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Banking Nexus · research and knowledge platform; GRA does not lend, invest, insure, rate or advise

Banking Nexus: domain, methods and instruments

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Each instrument below is illustrative, educational and non-binding.

Go to the instrumentsBanking Nexus home

Domain definition

What Banking Nexus studies

Bank risk management is how banks identify, measure, limit and carry the risks they take, from credit and liquidity to operational, model and climate risk, under prudential rules such as Basel III. Banking Nexus, The Global Risks Alliance's platform for the sector, explains how those risks reach households, firms and the financial system. It assesses no bank and gives no advice.

Banking Nexus studies how banks take, measure and carry risk, and how that risk reaches households, firms and the wider financial system. Its pages cover credit and counterparty exposure, capital and liquidity, operational and third-party resilience, payment dependencies, climate and nature risk, models and AI, governance and Islamic banking. Each page sets out mechanisms, indicators, sources, methods and the board and supervisory decisions the evidence serves. It is shared industry understanding from The Global Risks Alliance, not investment or financial advice.

واژهتعریف
Basel IIIThe Basel Committee's international framework of capital, leverage and liquidity standards for internationally active banks.
نسبت CET1Common equity tier 1 capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, the core measure of a bank's loss-absorbing capital.
نسبت پوشش نقدینگیHigh-quality liquid assets relative to net cash outflows over a thirty-day stress period.
Expected credit lossThe probability-weighted estimate of credit losses that IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for.

Financial system context

The parts of the financial system it covers

  • ریسک اعتباری و طرف مقابل

    نکول، جابه‌جایی رتبه و تمرکز در سبدهای وام و مواجهه‌های معاملاتی، و اینکه زیان‌ها چگونه میان طرف‌های معامله منتقل می‌شوند.

  • سرمایه و نقدینگی

    سرمایهٔ جذب‌کنندهٔ زیان، ضربه‌گیرهای نقدینگی و ساختارهای تأمین مالی، و رفتار آن‌ها هنگامی که بازارها و سپرده‌گذاران در تنش قرار می‌گیرند.

  • تاب‌آوری عملیاتی

    تداوم خدمات مهم در برابر رخدادهای سایبری، شکست اشخاص ثالث و از هم گسیختگی فرایندها، در حدود تحمل اثر اعلام‌شده.

  • پرداخت‌ها و زیرساخت بازار

    Payment systems, central counterparties, settlement systems and the digital services banks depend on to move money and collateral.

  • ریسک اقلیم و طبیعت

    Physical and transition risk to loan books and collateral across short, medium and long horizons, explored through scenario analysis.

  • مدل‌ها و هوش مصنوعی

    امتیازدهی اعتباری، ذخیره‌گیری و مدل‌های سرمایه، و اعتبارسنجی و حکمرانی‌ای که یادگیری ماشین اکنون می‌طلبد.

  • بانکداری و اقتصاد واقعی

    وام‌دهی به خانوارها، بنگاه‌های کوچک، مسکن و خدمات ضروری، و اینکه تنش بانکی چگونه به تنگنای اعتباری تبدیل می‌شود.

  • حکمرانی و نظارت

    هیئت‌مدیره‌ها، فرهنگ ریسک، خطوط دفاعی، بازبینی نظارتی و برنامه‌ریزی گره‌گشایی، از جمله ساختارهای بانکداری اسلامی.

رده‌بندی ریسک

Risks, topic by topic

  • ریسک اعتباری و طرف مقابل

    ریسک اعتباری احتمال آن است که وام‌گیرنده یا طرف مقابل نتواند به‌طور کامل و به‌موقع پرداخت کند، و همچنان منبع اصلی زیان برای بیشتر بانک‌هاست.

  • سرمایه و نقدینگی

    سرمایه زیان‌ها را جذب می‌کند و نقدینگی بانک را قادر می‌سازد تعهدات خود را در سررسید بپردازد.

  • تاب‌آوری عملیاتی بانک

    تاب‌آوری عملیاتی توانایی یک بانک برای ادامهٔ ارائهٔ خدمات حیاتی در جریان اختلال است، خواه ناشی از حملهٔ سایبری، تغییر ناموفق فناوری، قطعی یک شخص ثالث یا همه‌گیری.

  • Climate and nature bank risk

    تغییر اقلیم و زوال طبیعت از طریق وام‌گیرندگان، وثیقه‌ها و بازارهایی که بانک‌ها به آن‌ها وابسته‌اند به بانک‌ها می‌رسند.

  • وابستگی‌های پرداخت

    هر بانک برای جابه‌جایی پول و وثیقه به سامانه‌های پرداخت، طرف‌های مقابل مرکزی، سامانه‌های تسویهٔ اوراق بهادار، بانک‌های کارگزار و شبکه‌های پیام‌رسانی وابسته است.

