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GRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure

Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition

Payment cyber security

Payment and settlement systems are prime targets for cyber attack: theft through compromised endpoints, ransomware that halts operations and attacks on data integrity that corrupt balances. Because transactions settle quickly and finally, recovery is hard. This page sets out how cyber risk to payment infrastructure develops, how resilience is measured, and who decides.

01تۆمارکردن

Payment cyber security on the record.

02پرسیارەکە

Payment cyber security: how the risk develops.

Operational integrity and threat exposure. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

میکانیزم

Endpoints are the weak point

Attackers target participant systems connected to payment networks, sending fraudulent instructions that the network treats as valid.

میکانیزم

Integrity attacks corrupt records

An attack that alters balances or transactions undermines trust in the system’s records. Recovery must restore a correct state, not only resume operations.

میکانیزم

Resumption targets meet reality

Standards set a two-hour target to resume critical operations, but recovering safely from a destructive attack may take longer.

میکانیزم

Shared threat intelligence

Attacks often hit several institutions. Sharing indicators and coordinating response limits spread across the sector.

03تاقیکردنەوەی فشار

How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.

ئەو سەرمایەیەی سیستەمەکە دوای سەرایەتی نێوان بانکەکان لەدەستی دەدات، بەراورد بە زەبرە سەرەتاییەکە، کاتێک ڕێژەی قەرزکاری، پەیوەندیی نێوانیان و ڕێژەی گەڕانەوە دەگۆڕێن، کە کرۆکی تاقیکردنەوەی فشاری ئیحتیاتیی ماکرۆیە. مۆدێلێکی فێرکارییە بە بەهای نموونەیی دیاریکراو، نەک پێشبینی.

کۆنترۆڵەکان

Fall in external assets
2.0%
Leverage (assets over equity)
10 جار
Interbank share of assets
10%
Recovery on interbank claims
40%
Banks in the system
20
بانکە سەرەکییەکان
20% of banks

خوێندنەوەکان

Equity lost to the initial shock
18.0%
Equity lost after contagion
45.0%
Added by contagion (DebtRank)
27.0 خاڵ
Banks in default
0
ژمارە، ڕێگا و سەرچاوەکان
خولSystem equity lost (%)Banks in default
018.000
128.800
235.280
339.170
441.500
542.900
643.740
744.240
844.550
944.730
1044.840
1144.900
1244.940
1344.960
1444.980
1544.990
1644.990
1745.000
1845.000
1945.000
2045.000
2145.000
2245.000
2345.000
2445.000
2545.000
2645.000
2745.000
2845.000
2945.000
3045.000

ڕێگاکان

  1. DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
  2. Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
  3. Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
  4. Clearing in financial networks Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
  5. پەنجەی نادڵنیایی (مۆنتی کارلۆی پارامیتەر) Spiegelhalter, Pearson و Short (2011)، Visualising uncertainty about the future، Science 333
  6. هەستیاریی یەک-یەک (تۆرناد) Saltelli و ئەوانی دیکە (2008)، Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer، Wiley

داتا

No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.

How a shock to assets becomes a system loss. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466).

لە ناو شەش کۆڵەکەکەدا، بە سەرپەرشتیی Nexus Consortium

04نیشاندەرەکان

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

نیشاندەریەکەڕیتمSource typeناونیشان
Cyber incidents reported by FMIscount by typeساڵانەOverseer reportsئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان
Participants attesting to security controlsshare of participantsساڵانەNetwork security programmesDECLARED
Time to resume critical operations in testshoursper testTest reportsچاودێریکراو
Threat-led penetration tests completedcountساڵانەTIBER-EU and DORA recordsئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان
Fraudulent payment instructions detectedcount and valueساڵانەOperator and industry reportsڕاپۆرتکراو
Post-quantum migration plans in placeshare of operatorsperiodicSurveysDECLARED
05Exposure, loss and capital

What payment cyber security means for exposure, loss and capital.

The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.

Transmission channels

How a shock in payment cyber security reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.

Channel structure after the Basel Committee’s work on climate-related risk drivers and transmission channels; links shown are typical paths, not estimated exposures.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
06سەرچاوەکان

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

سەرچاوەWhat it givesLicence class
CPMI-IOSCO guidance on cyber resilience for FMIsCyber resilience expectationsFree, BIS terms
CPMI strategy for reducing wholesale payment endpoint fraudElements to reduce endpoint fraudFree, BIS terms
ECB TIBER-EU framework documentsThreat intelligence-based ethical red-teamingFree, ECB terms
FS-ISAC public reportsFinancial sector threat trendsFree to read, terms to check
ENISA threat landscape for the finance sectorThreats to EU financial entitiesFree, ENISA terms
07بڕیارەکان

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Payments and Market Infrastructure prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

کێ بڕیار دەداتپرسیارەکەEvidence this page serves
FMI boards and security functionsHow to protect, detect, respond and recoverThreat intelligence and test results
OverseersWhether cyber resilience meets expectationsAssessments and incident records
بەشداربووانHow to secure connections to payment networksNetwork security requirements
Authorities coordinating sector responseHow to share information and coordinate in incidentsSector exercise findings

Outputs this topic produces

  • Guide to cyber resilience expectations for FMIs
  • Brief on endpoint security and fraudulent instructions
  • Method note on integrity recovery
  • Questions for boards on post-quantum migration
08Core questions

What the industry asks.

