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GRA · Banking Nexus

공간 금융자본이 재해, 노출, 전환과 만나는 곳

금융 시스템 전이

Risk reaches banks from the real economy and leaves them again into the economy and the financial system. A drought, a cyber incident or a housing downturn can move through borrowers, collateral, funding and operations into bank losses, and from there into tighter credit, lower spending and stress at other institutions. This page shows how real-system and financial vulnerabilities propagate, as studied on Banking Nexus by the Global Risks Alliance (GRA).

STEM 방법
5
이 분야가 응용하는 정식 방법
주제
10
이 분야의 주제 페이지
상대 기관
11
네트워크 전반에서 분야를 공유하는 플랫폼
보고서 시리즈
2
기여하는 Reports 시리즈
01Inbound

How shocks reach banks.

경로메커니즘예시
Borrower incomeShocks cut the cash flow that services loansCrop failure reduces farm loan repayments
Collateral valueHazards or price falls impair assets securing loansFlood damage lowers property values in a mortgage book
Sector concentrationExposures cluster in one region or industryA regional bank lending mainly to one exposed economy
재원Depositors or markets withdraw on loss of confidenceRapid digital deposit outflows
운영Outages at the bank or a shared providerA 클라우드 장애 로 여러 은행의 결제가 중단됨

경로는 메커니즘을 설명하는 것이며 측정된 강도나 확률이 아닙니다.

02모니터링

분야 개요.

팀이 이 주제를 따라가는 데 사용할 화면으로, 그 지표, 상태, 결정을 보여 줍니다. 이름은 예시이며 값은 설명용입니다.

Field overview: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Banking.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
03피드백 루프

재난 이후 은행, 국가, 보험의 연쇄 고리.

After a large disaster, three balance sheets interact. Uninsured collateral losses raise loan losses; insurers facing claims may sell assets or withdraw cover; the sovereign spends on reconstruction and may face higher borrowing costs, which lowers the value of the government bonds banks hold. The loop is strongest where banks hold much domestic sovereign debt and insurance penetration is low. Sovereign effects continue at Public Finance and Sovereign Debt; insurance effects at Insurance Nexus risk transmission.

04유동성

지역 충격 시의 예금과 결제.

Regional disasters also move liquidity: depositors draw cash, firms draw credit lines and payment systems may be disrupted. The BCBS liquidity standards assume stressed outflows but not regional physical disruption to branches, ATMs and power. Operational dependence continues at payment dependencies; infrastructure evidence at GCRI grid disruption and recovery.

05증폭

Why losses grow inside the system.

Leverage magnifies losses relative to capital. When capital falls, banks cut lending to protect their ratios, which hurts borrowers and can create further losses, a feedback loop between banks and the real economy. Selling assets to raise liquidity can depress prices and impose losses on other holders.

Interconnection spreads stress. Interbank exposures, common holdings of similar assets and shared dependence on payment systems and technology providers mean that one institution’s problem can become many institutions’ problem. Uncertainty about who is exposed can freeze funding markets even for sound banks.

06Outbound

How bank stress reaches people.

Credit supply

Tighter lending

Households and small firms lose access to credit just when they need it to recover.

결제

Interrupted services

Outages stop wages, purchases and supplier payments.

공공 재정

재정 비용

Support for banks and lost tax revenue strain public budgets, which can feed back to banks holding government debt.

07GRA는 이를 어떻게 연구하는가

부문 단위로 집계되며 한계가 있습니다.

Analysis uses network science and contagion, probability and statistics and scenario methods, with aggregated sector data. It does not assess individual firms, recommend transactions or constitute investment advice. Methods and uncertainty are set out on analysis and uncertainty. The system-wide view is developed on Financial Stability transmission, and the hazard evidence comes from The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for example compound hazards.

08출처

Where this page’s references lead.

이 페이지를 읽을 때 기준이 되는 기구와 문서. 상태와 판은 바뀌며, 각 링크는 발행 기구로 연결됩니다.

09질문

질문과 답변.

이 페이지는 은행 위기를 예측합니까?
No. It describes mechanisms. Scenarios are published separately, labelled as such, with their assumptions.
Why include public finances?
Because banks and governments are linked: bank support costs the state, and banks often hold government debt, so stress can loop between them.
GRA 분석을 특정 은행을 평가하는 데 사용할 수 있습니까?
GRA analysis is aggregated and assesses no firm. Any use for a specific institution is the user’s own responsibility.
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Reports는 컨소시엄의 분기별 간행물입니다. 이 주제에 관해 귀하가 아는 것은 다음 호에서 근거, 사례 또는 정정이 될 수 있으며, 귀하의 이름으로 표시되고, 귀하 자신의 저작인 경우 CC BY 4.0으로 발행됩니다.

Global Risks AllianceBanking NexusFinance and Insurance ReadinessScenario and Stress-Test
Banking Nexus

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