GRA · Public Finance and Sovereign Debt
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Fiscal contingent liabilities
Contingent liabilities are obligations that fall on the government only if certain events occur: guarantees called, state-owned enterprises failing, public-private partnership contracts triggered or banks needing support. Many are poorly recorded, and when they materialise they can raise debt sharply. This page sets out how contingent liabilities arise and surface, how they are measured and disclosed, and who decides how they are managed.
Fiscal contingent liabilities on the record.
Fiscal contingent liabilities: how the risk develops.
Guarantees, disasters and public exposure. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Guarantees move risk off budget
Loan guarantees support projects and enterprises without immediate spending. If borrowers fail, the guarantee is called and the cost lands on the budget.
State enterprises borrow implicitly
Utilities, transport and energy companies owned by the state borrow on the expectation of support. Their losses often become government debt.
PPP contracts bind future budgets
Public-private partnerships can include revenue guarantees and termination payments. These create future obligations even when they are not recorded as debt.
Banking crises transfer to the state
Recapitalising banks or guaranteeing deposits in a crisis can add large amounts to public debt in a short period.
Where projects sit, and which layer protects them.
Where development projects meet hazard and poverty, and which financing layer protects them. Hypothetical projects and design values.
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Explicit government guarantees outstanding | currency and percent of GDP | annual | Debt management and budget reports | Published statistics |
| State-owned enterprise debt | currency and percent of GDP | annual | SOE reports and fiscal risk statements | IMERIPOTIWA |
| PPP contingent commitments | currency | annual | PPP registers | IMERIPOTIWA |
| Contingent liabilities that materialised | currency per year | annual | Fiscal accounts and studies | IMEKADIRIWA |
| Fiscal risk statement published | yes or no | annual | Government records | Published statistics |
| Coverage of public sector debt data | institutional coverage category | annual | World Bank debt reporting heat map | Published statistics |
Debt sustainability console.
The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Chanzo | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| IMF Fiscal Transparency Evaluations | Assessment of fiscal risk disclosure | Free, IMF terms |
| IMF and World Bank PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Model (P-FRAM) | Tool for assessing PPP fiscal costs and risks | Free, IMF and World Bank terms |
| National fiscal risk statements | Disclosure of guarantees, SOEs and other risks | Public records, terms per government |
| IMF database of contingent liability realisations | Historical episodes of contingent liabilities materialising | Free, IMF terms (to check) |
| World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt database | Public sector debt by institutional coverage | CC BY 4.0 |
Sovereign debt paths and the odds of breaching a threshold.
The distribution of debt paths, and the share above a threshold of concern at the horizon, that sovereign investors and rating analysts read from a fan chart. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows Africa; the model itself is not tied to a place.
- Median, 25% to 75% and 10% to 90% bands
- No shocks
Controls
- Debt today
- 70% of GDP
- Effective nominal interest rate
- 5.0%
- Nominal GDP growth
- 4.5%
- Primary balance
- −0.5% of GDP
- Volatility of growth
- 2.0 points
- Volatility of the interest rate
- 1.0 points
- Years ahead
- 10 years
- Threshold of concern
- 90% of GDP
Readouts
- Median debt at the horizon
- 79% of GDP
- Paths above the threshold at the horizon
- 2%
- Primary balance that stabilises debt
- 0.3% of GDP
Numbers, methods and sources
| Year | 10% | 25% | Median | 75% | 90% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 70.0 | 70.0 | 70.0 | 70.0 | 70.0 |
| 1 | 68.6 | 69.6 | 70.7 | 71.9 | 72.8 |
| 2 | 68.6 | 69.9 | 71.5 | 73.0 | 74.3 |
| 3 | 69.1 | 70.6 | 72.3 | 74.4 | 76.0 |
| 4 | 69.3 | 71.1 | 73.2 | 75.2 | 77.1 |
| 5 | 69.6 | 71.7 | 74.2 | 76.5 | 78.5 |
| 6 | 70.2 | 72.2 | 75.1 | 77.6 | 80.4 |
| 7 | 70.9 | 73.2 | 75.7 | 78.7 | 81.3 |
