Payment flow networks
Interbank payment flows are analysed as networks to find participants whose delays would most affect others’ liquidity.
GRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Network science and contagion for payments and market infrastructure
Network science represents payment and market infrastructure as nodes and links: participants, سیستەمەکان, settlement banks and providers. On this platform it maps dependencies, identifies critical nodes and simulates how a failure spreads.
01تۆمارکردن
Network science and contagion for payments and market infrastructure on the record.
Method recordSTEM method
- ڕێگازانستی تۆڕ و سەرایەت
- Applied inپارەدان و ژێرخانی بازاڕ
- داتا3 inputs
- Checks3 validation steps
- Canonical pageSTEM Commons
02بەکارهێنان
What network science and contagion does here.
Network science and contagion study how the structure of connections among entities shapes the spread of failures, information and disease. It provides tools to analyse interdependent infrastructure, supply chains and financial سیستەمەکان. In financial stability, cyber and digital resilience and digital public infrastructure, network science identifies critical nodes and pathways through which shocks propagate across sectors. It informs targeted protection and diversification to limit cascades. The canonical description is on the STEM Commons.
Shared provider mapping
Dependencies of institutions on cloud, messaging and software providers are mapped to show concentration that individual views miss.
CCP membership networks
Common membership across CCPs is mapped to show how one member default could affect several clearing houses at once.
03چاودێری
Network analysis.
The screen a team would use to follow this method: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Network analysis
Payments and market infrastructure · Network science and contagion · Run R-7933
Single point of failureGRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure
هێڵکاری پشتبەستن
nodes: assets · edges: dependencies
Most central nodes
| N3 | 0.16 | 11 | Critical |
| N4 | 0.31 | 14 | ئاسایی |
| N5 | 0.32 | 9 | ئاسایی |
| N6 | 0.41 | 14 | ئاسایی |
Cascade size under removal
04داتا
What the method consumes.
Datasets and records used by network science and contagion on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in the source register.
| داتا | ڕۆڵ | ناونیشان |
|---|---|---|
| Payment system transaction data | Flow networks | چاودێریکراو |
| Third-party registers | Provider dependencies | REPORTED |
| CCP membership lists | Clearing networks | ئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان |
05Stress test
How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.
The equity the system loses after interbank contagion, against the initial hit, as leverage, interconnection and recovery rates change, the core of a macroprudential تاقیکردنەوەی فشاری. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.
کۆنترۆڵەکان
- Fall in external assets
- 2.0%
- Leverage (assets over equity)
- 10 times
- Interbank share of assets
- 10%
- Recovery on interbank claims
- 40%
- Banks in the system
- 20
- Core banks
- 20% of banks
خوێندنەوەکان
- Equity lost to the initial shock
- 18.0%
- Equity lost after contagion
- 45.0%
- Added by contagion (DebtRank)
- 27.0 points
- Banks in default
- 0
ژمارە، ڕێگا و سەرچاوەکان
| Round | System equity lost (%) | Banks in default |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.00 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.80 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.28 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.17 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.50 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.90 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.74 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.24 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.55 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.73 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.84 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.90 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.94 | 0 |
| 13 | 44.96 | 0 |
| 14 | 44.98 | 0 |
| 15 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 16 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.00 | 0 |
ڕێگاکان
- DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
- Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
- Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
- Clearing in financial networks Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
- پەنجەی نادڵنیایی (مۆنتی کارلۆی پارامیتەر) Spiegelhalter, Pearson و Short (2011)، Visualising uncertainty about the future، Science 333
- هەستیاریی یەک-یەک (تۆرناد) Saltelli و ئەوانی دیکە (2008)، Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer، Wiley
داتا
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
لە ناو شەش کۆڵەکەکەدا، بە سەرپەرشتیی Nexus Consortium
- تاقیکردنەوەکان Labs
- تێدا دروستکراوە Payments and Market Infrastructure in Foundry
- تاقیکراوەتەوە لە Payments and Market Infrastructure in Universe
- کۆدکراوە لە دارایی، بیمە و ئابووری لە Standards
- بڵاوکراوەتەوە لە Payments and Market Infrastructure in Reports
- فێرکراو لە کۆلێژی دارایی و ئابووری لە Academy
06پشتڕاستکردنەوە
How results are checked.