  • Model and ai risk

    بانک‌ها برای اعطای اعتبار، تعیین ذخایر، قیمت‌گذاری محصولات، محاسبهٔ سرمایه و تشخیص کلاهبرداری به مدل‌ها متکی‌اند و سهم فزاینده‌ای از این مدل‌ها از یادگیری ماشین استفاده می‌کنند.

  • Banking and real economy

    بانک‌ها سپرده‌ها را به وام برای خانوارها، بنگاه‌های کوچک و متوسط و ارائه‌دهندگان خدمات ضروری تبدیل می‌کنند.

  • حکمرانی بانک

    بسیاری از ورشکستگی‌های بانکی به حکمرانی بازمی‌گردند: هیئت‌مدیره‌هایی که ریسک‌های پذیرفته‌شده را درک نمی‌کردند، مشوق‌هایی که رشد را بر احتیاط ترجیح می‌دادند، یا واحدهای کنترلی که جایگاه لازم برای به چالش کشیدن را نداشتند.

  • Housing property finance

    Mortgages and property lending are among the largest exposures on many bank balance sheets, and sharp falls in real estate prices have featured in many banking crises.

  • بانکداری اسلامی

    بانک‌های اسلامی بر پایهٔ قراردادها و ساختارهای حکمرانی‌ای فعالیت می‌کنند که برای انطباق با حقوق تجاری اسلامی طراحی شده‌اند و به جای وام‌های بهره‌دار از ابزارهای مبتنی بر بیع، اجاره و مشارکت استفاده می‌کنند.

Risk-transmission mechanisms

How these risks develop and spread

مبحثسازوکارچگونه کار می‌کند
ریسک اعتباری و طرف مقابلQuality erodes before defaultArrears, covenant breaches, rating downgrades and forbearance usually precede default by several quarters. Under IFRS 9 a significant increase in credit risk moves a loan from a twelve-month to a lifetime loss allowance, so provisions rise before losses are realised.
ریسک اعتباری و طرف مقابلLosses concentrateExposures cluster in sectors, regions, collateral types and large single names. A shock to one segment, such as commercial property or an export industry, can drive losses well beyond what a diversified portfolio model implies.
سرمایه و نقدینگیLosses deplete capitalCredit, market and operational losses reduce common equity. As capital ratios approach buffer levels, restrictions on distributions apply and banks may cut lending to rebuild ratios, passing the stress on to borrowers.
سرمایه و نقدینگیFunding can run quicklyUninsured deposits, wholesale funding and secured financing can be withdrawn within days, faster still with digital banking and rapid information spread. Concentrated deposit bases and maturity mismatch make a run self-reinforcing.
تاب‌آوری عملیاتی بانکوابستگی‌ها پنهان‌اندA single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.
تاب‌آوری عملیاتی بانکThird parties concentrate riskMany banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
Climate and nature bank riskPhysical risk hits collateral and incomeسیل، توفان، گرما و خشکسالی به املاک آسیب می‌زنند و تولید را مختل می‌کنند. زیان‌های بیمه‌نشده بر دوش وام‌گیرندگان می‌افتد و احتمال نکول و زیان در صورت نکول را بالا می‌برد، و خروج بیمه می‌تواند قیمت‌گذاری مجدد کل پرتفوی وام مسکن یک منطقه را در پی داشته باشد.
Climate and nature bank riskریسک گذار قیمت بخش‌ها را بازتعیین می‌کندCarbon pricing, regulation, technology and shifting demand can strand assets and squeeze the margins of emissions-intensive borrowers. Timing matters: a late and abrupt transition produces sharper losses than an orderly one.
وابستگی‌های پرداختLiquidity is needed intradayReal-time gross settlement requires banks to fund each payment as it is made. If a large participant delays payments to conserve liquidity, others wait in turn, and gridlock can build within hours.
وابستگی‌های پرداختCentral counterparties concentrate riskClearing nets exposures and mutualises default losses. In stress, margin calls rise across members at the same time, and a member default draws on a default fund that all members share.
Model and ai riskDrift and regime changeمدل‌ها از داده‌های گذشته می‌آموزند. وقتی اقتصاد، رفتار مشتریان یا محصولات تغییر می‌کنند، روابط جابه‌جا می‌شوند و دقت کاهش می‌یابد، اغلب بی‌صدا تا زمانی که زیان یا شکایت آن را آشکار کند.
Model and ai riskOpacity weakens challengeComplex machine learning models can be hard to explain to credit officers, customers and supervisors. Effective challenge, a pillar of model governance, is weaker when no one can say why a model decides as it does.
Banking and real economyCredit supply tightensWhen capital or funding is scarce, banks raise lending standards and margins, cut credit lines and favour safer borrowers. Small firms and lower-income households, with fewer alternatives, feel it first.
Banking and real economyBorrower stress feeds backHigher rates, unemployment or falling incomes raise arrears. Bank losses then reduce capital and lending further, a loop that deepens downturns and is central to macroprudential policy.
حکمرانی بانکBoard oversight sets the frameThe board approves strategy, risk appetite and senior appointments. Without the expertise and information to challenge management, it cannot see when risk-taking drifts beyond the appetite it set.
حکمرانی بانکIncentives shape behaviourRemuneration tied to short-term revenue encourages risk-taking whose costs appear later. Deferral, malus and clawback aim to align pay with the risk outcome as it is realised.
Housing property financeCredit and prices reinforce each otherEasier credit raises demand and prices. Higher prices raise collateral values and allow more borrowing. The loop runs in reverse in a downturn, and loan-to-value at origination shapes how much loss a lender then absorbs.
Housing property financeAffordability under rising ratesVariable-rate and short-fixation mortgages pass rate rises to borrowers quickly. Debt service burdens rise, arrears follow with a lag, and refinancing can become impossible for stretched borrowers.
بانکداری اسلامیساختار قرارداد ریسک را شکل می‌دهدMurabaha sale, ijarah lease, musharakah and mudarabah partnerships and sukuk carry different mixes of credit, market, equity and operational risk. The risk profile depends on the contract's actual terms, not on its label.
بانکداری اسلامیInvestment accounts share returnsProfit-sharing investment account holders bear losses in principle. Competitive pressure can lead banks to smooth returns and absorb losses themselves, a transfer known as displaced commercial risk.