| 8 | 71.3 | 73.9 | 76.7 | 79.7 | 82.4 |
| 9 | 72.0 | 74.8 | 77.5 | 80.6 | 84.3 |
| 10 | 72.6 | 75.3 | 78.7 | 81.8 | 85.3 |
Mbinu
- Debt dynamics and the interest-growth differential Blanchard (2019), Public debt and low interest rates, American Economic Review 109
- Stochastic fan charts Celasun, Debrun and Ostry (2006), IMF Staff Papers 53
- Sovereign risk and debt sustainability framework IMF (2022), Staff Guidance Note on the SRDSF
Data
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in Public Finance and Sovereign Debt in Foundry
- Tested at Public Finance and Sovereign Debt in Universe
- Codified in Finance, Insurance and the Economy in Standards
- Published in Public Finance and Sovereign Debt in Reports
- Taught in Faculty of Finance and Economics in Academy
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Public Finance and Sovereign Debt prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Nani anaamua | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Finance ministries | Whether to issue guarantees and how to price and record them | Fiscal risk analysis and guarantee records |
| SOE oversight units | How to monitor and limit enterprise borrowing | SOE financial data and risk assessments |
| PPP units and procurement authorities | Which contract terms create acceptable fiscal exposure | P-FRAM analysis and contract records |
| Legislatures | What limits and disclosure apply to contingent liabilities | Fiscal risk statements and audit findings |
Outputs this topic produces
- Guide to types of fiscal contingent liabilities
- Method note on stress-testing guarantees and SOE exposures
- Brief on PPP fiscal risk disclosure
- Questions for treasuries on fiscal risk statements
Trace a shock in fiscal contingent liabilities to the balance sheet.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Disaster and climate risk finance: the shocks it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Pick an initiating shock and step through the cascade to see which exposures it reaches and where losses could concentrate. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every weight is a stated assumption. An exercise, not a forecast, a valuation, a rating or investment advice. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
Majanga
- Tropical cyclone
- Earthquake
- Ice-jam flood
- Storm surge (set off downstream)
- Intense rainfall (set off downstream)
- River flood (set off downstream)
- Flash flood (set off downstream)
- Dangerous surf (set off downstream)
- Widespread power outage (set off downstream)
- Mass displacement (set off downstream)
- Coastal flood (set off downstream)
- Aftershock sequence (set off downstream)
- Fault surface rupture (set off downstream)
- Soil liquefaction (set off downstream)
- Slope slide (set off downstream)
- Rockfall (set off downstream)
- Tsunami (set off downstream)
- Building collapse (set off downstream)
Systems and couplings
Controls
NS-0Katiba na kanuniNS-3UNI za rekodi za hatari (sarufi, ulinganishi wa urithi, mamlaka ya ugawaji)NS-9UNI za kimuktadha (utekelezaji, matukio, matukio ya programu)NS-10Sera na vifungu (wajibu unaosomeka na mashine: ufafanuzi, ufungamanishaji, tathmini na utekelezaji)NS-11Uthibitishaji na ufuatiliaji (ushahidi, uthibitisho, uchunguzi wa ulinganifu usio na imani)NS-14Ulinganifu na upatanisho na viwango vya njeNRS-F8Uhamishaji wa hatari kwa vigezo na kwa faharasaNRS-F7Fedha za hatari za maafa na fedha zilizopangwa mapemaNRS-H113Familia ya majanga: Udhaifu wa mfumo wa fedha (NHS-1 soc.financial-system)NRS-H114Familia ya majanga: Mishtuko ya uchumi mkuu na ya kifedha ya serikali (NHS-1 soc.macro-fiscal)NRS-D1Maendeleo yanayozingatia hatari na uchujaji wa miradiNRS-H28Familia ya majanga: Mabadiliko ya hali ya tabianchi (NHS-1 eco.climate-state)
Observation
- ERA5 reanalysis (Copernicus Climate Data Store) (listed for reference)
- CHIRPS quasi-global gridded precipitation (listed for reference)
- USGS earthquake GeoJSON summary feeds (listed for reference)
- Total public international support for national disaster risk reduction actions (Sendai indicator F-1)
- Direct economic loss attributed to disasters in relation to global GDP
Example geography
- Western Europe: 152 hexagonal cells
- Rain rate, last half hour (IMERG), NASA GIBS
- Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
- Surface water through cloud, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 radar), NASA GIBS
- Surface soil moisture (SMAP), NASA GIBS
What specialists ask.
