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GRA · Public Finance and Sovereign Debt

Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition

Fiscal contingent liabilities

Contingent liabilities are obligations that fall on the government only if certain events occur: guarantees called, state-owned enterprises failing, public-private partnership contracts triggered or banks needing support. Many are poorly recorded, and when they materialise they can raise debt sharply. This page sets out how contingent liabilities arise and surface, how they are measured and disclosed, and who decides how they are managed.

01Qeyd

Fiscal contingent liabilities on the record.

02Pirs

Fiscal contingent liabilities: how the risk develops.

Guarantees, disasters and public exposure. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mekanîzma

Guarantees move risk off budget

Loan guarantees support projects and enterprises without immediate spending. If borrowers fail, the guarantee is called and the cost lands on the budget.

Mekanîzma

State enterprises borrow implicitly

Utilities, transport and energy companies owned by the state borrow on the expectation of support. Their losses often become government debt.

Mekanîzma

PPP contracts bind future budgets

Public-private partnerships can include revenue guarantees and termination payments. These create future obligations even when they are not recorded as debt.

Mekanîzma

Banking crises transfer to the state

Recapitalising banks or guaranteeing deposits in a crisis can add large amounts to public debt in a short period.

03Spatial finance

Where projects sit, and which layer protects them.

Where development projects meet hazard and poverty, and which financing layer protects them. Hypothetical projects and design values.

Development projects in Mozambique and Malawi against hazard and poverty, with the financing layer that would protect each.Hypothetical projects and design values; no country’s strategy is shown.
04Nîşander

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

NîşaneYekîneRîtmSource typeNîşan
Explicit government guarantees outstandingcurrency and percent of GDPsalaneDebt management and budget reportsStatîstîkên weşandî
State-owned enterprise debtcurrency and percent of GDPsalaneSOE reports and fiscal risk statementsHATIYE RAPORKIRIN
PPP contingent commitmentscurrencysalanePPP registersHATIYE RAPORKIRIN
Contingent liabilities that materialisedcurrency per yearsalaneFiscal accounts and studiesTEXMÎNKIRÎ
Fiscal risk statement publishedyes or nosalaneGovernment recordsStatîstîkên weşandî
Coverage of public sector debt datainstitutional coverage categorysalaneWorld Bank debt reporting heat mapStatîstîkên weşandî
05Çavdêrî bike

Debt sustainability console.

Ekrana ku tîmek dê ji bo şopandina vê mijarê bikar bîne: pîvan, rewş û biryarên wê. Nav mînak in û nirx nîşander in.

Debt sustainability console: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Fiscal contingent liabilities.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
06Çavkanî

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

ÇavkanîWhat it givesLicence class
IMF Fiscal Transparency EvaluationsAssessment of fiscal risk disclosureFree, IMF terms
IMF and World Bank PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Model (P-FRAM)Tool for assessing PPP fiscal costs and risksFree, IMF and World Bank terms
National fiscal risk statementsDisclosure of guarantees, SOEs and other risksPublic records, terms per government
IMF database of contingent liability realisationsHistorical episodes of contingent liabilities materialisingFree, IMF terms (to check)
World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt databasePublic sector debt by institutional coverageCC BY 4.0
07Scenario model

Sovereign debt paths and the odds of breaching a threshold.

The distribution of debt paths, and the share above a threshold of concern at the horizon, that sovereign investors and rating analysts read from a fan chart. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows Africa; the model itself is not tied to a place.

  • Median, 25% to 75% and 10% to 90% bands
  • Tu şok tune

Kontrol

Debt today
70% of GDP
Effective nominal interest rate
5.0%
Nominal GDP growth
4.5%
Primary balance
−0.5% of GDP
Volatility of growth
2.0 xal
Volatility of the interest rate
1.0 xal
Salên pêş
10 sal
Threshold of concern
90% of GDP

Xwendin

Median debt at the horizon
79% ji GDP
Paths above the threshold at the horizon
2%
Primary balance that stabilises debt
0.3% of GDP
Jimar, rêbaz û çavkanî
Sal10%25%Medyan75%90%
070.070.070.070.070.0
168.669.670.771.972.8
268.669.971.573.074.3
369.170.672.374.476.0
469.371.173.275.277.1
569.671.774.276.578.5
670.272.275.177.680.4
770.973.275.778.781.3
871.373.976.779.782.4
972.074.877.580.684.3
1072.675.378.781.885.3

Rêbaz

  1. Debt dynamics and the interest-growth differential Blanchard (2019), Public debt and low interest rates, American Economic Review 109
  2. Stochastic fan charts Celasun, Debrun and Ostry (2006), IMF Staff Papers 53
  3. Sovereign risk and debt sustainability framework IMF (2022), Staff Guidance Note on the SRDSF

Dane

No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.

