Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Payment and financial market technology at Payments and Market Infrastructure
Payments technology covers theسیستەمەکان, messages and settlement mechanisms that move money and securities. On this platform it explains how design choices such as settlement asset, timing, messaging standard and liquidity tools shape risk in payment and market infrastructure.
What payment and financial market technology does here.
Payment and financial market technology covers theسیستەمەکانthat clear and settle transactions and support trading. Their continuity is essential for economic activity and crisis response. In financial stability, cyber and digital resilience and digital public infrastructure, payments analysis shows how operational outages or cyber events canfreezeliquidity across the economy. It informs resilience standards and contingency arrangements. The canonical description is onthe STEM Commons.
Liquidity-saving mechanisms
Queues and offsetting algorithms in large-value systems are analysed for how much intraday liquidity they save and how they behave under participant stress.
ISO 20022 data quality
Structured message fields are examined for how they improve screening, reconciliation and straight-through processing across borders.
Settlement cycle design
Effects of moving to shorter settlement cycles on funding, fails and operations are compared across markets that have changed.
03Stress test
How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.
The equity the system loses after interbank contagion, against the initial hit, as leverage, interconnection and recovery rates change, the core of a macroprudentialتاقیکردنەوەی فشاری. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.
کۆنترۆڵەکان
Fall in external assets
2.0%
Leverage (assets over equity)
10 times
Interbank share of assets
10%
Recovery on interbank claims
40%
Banks in the system
20
Core banks
20% of banks
خوێندنەوەکان
Equity lost to the initial shock
18.0%
Equity lost after contagion
45.0%
Added by contagion (DebtRank)
27.0 points
Banks in default
0
ژمارە، ڕێگا و سەرچاوەکان
Round
System equity lost (%)
Banks in default
0
18.00
0
1
28.80
0
2
35.28
0
3
39.17
0
4
41.50
0
5
42.90
0
6
43.74
0
7
44.24
0
8
44.55
0
9
44.73
0
10
44.84
0
11
44.90
0
12
44.94
0
13
44.96
0
14
44.98
0
15
44.99
0
16
44.99
0
17
45.00
0
18
45.00
0
19
45.00
0
20
45.00
0
21
45.00
0
22
45.00
0
23
45.00
0
24
45.00
0
25
45.00
0
26
45.00
0
27
45.00
0
28
45.00
0
29
45.00
0
30
45.00
0
ڕێگاکان
DebtRankBattiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
Differential DebtRankBardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
Contagion in financial networksGai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
Clearing in financial networksEisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
پەنجەی نادڵنیایی (مۆنتی کارلۆی پارامیتەر) Spiegelhalter, Pearson و Short (2011)، Visualising uncertainty about the future، Science 333
هەستیاریی یەک-یەک (تۆرناد) Saltelli و ئەوانی دیکە (2008)، Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer، Wiley
داتا
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
How a shock to assets becomes a system loss. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466).
Datasets and records used by payment and financial market technology on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed inthe source register.
داتا
ڕۆڵ
ناونیشان
Payment system statistics
Volumes and values
ئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان
Message standards documentation
Data structure
ئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان
Settlement fail data
Settlement performance
ئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان
05Exposure, loss and capital
What it means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Transmission channels
How a shock in Payment and financial market technology at Payments and Market Infrastructure reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.
Channel structure after the Basel Committee’s work on climate-related risk drivers and transmission channels; links shown are typical paths, not estimated exposures.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
06پشتڕاستکردنەوە
How results are checked.
سیستەمەکانare tested through failover exercises, liquidity simulations and supervisory oversight. Reconciliation checks the integrity of settled positions.
بپشکنە
How it is done
Design documentation
Analyses state the version of rules and standards examined
Comparability
Statistics are reconciled across systems before comparison
Operator review
Technical descriptions are checked against published system rules
Interdependence among participants and third-party providers can produce unexpected failures. Simulations may not capture behavioural responses under stress.
What are the limits of payment and financial market technology in this field?
Interdependence among participants and third-party providers can produce unexpected failures. Simulations may not capture behavioural responses under stress.
How are results checked?
Systems are tested through failover exercises, liquidity simulations and supervisory oversight. Reconciliation checks the integrity of settled positions.
Are the values on this page real?
The data names, roles and checks are real descriptions of practice. The canvas shows a design of the method’s use, not a run; no result is reported here.
Reportsis the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
Global Risks Allianceپارەدان و ژێرخانی بازاڕسیستەمە ستراتیژییەکانسیناریۆ و تاقیکردنەوەی گوشار
Editors and the expert reviewers named on each article decide what we publish. Funders and partners do not review or approve articles before publication.
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