt-service-to-income or sectoral capital measures | Relación precio-ingresos, crecimiento del crédito, criterios de concesión de préstamos y morosidad |
| Bank board | What risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accounts | Displaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact |
These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.
Key indicators
What is measured, in which unit, by whom
| Indicador | Unidad | Cadencia | Tipo de fuente | Etiqueta de evidencia |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ratio de préstamos dudosos | porcentaje de la cartera bruta de préstamos | trimestral | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Estadísticas publicadas |
| Proporción de préstamos de la fase 2 y la fase 3 | porcentaje de la cartera bruta de préstamos | trimestral | IFRS 9 financial statements | NOTIFICADO |
| Ratio de capital ordinario de nivel 1 | porcentaje de los activos ponderados por riesgo | trimestral | Supervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosures | Estadísticas publicadas |
| Leverage ratio | percent of total exposure measure | trimestral | Informes de supervisión | Estadísticas publicadas |
| Important business services within impact tolerance in testing | count of services tested and count passing | anual | Registros de pruebas de escenarios | NOTIFICADO |
| Incidentes graves relacionados con las TIC | recuento por clase de gravedad | trimestral | Informes de incidentes a los supervisores | Estadísticas publicadas |
| Emisiones financiadas | toneladas de dióxido de carbono equivalente | anual | PCAF methodology applied to loan and investment books | ESTIMADO |
| Exposición a sectores relevantes para la política climática | porcentaje de la cartera de préstamos | anual | Pillar 3 ESG disclosures | NOTIFICADO |
| Value settled through large-value payment systems | currency units per day | diario | System operator statistics | Estadísticas publicadas |
| Disponibilidad del sistema de pagos | porcentaje de horas de operación | mensual | Divulgaciones de los operadores | NOTIFICADO |
| Model inventory coverage | count of models by tier and validation status | trimestral | Model risk management records | NOTIFICADO |
| Poder discriminante de los modelos de puntuación crediticia | Coeficiente de Gini o área bajo la curva | anual | Validación de modelos | MODELIZADO |
| Brecha crédito/PIB | puntos porcentuales | trimestral | Estadísticas de crédito del BPI | ESTIMADO |
| Credit standards on loans to enterprises | porcentaje neto de bancos que informan de un endurecimiento | trimestral | Encuestas sobre préstamos bancarios | NOTIFICADO |
| Board members with banking or risk expertise | share of board | anual | Divulgaciones de gobernanza | DECLARADO |
| Independent directors | share of board | anual | Divulgaciones de gobernanza | DECLARADO |
| Relación préstamo-valor en el momento de la originación | percent of property value | trimestral | Loan-level and supervisory data | Estadísticas publicadas |
| Ratio de servicio de la deuda sobre ingresos en la originación | percent of gross income | trimestral | Loan-level data, household surveys | NOTIFICADO |
| Capital adequacy ratio of Islamic banks | porcentaje de los activos ponderados por riesgo | trimestral | IFSB prudential indicators | Estadísticas publicadas |
| Ratio de financiación morosa | porcentaje de la financiación bruta | trimestral | IFSB prudential indicators | Estadísticas publicadas |
Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.
Metodología
The methods the platform's work rests on
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Economía financiera
La economía financiera y la macrofinanza explican cómo interactúan los balances bancarios, el crédito y los precios de los activos con la producción, el empleo y las finanzas públicas. En el riesgo bancario, conectan un escenario con las pérdidas y el capital, muestran cómo la tensión bancaria repercute en la economía y fundamentan las decisiones macroprudenciales y monetarias en relaciones contrastadas.
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Probability statistics
Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.
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Ciencia de redes
Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.
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Financial engineering
Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.
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Ai ml
Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.
