GRA · Banking Nexus
空间金融资本与危害、风险暴露和转型的交汇之处
银行运营韧性
Operational resilience is a bank’s ability to keep delivering critical services through disruption, whether from a cyber attack, a failed technology change, a third-party outage or a pandemic. Supervisors now ask banks to identify their important business services, set impact tolerances and show they can stay within them. This page explains how operational disruption develops and spreads, how resilience is measured and tested, and who decides what level of disruption is tolerable.
Bank operational resilience: how the risk develops.
第三方、网络与流程连续性。下面的档案说明风险如何发展、衡量什么、数据来自何处、如何建模以及由谁决定。
依赖关系被隐藏
A single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.
Third parties concentrate risk
Many banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.
网络事件不断升级
入侵、勒索软件或数据损坏可能使服务瘫痪并损害记录的完整性。当备份遭到破坏,或攻击通过共享网络和供应链蔓延时,恢复会更为缓慢。
Disruption becomes financial
An outage blocks payments, delays settlement and erodes customer confidence. Prolonged disruption can trigger deposit outflows, sanctions and compensation costs, and at a market utility it can cause knock-on failures elsewhere.
控制措施
- 外部资产下降
- 2.0%
- 杠杆率(资产与权益之比)
- 10 倍
- 银行间资产占比
- 10%
- 银行间债权的回收
- 40%
- 体系内的银行
- 20
- 核心银行
- 占银行的 20%
读数
- 初始冲击造成的权益损失
- 18.0%
- 传染后的权益损失
- 45.0%
- 传染新增(DebtRank)
- 27.0 个点
- 违约银行
- 0
数字、方法与来源
| 轮次 | 系统权益损失(%) | 违约银行 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.00 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.80 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.28 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.17 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.50 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.90 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.74 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.24 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.55 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.73 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.84 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.90 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.94 | 0 |
| 13 | 44.96 | 0 |
| 14 | 44.98 | 0 |
| 15 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 16 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.00 | 0 |
方法
- DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
- Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
- Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
- 金融网络中的清算 Eisenberg 和 Noe(2001),Management Science 47
- Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
- One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
数据
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
贯穿六大支柱,由 Nexus Consortium 牵头
衡量什么,以及衡量得如何。
每个指标都注明其单位、频率、背后的来源类型以及数值将附带的证据标签。此处不显示数值:数值由计划依据其自身权限提供。
| 指标 | 单位 | 节奏 | 来源类型 | 标签 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Important business services within impact tolerance in testing | 已测试的服务数量及通过数量 | 年度 | 情景测试记录 | 已报告 |
| Major ICT-related incidents | 按严重程度类别统计的数量 | 每季度 | 向监管机构报送的事件报告 | 已发布统计 |
| Service downtime | minutes per incident | 每个事件 | 事件日志 | 观测 |
| Recovery time against objective | 小时 | 每个事件 | Continuity tests and incident records | 观测 |
| 关键第三方集中度 | 每个提供方的重要服务数量 | 年度 | Register of third-party arrangements | 已报告 |