- What explicit and implicit contingent liabilities does a government carry?
- How likely are they to crystallise, and how large could they be?
- How do public-private partnerships create long-term fiscal exposure?
- How should contingent liabilities be disclosed and managed?
- How do contingent liabilities interact during a crisis?
What fiscal contingent liabilities means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Financing instruments by layer
How retention and transfer instruments could share losses from fiscal contingent liabilities, from frequent to extreme.
| Layer | Who holds the risk | Speed of funds | Main limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retention and reserves | Budget, contingency funds | Immediate | Size of the budget |
| Contingent credit | Development banks, ministries of finance | Days to weeks | Debt capacity |
| Parametric cover and risk pools | Regional pools, insurers | Days, on a trigger | Basis risk |
| Reinsurance and catastrophe bonds | Reinsurers, capital markets investors | Weeks to months | Cost of capital |
| Residual loss | Households, firms, humanitarian funding | Uncertain | Unfunded |
Drivers and dynamics.
Explicit contingent liabilities are written into law or contract: loan guarantees, deposit insurance, public-private partnership commitments and guarantees on state enterprise debt. Implicit contingent liabilities arise from expectations that the government will act, such as rescuing systemically important banks, supporting subnational governments or funding disaster relief. Studies of fiscal crises show that the crystallisation of contingent liabilities has been a major driver of unexpected increases in public debt.
Contingent liabilities tend to crystallise together. A severe recession can trigger bank losses, state enterprise distress and calls on guarantees at once. Disasters create immediate spending needs and can trigger guarantees on damaged infrastructure. Good practice includes registering, quantifying and disclosing contingent liabilities in fiscal risk statements, and setting limits or charging fees for guarantees.
How it is studied.
- 01
Fiscal risk registers
Cataloguing explicit and implicit contingent liabilities with their triggers.
- 02
Quantification
Estimating expected and stressed costs, using scenario design and stress testing and decision analysis under uncertainty.
- 03
Disclosure analysis
Comparing fiscal risk statements and their coverage across countries.
- 04
Limits
Implicit liabilities are hard to quantify, probabilities are uncertain, and correlation in crises is difficult to model.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Economics and development economicsDebt dynamics · Fiscal multipliers · Fiscal federalismApplied here
- 02Scenario design and stress testingStandard DSA stress tests · Contingent liability shocks · Climate and disaster scenariosApplied here
- 03Decision analysis under uncertaintyDebt management strategy · Fiscal rule design · Guarantee approvalApplied here
- 04EconometricsFiscal reaction functions · Revenue volatility · Disaster effects on public financeApplied here
Questions and answers.
What is a fiscal contingent liability?
Why do SOEs matter for public debt?
What is a fiscal risk statement?
What is an implicit contingent liability?
Why do contingent liabilities matter for debt?
Does GRA assess governments’ guarantees?
Does GRA give advice on this topic?
Changia ushahidi kutoka ukurasa huu.
Reports ni chapisho la kila robo mwaka la Muungano. Unachojua kuhusu somo hili kinaweza kuwa ushahidi, kisa au sahihisho katika toleo lijalo, kikitajwa kwa jina lako na kuchapishwa chini ya CC BY 4.0 pale ambapo ni kazi yako mwenyewe.
- EmailGateway GW-GRASend it from this pageEvidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen depositDeposit it and submit to the communityPublish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsGlobal Risks AllianceSee every way to contributeThe contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
Usitume kamwe data binafsi, maelezo nyeti ya miundombinu wala chochote ambacho huna haki ya kukishiriki. Mchango hupitiwa kabla ya kutumika; kuutuma hakutoi haki za uandishi wala za uhariri, na udhamini haununui matokeo.
Bring an exposure or capital question to the Alliance.
Information and enquiries are open today. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.
Legal documents.
Maps, data and figures on this site are shown for context and general information. They are not advice, forecasts or warnings; the limits of the information are set out in the Disclaimers and Data Notices.