پرسش‌های پژوهشی

Who decides, and what they need to know

Decision holderپرسشEvidence the platform's pages describe
Bank board and board risk committeeWhat credit risk appetite to set, and which sector and single-name limits to imposeConcentration measures, stage migration and stress losses by segment
Bank board and asset liability committeeWhat capital target and management buffer to hold, and how to structure fundingCapital and liquidity projections under internal and supervisory scenarios
Bank boardWhich business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryService maps, scenario test results and incident history
Bank board and board risk committeeHow climate and nature risks enter risk appetite, strategy and transition planningMateriality assessment, scenario results and sector exposures
Central bank as overseer and operatorWhich systems are systemically important and what standards and recovery plans they must meetAvailability, incident and participation data; concentration of flows
Bank board and model risk committeeWhat model risk appetite to set and which uses of AI are acceptableModel inventory, tiering and validation findings
Macroprudential authority or financial policy committeeWhether to set or release capital buffers and borrower-based measuresCredit gaps, debt service ratios and lending surveys
هیئت مدیرهٔ بانک و کمیتهٔ نامزدهااینکه آیا مهارت‌ها، استقلال و اطلاعات هیئت‌مدیره برای نمایهٔ ریسک بانک کافی استبازبینی اثربخشی هیئت‌مدیره، ماتریس‌های مهارت و گزارش‌های ریسک
مرجع احتیاطی کلاناینکه آیا باید نسبت وام به ارزش وثیقه، نسبت بدهی به درآمد یا الزامات سرمایه‌ای بخشی تعیین یا تعدیل شودنسبت قیمت به درآمد، رشد اعتبار، استانداردهای وام‌دهی و معوقات
Bank boardWhat risk appetite, return smoothing policy and reserve practice to adopt for investment accountsDisplaced commercial risk analysis, return history and capital impact

These are the decisions of the named institutions. The platform describes the evidence they use; it takes none of these decisions and advises on none.

Key indicators

What is measured, in which unit, by whom

نشانگرواحدتناوبنوع منبعبرچسب شواهد
Non-performing loan ratioدرصد از کل وام‌هافصلیSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresآمارهای منتشرشده
Stage 2 and stage 3 loan shareدرصد از کل وام‌هافصلیIFRS 9 financial statementsگزارش‌شده
Common equity tier 1 ratioدرصد دارایی‌های موزون به ریسکفصلیSupervisory returns, Pillar 3 disclosuresآمارهای منتشرشده
Leverage ratiopercent of total exposure measureفصلیگزارش‌های نظارتیآمارهای منتشرشده
Important business services within impact tolerance in testingcount of services tested and count passingسالانهScenario testing recordsگزارش‌شده
Major ICT-related incidentscount by severity classفصلیIncident reports to supervisorsآمارهای منتشرشده
انتشارهای تأمین‌مالی‌شدهtonnes of carbon dioxide equivalentسالانهPCAF methodology applied to loan and investment booksبرآوردشده
Exposure to climate-policy-relevant sectorsدرصد از پورتفوی وامسالانهPillar 3 ESG disclosuresگزارش‌شده
Value settled through large-value payment systemscurrency units per dayروزانهSystem operator statisticsآمارهای منتشرشده
دسترس‌پذیری سامانهٔ پرداختpercent of operating hoursماهانهافشاهای بهره‌بردارانگزارش‌شده
Model inventory coveragecount of models by tier and validation statusفصلیModel risk management recordsگزارش‌شده
Discriminatory power of credit scorecardsGini coefficient or area under the curveسالانهاعتبارسنجی الگومدل‌سازی‌شده
شکاف اعتبار به تولید ناخالص داخلیواحد درصدفصلیآمار اعتباری BISبرآوردشده
استانداردهای اعتباری برای وام به بنگاه‌هاnet percentage of banks reporting tighteningفصلیپیمایش‌های وام‌دهی بانکیگزارش‌شده
Board members with banking or risk expertiseshare of boardسالانهافشاهای حکمرانیDECLARED
مدیران مستقلshare of boardسالانهافشاهای حکمرانیDECLARED
Loan-to-value ratio at originationدرصد ارزش داراییفصلیLoan-level and supervisory dataآمارهای منتشرشده
نسبت پرداخت بدهی به درآمد در زمان صدورpercent of gross incomeفصلیداده‌های سطح وام، پیمایش‌های خانوارگزارش‌شده
نسبت کفایت سرمایهٔ بانک‌های اسلامیدرصد دارایی‌های موزون به ریسکفصلیIFSB prudential indicatorsآمارهای منتشرشده
Non-performing financing ratiopercent of gross financingفصلیIFSB prudential indicatorsآمارهای منتشرشده

