Interbank and counterparty contagion
Bilateral exposures are arranged as a network and default cascades are simulated to see how losses spread from an initial failure and which institutions amplify them.
GRA · Banking Nexus
空间金融资本与危害、风险暴露和转型的交汇之处
Network science maps how banks are linked through interbank lending, derivatives, common asset holdings, payment flows and shared service providers. It shows where a single failure could cascade, which institutions are central to the system, and why contagion differs from the sum of individual bank risks.
Network science and contagion study how the structure of connections among entities shapes the spread of failures, information and disease. It provides tools to analyse interdependent infrastructure, supply chains and financial 系统. In financial stability, capital markets and investment and climate and hazards, network science identifies critical nodes and pathways through which shocks propagate across sectors. It informs targeted protection and diversification to limit cascades. The canonical description is on STEM Commons.
Bilateral exposures are arranged as a network and default cascades are simulated to see how losses spread from an initial failure and which institutions amplify them.
Common holdings of securities and loans are mapped so that forced sales by one bank can be traced through price falls to losses at other holders.
Banks, payment systems, cloud and software providers are represented as a multilayer network to find concentration points whose failure would affect many institutions together.
一个金融中心的故障如何通过结算联系扩散。为设计的联系,并非真实的依赖关系。
Datasets and records used by network science and contagion on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in 来源登记册.
| 数据 | 角色 | 标签 |
|---|---|---|
| Supervisory large exposure and counterparty data | Bilateral links between institutions | 已发布统计 |
| BIS international banking statistics | Cross-border exposures by country | 已发布统计 |
| Payment system transaction data | Payment flow networks | 观测 |
| Registers of third-party arrangements | Service dependency links | 已报告 |
团队遵循该方法时会使用的界面:其指标、状态与决策。名称为示例,数值仅作示意。
Banking · Network science for banking · Run R-5964
nodes: assets · edges: dependencies
| N3 | 0.25 | 4 | Critical |
| N4 | 0.16 | 12 | 正常 |
| N5 | 0.17 | 11 | 正常 |
| N6 | 0.18 | 8 | 正常 |
Models are checked by reproducing observed cascades and outbreaks. Robustness of results to missing or uncertain links is tested.
| 核查 | 如何开展 |
|---|---|
| Missing link sensitivity | Results are tested under alternative reconstructions of unobserved exposures, and the range is reported |
| Historical replay | Models are checked against known stress episodes and failures |
| Behavioural assumptions | Assumptions about liquidity hoarding, fire sales and recovery rates are stated and varied |
Network data are often incomplete or confidential. Static network models may miss adaptive behaviour during cascades.
银行间传染之后系统损失的权益,相对于最初的冲击,随杠杆、互联程度和回收率变化而变化,这是宏观审慎 压力测试. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows Western Europe; the model itself is not tied to a place.
控制措施
读数
| 轮次 | 系统权益损失(%) | 违约银行 |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.00 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.80 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.28 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.17 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.50 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.90 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.74 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.24 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.55 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.73 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.84 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.90 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.94 | 0 |
| 13 | 44.96 | 0 |
| 14 | 44.98 | 0 |
| 15 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 16 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.00 | 0 |
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
贯穿六大支柱,由 Nexus Consortium 牵头
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile 银行业: the shocks it names, the 系统 and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Pick an initiating shock and step through the cascade to see which exposures it reaches and where losses could concentrate. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every weight is a stated assumption. An exercise, not a forecast, a valuation, a rating or investment advice. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
灾害
系统与耦合
控制措施
NS-0 章程与原则NS-3 风险记录 UNI(语法、旧编码对照、分配机构)NS-9 情境 UNI(部署、实例、计划实例)NS-10 政策和条款(机器可读的义务:定义、约束、评估和执行)NS-11 验证与监测(证据、证明、零信任符合性观测)NS-14 符合性及与外部标准的对照NRS-U2 宇宙 platform profile: Banking NexusNRS-F2 银行业气候、自然与转型风险NRS-H113 危害类别:金融体系脆弱性(NHS-1 soc.financial-system)NRS-K20 领域包规范:气候适应(DOMAIN-020)NRS-U8 Universe 平台概况:Energy NexusNRS-D1 风险知情的发展与项目筛查观测
示例地理范围
系统科学与建模 stewards network science and contagion for the Consortium and reviews how it is applied across platforms.
风险官、监管者或财政部会要求的风险暴露、损失、情景和资本视图,以及它们据以报告的框架。结构遵循监管和精算实务。数值为说明性:绝非价格、评级或建议。
How a shock in network science for banking contagion reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.
报告 is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
切勿发送个人数据、敏感基础设施细节或您无权分享的任何内容。贡献在使用前会经过审查;发送贡献不赋予署名权或编辑权,赞助也绝不能换取研究结论。
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