| 运营风险 损失 | currency units by Basel event type | 每季度 | Internal loss data | 已报告 |
| 超过整改期限的关键漏洞 | 计数 | 每月 | Security management records | 观测 |
银行运营韧性对风险暴露、损失和资本意味着什么。
风险官、监管者或财政部会要求的风险暴露、损失、情景和资本视图,以及它们据以报告的框架。结构遵循监管和精算实务。数值为说明性:绝非价格、评级或建议。
情景路径
在各国央行和监管机构所用的情景系列下,银行运营韧性可能承受怎样的压力。
| 情景系列 | 转型风险 | 物理风险 | 压力测试问什么 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 有序 | 早期、渐进的政策 | 较低 | 账面能否承受持续的重新定价? |
| 无序 | 迟缓而突然的政策 | 中低 | 在突然重新定价和信用迁移下,什么会出现问题? |
| 温室世界 | 有限政策 | 高且上升 | 实体损失集中在抵押品和保险的哪些环节? |
证据来自何处。
具名公共数据集与机构记录,各自注明许可类别。依协议获得的来源仅按其条款使用,绝不再次发布。
| 来源 | 它提供什么 | 许可类别 |
|---|---|---|
| Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act | 主管机构持有的信息通信技术第三方安排登记册,以及已指定关键信息通信技术服务提供方的公开名单 | 登记册仅限主管部门查阅;指定名单公开 |
| 欧洲央行网络韧性 压力测试 和监管出版物 | 关于网络响应和恢复能力的监管发现 | 免费,须署名 |
| Bank of England and PRA operational resilience publications | Policy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reports | 免费,英格兰银行使用条款 |
| ORX 操作风险 损失数据 | Pooled loss events by event type and business line from member banks | Licensed, membership |
| ENISA 金融部门威胁态势 | Analysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutions | 免费,须署名 |
| Pillar 3 operational risk disclosures | Operational risk capital and loss summaries published by banks | 公开,银行条款 |
由谁决定,以及证据服务于什么。
Banking Nexus 负责准备证据。以下决定由所列机关依其自身规则作出,绝不由平台作出。
| 谁来决定 | 问题 | 本页面服务的证据 |
|---|---|---|
| 银行董事会 | Which business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carry | Service maps, scenario test results and incident history |
| 首席运营官和首席信息安全官 | 在何处投资于第三方的冗余、恢复和退出计划 | 依赖关系图、恢复测试、脆弱性和事件数据 |
| 审慎监管机构 | Whether a bank’s self-assessment and testing are credible, and when to intervene | Incident reports, test evidence and thematic reviews |
| 监督关键第三方的机构 | Which providers to designate and what oversight to apply | Concentration across the sector and the substitutability of each provider |
该主题产生的产出
- Guides to mapping important business services and their dependencies
- 用于桌面推演和实战测试的严重但合理的中断情景
- 关于云和关键技术提供方集中度的研究
- 关于事件模式的简报,附来源和证据标签
行业提出的共同问题。
- 01
Which services matter most?
Which business services, if disrupted, would harm customers or market integrity.
- 02
What do they depend on?
每项服务背后的人员、流程、技术、设施和第三方。
- 03
共同依赖在哪里?
Providers and systems that many banks rely on at once.
- 04
服务能以多快的速度恢复?
银行在严峻情景下能否保持在影响容忍度之内。
风险如何产生与传导。
现代银行业依赖技术链条运行。一笔支付可能取决于核心银行 系统、云基础设施、网络提供商、银行卡组织和结算系统,其中许多由第三方运营。
Concentration in technology providers creates shared exposure. An outage or compromise at a major cloud, software or data provider can affect many banks simultaneously, a systemic risk that no single bank’s contract can address.
网络威胁持续存在且不断适应变化。勒索软件、数据窃取和破坏性攻击以银行及其供应商为目标。恢复取决于网络分段、可信备份和经过演练的响应。
Physical hazards affect operations too. Floods, heat and power outages can disable data centres, branches and staff access, often in the same region as borrower losses.
从防止失效转为假定失效终会发生,这一转变重塑了该学科:银行如今对服务进行端到端映射,并测试能否在设定的容忍度内恢复。
证据如何收集,以及止于何处。
| 方法或数据 | 显示内容 | 其局限 |
|---|---|---|
| 服务映射 | 各项服务背后的依赖关系 | 随着 系统 变化,地图很快过时 |
| 情景测试 | Recovery within tolerances | 情景可能无法涵盖新型故障 |
| 事件数据 | 中断的原因与持续时间 | 漏报与保密 |
| 第三方登记册 | 共同的提供方集中度 | 对直接供应商之外的可见度有限 |
问题与解答。
什么是影响容忍度?
运营韧性与业务连续性有何不同?
为什么云服务提供商是监管关注的问题?
Does GRA test banks’ resilience?
Can banks share incident information through GRA?
为什么要将物理危害纳入运营韧性?
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