Indicators carry a name, a unit and the kind of evidence behind them. This page publishes no value for them: values belong to their sources, with their own dates and definitions.

روش‌شناسی

The methods the platform's work rests on

  • اقتصاد مالی

    Financial economics and macro-finance explain how bank balance sheets, credit and asset prices interact with output, employment and public finances. In banking risk they connect a scenario to losses and capital, show how bank stress feeds back into the economy, and ground macroprudential and monetary decisions in tested relationships.

  • Probability statistics

    Probability and statistics underlie every credit, market and operational risk measure in banking. Default probabilities, loss distributions, value at risk and stress losses all rest on estimation from limited and often unrepresentative data. The discipline makes the uncertainty in those estimates explicit for the people who rely on them.

  • علم شبکه

    Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.

  • Financial engineering

    Financial and risk engineering supplies the instruments and models banks use to measure, price, hedge and transfer risk, from expected credit loss and counterparty exposure to value at risk and capital allocation. It also supplies the discipline of model risk management that keeps those tools reliable.

  • Ai ml

    Artificial intelligence and machine learning now support credit underwriting, fraud and financial crime detection, early warning of borrower stress and supervisory analysis. In banking they are both a tool and a source of risk: their outputs must be explainable, fair, robust and validated before they influence consequential decisions about customers or capital.

منابع داده

شواهد از کجا می‌آید

منبعآنچه فراهم می‌کندرستهٔ پروانه
شاخص‌های سلامت مالی IMFNon-performing loans, provisioning and sectoral loan distribution reported by national authoritiesرایگان، شرایط استفادهٔ IMF
EBA risk dashboard and EU-wide transparency exerciseBank-level asset quality, forbearance and IFRS 9 stage data for EU banksرایگان، با انتساب
آمار نظارتی بانکی ECBAsset quality and credit risk aggregates for significant institutions in the euro areaرایگان، با انتساب
FFIEC Call Reports and Federal Reserve FR Y-9CLoan categories, past-due and charge-off data for US banks and holding companiesمالکیت عمومی
BIS consolidated banking statisticsBanks' foreign claims by counterparty country and sector on an ultimate-risk basisرایگان، شرایط استفادهٔ BIS
Rating agency default and recovery studiesHistorical default and recovery rates by rating grade and sectorدارای پروانه، با اشتراک
National central credit registersBorrower-level exposures for concentration and interconnection analysisدسترسی محدود و نظارتی
BIS Basel III monitoring reportsAggregate capital, leverage and liquidity positions of internationally active banksرایگان، شرایط استفادهٔ BIS
Federal Reserve supervisory stress test resultsScenario design, projected losses and post-stress capital for large US banksمالکیت عمومی
نتایج آزمون تنش بانک انگلستانScenario design and outcomes of concurrent and exploratory stress tests for major UK banksرایگان، شرایط استفادهٔ بانک انگلستان
EBA EU-wide stress testBank-level stressed capital projections under a common methodologyرایگان، با انتساب
افشاهای رکن 3Bank-published capital composition, risk-weighted assets, LCR and NSFRعمومی، شرایط بانک
Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience ActRegisters of ICT third-party arrangements held by authorities and the public list of designated critical ICT providersثبت‌ها محدود به مراجع رسمی؛ فهرست تعیین‌شده‌ها عمومی
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publicationsSupervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilitiesرایگان، با انتساب
Bank of England and PRA operational resilience publicationsPolicy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reportsرایگان، شرایط استفادهٔ بانک انگلستان
ORX operational risk loss dataPooled loss events by event type and business line from member banksLicensed, membership
چشم‌انداز تهدیدات ENISA برای بخش مالیAnalysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutionsرایگان، با انتساب
Pillar 3 operational risk disclosuresOperational risk capital and loss summaries published by banksعمومی، شرایط بانک
سناریوهای NGFSTransition and physical risk pathways with macroeconomic variables for scenario analysisرایگان، با انتساب
ECB climate stress test and climate-related statistical indicatorsروش‌شناسی مانور نظارتی و نشانگرهای آزمایشی مواجهه‌های بانکی منطقهٔ یورورایگان، با انتساب
Bank of England Climate Biennial Exploratory ScenarioDesign and published results of the exploratory exercise for UK banks and insurersرایگان، شرایط استفادهٔ بانک انگلستان
Pillar 3 ESG disclosures under EBA standardsBank-reported exposures to carbon-intensive sectors, physical risk and taxonomy alignmentعمومی، شرایط بانک
استاندارد جهانی حسابداری و گزارش‌دهی گازهای گلخانه‌ای PCAFMethodology and data quality scores for financed emissionsFree standard; emission factor database by membership
Copernicus Climate Change Service and JRC hazard mapsPhysical hazard layers for flood, heat and droughtرایگان و باز، با انتساب

