GRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Cash and digital resilience
As cash use falls, payments depend more on digital systems that can fail together through outages, cyber attacks or power loss. Cash, offline payment options and central bank money provide fallback. This page sets out how the balance between cash and digital payments affects resilience, how access and fallback are measured, and who decides.
Cash and digital resilience on the record.
Cash and digital resilience: how the risk develops.
Fallbacks and financial access. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Cash infrastructure contracts
Fewer users mean fewer ATMs, branches and cash logistics, which raises costs and makes cash harder to use when digital channels fail.
Digital payments share dependencies
Card, mobile and account payments depend on power, telecom and a few processors. A wide outage stops all of them at once.
Exclusion grows
People without bank accounts, digital skills or connectivity rely on cash. Its decline can exclude them from commerce and services.
Public money anchors trust
Cash is the public’s only direct access to central bank money. Central banks are considering digital currencies partly to preserve that access.
RTGS operations console.
Ekrana ku tîmek dê ji bo şopandina vê mijarê bikar bîne: pîvan, rewş û biryarên wê. Nav mînak in û nirx nîşander in.
RTGS operations console
Cash and digital resilience · RTGS system · Business day 235
- Value settled today148mîlyar herêmîÇalak
- Payments queued23531Çavdêrî
- Peydabûn, % vê mehê99.9Normal
- Participants below liquidity floor0Hişyarî
Intraday liquidity, system
Incident and failover log
- 09:36INCParticipant P-12 message delay
- 10:35LSMLiquidity saving cycle released 28 payments
- 14:00CUTCustomer payment cut-off
- Q1TESTContingency site failover in 103 min
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Nîşane | Yekîne | Rîtm | Source type | Nîşan |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash share of point-of-sale payments | percent of transactions | periodic | Central bank payment diaries | TEXMÎNKIRÎ |
| ATMs and cash access points | count per hundred thousand adults | salane | IMF Financial Access Survey | Statîstîkên weşandî |
| Population within set distance of cash access | share of population | periodic | Central bank studies | TEXMÎNKIRÎ |
| Offline payment capability | available or not, by scheme | on change | Scheme rules | DECLARED |
| Unbanked adults | share of adults | periodic | World Bank Global Findex | TEXMÎNKIRÎ |
| Major digital payment outages | count and duration | salane | Overseer and operator reports | Statîstîkên weşandî |
Transition and physical risk on a portfolio.
Three scenario families after the NGFS framework move a sector portfolio through carbon costs and warming damages; the transmission view follows the losses to lenders, investors, public finances and households. Scenario: named assumptions about the future, not a forecast.
Kontrol
- Carbon price at the horizon, orderly path
- 200 per tCO2
- Delay before a disorderly transition
- 50% of horizon
- Cost passed to customers
- 50%
- Warming today above pre-industrial
- 1.30°C
- Warming per decade, current policies
- 0.25°C
- Damage coefficient
- 0.24% per °C²
- Salên pêş
- 25 sal
Xwendin
- Worst scenario at the horizon
- −33.6% of value
Jimar, rêbaz û çavkanî
| Sal | Orderly transition (% value) | Delayed, disorderly transition (% value) | Current policies (% value) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | −0.38 | −0.38 | −0.38 |
| 3 | −2.87 | −0.53 | −0.67 |
| 6 | −5.36 | −0.68 | −0.97 |
| 9 | −7.84 | −0.84 | −1.27 |
| 12 | −10.33 | −0.99 | −1.57 |
| 15 | −12.82 | −7.12 | −1.87 |
| 18 | −15.31 | −15.05 | −2.17 |
| 21 | −17.80 | −23.00 | −2.48 |
| 24 | −20.29 | −30.94 | −2.79 |
Rêbaz
- Climate scenario families NGFS (2023), Climate Scenarios for central banks and supervisors, Phase IV
- Climate stress test of the financial system Battiston and others (2017), Nature Climate Change 7
- Damage function Nordhaus (2017), Revisiting the social cost of carbon, PNAS 114
- Transmission channels BCBS (2021), Climate-related risk drivers and their transmission channels
- Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
- One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Dane
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page’s map can draw:
- Urban extents Natural Earth
- Seaports Natural Earth
- Past year, daily temperature (ERA5 via Open-Meteo) Open-Meteo.com (CC BY 4.0), Copernicus ERA5 (C3S/ECMWF) · register open-meteo.public-pages
- Surface air temperature, daytime (AIRS) NASA AIRS · register nasa.gibs.context-live-layers
Li seranserê şeş stûnan, bi pêşengiya Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in Payments and Market Infrastructure in Foundry
- Tested at Payments and Market Infrastructure in Universe
- Hatiye kodkirin di Darayî, sîgorta û aborî di Standards de
- Published in Payments and Market Infrastructure in Reports
- Tê de tê dayîn Fakulteya Darayî û Aborî di Academy de
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Çavkanî | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| IMF Financial Access Survey | Access points and usage of financial services | Free, IMF terms |
| World Bank Global Findex | Account ownership and payment use | CC BY 4.0 |
| ECB study on payment attitudes of consumers | Cash and card use in the euro area | Free, ECB terms |
| Sveriges Riksbank payments reports | Cash decline and preparedness in Sweden | Free, Riksbank terms |
| BIS central bank digital currency surveys | Central bank work on digital currencies | Free, BIS terms |
What cash and digital resilience means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Transmission channels
How a shock in cash and digital resilience reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Payments and Market Infrastructure prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Kî biryarê dide | Pirs | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Central banks | How to preserve cash access and whether to issue a digital currency | Usage, access and outage evidence |
| Legislators | Whether to require cash acceptance or access | Comparative laws and exclusion evidence |
| Payment schemes | Whether to support offline payments | Outage experience and design options |
| Civil preparedness authorities | How payments continue in a wide outage | Preparedness plans and exercises |
Outputs this topic produces
- Guide to cash, offline payments and digital resilience
- Comparative notes on cash access policies
- Brief on central bank digital currency and resilience
- Questions for authorities on payment preparedness
What the industry asks.
