Financial stability analysis
This page sets out the methodology and limitations of financial stability research at The Global Risks Alliance (GRA): how it maps contagion, liquidity stress and compound shocks, what data it relies on and what it cannot show. Findings are listed here as they pass review and are released; nothing is shown before release. The research complements the channel overview on systemic stability and belongs to research and intelligence.
- Institution
- The Global Risks Alliance (GRA)
- Service level
- R0: information and enquiries
Evidence register
GRA · Financial stability analysis
Indicators
unit · cadence · label
| Exposures aggregated | local bn | quarterly | MODELLED | SP-6905 |
| Readiness dossiers in progress | dossiers | monthly | OFFICIAL | SP-6341 |
| Triggers monitored | triggers | daily | OBSERVED | SP-1615 |
| Risks above appetite | risks | quarterly | ASSESSED | SP-7892 |
Source passport
- Source
- Member exposure submissions
- Licence
- open · attribution
- Steward
- Supervisor
- Coverage
- 93 pct of places
- Known limits
- sparse in uplands
Coverage by place
GRA · Evidence registerEvidence register, in outline: domain structure with placeholder names and illustrative values, not a record.
The short answer.
Financial stability research at GRA maps contagion, liquidity stress and compound shocks, with its data, methods and limitations stated: what it uses and what it cannot show. Findings are listed as they pass review and are released, and the work complements the channel overview on systemic stability.
Draft to published version.
Fig.How a finding is reviewed before it is published. Design, not a record.
Settlement dependencies, and what fails with a node.
How a failure at one financial centre can spread through settlement links. Design links, not real dependencies.
How stability research is built.
- 01
Network mapping
Exposures between institutions, markets and providers represented as a network, so that the path of a loss can be traced. Method reference: network science and contagion.
- 02
Liquidity analysis
How margin calls, redemptions and withdrawals interact with asset sales under stress, including second-round price effects.
- 03
Compound scenarios
Physical, operational and economic shocks combined with stated assumptions. Method reference: scenario design and stress testing.
- 04
Sensitivity
Results reported across a range of assumptions, so a reader sees how conclusions change, not only a central case.
The stability models research draws on.
| Family | Question | Known limit |
|---|---|---|
| Interbank network models (for example Eisenberg-Noe clearing) | How losses propagate through bilateral exposures | Bilateral data are confidential; public work relies on reconstructed networks |
| Fire-sale and price-impact models | How forced selling transmits losses through common holdings | Price impact parameters are unstable in stress |
| Macro-financial scenario models | How shocks move between the real economy and balance sheets | Feedback loops are simplified |
| Liquidity stress models | Whether institutions meet outflows under stress | Behavioural assumptions dominate results |
Public data that supports sector-level work.
BIS locational and consolidated banking statistics, debt securities statistics and OTC derivatives statistics give cross-border exposure at country level. FSB nonbank monitoring reports give sector aggregates. GRA uses these as public, aggregate sources and holds no firm-level supervisory data. Platform work continues at Financial Stability.
What the research uses, and how.
Published statistics
Officially reported aggregates and disclosures, labelled as such, with their dates and revisions.
Aggregated industry data
Data contributed within granted rights and aggregated so that no individual firm can be identified.
Model outputs
Estimates and scenarios with their method, assumptions and uncertainty stated.
What stability research cannot show.
- Exposures held off balance sheet or outside regulated reporting are often invisible
- Behaviour under stress can differ sharply from behaviour in calm periods used to calibrate models
- Aggregation protects firms but hides concentration within a group
- A scenario shows a plausible path, never a probability of crisis or a forecast of loss
- Results do not assess any institution's soundness and are not supervisory findings
Where deeper work sits.
A proposed Financial Stability community is in development and not yet open. Sector perspectives are carried by Banking Nexus and Capital Markets Nexus. Methods are documented on models and professional methods, and the The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) field page on financial stability gives the wider evidence context. Scenario work may inform the Scenario and Stress-Test series of Nexus Reports.
Terms used on this page.
Each term as this page uses it. Where a standard-setting body defines the term, the wording follows that body.
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Contagion model | A model of how a state, such as failure or infection, spreads between connected nodes. |
| Liquidity stress test | A test of whether cash and facilities cover obligations under severe conditions. |
| System-wide stress test | A stress test that models interactions among many institutions rather than one in isolation. |
| SRISK | A market-based estimate of the capital a financial firm would need in a severe market decline. |
Where this page's references lead.
The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.
Questions and answers.
Does GRA publish assessments of individual banks?
Can supervisors use this research?
Why are findings not listed yet?
Can I contribute data?
Around GRA.
Start with an enquiry.
The current service level is R0: information and enquiries. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.