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Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition

Bank operational resilience

Operational resilience is a bank’s ability to keep delivering critical services through disruption, whether from a cyber attack, a failed technology change, a third-party outage or a pandemic. Supervisors now ask banks to identify their important business services, set impact tolerances and show they can stay within them. This page explains how operational disruption develops and spreads, how resilience is measured and tested, and who decides what level of disruption is tolerable.

01Register

Bank operational resilience on the record.

02The question

Bank operational resilience: how the risk develops.

Third-party, cyber and process continuity. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

Dependencies are hidden

A single payment or lending service rests on people, processes, data, technology and external providers. Mapping these dependencies end to end often reveals single points of failure that no one clearly owns.

Mechanism

Third parties concentrate risk

Many banks rely on the same cloud, software and data providers. An outage or compromise at one provider can hit many institutions at once, turning an operational event at one firm into a sector-wide one.

Mechanism

Cyber incidents escalate

Intrusion, ransomware or data corruption can disable services and damage the integrity of records. Recovery is slower when backups are compromised or when an attack spreads through shared networks and supply chains.

Mechanism

Disruption becomes financial

An outage blocks payments, delays settlement and erodes customer confidence. Prolonged disruption can trigger deposit outflows, sanctions and compensation costs, and at a market utility it can cause knock-on failures elsewhere.

03Stress test

How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.

The equity the system loses after interbank contagion, against the initial hit, as leverage, interconnection and recovery rates change, the core of a macroprudential stress test. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.

Controls

Fall in external assets
2.0%
Leverage (assets over equity)
10 times
Interbank share of assets
10%
Recovery on interbank claims
40%
Banks in the system
20
Core banks
20% of banks

Readouts

Equity lost to the initial shock
18.0%
Equity lost after contagion
45.0%
Added by contagion (DebtRank)
27.0 points
Banks in default
0
Numbers, methods and sources
RoundSystem equity lost (%)Banks in default
018.000
128.800
235.280
339.170
441.500
542.900
643.740
744.240
844.550
944.730
1044.840
1144.900
1244.940
1344.960
1444.980
1544.990
1644.990
1745.000
1845.000
1945.000
2045.000
2145.000
2245.000
2345.000
2445.000
2545.000
2645.000
2745.000
2845.000
2945.000
3045.000

Metodes

  1. DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
  2. Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
  3. Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
  4. Clearing in financial networks Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
  5. Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
  6. One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley

Data

No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.

How a shock to assets becomes a system loss. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466).

Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium

04Aanwysers

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Important business services within impact tolerance in testingcount of services tested and count passingannualScenario testing recordsREPORTED
Major ICT-related incidentscount by severity classquarterlyIncident reports to supervisorsPublished statistics
Service downtimeminutes per incidentper eventIncident logsOBSERVED
Recovery time against objectivehoursper eventContinuity tests and incident recordsOBSERVED
Critical third-party concentrationcount of important services per providerannualRegister of third-party arrangementsREPORTED
Operational risk lossescurrency units by Basel event typequarterlyInternal loss dataREPORTED
Critical vulnerabilities past remediation deadlinecountmonthlySecurity management recordsOBSERVED
05Exposure, loss and capital

What bank operational resilience means for exposure, loss and capital.

The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.

Scenario pathways

How bank operational resilience could be stressed under the scenario families central banks and supervisors use.

OrderlyDisorderlyHot house world202520302035204020452050highlow
Scenario familyTransition riskPhysical riskWhat a stress test asks
OrderlyEarly, gradual policyLaerCan the book absorb a steady repricing?
DisorderlyLate, abrupt policyLower to mediumWhat breaks under a sudden repricing and credit migration?
Hot house worldLimited policyHigh and risingWhere do physical losses concentrate in collateral and insurance?
Scenario families as defined by the NGFS; the curves are an illustrative combined pressure index, not NGFS variables or forecasts.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
06Bronne