Fuentes de datos
De dónde proviene la evidencia
| Fuente | Lo que aporta | Tipo de licencia |
|---|---|---|
| Indicadores de solidez financiera del FMI | Préstamos morosos, provisiones y distribución sectorial de los préstamos, notificados por las autoridades nacionales | Gratuito, condiciones de uso del FMI |
| EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exercise | Bank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banks | Gratuita, con atribución |
| Estadísticas bancarias de supervisión del BCE | Asset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro area | Gratuita, con atribución |
| FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9C | Loan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companies | Dominio público |
| BIS consolidated banking statistics | Banks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basis | Gratuito, condiciones de uso del BIS |
| Estudios de las agencias de calificación sobre impago y recuperación | Historical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sector | Con licencia, por suscripción |
| National central credit registers | Exposiciones a nivel de prestatario para el análisis de concentración e interconexión | Acceso restringido, de supervisión |
| Informes de seguimiento de Basilea III del BPI | Posiciones agregadas de capital, apalancamiento y liquidez de los bancos con actividad internacional | Gratuito, condiciones de uso del BIS |
| Federal Reserve supervisory stress test results | Scenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banks | Dominio público |
| Bank of England stress testing results | Diseño de escenarios y resultados de las pruebas de resistencia simultáneas y exploratorias de los principales bancos del Reino Unido | Gratuito, condiciones de uso del Bank of England |
| Prueba de resistencia a escala de la UE de la EBA | Bank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodology | Gratuita, con atribución |
| Divulgaciones del Pilar 3 | Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFR | Público, condiciones bancarias |
| Registros y designaciones de proveedores críticos con arreglo a la Ley de Resiliencia Operativa Digital de la UE | Registros de acuerdos con terceros de TIC en poder de las autoridades y la lista pública de proveedores críticos de TIC designados | Registers restricted to authorities; designation list public |
| ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publications | Supervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilities | Gratuita, con atribución |
| Publicaciones del Banco de Inglaterra y la PRA sobre resiliencia operativa | Policy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports | Gratuito, condiciones de uso del Bank of England |
| ORX operational risk loss data | Pooled loss events by event type and business line from member banks | Licensed, membership |
| Panorama de amenazas de ENISA para el sector financiero | Análisis de las ciberamenazas y de los patrones de incidentes que afectan a las instituciones financieras | Gratuita, con atribución |
| Pillar 3 operational risk disclosures | Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banks | Público, condiciones bancarias |
| Escenarios del NGFS | Vías de riesgo de transición y riesgo físico con variables macroeconómicas para el análisis de escenarios | Gratuita, con atribución |
| ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicators | Supervisory exercise methodology and experimental indicators of euro area bank exposures | Gratuita, con atribución |
| Escenario exploratorio bienal sobre el clima del Banco de Inglaterra | Diseño y resultados publicados del ejercicio exploratorio para bancos y aseguradoras del Reino Unido | Gratuito, condiciones de uso del Bank of England |
| Divulgaciones ESG del Pilar 3 conforme a las normas de la EBA | Bank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignment | Público, condiciones bancarias |
| Norma Global de Contabilidad y Reporte de GEI de PCAF | Methodology and data quality scores for financed emissions | Norma gratuita; base de datos de factores de emisión mediante suscripción |
| Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard maps | Capas de amenazas físicas de inundación, calor y sequía | Libre y abierta, con atribución |
Instruments explained for research
Analytical instruments
Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.
riesgo de crédito
A credit portfolio's loss distribution
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.
- Pérdida de la cartera
- Expected loss
With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.
Controles
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Pérdida en caso de incumplimiento
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Resultados
- Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
- 0.45
- Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
- 2.36
- Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
- 3.61
Data, source and model record
| Período de retorno (años) | Loss (% of exposure) |
|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 |
| 4 | 0.59 |
| 8 | 0.91 |
| 17 | 1.28 |
| 34 | 1.68 |
| 70 | 2.13 |
| 141 | 2.60 |
| 288 | 3.11 |
| 585 | 3.64 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 |
- Fuente
- This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
- Alcance
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Unidades
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Estado
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modelo
- gra.credit.one-factor
- Versión
- 1.0.0
- Propietario
- GRA platforms lane
- Finalidad
- To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
- Risk domain
- Riesgo de crédito y de contraparte
- Supuestos
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Entradas
- Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Datos
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Métodos
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
- Validación
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Limitaciones
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Incertidumbre
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Concentración
One large exposure and the tail
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.
- Granular portfolio
- With the large exposure
Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.