Sovereign debt paths and the odds of breaching a threshold. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: Debt dynamics and the interest-growth differential (Blanchard (2019), Public debt and low interest rates, American Economic Review 109); Stochastic fan charts (Celasun, Debrun and Ostry (2006), IMF Staff Papers 53); Sovereign risk and debt sustainability framework (IMF (2022), Staff Guidance Note on the SRDSF).
08Biryar

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Public Finance and Sovereign Debt prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Kî biryarê didePirsEvidence this page serves
Finance ministriesWhether to issue guarantees and how to price and record themFiscal risk analysis and guarantee records
SOE oversight unitsHow to monitor and limit enterprise borrowingSOE financial data and risk assessments
PPP units and procurement authoritiesWhich contract terms create acceptable fiscal exposureP-FRAM analysis and contract records
LegislaturesWhat limits and disclosure apply to contingent liabilitiesFiscal risk statements and audit findings

Outputs this topic produces

  • Guide to types of fiscal contingent liabilities
  • Method note on stress-testing guarantees and SOE exposures
  • Brief on PPP fiscal risk disclosure
  • Questions for treasuries on fiscal risk statements
09Simulatorê cêwî û kaskade

Trace a shock in fiscal contingent liabilities to the balance sheet.

Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Disaster and climate risk finance: the shocks it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Pick an initiating shock and step through the cascade to see which exposures it reaches and where losses could concentrate. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every weight is a stated assumption. An exercise, not a forecast, a valuation, a rating or investment advice. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.

Metirsî

  • Tropical cyclone
  • Erdhej
  • Ice-jam flood
  • Storm surge (set off downstream)
  • Intense rainfall (set off downstream)
  • River flood (set off downstream)
  • Flash flood (set off downstream)
  • Dangerous surf (set off downstream)
  • Qutbûna berfireh a elektrîkê (li aliyê jêr çê dibe)
  • Koçberiya girseyî (li aliyê jêr çê dibe)
  • Coastal flood (set off downstream)
  • Aftershock sequence (set off downstream)
  • Fault surface rupture (set off downstream)
  • Soil liquefaction (set off downstream)
  • Slope slide (set off downstream)
  • Rockfall (set off downstream)
  • Tsunami (set off downstream)
  • Building collapse (set off downstream)

Kontrol

  • NS-0 Destûr û prensîb
  • NS-3 UNIyên tomara xetereyê (rêzimanî, nexşeya veguhastina ji pergala kevin, desthilata veqetandinê)
  • NS-9 UNI yên çarçoveyî (belavkirin, mînak, mînakên bernameyê)
  • NS-10 Polîtîka û xal (erkên ku makîne dikare bixwîne: pênase, girêdanî, nirxandin û sepandin)
  • NS-11 Piştrastkirin û çavdêrî (delîl, erêkirin, çavdêriya lihevhatina zero-trust)
  • NS-14 Lihevhatin û nexşeya li standardên derveyî
  • NRS-F8 Veguhastina xeterê ya parametrîk û li ser bingeha îndeksê
  • NRS-F7 Darayiya xetera karesatan û darayiya pêşwext amadekirî
  • NRS-H113 Malbata metirsiyê: Nazikiya pergala darayî (NHS-1 soc.financial-system)
  • NRS-H114 Malbata metirsiyê: Şokên makroaborî û darayiya giştî (NHS-1 soc.macro-fiscal)
  • NRS-D1 Pêşketina li gorî xeterê û sehkirina projeyan
  • NRS-H28 Malbata metirsiyê: Guherînên rewşa avhewayê (NHS-1 eco.climate-state)

Çavdêrî

  • ERA5 reanalysis (Copernicus Climate Data Store) (listed for reference)
  • CHIRPS quasi-global gridded precipitation (listed for reference)
  • USGS earthquake GeoJSON summary feeds (listed for reference)
  • Total public international support for national disaster risk reduction actions (Sendai indicator F-1)
  • Direct economic loss attributed to disasters in relation to global GDP