Models are checked by reproducing observed cascades and outbreaks. Robustness of results to missing or uncertain links is tested.
| بپشکنە | How it is done |
|---|---|
| Data coverage | The share of activity covered by the network data is stated |
| جێگیری | Critical node rankings are checked across periods |
| Scenario realism | Simulated failures reflect plausible operational events |
Network data are often incomplete or confidential. Static network models may miss adaptive behaviour during cascades.
07Exposure, loss and capital
What it means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Transmission channels
How a shock in network science and contagion for payments and market infrastructure reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
08Connections
Topics that rely on this method.
09Stewardship
Who maintains the method.
زانستی سیستەمەکان و مۆدێلسازی stewards network science and contagion for the Consortium and reviews how it is applied across platforms.
10پەیوەست
ئەو شوێنانەی ئەم لاپەڕەیە لە ناو کۆنسۆرتیۆم بۆیان دەبات.
11پرسیارەکان
پرسیار و وەڵام.
What are the limits of network science and contagion in this field?
Network data are often incomplete or confidential. Static network models may miss adaptive behaviour during cascades.
How are results checked?
Models are checked by reproducing observed cascades and outbreaks. Robustness of results to missing or uncertain links is tested.
Are the values on this page real?
The data names, roles and checks are real descriptions of practice. The canvas shows a design of the method’s use, not a run; no result is reported here.
Where else is this method applied?
ئەو canonical method page lists every platform that applies it.
Reportsبەشداربە
لەم لاپەڕەیەوە بەڵگە پێشکەش بکە.
Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
Global Risks Allianceپارەدان و ژێرخانی بازاڕسیستەمە ستراتیژییەکانسیناریۆ و تاقیکردنەوەی گوشار
- ئیمەیڵGateway GW-GRAلەم لاپەڕەیەوە بینێرەبەڵگە، ڕاستکردنەوە، بابەت، ڕێگا، پێداچوونەوە، وەرگێڕان یان تێکردنی پڕۆفایل. بە نیشانەی ئەم لاپەڕەیە دەگات، بۆ ئەوەی دەستکاریکەری خاوەنەکەی وەریبگرێت.
- Zenodoتەکیەی کراوەدایبنێ و بیدە بە کۆمەڵگاتۆماری خۆت لە Zenodo بە ORCID iD ی خۆت بڵاو بکەرەوە، پاشان لەوێ بیدە بە کۆمەڵگای Reports. سەرپەرشتیارەکان پێداچوونەوەی بۆ دەکەن؛ DOI هەر هی تۆیە.
- ReportsGlobal Risks Allianceهەموو ڕێگاکانی بەشداری ببینەجۆرەکانی بەشداری، هەریەکە چۆن پێداچوونەوەی بۆ دەکرێت، چ ناوبردنێک وەردەگریت، مۆڵەتەکە و ئەوەی هەرگیز وەرناگیرێت.
هەرگیز داتای کەسی، وردەکاریی هەستیاری ژێرخان یان هیچ شتێک مەنێرە کە مافی بڵاوکردنەوەت نییە. بەشدارییەک پێش بەکارهێنان پێداچوونەوەی بۆ دەکرێت؛ ناردنی ماف نابەخشێت بە نووسەرایەتی یان بەڕێوەبردنی ڕاگەیاندن، و پاڵپشتی دارایی هەرگیز دۆزینەوەیەک ناکڕێت.
پارەدان و ژێرخانی بازاڕ
Bring an exposure or capital question to the Alliance.
زانیاری و پرسیار ئەمڕۆ کراوەن. پرسیارێک ژمارەی ئاماژەی پێدەدرێت و هەنگاوی دواتر دیاری دەکات؛ داواکاری، پارەدان، تەرخانکردنی کۆمپیوتەر و تۆمارکردن تەنیا کاتێک دەکرێنەوە کە تیم، مەرج و توانای پێداچوونەوەیان هەبێت.
یاسایی
بەڵگەنامە یاساییەکان.
نەخشە، داتا و وێنەکانی ئەم ماڵپەڕە بۆ ناوەڕۆک و زانیاریی گشتی پیشان دراون. ئامۆژگاری، پێشبینی یان ئاگادارکردنەوە نین؛ سنوورەکانی زانیارییەکە لە ڕەتکردنەوەی بەرپرسیارێتی و ئاگاداریی داتادا دەستنیشان کراون.