A-P05 · TOPIC · cash-and-digital-resilienceGRA dossier · service level R0
GRAPayments and Market InfrastructureIn development
Topic dossier · Payments and Market Infrastructure

Cash and digital resilience

As cash use falls, payments depend more on digital systems that can fail together through outages, cyber attacks or power loss. Cash, offline payment options and central bank money provide fallback. This page sets out how the balance between cash and digital payments affects resilience, how access and fallback are measured, and who decides.

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NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth

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For cash and digital resilience, in GRA's spatial-finance reading, the map opens on night lights and population density with night lights tonight from NASA GIBS, framed on the United Kingdom and Ireland; every other NASA layer, live feed and forecast waits in the layer list.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date; indicators, not assessments of any place; claim ceiling INTEGRATED.

Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA/NOAA VIIRS · CIESIN/Columbia, NASA SEDAC HBASE · GDACSSources and licences

  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). CC BY 4.0
  • VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Made with Natural Earth. Free vector and raster map data @ naturalearthdata.com. Public domain
  • © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). ODbL
  • Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into H3 cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Context on the globe and flat map: coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names from NASA GIBS reference layers (OpenStreetMap data, ODbL, © OpenStreetMap contributors); Blue Marble imagery as an optional base; 3D terrain and the elevation read-out from the ASTER GDEM elevation colour index (5 m to 200 m classes, exaggerated for legibility). Boundaries are drawn as published and imply no position on any territory.
  • Globe: MapLibre GL JS 6.9.1, BSD-3-Clause, © MapLibre contributors.
  • Observed (EO): NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • Context: CIESIN/Columbia, NASA SEDAC HBASE. Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University, and NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC): Global Human Built-up And Settlement Extent (HBASE) 2010; Seto, Guneralp and Hutyra 2012, Global Grid of Probabilities of Urban Expansion to 2030; Global Urban Heat Island (UHI) Data Set, 2013.
  • Live: GDACS (EC JRC / UN OCHA) Events are indicative, not official warnings.
  • Optional layers (35 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.

Layers and dates

  • Night-time lights, daily: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Oct 2026
  • Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
  • Flood water, 3-day composite: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Oct 2026
  • Land surface temperature, day, 8-day composite: VIIRS NOAA-20 Level 3, 8-day, NASA LANCE · 14 Sep 2026
  • True colour: VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
  • Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024

01In brief

The short answer.

Cash and digital payment resilience is the ability of people to keep paying when digital systems fail, and it depends on how far cash has declined. Cash, offline payments and access to central bank money provide fallback. Central banks, legislators, payment schemes and preparedness authorities hold the decisions.

02Console

RTGS operations console, in outline.

The working screen behind this subject: its structure, terms and states. Names are placeholders and values illustrative.

RTGS operations console

Cash and digital resilience · RTGS system · Business day 235

  • Value settled today
    148local bnActive
  • Payments queued
    23531Watch
  • Availability, % this month
    99.9Normal
  • Participants below liquidity floor
    0Alert
Queue building at peakGRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure

Intraday liquidity, system

Incident and failover log

  1. 09:36INCParticipant P-12 message delay
  2. 10:35LSMLiquidity saving cycle released 28 payments
  3. 14:00CUTCustomer payment cut-off
  4. Q1TESTContingency site failover in 103 min
RTGS operations console: the screen's structure, terms and states for Cash and digital resilience.Placeholder names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
03The question

Cash and digital resilience: how the risk develops.

Fallbacks and financial access. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

Cash infrastructure contracts

Fewer users mean fewer ATMs, branches and cash logistics, which raises costs and makes cash harder to use when digital channels fail.

Mechanism

Digital payments share dependencies

Card, mobile and account payments depend on power, telecom and a few processors. A wide outage stops all of them at once.

Mechanism

Exclusion grows

People without bank accounts, digital skills or connectivity rely on cash. Its decline can exclude them from commerce and services.

Mechanism

Public money anchors trust

Cash is the public's only direct access to central bank money. Central banks are considering digital currencies partly to preserve that access.

04Key terms

Terms used on this page.

Each term as this page uses it. Where a standard-setting body defines the term, the wording follows that body.

TermDefinition
Cash accessThe ability of people to withdraw and deposit cash at reasonable distance and cost.
Offline paymentA digital payment that can be made without a live network connection.
Central bank moneyMoney that is a liability of the central bank, such as cash and reserves.
05Indicators

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Cash share of point-of-sale paymentspercent of transactionsperiodicCentral bank payment diariesESTIMATED
ATMs and cash access pointscount per hundred thousand adultsannualIMF Financial Access SurveyOFFICIAL
Population within set distance of cash accessshare of populationperiodicCentral bank studiesESTIMATED
Offline payment capabilityavailable or not, by schemeon changeScheme rulesDECLARED
Unbanked adultsshare of adultsperiodicWorld Bank Global FindexESTIMATED
Major digital payment outagescount and durationannualOverseer and operator reportsOFFICIAL
06Canvas

From sources to decisions.