Instruments explained for research

Analytical instruments

Each instrument runs a named, cited method on stated teaching values, shows its uncertainty and limits, and keeps its data in a table. All of them are illustrative, educational and non-binding: none quotes a premium, a rate, a price, a rating or an eligibility, and none describes a real institution, portfolio or place.

مدل‌های ریسک اعتباری

A credit portfolio's loss distribution

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The one-factor model behind risk-based capital: the expected loss is probability of default times loss given default; correlation between borrowers spreads losses into rare bad years. The gap between the 99.9 % loss and the expected loss is the unexpected loss that capital is meant to absorb.

02468 1 in 21 در 101 در 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • زیان سبد
  • Expected loss

With low correlation the curve stays close to the expected loss; with high correlation bad years cluster, and the tail rises steeply.

کنترل‌ها

Probability of default
1.00 % a year
زیان در صورت نکول
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

نتایج

Expected loss (% of exposure a year)
0.45
Loss at 99 % (% of exposure)
2.36
Loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
4.06
Unexpected loss at 99.9 % (% of exposure)
3.61
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period
دورهٔ بازگشت (سال)Loss (% of exposure)
20.30
40.59
80.91
171.28
341.68
702.13
1412.60
2883.11
5853.64
1,1894.20
2,4184.79
4,9185.41
10,0006.04
منبع
This page's one-factor model (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions).
تاریخ
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values chosen inside the ranges the cited note discusses.
دامنه
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Units
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
وضعیت
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

مدل
gra.credit.one-factor
نسخه
1.0.0
مالک
GRA platforms lane
هدف
To show how probability of default, loss given default and correlation between borrowers shape a portfolio's loss distribution: expected loss, high quantiles and unexpected loss.
Risk domain
ریسک اعتباری و طرف مقابل
مفروضات
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
ورودی‌ها
Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
داده
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
روش‌ها
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions)
اعتبارسنجی
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limitations
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
عدم قطعیت
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

غلظت

One large exposure and the tail

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

The same portfolio with one borrower holding a share of it. The expected loss does not change; the tail does, because the large exposure's default is a lump the rest of the portfolio cannot average away. The Herfindahl index and the effective number of exposures summarise it.

02468 1 in 21 در 101 در 1001 in 1,0001 in 10,000 Return period of the annual loss (years, log scale) Loss (% of exposure)
  • Granular portfolio
  • With the large exposure

Move the large exposure from zero: the 99.9 % loss rises above the granular curve, by more than its share times the loss given default would suggest at low default probabilities.

کنترل‌ها

Share of the largest exposure
5.0 % of the portfolio
Probability of default
1.00 % a year
زیان در صورت نکول
45 % of exposure
Asset correlation
0.12

نتایج

Loss at 99.9 %, granular portfolio (% of exposure)
4.06
Loss at 99.9 %, with the large exposure (% of exposure)
4.55
Concentration add-on (% of exposure)
0.49
Effective number of exposures (1 / HHI of the large exposure)
400
Data, source and model record
Portfolio loss by return period, granular and concentrated
دورهٔ بازگشت (سال)Granular (%)With the large exposure (%)
20.300.28
40.590.56
80.910.89
171.281.29
341.681.81
702.132.53
1412.603.06
2883.113.57
5853.644.12
1,1894.204.69
2,4184.795.29
4,9185.415.91
10,0006.046.56
منبع
This page's model: the one-factor distribution with one exposure added exactly, integrated over the common factor (the network's own records). Methods: Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15).
تاریخ
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16.
دامنه
A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.
Units
Losses in percent of total exposure; return periods in years (1 in 1,000 years is the 99.9 % level).
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
وضعیت
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