Attacks on payment systems have included fraudulent payment instructions sent through compromised participants, ransomware against providers and disruption of services. The consequences go beyond financial loss: corrupted data can force settlement to halt while positions are reconciled, and loss of confidence can spread. Because infrastructures connect many participants, a weak participant can be the entry point for an attack on the system.

  • Which threats target payment infrastructures and participants, and how have attack techniques evolved?
  • How is the integrity of payment data protected, and how would corrupted data be detected and corrected?
  • Can critical payment operations resume quickly after a destructive attack without restoring compromised systems?
  • How do participants’ security levels affect the security of the infrastructures they connect to?
09Mechanisms

How the infrastructure works and fails.

Payment cyber risk spans infrastructures, participants and their providers.

Endpoints

Participant security

Attackers have used compromised participant systems to send fraudulent payment instructions through legitimate channels.

ڕاستگۆیی

Data correctness

Corruption of payment or account data can be harder to recover from than an outage, because the correct state must be re-established.

Recovery

Resuming operations

Recovery from a destructive attack may require clean systems and reconciled data, which takes time and coordination.

A distinctive challenge for payments is the tension between rapid recovery and data integrity. Restoring operations quickly from backups risks reintroducing malware or corrupted data, while waiting for full verification prolongs disruption. Industry discussion has focused on clean recovery environments, data vaults and agreed procedures for reconciling positions across participants after an incident.

10ڕێگا و بەڵگە

How the evidence is built, and its limits.

  1. 01

    Threat intelligence

    Sector information sharing on threats and techniques. Shared through dedicated arrangements, not by this platform.

  2. 02

    Security frameworks

    Established frameworks and supervisory expectations for cyber resilience in financial market infrastructures.

  3. 03

    Incident analysis

    Published incident reports, analysed with cybersecurity and cryptography. Many incidents are not disclosed in detail.

  4. 04

    Scenario exercises

    Sector-wide exercises simulating cyber attacks on payment systems.

12پرسیارەکان

پرسیار و وەڵام.

What is the two-hour recovery target?
The CPMI-IOSCO cyber guidance expects FMIs to be able to resume critical operations within two hours of a disruption, while ensuring data integrity, and to complete settlement by end of day.
What is endpoint fraud?
Fraud in which attackers compromise a participant’s systems to send unauthorised payment instructions through a legitimate network.
Why does post-quantum cryptography matter for payments?
Because a future quantum computer could break widely used public-key cryptography, and long-lived systems and data need to migrate to quantum-resistant algorithms in time.
Does the platform share threat intelligence?
No. Threat sharing takes place through dedicated sector arrangements. The platform builds shared understanding of risks at a general level.
What is a cyber recovery objective?
A target for resuming critical operations after a cyber incident. Supervisory expectations in many jurisdictions set ambitious objectives that are challenging to meet for destructive attacks.
Why does quantum computing matter for payments?
Because much payment security relies on public-key cryptography that a future quantum computer could break. Migration planning is studied at post-quantum migration.
Can the platform help during a cyber incident?
No. The Consortium is not an emergency or incident response service. Contact your national computer emergency response team or your own security provider.
ڕاپۆرتەکانبەشداربە

لەم لاپەڕەیەوە بەڵگە پێشکەش بکە.

Reports بڵاوکراوەی وەرزیی کۆنسۆرتیۆم ـە. ئەوەی تۆ لەسەر ئەم بابەتە دەیزانیت دەتوانێت لە وەشانی داهاتوودا ببێتە بەڵگە، کەیس یان ڕاستکردنەوە، بە ناوی خۆتەوە و لەژێر CC BY 4.0 بڵاو دەکرێتەوە کاتێک کاری خۆتە.

Global Risks AlliancePayments and Market InfrastructureStrategic SystemsScenario and Stress-Test

هەرگیز داتای کەسی، وردەکاریی هەستیاری ژێرخان یان هیچ شتێک مەنێرە کە مافی بڵاوکردنەوەت نییە. بەشدارییەک پێش بەکارهێنان پێداچوونەوەی بۆ دەکرێت؛ ناردنی ماف نابەخشێت بە نووسەرایەتی یان بەڕێوەبردنی ڕاگەیاندن، و پاڵپشتی دارایی هەرگیز دۆزینەوەیەک ناکڕێت.

پارەدان و ژێرخانی بازاڕ

Bring an exposure or capital question to the Alliance.

زانیاری و پرسیار ئەمڕۆ کراوەن. پرسیارێک ژمارەی ئاماژەی پێدەدرێت و هەنگاوی دواتر دیاری دەکات؛ داواکاری، پارەدان، تەرخانکردنی کۆمپیوتەر و تۆمارکردن تەنیا کاتێک دەکرێنەوە کە تیم، مەرج و توانای پێداچوونەوەیان هەبێت.