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GRA · Public Finance and Sovereign Debt

Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition

Fiscal contingent liabilities

Contingent liabilities are obligations that fall on the government only if certain events occur: guarantees called, state-owned enterprises failing, public-private partnership contracts triggered or banks needing support. Many are poorly recorded, and when they materialise they can raise debt sharply. This page sets out how contingent liabilities arise and surface, how they are measured and disclosed, and who decides how they are managed.

01Bhalisa

Fiscal contingent liabilities on the record.

02The question

Fiscal contingent liabilities: how the risk develops.

Guarantees, disasters and public exposure. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Indlela yokusebenza

Guarantees move risk off budget

Loan guarantees support projects and enterprises without immediate spending. If borrowers fail, the guarantee is called and the cost lands on the budget.

Indlela yokusebenza

State enterprises borrow implicitly

Utilities, transport and energy companies owned by the state borrow on the expectation of support. Their losses often become government debt.

Indlela yokusebenza

PPP contracts bind future budgets

Public-private partnerships can include revenue guarantees and termination payments. These create future obligations even when they are not recorded as debt.

Indlela yokusebenza

Banking crises transfer to the state

Recapitalising banks or guaranteeing deposits in a crisis can add large amounts to public debt in a short period.

03Spatial finance

Where projects sit, and which layer protects them.

Where development projects meet hazard and poverty, and which financing layer protects them. Hypothetical projects and design values.

Development projects in Mozambique and Malawi against hazard and poverty, with the financing layer that would protect each.Hypothetical projects and design values; no country’s strategy is shown.
04Izalathisi

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeIleyibhile
Explicit government guarantees outstandingcurrency and percent of GDPannualDebt management and budget reportsPublished statistics
State-owned enterprise debtcurrency and percent of GDPannualSOE reports and fiscal risk statementsKUXELIWE
PPP contingent commitmentscurrencyannualPPP registersKUXELIWE
Contingent liabilities that materialisedcurrency per yearannualFiscal accounts and studiesKUQIKELELWE
Fiscal risk statement publishedyes or noannualGovernment recordsPublished statistics
Coverage of public sector debt datainstitutional coverage categoryannualWorld Bank debt reporting heat mapPublished statistics
05Beka iliso

Debt sustainability console.

The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.

Debt sustainability console: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Fiscal contingent liabilities.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
06Imithombo

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

UmthomboWhat it givesLicence class
IMF Fiscal Transparency EvaluationsAssessment of fiscal risk disclosureFree, IMF terms
IMF and World Bank PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Model (P-FRAM)Tool for assessing PPP fiscal costs and risksFree, IMF and World Bank terms
National fiscal risk statementsDisclosure of guarantees, SOEs and other risksPublic records, terms per government
IMF database of contingent liability realisationsHistorical episodes of contingent liabilities materialisingFree, IMF terms (to check)
World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt databasePublic sector debt by institutional coverageCC BY 4.0
07Scenario model

Sovereign debt paths and the odds of breaching a threshold.

The distribution of debt paths, and the share above a threshold of concern at the horizon, that sovereign investors and rating analysts read from a fan chart. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows Africa; the model itself is not tied to a place.

  • Median, 25% to 75% and 10% to 90% bands
  • No shocks

Izilawuli

Debt today
70% of GDP
Effective nominal interest rate
5.0%
Nominal GDP growth
4.5%
Primary balance
−0.5% of GDP
Volatility of growth
2.0 points
Volatility of the interest rate
1.0 points
Years ahead
10 years
Threshold of concern
90% of GDP

Iziphumo ezifundwayo

Median debt at the horizon
79% of GDP
Paths above the threshold at the horizon
2%
Primary balance that stabilises debt
0.3% of GDP
Amanani, iindlela nemithombo
Unyaka10%25%Median75%90%
070.070.070.070.070.0
168.669.670.771.972.8
268.669.971.573.074.3
369.170.672.374.476.0
469.371.173.275.277.1
569.671.774.276.578.5
670.272.275.177.680.4
770.973.275.778.781.3
871.373.976.779.782.4
972.074.877.580.684.3
1072.675.378.781.885.3

Iindlela zokusebenza

  1. Debt dynamics and the interest-growth differential Blanchard (2019), Public debt and low interest rates, American Economic Review 109
  2. Stochastic fan charts Celasun, Debrun and Ostry (2006), IMF Staff Papers 53
  3. Sovereign risk and debt sustainability framework IMF (2022), Staff Guidance Note on the SRDSF

Idatha

No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.