مدل
gra.credit.concentration
نسخه
1.0.0
مالک
GRA platforms lane
هدف
To show why single-name concentration raises tail loss while leaving expected loss unchanged.
Risk domain
ریسک اعتباری و طرف مقابل
مفروضات
Every borrower has the same probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Defaults depend on one common factor and an independent part (one-factor Gaussian model). The portfolio is infinitely granular unless a large exposure is set.
ورودی‌ها
Share of the largest exposure (%); Probability of default (% a year); Loss given default (% of exposure); Asset correlation
داده
None: teaching values set by the controls; no bank's data.
روش‌ها
Asymptotic single risk factor (one-factor) credit loss distribution (Vasicek (2002), The distribution of loan portfolio value, Risk 15(12)); The model behind the Basel IRB risk-weight functions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions); Credit risk concentration: name and sector concentration (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), Studies on credit risk concentration, Working Paper 15)
اعتبارسنجی
Checked against the closed form of the model, including the 99.9 % conditional default probability of the IRB formula (the network's own records). Not calibrated to any portfolio.
Limitations
One factor, homogeneous borrowers, no migration, no maturity adjustment, no collateral dynamics. A capital concept: it is not the regulatory capital requirement of any bank or jurisdiction.
عدم قطعیت
Parameter uncertainty is not shown: move the controls to see how far the tail moves with probability of default and correlation.
Approved use
Education and research on credit loss distributions and the ideas behind risk-based capital.
Prohibited use
Credit decisions, ratings, regulatory capital calculation, provisioning, or any statement about a real bank or borrower. Setting or assessing large-exposure limits.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server, no data leaves the page.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical loan portfolio of a hypothetical bank. It names no bank, borrower, sector or country, and represents none.

نقدینگی

The structure of the liquidity coverage ratio

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

A stylised balance sheet run through the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio's arithmetic: each class of funding runs off at the standard's baseline rate over a 30-day stress, inflows count up to 75 % of outflows, and the stock of high-quality liquid assets is set against the net outflow. The stress control scales every run-off rate.

  • Stable retail 1.50
  • Less stable retail 2.00
  • Operational deposits 3.75
  • Corporate, non-operational 6.00
  • Financial institutions 10.0
  • Net outflows 18.3
  • Liquid assets (HQLA) 15.0
  • Outflow over 30 days by funding class
  • Net outflows after capped inflows
  • Stock of high-quality liquid assets

Funding from financial institutions runs off in full, stable retail deposits barely at all: the mix of funding matters as much as the size of the buffer.

کنترل‌ها

High-quality liquid assets
15.0 % of total funding
Stable retail deposits
30 % of total funding
Less stable retail deposits
20 % of total funding
Operational deposits
15 % of total funding
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates
15 % of total funding
Unsecured funding from financial institutions
10 % of total funding
Contractual inflows over 30 days
5.0 % of total funding
Stress on run-off rates
1.00 times the baseline

نتایج

Outflows over 30 days (% of total funding)
23.3
Inflows counted (capped at 75 % of outflows) (% of total funding)
5.00
Net outflows (% of total funding)
18.3
Liquid assets over net outflows (%)
82
Data, source and model record
Outflows by funding class and the stock of liquid assets
Funding classBalance (% of funding)Run-off rate (%)Outflow (% of funding)
Stable retail deposits30.051.50
Less stable retail deposits20.0102.00
Operational deposits15.0253.75
Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates15.0406.00
Unsecured funding from financial institutions10.010010.0
منبع
Run-off rates and the 75 % inflow cap: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (BCBS 238), baseline rates for the classes shown (Stable retail deposits 5 %; Less stable retail deposits 10 %; Operational deposits 25 %; Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates 40 %; Unsecured funding from financial institutions 100 %). Arithmetic: this page's model (the network's own records).
تاریخ
BCBS 238 published January 2013; instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16. Jurisdictions implement and adjust these rates: check the rules that apply before relying on any rate.
دامنه
A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.
Units
Percent of total funding; the ratio in percent.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
وضعیت
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

مدل
gra.liquidity.lcr-structure
نسخه
1.0.0
مالک
GRA platforms lane
هدف
To show how the funding mix, run-off rates, the inflow cap and liquid assets combine in the liquidity coverage ratio.
Risk domain
ریسک نقدشوندگی
مفروضات
Five funding classes at the standard's baseline run-off rates. All liquid assets count at full value (no haircuts, no caps by asset level). Inflows are a single contractual amount, capped at 75 % of outflows.
ورودی‌ها
High-quality liquid assets and funding balances (% of total funding); Contractual inflows (% of total funding); Stress multiplier on run-off rates
داده
BCBS 238 (January 2013): baseline run-off rates and the inflow cap.
روش‌ها
Liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), BCBS 238)
اعتبارسنجی
Checked against hand-computed outflows and the inflow cap (the network's own records).
Limitations
Omits asset haircuts and level caps, secured funding, committed facilities, derivatives and every jurisdictional option. It is not an LCR calculation, and its result says nothing about compliance.
عدم قطعیت
None modelled: the stress control shows how far the ratio moves when run-off rates are worse than the baseline.
Approved use
Education on the structure of the liquidity coverage ratio.
Prohibited use
Calculating, reporting or assessing any bank's LCR or compliance; supervisory or funding decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time and in the reader's browser; no server.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A hypothetical bank's funding mix. The listed classes need not add up to 100 %: the rest is equity and funding that does not fall due within 30 days.