The topic as a computational graph: named sources feed the methods, an evidence review gates the outputs, and the decisions stay with the authorities that hold them.

Pipeline canvas · Cash and digital resilience as a run graphDesign, not a record
Cash and digital resilience: operational resilienceImportant business services are identified and impact tolerances set; people, processes, technology and third parties are mapped; severe but plausible scenarios test whether services stay within tolerance; vulnerabilities are remediated and the board self-assesses. Design of the process, not a record of a run.

Fig. 02Nodes carry their type, two metric rows and a state; connectors show what feeds what; dashed frames name the owners; the timeline is the cadence. Design of the pipeline, not a record of a run.

07Sources

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

SourceWhat it givesLicence class
IMF Financial Access SurveyAccess points and usage of financial servicesFree, IMF terms
World Bank Global FindexAccount ownership and payment useCC BY 4.0
ECB study on payment attitudes of consumersCash and card use in the euro areaFree, ECB terms
Sveriges Riksbank payments reportsCash decline and preparedness in SwedenFree, Riksbank terms
BIS central bank digital currency surveysCentral bank work on digital currenciesFree, BIS terms
08Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Payments and Market Infrastructure prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Central banksHow to preserve cash access and whether to issue a digital currencyUsage, access and outage evidence
LegislatorsWhether to require cash acceptance or accessComparative laws and exclusion evidence
Payment schemesWhether to support offline paymentsOutage experience and design options
Civil preparedness authoritiesHow payments continue in a wide outagePreparedness plans and exercises

Outputs this topic produces

  • Guide to cash, offline payments and digital resilience
  • Comparative notes on cash access policies
  • Brief on central bank digital currency and resilience
  • Questions for authorities on payment preparedness
09Core questions

What the industry asks.

Digital payments are fast and convenient, but they depend on power, telecommunications and functioning infrastructure. During outages, natural disasters and cyber incidents, people without cash or alternative means may be unable to buy food, fuel or medicine. At the same time, the cash infrastructure itself, from ATMs to cash transport, becomes harder to sustain as cash use falls. Several authorities are examining how to preserve resilience and access.

  • What fallback options exist when card and digital payments fail, and how widely available are they?
  • Who depends on cash, and what happens to them as cash acceptance and access decline?
  • Can the cash infrastructure remain viable as volumes fall, and who should sustain it?
  • Can digital payments be designed to work offline or degrade gracefully during outages?
10Mechanisms

How the infrastructure works and fails.

Payment resilience depends on diverse means of payment and their infrastructures.

Cash

Physical fallback

Cash works without power or networks, but requires access points, transport and acceptance by merchants.

Offline digital

Degraded modes

Some card and digital systems can operate offline with limits, settling later when connectivity returns.

Inclusion

Access for all

Older people, people with disabilities, low-income households and rural communities may rely more on cash.

Experience from major outages and disasters has shown that cash use rises when digital payments fail, but only if people hold cash and can obtain more. As cash networks shrink, this fallback weakens. Some authorities now treat cash access as part of national resilience planning, alongside offline digital capabilities and clear public guidance for disruptions.

11Methods and evidence

How the evidence is built, and its limits.

  1. 01

    Payment surveys

    Surveys of payment behaviour and cash use show trends and dependence by group.

  2. 02

    Access mapping

    Mapping of cash access points and their distribution, which may thin out in rural areas.

  3. 03

    Outage studies

    Analysis of how people paid during past outages and disasters.

  4. 04

    Design research

    Study of offline and resilient payment designs, applying payment and financial market technology.

12Methods

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Reliability and resilience engineeringImpact tolerance setting · Recovery design · Learning from incidentsApplied here
  2. Payment and financial market technologyLiquidity-saving mechanisms · ISO 20022 data quality · Settlement cycle designApplied here
  3. Cybersecurity and cryptographyEndpoint control frameworks · Threat-led testing · Destructive attack recoveryApplied here
13Questions

Questions and answers.

Why does cash matter for resilience?
Because it works without power, telecom or payment processors, so it provides a fallback when digital systems fail.
What is an offline payment?
A digital payment that can be made without a live network connection, with settlement completed later.
What is a central bank digital currency?
A digital form of central bank money, available to the public or to financial institutions, that some central banks are researching or piloting.
Is cash still needed?
Many authorities consider cash an important fallback and means of inclusion. How much cash infrastructure to preserve is a policy decision for each country.
Can digital payments work during power outages?
Some can, in limited offline modes. Widespread outages affecting power and telecommunications disrupt most digital payments.
Does GRA take a position on cash policy?
No. It builds shared understanding of evidence. Policy decisions belong to authorities.
What about central bank digital currencies?
Some designs include offline functionality. Whether and how they support resilience is a research question, and decisions belong to central banks.
Payments and Market Infrastructure

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