Sovereign debt paths and the odds of breaching a threshold. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: Debt dynamics and the interest-growth differential (Blanchard (2019), Public debt and low interest rates, American Economic Review 109); Stochastic fan charts (Celasun, Debrun and Ostry (2006), IMF Staff Papers 53); Sovereign risk and debt sustainability framework (IMF (2022), Staff Guidance Note on the SRDSF).
08Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Public Finance and Sovereign Debt prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Finance ministriesWhether to issue guarantees and how to price and record themFiscal risk analysis and guarantee records
SOE oversight unitsHow to monitor and limit enterprise borrowingSOE financial data and risk assessments
PPP units and procurement authoritiesWhich contract terms create acceptable fiscal exposureP-FRAM analysis and contract records
LegislaturesWhat limits and disclosure apply to contingent liabilitiesFiscal risk statements and audit findings

Outputs this topic produces

  • Guide to types of fiscal contingent liabilities
  • Method note on stress-testing guarantees and SOE exposures
  • Brief on PPP fiscal risk disclosure
  • Questions for treasuries on fiscal risk statements
09Isilinganisi sokuphindwa nothotho lweziphumo

Trace a shock in fiscal contingent liabilities to the balance sheet.

Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Disaster and climate risk finance: the shocks it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Pick an initiating shock and step through the cascade to see which exposures it reaches and where losses could concentrate. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every weight is a stated assumption. An exercise, not a forecast, a valuation, a rating or investment advice. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.

Iingozi

  • Tropical cyclone
  • Inyikima
  • Ice-jam flood
  • Storm surge (set off downstream)
  • Intense rainfall (set off downstream)
  • River flood (set off downstream)
  • Flash flood (set off downstream)
  • Dangerous surf (set off downstream)
  • Ukuqhawuka kombane okuxhaphakileyo (kubangela iziphumo ezilandelayo)
  • Ukufuduswa kwabantu abaninzi (kubangela iziphumo ezilandelayo)
  • Coastal flood (set off downstream)
  • Aftershock sequence (set off downstream)
  • Fault surface rupture (set off downstream)
  • Soil liquefaction (set off downstream)
  • Slope slide (set off downstream)
  • Rockfall (set off downstream)
  • Tsunami (set off downstream)
  • Building collapse (set off downstream)

Izilawuli

  • NS-0 Umgaqo-siseko nemigaqo
  • NS-3 Ii-UNI zerekhodi yomngcipheko (igrama, uthelekiso lwakudala, igunya lokwabiwa)
  • NS-9 Ii-UNI zemeko (ukusasazwa, iimeko, iimeko zenkqubo)
  • NS-10 Imigaqo-nkqubo namagatya (izibophelelo ezifundeka ngoomatshini: inkcazo, ukubopha, uvavanyo nokunyanzeliswa)
  • NS-11 Ukuqinisekiswa nokubekwa kweliso (ubungqina, iziqinisekiso, uqwalaselo lokuhambelana ngaphandle kokuthemba)
  • NS-14 Ukuhambelana nokuthelekiswa nemigangatho yangaphandle
  • NRS-F8 Parametric and index-based risk transfer
  • NRS-F7 Disaster risk finance and pre-arranged finance
  • NRS-H113 Hazard family: Financial-system fragility (NHS-1 soc.financial-system)
  • NRS-H114 Hazard family: Macroeconomic and fiscal shocks (NHS-1 soc.macro-fiscal)
  • NRS-D1 Risk-informed development and project screening
  • NRS-H28 Hazard family: Climate-state shifts (NHS-1 eco.climate-state)

Uqwalaselo

  • ERA5 reanalysis (Copernicus Climate Data Store) (listed for reference)
  • CHIRPS quasi-global gridded precipitation (listed for reference)
  • USGS earthquake GeoJSON summary feeds (listed for reference)
  • Total public international support for national disaster risk reduction actions (Sendai indicator F-1)
  • Direct economic loss attributed to disasters in relation to global GDP

Umzekelo wejografi

  • Western Europe: 152 hexagonal cells
  • Isantya semvula, isiqingatha seyure esidlulileyo (IMERG), NASA GIBS
  • Izibane zasebusuku namhlanje, ukuqhawuka kombane (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
  • Amanzi aphezu komhlaba phantsi kwamafu, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 radar), NASA GIBS
  • Surface soil moisture (SMAP), NASA GIBS
10Core questions

What specialists ask.