Controles
- Share of the largest exposure
- 5.0 % of the portfolio
- Probability of default
- 1.00 % a year
- Pérdida en caso de incumplimiento
- 45 % of exposure
- Asset correlation
- 0.12
Resultados
- Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
- 4.06
- Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
- 4.55
- Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
- 0.49
- Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
- 400
Data, source and model record
| Período de retorno (años) | Granular (%) | With the large exposure (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 0.30 | 0.28 |
| 4 | 0.59 | 0.56 |
| 8 | 0.91 | 0.89 |
| 17 | 1.28 | 1.29 |
| 34 | 1.68 | 1.81 |
| 70 | 2.13 | 2.53 |
| 141 | 2.60 | 3.06 |
| 288 | 3.11 | 3.57 |
| 585 | 3.64 | 4.12 |
| 1,189 | 4.20 | 4.69 |
| 2,418 | 4.79 | 5.29 |
| 4,918 | 5.41 | 5.91 |
| 10,000 | 6.04 | 6.56 |
- Fuente
- This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
- Alcance
- A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
- Unidades
- Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Estado
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modelo
- gra.credit.concentration
- Versión
- 1.0.0
- Propietario
- GRA platforms lane
- Finalidad
- To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
- Risk domain
- Riesgo de crédito y de contraparte
- Supuestos
- Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
- Entradas
- Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
- Datos
- None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
- Métodos
- Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
- Validación
- Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
- Limitaciones
- One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
- Incertidumbre
- Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
- Approved use
- Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
- Prohibited use
- Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Liquidez
The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.
- Outflow over 30 days by funding class
- Net outflows after capped inflows
- Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.
Controles
- High-quality liquid assets
- 15.0 % of total funding
- Stable retail deposits
- 30 % of total funding
- Less stable retail deposits
- 20 % of total funding
- Operational deposits
- 15 % of total funding
- Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
- 15 % of total funding
- Unsecured funding from financial institutions
- 10 % of total funding
- Contractual inflows over 30 days
- 5.0 % of total funding
- Stress on run-off rates
- 1.00 times the baseline
Resultados
- Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
- 23.3
- Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
- 5.00
- Net outflows (% of total funding)
- 18.3
- Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
- 82
Data, source and model record
| Funding class | Balance (% of funding) | Run-off rate (%) | Outflow (% of funding) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stable retail deposits | 30.0 | 5 | 1.50 |
| Less stable retail deposits | 20.0 | 10 | 2.00 |
| Operational deposits | 15.0 | 25 | 3.75 |
| Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates | 15.0 | 40 | 6.00 |
| Unsecured funding from financial institutions | 10.0 | 100 | 10.0 |
- Fuente
- Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
- Date
- BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
- Alcance
- A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
- Unidades
- Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Estado
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modelo
- gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
- Versión
- 1.0.0
- Propietario
- GRA platforms lane
- Finalidad
- To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Risk domain
- riesgo de liquidez
- Supuestos
- Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
- Entradas
- High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
- Datos
- BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
- Métodos
- Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
- Validación
- Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
- Limitaciones
- Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
- Incertidumbre
- None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
- Approved use
- Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
- Prohibited use
- Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Red de exposición
Cómo una perturbación en los activos se convierte en una pérdida del sistema
Illustrative, educational and non-binding
Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.
- System equity lost
Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.
Controles
- Caída de los activos externos
- 2.0 %
Resultados
- Caída de los activos externos (%)
- 2.0
- System equity lost in the first round (%)
- 18.0
- System equity lost after contagion (%)
- 45.0
- Amplification by the network (percentage points)
- 27.0
- Banks in default (of 20)
- 0
Data, source and model record
| Ronda | Patrimonio del sistema perdido (%) | Bancos en impago |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.0 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.8 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.3 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.2 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.5 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.9 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.7 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.2 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.5 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.7 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.8 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.9 | 0 |
| 13 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 14 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 15 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 16 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.0 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.0 | 0 |
- Fuente
- Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
- Date
- Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
- Alcance
- A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
- Unidades
- Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
- Currency
- None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
- Estado
- Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.
