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GRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure

Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition

Cybersecurity and cryptography for payments and market infrastructure

Cybersecurity protects pergalan and data against attack. On this platform it covers threats to payment and settlement infrastructure, endpoint security, threat-led testing and recovery from attacks that corrupt data or halt operations.

Pirsek bike Back to STEM foundation of Payments and Market Infrastructure
01Qeyd

Cybersecurity and cryptography for payments and market infrastructure on the record.

Method recordSTEM method
  1. RêbazEwlehiya sîber û kriptografî
  3. Applied inDayîn û binesaziya bazarê
  6. Canonical pageSTEM Commons
02Serlêdan

What cybersecurity and cryptography does here.

Cybersecurity and cryptography protect information pergalan and data from unauthorised access, disruption and manipulation. They address threats that can spread rapidly across interconnected digital and physical systems. In financial stability, cyber and digital resilience and digital public infrastructure, cybersecurity analysis identifies how a single compromise can propagate across sectors that share software, vendors or networks. It informs resilience requirements and cyber insurance. The canonical description is on the STEM Commons.

Endpoint control frameworks

Security controls required of participants connecting to payment networks are examined for coverage of known fraud techniques.

Threat-led testing

Red-team methods based on real attacker techniques are explained, with how scope and safety are controlled in production.

Destructive attack recovery

Recovery from ransomware and integrity attacks is analysed, including clean-room rebuilds and reconciliation of balances.

03Stress test

How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.

The equity the system loses after interbank contagion, against the initial hit, as leverage, interconnection and recovery rates change, the core of a macroprudential Testa zextê. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.

Kontrol

Fall in external assets
2.0%
Leverage (assets over equity)
10 times
Interbank share of assets
10%
Recovery on interbank claims
40%
Banks in the system
20
Core banks
20% of banks

Xwendin

Equity lost to the initial shock
18.0%
Equity lost after contagion
45.0%
Added by contagion (DebtRank)
27.0 points
Banks in default
0
Jimar, rêbaz û çavkanî
RoundSystem equity lost (%)Banks in default
018.000
128.800
235.280
339.170
441.500
542.900
643.740
744.240
844.550
944.730
1044.840
1144.900
1244.940
1344.960
1444.980
1544.990
1644.990
1745.000
1845.000
1945.000
2045.000
2145.000
2245.000
2345.000
2445.000
2545.000
2645.000
2745.000
2845.000
2945.000
3045.000

Rêbaz

  1. DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
  2. Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
  3. Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
  4. Clearing in financial networks Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
  5. Pankeya nediyarîyê (Monte Carlo ya parametreyan) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
  6. Hesasiyeta yek-yek (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley

Dane

No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.

How a shock to assets becomes a system loss. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466).

Li seranserê şeş stûnan, bi pêşengiya Nexus Consortium

04Dane

What the method consumes.

Datasets and records used by cybersecurity and cryptography on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in the source register.

DaneRolNîşan
Threat intelligence reportsThreat landscapeREPORTED
Test framework documentsTesting methodsStatîstîkên weşandî
Incident reportsAttack outcomesREPORTED
05Exposure, loss and capital

What it means for exposure, loss and capital.

The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.

Transmission channels

How a shock in cybersecurity and cryptography for payments and market infrastructure reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.

Channel structure after the Basel Committee’s work on climate-related risk drivers and transmission channels; links shown are typical paths, not estimated exposures.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
06Erêkirin

How results are checked.

Controls are tested through red-team exercises, audits and formal analysis of cryptographic schemes. Incident data are used to check whether defences performed as intended.

Kontrol bikinHow it is done
Threat relevanceScenarios are based on current, sector-relevant threats
Safety controlsTests document controls that protect production
Nirxandina serbixweFindings are reviewed by parties outside the tested team

Adversaries adapt, so historical data may not reflect future attacks. Software supply chains and legacy systems introduce weaknesses that are hard to inventory.

07Connections

Topics that rely on this method.

08Stewardship

Who maintains the method.

Ewlehiya sîber û berxwedana dîjîtal stewards cybersecurity and cryptography for the Consortium and reviews how it is applied across platforms.

Canonical page: Cybersecurity and cryptography

09Girêdayî

Ev rûpel li ser Konsorsiyûmê te ber bi kû ve dibe.

10Pirs

Pirs û bersiv.

What are the limits of cybersecurity and cryptography in this field?
Adversaries adapt, so historical data may not reflect future attacks. Software supply chains and legacy systems introduce weaknesses that are hard to inventory.
How are results checked?
Controls are tested through red-team exercises, audits and formal analysis of cryptographic schemes. Incident data are used to check whether defences performed as intended.
Are the values on this page real?
The data names, roles and checks are real descriptions of practice. The canvas shows a design of the method’s use, not a run; no result is reported here.
Where else is this method applied?
Çavdêrxaneya canonical method page lists every platform that applies it.
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rêzeya Pergalên Stratejîk is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

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