  • What explicit and implicit contingent liabilities does a government carry?
  • How likely are they to crystallise, and how large could they be?
  • How do public-private partnerships create long-term fiscal exposure?
  • How should contingent liabilities be disclosed and managed?
  • How do contingent liabilities interact during a crisis?
11Exposure, loss and capital

What fiscal contingent liabilities means for exposure, loss and capital.

The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.

Financing instruments by layer

How retention and transfer instruments could share losses from fiscal contingent liabilities, from frequent to extreme.

Retention and reservesFrequent, low severityContingent creditIphakathiParametric cover and risk poolsOkunzimaReinsurance and catastrophe bondsRare, extremeResidual lossBeyond all layersseverity rises upward
LayerWho holds the riskSpeed of fundsMain limit
Retention and reservesBudget, contingency fundsImmediateSize of the budget
Contingent creditDevelopment banks, ministries of financeDays to weeksDebt capacity
Parametric cover and risk poolsRegional pools, insurersDays, on a triggerBasis risk
Reinsurance and catastrophe bondsReinsurers, capital markets investorsWeeks to monthsCost of capital
Residual lossHouseholds, firms, humanitarian fundingUncertainUnfunded
Risk layering as described in disaster risk finance practice; instruments are illustrative of the structure, not offers, prices or advice.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
12Mechanisms

Drivers and dynamics.

Explicit contingent liabilities are written into law or contract: loan guarantees, deposit insurance, public-private partnership commitments and guarantees on state enterprise debt. Implicit contingent liabilities arise from expectations that the government will act, such as rescuing systemically important banks, supporting subnational governments or funding disaster relief. Studies of fiscal crises show that the crystallisation of contingent liabilities has been a major driver of unexpected increases in public debt.

Contingent liabilities tend to crystallise together. A severe recession can trigger bank losses, state enterprise distress and calls on guarantees at once. Disasters create immediate spending needs and can trigger guarantees on damaged infrastructure. Good practice includes registering, quantifying and disclosing contingent liabilities in fiscal risk statements, and setting limits or charging fees for guarantees.

13Methods and limits

How it is studied.

  1. 01

    Fiscal risk registers

    Cataloguing explicit and implicit contingent liabilities with their triggers.

  2. 02

    Quantification

    Estimating expected and stressed costs, using scenario design and stress testing and decision analysis under uncertainty.

  3. 03

    Disclosure analysis

    Comparing fiscal risk statements and their coverage across countries.

  4. 04

    Imida

    Implicit liabilities are hard to quantify, probabilities are uncertain, and correlation in crises is difficult to model.

14Iindlela zokusebenza

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

15Imibuzo

Imibuzo neempendulo.

What is a fiscal contingent liability?
A government obligation that depends on an uncertain future event, such as a guarantee being called or a state enterprise needing support.
Why do SOEs matter for public debt?
Because governments often stand behind their enterprises, so SOE losses and debts can become government obligations even if not recorded as public debt.
What is a fiscal risk statement?
A government report that identifies and, where possible, quantifies risks to the public finances, including contingent liabilities.
What is an implicit contingent liability?
An obligation the government is expected to meet, such as rescuing a major bank, though no law or contract requires it.
Why do contingent liabilities matter for debt?
Because when they crystallise, they can add suddenly to public debt, often during a crisis.
Does GRA assess governments’ guarantees?
No. It studies the field at sector level.
Does GRA give advice on this topic?
No. GRA does not lend, underwrite, rate, invest, advise on or arrange transactions, including sovereign borrowing or debt restructuring, and it introduces no counterparties. Readiness work is not approval. Its analysis is shared, sector-level understanding.
IingxeloNikela

Faka ubungqina obuvela kweli phepha.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

Global Risks AlliancePublic Finance and Sovereign DebtFinance and Insurance ReadinessCountry Systems Risk and Resilience
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