Digital payments are fast and convenient, but they depend on power, telecommunications and functioning infrastructure. During outages, natural disasters and cyber incidents, people without cash or alternative means may be unable to buy food, fuel or medicine. At the same time, the cash infrastructure itself, from ATMs to cash transport, becomes harder to sustain as cash use falls. Several authorities are examining how to preserve resilience and access.
- What fallback options exist when card and digital payments fail, and how widely available are they?
- Who depends on cash, and what happens to them as cash acceptance and access decline?
- Can the cash infrastructure remain viable as volumes fall, and who should sustain it?
- Can digital payments be designed to work offline or degrade gracefully during outages?
How the infrastructure works and fails.
Payment resilience depends on diverse means of payment and their infrastructures.
Physical fallback
Cash works without power or networks, but requires access points, transport and acceptance by merchants.
Degraded modes
Some card and digital systems can operate offline with limits, settling later when connectivity returns.
Access for all
Older people, people with disabilities, low-income households and rural communities may rely more on cash.
Experience from major outages and disasters has shown that cash use rises when digital payments fail, but only if people hold cash and can obtain more. As cash networks shrink, this fallback weakens. Some authorities now treat cash access as part of national resilience planning, alongside offline digital capabilities and clear public guidance for disruptions.
How the evidence is built, and its limits.
- 01
Payment surveys
Surveys of payment behaviour and cash use show trends and dependence by group.
- 02
Access mapping
Mapping of cash access points and their distribution, which may thin out in rural areas.
- 03
Outage studies
Analysis of how people paid during past outages and disasters.
- 04
Design research
Study of offline and resilient payment designs, applying payment and financial market technology.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Reliability and resilience engineeringImpact tolerance setting · Recovery design · Learning from incidentsApplied here
- 02Payment and financial market technologyLiquidity-saving mechanisms · ISO 20022 data quality · Settlement cycle designApplied here
- 03Cybersecurity and cryptographyEndpoint control frameworks · Threat-led testing · Destructive attack recoveryApplied here
Pirs û bersiv.
Why does cash matter for resilience?
What is an offline payment?
What is a central bank digital currency?
Is cash still needed?
Can digital payments work during power outages?
Does GRA take a position on cash policy?
What about central bank digital currencies?
Ji vê rûpelê delîl bidin.
Reports weşana sê mehane ya Konsorsiyûmê ye. Tiştê ku tu li ser vê mijarê dizanî dikare di çapa pêş de bibe delîl, dosya an rastkirin, bi navê te û di bin CC BY 4.0 de weşandî li cihê ku karê te bi xwe be.
- EmailGateway GW-GRASend it from this pageEvidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen depositDeposit it and submit to the communityPublish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsGlobal Risks AllianceSee every way to contributeThe contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
Tu carî daneyên şexsî, hûrgiliyên binesaza hesas an tiştekî ku mafê we yê parvekirinê tune ne neşînin. Beşdarî berî bikaranînê tê nirxandin; şandina wê nivîskarî an mafên edîtorî nade û sponsorî tu carî encamekê nakire.
Bring an exposure or capital question to the Alliance.
Agahî û pirs îro vekirî ne. Pirsek referansekê distîne û gava piştî wê dide nasîn; serlêdan, drav, veqetandina hesabkirinê û tomarkirin tenê dema ku tîm, mercên wê û kapasîteya vekolînê hebin vedibin.
Belgeyên hiqûqî.
Nexşe, dane û jimarên vê malperê ji bo çarçoveyê û agahiyên giştî têne nîşandan. Ew ne şîret, ne pêşbînî û ne hişyarî ne; sînorên agahiyê di Daxuyaniyên Berpirsiyariyê û Daxuyaniyên Daneyê de hatine diyarkirin.