شبکهٔ مواجهه

چگونه شوک به دارایی‌ها به زیان سامانه تبدیل می‌شود

Illustrative, educational and non-binding

Banks hold claims on each other. A fall in the value of their external assets distresses each bank in proportion to its leverage, and DebtRank passes that distress along interbank exposures, round by round, until it settles. The amplification is the system loss beyond the initial hit.

0255075100 051015202530 Contagion round سهام سامانه از دست‌رفته (%)
  • System equity lost

Small shocks are amplified by the network; past a point, banks default in the first round and there is little left to amplify.

کنترل‌ها

کاهش دارایی‌های خارجی
2.0 %

نتایج

کاهش دارایی‌های خارجی (%)
2.0
System equity lost in the first round (%)
18.0
System equity lost after contagion (%)
45.0
Amplification by the network (percentage points)
27.0
Banks in default (of 20)
0
Data, source and model record
System equity lost, round by round
دورسهام سامانه از دست‌رفته (%)بانک‌های نکول‌کرده
018.00
128.80
235.30
339.20
441.50
542.90
643.70
744.20
844.50
944.70
1044.80
1144.90
1244.90
1345.00
1445.00
1545.00
1645.00
1745.00
1845.00
1945.00
2045.00
2145.00
2245.00
2345.00
2445.00
2545.00
2645.00
2745.00
2845.00
2945.00
3045.00
منبع
Computed by the estate's debtrank model (the network's own records, sha256 e8f84afa4822), the same code the platform's existing simulators run. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley). Scenarios: the catalogue's teaching values (leverage 10 times, interbank share 10 %, recovery 40 %, 20 banks, seed 62036) with the fall in external assets varied.
تاریخ
Instrument record 1.0.0, 2026-11-16; teaching values from the estate's instrument catalogue (the network's own records).
دامنه
A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.
Units
Percent of total system equity; rounds of contagion.
Currency
None: every value is a share (percent), so no currency or exchange rate applies
وضعیت
Illustrative, educational and non-binding: no premium, rate, price, rating, eligibility or advice is given or implied.

Model record

مدل
gra.network.debtrank
نسخه
1.0.0
مالک
GRA platforms lane (model code: the estate's instrument engine, W13)
هدف
To show how interconnection and leverage amplify a common shock in a banking network.
Risk domain
Systemic and contagion risk
مفروضات
Distress passes linearly along interbank exposures (DebtRank), each node once per round. External assets fall by the same share for every bank. Network: a densely linked core and a sparsely linked periphery, generated from the seed.
ورودی‌ها
Fall in external assets (%); Leverage (assets over equity) (times); Interbank share of assets (%); Recovery on interbank claims (%); Banks in the system (count); Core banks (% of banks)
داده
None: a generated network with teaching values; no supervisory or market data.
روش‌ها
DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466); Clearing in financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47); Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) (Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualizing uncertainty about the future, Science 333); One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) (Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley)
اعتبارسنجی
The engine's code, run unchanged at build time (the network's own records, checked current by its --check).
Limitations
No fire sales, no funding runs, no clearing (Eisenberg and Noe) or recapitalisation, one generated network. Results depend on the network drawn.
عدم قطعیت
Not shown on this page; the engine's sensitivity of the final loss is listed in the table below the chart.
Approved use
Education and research on contagion mechanisms and macroprudential stress testing ideas.
Prohibited use
Statements about real banks or systems; supervisory, investment or credit decisions.
Runs on
Static: computed at build time; the reader's browser only switches between precomputed scenarios.
Illustrative, educational and non-binding. A generated network of hypothetical banks (a core and a periphery). It names no bank or banking system, and represents none.

تحلیل سناریو

Scenarios, not forecasts

A scenario is a set of named assumptions about the future, run through a model to see what follows; it is not a prediction. The instruments above move one assumption at a time; scenario work moves several together, with every assumption stated.