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

BronWhat it givesLicence class
Registers and critical provider designations under the EU Digital Operational Resilience ActRegisters of ICT third-party arrangements held by authorities and the public list of designated critical ICT providersRegisters restricted to authorities; designation list public
ECB cyber resilience stress test and supervisory publicationsSupervisory findings on cyber response and recovery capabilitiesFree, attribution
Bank of England and PRA operational resilience publicationsPolicy statements, thematic findings and CBEST threat-led testing reportsFree, Bank of England terms of use
ORX operational risk loss dataPooled loss events by event type and business line from member banksLicensed, membership
ENISA threat landscape for the finance sectorAnalysis of cyber threats and incident patterns affecting financial institutionsFree, attribution
Pillar 3 operational risk disclosuresOperational risk capital and loss summaries published by banksPublic, bank terms
07Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Banking Nexus prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Wie besluitThe questionEvidence this page serves
Bank boardWhich business services are important and what impact tolerance each should carryService maps, scenario test results and incident history
Chief operating officer and chief information security officerWhere to invest in redundancy, recovery and exit plans for third partiesDependency maps, recovery tests, vulnerability and incident data
Prudential supervisorWhether a bank’s self-assessment and testing are credible, and when to interveneIncident reports, test evidence and thematic reviews
Authorities overseeing critical third partiesWhich providers to designate and what oversight to applyConcentration across the sector and the substitutability of each provider

Outputs this topic produces

  • Guides to mapping important business services and their dependencies
  • Severe but plausible disruption scenarios for tabletop and live testing
  • Research on concentration in cloud and critical technology providers
  • Briefings on incident patterns, with sources and evidence labels
08Core questions

Shared questions the industry asks.

  1. 01

    Which services matter most?

    Which business services, if disrupted, would harm customers or market integrity.

  2. 02

    What do they depend on?

    The people, processes, technology, facilities and third parties behind each service.

  3. 03

    Where are shared dependencies?

    Providers and systems that many banks rely on at once.

  4. 04

    How fast can services recover?

    Whether banks can stay within impact tolerances in severe scenarios.

09Mechanisms

How the risk arises and transmits.

Modern banking runs on technology chains. A payment may depend on core banking systems, cloud infrastructure, network providers, card schemes and settlement systems, many operated by third parties.

Concentration in technology providers creates shared exposure. An outage or compromise at a major cloud, software or data provider can affect many banks simultaneously, a systemic risk that no single bank’s contract can address.

Cyber threats are persistent and adaptive. Ransomware, data theft and destructive attacks target banks and their suppliers. Recovery depends on segmentation, trusted backups and rehearsed response.

Physical hazards affect operations too. Floods, heat and power outages can disable data centres, branches and staff access, often in the same region as borrower losses.

The shift from preventing failure to assuming it will occur has reshaped the discipline: banks now map services end to end and test whether they can recover within set tolerances.

10Methods and limits

How evidence is gathered, and where it stops.

Method or dataWhat it showsIts limit
Service mappingDependencies behind each serviceMaps age quickly as systems change
Scenario testingRecovery within tolerancesScenarios may not capture novel failures
Incident dataCauses and duration of disruptionsUnder-reporting and confidentiality
Third-party registersShared provider concentrationVisibility beyond direct suppliers is limited
11Metodes

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Network science and contagionInterbank and counterparty contagion · Overlapping portfolios and fire salesApplied here
  2. Probability and statisticsEstimating default and loss parameters · Operational loss modellingApplied here
  3. Financial and risk engineeringExpected credit loss modelling · Counterparty exposure and valuation adjustmentsApplied here
  4. Artificial intelligence and machine learningCredit decisioning with explainability · Early warning and transaction monitoringApplied here
12Vrae

Questions and answers.

What is an impact tolerance?
The maximum disruption to an important business service that a bank’s board judges tolerable, usually expressed as time, volume or customers affected. Banks must show they can remain within it under severe but plausible scenarios.
How is operational resilience different from business continuity?
Business continuity focuses on recovering systems and sites. Operational resilience starts from the service to customers and the market, assumes disruption will happen, and asks whether harm stays within tolerance.
Why are cloud providers a supervisory concern?
Because many banks depend on a small number of providers. A failure at one can affect many institutions together, which no single bank can manage through its own contract.
Does GRA test banks’ resilience?
No. It conducts no test of any institution. It researches shared dependencies and methods.
Can banks share incident information through GRA?
Only in aggregated or anonymised form under the competition and confidentiality safeguards.
Why include physical hazards in operational resilience?
Because data centres, branches and staff are exposed to the same floods, heat and outages as borrowers.
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Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

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