Erdnîgariya mînakê

  • Ewropaya Rojava: 152 şaneyên şeşgoşe
  • Rêjeya barînê, nîv saeta dawî (IMERG), NASA GIBS
  • Ronahiyên şevê îşev, qutbûn (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
  • Ava rûyê erdê di nav ewr re, 30 m (radara OPERA DSWx-S1), NASA GIBS
  • Şiliya axa rûyê erdê (SMAP), NASA GIBS
10Core questions

What specialists ask.

  • What explicit and implicit contingent liabilities does a government carry?
  • How likely are they to crystallise, and how large could they be?
  • How do public-private partnerships create long-term fiscal exposure?
  • How should contingent liabilities be disclosed and managed?
  • How do contingent liabilities interact during a crisis?
11Exposure, loss and capital

What fiscal contingent liabilities means for exposure, loss and capital.

The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.

Financing instruments by layer

How retention and transfer instruments could share losses from fiscal contingent liabilities, from frequent to extreme.

Retention and reservesFrequent, low severityKrediya mercdarNavînParametric cover and risk poolsTundReinsurance and catastrophe bondsRare, extremeResidual lossBeyond all layersseverity rises upward
QatWho holds the riskSpeed of fundsSînorê sereke
Retention and reservesBudget, contingency fundsYekserSize of the budget
Krediya mercdarDevelopment banks, ministries of financeDays to weeksDebt capacity
Parametric cover and risk poolsRegional pools, insurersDays, on a triggerXetera bingehê
Reinsurance and catastrophe bondsReinsurers, capital markets investorsWeeks to monthsCost of capital
Residual lossHouseholds, firms, humanitarian fundingNediyarBê fon
Risk layering as described in disaster risk finance practice; instruments are illustrative of the structure, not offers, prices or advice.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
12Mechanisms

Drivers and dynamics.

Explicit contingent liabilities are written into law or contract: loan guarantees, deposit insurance, public-private partnership commitments and guarantees on state enterprise debt. Implicit contingent liabilities arise from expectations that the government will act, such as rescuing systemically important banks, supporting subnational governments or funding disaster relief. Studies of fiscal crises show that the crystallisation of contingent liabilities has been a major driver of unexpected increases in public debt.

Contingent liabilities tend to crystallise together. A severe recession can trigger bank losses, state enterprise distress and calls on guarantees at once. Disasters create immediate spending needs and can trigger guarantees on damaged infrastructure. Good practice includes registering, quantifying and disclosing contingent liabilities in fiscal risk statements, and setting limits or charging fees for guarantees.

13Methods and limits

How it is studied.

  1. 01

    Fiscal risk registers

    Cataloguing explicit and implicit contingent liabilities with their triggers.

  2. 02

    Quantification

    Estimating expected and stressed costs, using scenario design and stress testing and decision analysis under uncertainty.

  3. 03

    Disclosure analysis

    Comparing fiscal risk statements and their coverage across countries.

  4. 04

    Sînor

    Implicit liabilities are hard to quantify, probabilities are uncertain, and correlation in crises is difficult to model.

14Rêbaz

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

15Pirs

Pirs û bersiv.

What is a fiscal contingent liability?
A government obligation that depends on an uncertain future event, such as a guarantee being called or a state enterprise needing support.
Why do SOEs matter for public debt?
Because governments often stand behind their enterprises, so SOE losses and debts can become government obligations even if not recorded as public debt.
What is a fiscal risk statement?
A government report that identifies and, where possible, quantifies risks to the public finances, including contingent liabilities.
What is an implicit contingent liability?
An obligation the government is expected to meet, such as rescuing a major bank, though no law or contract requires it.
Why do contingent liabilities matter for debt?
Because when they crystallise, they can add suddenly to public debt, often during a crisis.
Does GRA assess governments’ guarantees?
No. It studies the field at sector level.
Does GRA give advice on this topic?
No. GRA does not lend, underwrite, rate, invest, advise on or arrange transactions, including sovereign borrowing or debt restructuring, and it introduces no counterparties. Readiness work is not approval. Its analysis is shared, sector-level understanding.
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