Regulatory context and related standards

The frameworks this work is read against

چارچوبنهادآنچه تعیین می‌کندEdition or dateWhere it applies
چارچوب بازل 3Basel Committee on Banking Supervisionالزامات حداقل سرمایه، اهرم، پوشش نقدینگی و تأمین مالی پایدار و ضربه‌گیرهای سرمایه‌ای فراتر از آن‌هاDecember 2010, finalised December 2017; consolidated in the Basel FrameworkBasel Committee members, by national rules on their own timetables
اصول بنیادین نظارت مؤثر بانکیBasel Committee on Banking Supervisionاستانداردهای پایه برای اختیارات نظارتی، صدور مجوز، مدیریت ریسک و حکمرانی که در FSAPهای صندوق بین‌المللی پول و بانک جهانی ارزیابی می‌شوندRevised April 2024International standard for supervisors; assessed in IMF and World Bank FSAPs
اصول مدیریت و نظارت مؤثر بر ریسک‌های مالی مرتبط با اقلیمBasel Committee on Banking Supervisionانتظارات دربارهٔ حکمرانی بانکی، مدیریت ریسک و تحلیل سناریوی ریسک مرتبط با اقلیم، و دربارهٔ بازبینی نظارتی آنJune 2022Basel Committee members, through national supervisors
ویژگی‌های کلیدی نظام‌های برون‌رفت مؤثر برای نهادهای مالیFinancial Stability Boardاختیارات گره‌گشایی، برنامه‌ریزی بازیابی و گره‌گشایی، و همکاری فرامرزی تا یک بانک بتواند بدون حمایت مالیات‌دهندگان ورشکست شودOctober 2011, updated October 2014FSB member jurisdictions
IFRS 9 ابزارهای مالیهیئت استانداردهای حسابداری بین‌المللیطبقه‌بندی دارایی‌های مالی و ذخیره‌گیری آینده‌نگر برای زیان اعتباری مورد انتظار در سه مرحلهIssued July 2014; effective 1 January 2018Jurisdictions that apply IFRS (US GAAP uses CECL instead)
سناریوهای اقلیمی NGFSشبکهٔ سبزسازی نظام مالیمسیرهای مرجع ریسک گذار و ریسک فیزیکی که بانک‌های مرکزی و ناظران برای تحلیل سناریوی اقلیمی به کار می‌برندPhase V, November 2024Reference scenarios for NGFS members; not binding
IFRS S2 افشاهای مرتبط با اقلیمهیئت استانداردهای بین‌المللی پایداریافشای ریسک‌ها و فرصت‌های مرتبط با اقلیم، از جمله انتشار تأمین‌مالی‌شده و تاب‌آوری اقلیمیIssued June 2023, amended December 2025Where a jurisdiction adopts it
فرایند بازبینی و ارزیابی نظارتی (SREP)مرجع بانکی اروپا (EBA) و نظارت بانکی بانک مرکزی اروپا (ECB)فرایند نظارتی که مدل کسب‌وکار، حکمرانی و ریسک‌های سرمایه و نقدینگی را ارزیابی می‌کند و الزامات و راهنمای رکن 2 را تعیین می‌کندEBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2022/03 (March 2022)European Union; the ECB for significant euro area banks
تحلیل و بازبینی جامع سرمایه (CCAR) و آزمون تنش نظارتیهیئت‌مدیرهٔ فدرال رزرو (Federal Reserve System)فرایند نظارتی سناریوهای تنش و بازبینی برنامهٔ سرمایه که ضربه‌گیر سرمایهٔ تنش را برای بانک‌های بزرگ آمریکایی تعیین می‌کندAnnual; capital plan rule with the stress capital buffer since 2020United States, large bank holding companies
رهنمودهای مدیریت ریسک ISO 31000سازمان بین‌المللی استانداردسازیاصول، چارچوب و فرایند مدیریت ریسک در سراسر یک سازمانISO 31000:2018International, voluntary

Frameworks change and apply differently by jurisdiction. Check the current version and its applicability with the issuing body before relying on it; nothing here is legal or compliance guidance, and no comparison here is a supervisory determination.

Institutional counterparts

The institutions this work speaks to

  • Bank board and board risk committee
  • مدیر ارشد ریسک و کمیتهٔ اعتباری
  • ناظر احتیاطی
  • مرجع احتیاطی کلان
  • Bank board and asset liability committee
  • Prudential supervisor through SREP or CCAR
  • بانک مرکزی
  • Bank board
  • Chief operating officer and chief information security officer
  • Authorities overseeing critical third parties
  • Credit risk function
  • بانک‌های مرکزی و ناظران در NGFS
  • Central bank as overseer and operator
  • Bank treasury
  • Central counterparty board and risk committee
  • Resolution authority

Readiness workflows

آمادگی مالی

Finance readiness is the structured preparation of evidence for financial-sector analysis and due diligence. It is not financing approval: reaching any readiness stage never makes a project, institution or portfolio eligible for funding, cover or credit.

مرز

What this page is not

Banking Nexus is part of The Global Risks Alliance, which does not accept deposits, extend credit, underwrite or bind insurance, arrange or execute investments, offer securities, broker regulated products, issue credit ratings or give financial-product recommendations. Every instrument on this page is illustrative, educational and non-binding: it quotes no premium, rate, price, rating or eligibility, and it describes no real institution, portfolio or place.