Payment flow networks
Interbank payment flows are analysed as networks to find participants whose delays would most affect others’ liquidity.
GRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Network science and contagion for payments and market infrastructure
Network science represents payment and market infrastructure as nodes and links: participants, pergalan, settlement banks and providers. On this platform it maps dependencies, identifies critical nodes and simulates how a failure spreads.
01Qeyd
Network science and contagion for payments and market infrastructure on the record.
Method recordSTEM method
- RêbazZanista torê û vegirtinê
- ParêzvanZanista pergalan û modelkirin
- Applied inDayîn û binesaziya bazarê
- Dane3 inputs
- Checks3 validation steps
- Canonical pageSTEM Commons
02Serlêdan
What network science and contagion does here.
Network science and contagion study how the structure of connections among entities shapes the spread of failures, information and disease. It provides tools to analyse interdependent infrastructure, supply chains and financial pergalan. In financial stability, cyber and digital resilience and digital public infrastructure, network science identifies critical nodes and pathways through which shocks propagate across sectors. It informs targeted protection and diversification to limit cascades. The canonical description is on the STEM Commons.
Shared provider mapping
Dependencies of institutions on cloud, messaging and software providers are mapped to show concentration that individual views miss.
CCP membership networks
Common membership across CCPs is mapped to show how one member default could affect several clearing houses at once.
03Çavdêrî bike
Network analysis.
The screen a team would use to follow this method: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Network analysis
Payments and market infrastructure · Network science and contagion · Run R-7933
Single point of failureGRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure
Grafika girêdayîbûnê
nodes: assets · edges: dependencies
Most central nodes
| N3 | 0.16 | 11 | Critical |
| N4 | 0.31 | 14 | Normal |
| N5 | 0.32 | 9 | Normal |
| N6 | 0.41 | 14 | Normal |
Cascade size under removal
04Dane
What the method consumes.
Datasets and records used by network science and contagion on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in the source register.
| Dane | Rol | Nîşan |
|---|---|---|
| Payment system transaction data | Flow networks | ÇAVDÊRÎKIRÎ |
| Third-party registers | Provider dependencies | REPORTED |
| CCP membership lists | Clearing networks | Statîstîkên weşandî |
05Stress test
How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.
The equity the system loses after interbank contagion, against the initial hit, as leverage, interconnection and recovery rates change, the core of a macroprudential Testa zextê. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.
Kontrol
- Fall in external assets
- 2.0%
- Leverage (assets over equity)
- 10 times
- Interbank share of assets
- 10%
- Recovery on interbank claims
- 40%
- Banks in the system
- 20
- Core banks
- 20% of banks
Xwendin
- Equity lost to the initial shock
- 18.0%
- Equity lost after contagion
- 45.0%
- Added by contagion (DebtRank)
- 27.0 points
- Banks in default
- 0
Jimar, rêbaz û çavkanî
| Round | System equity lost (%) | Banks in default |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.00 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.80 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.28 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.17 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.50 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.90 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.74 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.24 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.55 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.73 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.84 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.90 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.94 | 0 |
| 13 | 44.96 | 0 |
| 14 | 44.98 | 0 |
| 15 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 16 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.00 | 0 |
Rêbaz
- DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
- Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
- Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
- Clearing in financial networks Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
- Pankeya nediyarîyê (Monte Carlo ya parametreyan) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
- Hesasiyeta yek-yek (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Dane
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
Li seranserê şeş stûnan, bi pêşengiya Nexus Consortium
- Ceribandin Labs
- Hatiye avakirin di Payments and Market Infrastructure in Foundry
- Tê ceribandin li Payments and Market Infrastructure in Universe
- Hatiye kodkirin di Darayî, sîgorta û aborî di Standards de
- Hatiye weşandin di Payments and Market Infrastructure in Reports
- Tê de tê dayîn Fakulteya Darayî û Aborî di Academy de
06Erêkirin
How results are checked.
Models are checked by reproducing observed cascades and outbreaks. Robustness of results to missing or uncertain links is tested.
| Kontrol bikin | How it is done |
|---|---|
| Data coverage | The share of activity covered by the network data is stated |
| Aramî | Critical node rankings are checked across periods |
| Scenario realism | Simulated failures reflect plausible operational events |
Network data are often incomplete or confidential. Static network models may miss adaptive behaviour during cascades.
07Exposure, loss and capital
What it means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Transmission channels
How a shock in network science and contagion for payments and market infrastructure reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
08Connections
Topics that rely on this method.
09Stewardship
Who maintains the method.
Zanista pergalan û modelkirin stewards network science and contagion for the Consortium and reviews how it is applied across platforms.
10Girêdayî
Ev rûpel li ser Konsorsiyûmê te ber bi kû ve dibe.
11Pirs
Pirs û bersiv.
What are the limits of network science and contagion in this field?
Network data are often incomplete or confidential. Static network models may miss adaptive behaviour during cascades.
How are results checked?
Models are checked by reproducing observed cascades and outbreaks. Robustness of results to missing or uncertain links is tested.
Are the values on this page real?
The data names, roles and checks are real descriptions of practice. The canvas shows a design of the method’s use, not a run; no result is reported here.
Where else is this method applied?
Çavdêrxaneya canonical method page lists every platform that applies it.
rêzeya Pergalên StratejîkTevkarî bike
Ji vê rûpelê delîl bidin.
rêzeya Pergalên Stratejîk is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
Global Risks AllianceDayîn û binesaziya bazarêPergalên stratejîkSenaryo û ceribandina stresê
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Dayîn û binesaziya bazarê
Bring an exposure or capital question to the Alliance.
Agahî û pirs îro vekirî ne. Pirsek referansekê distîne û gava piştî wê dide nasîn; serlêdan, drav, veqetandina hesabkirinê û tomarkirin tenê dema ku tîm, mercên wê û kapasîteya vekolînê hebin vedibin.
Hiqûqî
Belgeyên hiqûqî.
Nexşe, dane û jimarên vê malperê ji bo çarçoveyê û agahiyên giştî têne nîşandan. Ew ne şîret, ne pêşbînî û ne hişyarî ne; sînorên agahiyê di Daxuyaniyên Berpirsiyariyê û Daxuyaniyên Daneyê de hatine diyarkirin.