Model record
- Modelo
- gra.network.debtrank
- Versión
- 1.0.0
- Propietario
- GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
- Finalidad
- To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
- Risk domain
- Systemic and contagion risk
- Supuestos
- Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
- Entradas
- Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
- Datos
- None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
- Métodos
- DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
- Validación
- The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
- Limitaciones
- No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
- Incertidumbre
- Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
- Approved use
- Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
- Prohibited use
- Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
- Runs on
- Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Análisis de escenarios
Scenarios, not forecasts
A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.
Regulatory context and related standards
The frameworks this work is read against
| Marco | Órgano | Qué establece | Edition or date | Where it applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marco de Basilea III | Comité de Supervisión Bancaria de Basilea | Requisitos mínimos de capital, apalancamiento, cobertura de liquidez y financiación estable, y los colchones de capital por encima | December 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel Framework | Basel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables |
| Principios Básicos para una Supervisión Bancaria Eficaz | Comité de Supervisión Bancaria de Basilea | Normas de referencia sobre facultades de supervisión, licencias, gestión de riesgos y gobernanza, evaluadas en los FSAP del FMI y del Banco Mundial | Revised April 2024 | International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs |
| Principios para la gestión y supervisión eficaces de los riesgos financieros relacionados con el clima | Comité de Supervisión Bancaria de Basilea | Expectativas sobre la gobernanza, la gestión de riesgos y el análisis de escenarios de los bancos ante el riesgo climático, y sobre su revisión supervisora | June 2022 | Basel Committee members, through national supervisors |
| Atributos clave de los regímenes de resolución eficaces para las instituciones financieras | Consejo de Estabilidad Financiera | Facultades de resolución, planificación de la recuperación y la resolución y cooperación transfronteriza para que un banco pueda quebrar sin apoyo de los contribuyentes | October 2011, updated October 2014 | FSB member jurisdictions |
| NIIF 9 Instrumentos financieros | Consejo de Normas Internacionales de Contabilidad | Clasificación de los activos financieros y dotación prospectiva de provisiones por pérdidas crediticias esperadas en tres etapas | Issued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018 | Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead) |
| Escenarios climáticos de la NGFS | Red para la Ecologización del Sistema Financiero | Trayectorias de referencia de riesgo de transición y físico utilizadas por bancos centrales y supervisores para el análisis de escenarios climáticos | Phase V, November 2024 | Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding |
| IFRS S2 Información a revelar relacionada con el clima | Consejo de Normas Internacionales de Sostenibilidad | Divulgación de riesgos y oportunidades relacionados con el clima, incluidas las emisiones financiadas y la resiliencia climática | Issued June 2023, amended December 2025 | Where a jurisdiction adopts it |
| Proceso de Revisión y Evaluación Supervisora (SREP) | Autoridad Bancaria Europea y Supervisión Bancaria del BCE | Proceso supervisor que evalúa el modelo de negocio, la gobernanza y los riesgos para el capital y la liquidez, y fija los requisitos y orientaciones del Pilar 2 | EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022) | European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks |
| Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) y pruebas de estrés supervisoras | Junta de Gobernadores del Sistema de la Reserva Federal | Proceso supervisor de revisión de escenarios de estrés y del plan de capital que fija el colchón de capital de estrés de los grandes bancos estadounidenses | Annual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020 | United States, large bank holding companies |
| ISO 31000 Gestión del riesgo - Directrices | Organización Internacional de Normalización | Principios, marco y proceso para gestionar el riesgo en toda una organización | ISO 31000:2018 | International, voluntary |
Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.
Geographic dimensions
Global, regional and country programmes
Institutional counterparts
The institutions this work speaks to
- Bank board and board risk committee
- Director de riesgos y comité de crédito
- Supervisor prudencial
- Autoridad macroprudencial
- Consejo de administración del banco y comité de activos y pasivos
- Supervisor prudencial mediante SREP o CCAR
- Banco central
- Bank board
- Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
- Authorities overseeing critical third parties
- Credit risk function
- Central banks and supervisors in the NGFS
- El banco central como supervisor y operador
- Bank treasury
- Consejo de administración y comité de riesgos de la contraparte central
- Autoridad de resolución
Publicaciones de investigación
Research, methods and sources
Educational resources
Learn the methods
Readiness workflows
Preparación financiera
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What this page is not
Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.