GRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Payment cyber security
Payment and settlement systems are prime targets for cyber attack: theft through compromised endpoints, ransomware that halts operations and attacks on data integrity that corrupt balances. Because transactions settle quickly and finally, recovery is hard. This page sets out how cyber risk to payment infrastructure develops, how resilience is measured, and who decides.
Payment cyber security on the record.
Payment cyber security: how the risk develops.
Operational integrity and threat exposure. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Endpoints are the weak point
Attackers target participant systems connected to payment networks, sending fraudulent instructions that the network treats as valid.
Integrity attacks corrupt records
An attack that alters balances or transactions undermines trust in the system’s records. Recovery must restore a correct state, not only resume operations.
Resumption targets meet reality
Standards set a two-hour target to resume critical operations, but recovering safely from a destructive attack may take longer.
Shared threat intelligence
Attacks often hit several institutions. Sharing indicators and coordinating response limits spread across the sector.
How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.
The equity the system loses after interbank contagion, against the initial hit, as leverage, interconnection and recovery rates change, the core of a macroprudential stress test. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.
Controls
- Fall in external assets
- 2.0%
- Leverage (assets over equity)
- 10 times
- Interbank share of assets
- 10%
- Recovery on interbank claims
- 40%
- Banks in the system
- 20
- Core banks
- 20% of banks
Readouts
- Equity lost to the initial shock
- 18.0%
- Equity lost after contagion
- 45.0%
- Added by contagion (DebtRank)
- 27.0 points
- Banks in default
- 0
Numbers, methods and sources
| Round | System equity lost (%) | Banks in default |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.00 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.80 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.28 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.17 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.50 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.90 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.74 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.24 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.55 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.73 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.84 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.90 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.94 | 0 |
| 13 | 44.96 | 0 |
| 14 | 44.98 | 0 |
| 15 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 16 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.00 | 0 |
Izindlela
- DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
- Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
- Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
- Clearing in financial networks Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
- Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
- One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Idatha
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in Payments and Market Infrastructure in Foundry
- Tested at Payments and Market Infrastructure in Universe
- Codified in Finance, Insurance and the Economy in Standards
- Published in Payments and Market Infrastructure in Reports
- Taught in Faculty of Finance and Economics in Academy
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cyber incidents reported by FMIs | count by type | annual | Overseer reports | Published statistics |
| Participants attesting to security controls | share of participants | annual | Network security programmes | DECLARED |
| Time to resume critical operations in tests | hours | per test | Test reports | OBSERVED |
| Threat-led penetration tests completed | count | annual | TIBER-EU and DORA records | Published statistics |
| Fraudulent payment instructions detected | count and value | annual | Operator and industry reports | REPORTED |
| Post-quantum migration plans in place | share of operators | periodic | Surveys | DECLARED |
What payment cyber security means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Transmission channels
How a shock in payment cyber security reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Umthombo | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| CPMI-IOSCO guidance on cyber resilience for FMIs | Cyber resilience expectations | Free, BIS terms |
| CPMI strategy for reducing wholesale payment endpoint fraud | Elements to reduce endpoint fraud | Free, BIS terms |
| ECB TIBER-EU framework documents | Threat intelligence-based ethical red-teaming | Free, ECB terms |
| FS-ISAC public reports | Financial sector threat trends | Free to read, terms to check |
| ENISA threat landscape for the finance sector | Threats to EU financial entities | Free, ENISA terms |
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Payments and Market Infrastructure prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Ubani onqumayo | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| FMI boards and security functions | How to protect, detect, respond and recover | Threat intelligence and test results |
| Overseers | Whether cyber resilience meets expectations | Assessments and incident records |
| Participants | How to secure connections to payment networks | Network security requirements |
| Authorities coordinating sector response | How to share information and coordinate in incidents | Sector exercise findings |
Outputs this topic produces
- Guide to cyber resilience expectations for FMIs
- Brief on endpoint security and fraudulent instructions
- Method note on integrity recovery
- Questions for boards on post-quantum migration
What the industry asks.
Attacks on payment systems have included fraudulent payment instructions sent through compromised participants, ransomware against providers and disruption of services. The consequences go beyond financial loss: corrupted data can force settlement to halt while positions are reconciled, and loss of confidence can spread. Because infrastructures connect many participants, a weak participant can be the entry point for an attack on the system.
- Which threats target payment infrastructures and participants, and how have attack techniques evolved?
- How is the integrity of payment data protected, and how would corrupted data be detected and corrected?
- Can critical payment operations resume quickly after a destructive attack without restoring compromised systems?
- How do participants’ security levels affect the security of the infrastructures they connect to?
How the infrastructure works and fails.
Payment cyber risk spans infrastructures, participants and their providers.
Participant security
Attackers have used compromised participant systems to send fraudulent payment instructions through legitimate channels.
Data correctness
Corruption of payment or account data can be harder to recover from than an outage, because the correct state must be re-established.
Resuming operations
Recovery from a destructive attack may require clean systems and reconciled data, which takes time and coordination.
A distinctive challenge for payments is the tension between rapid recovery and data integrity. Restoring operations quickly from backups risks reintroducing malware or corrupted data, while waiting for full verification prolongs disruption. Industry discussion has focused on clean recovery environments, data vaults and agreed procedures for reconciling positions across participants after an incident.
How the evidence is built, and its limits.
- 01
Threat intelligence
Sector information sharing on threats and techniques. Shared through dedicated arrangements, not by this platform.
- 02
Security frameworks
Established frameworks and supervisory expectations for cyber resilience in financial market infrastructures.
- 03
Incident analysis
Published incident reports, analysed with cybersecurity and cryptography. Many incidents are not disclosed in detail.
- 04
Scenario exercises
Sector-wide exercises simulating cyber attacks on payment systems.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Cybersecurity and cryptographyEndpoint control frameworks · Threat-led testing · Destructive attack recoveryApplied here
- 02Reliability and resilience engineeringImpact tolerance setting · Recovery design · Learning from incidentsApplied here
- 03Quantum computing, sensing and communicationCryptographic inventory · Migration planning · Harvest now, decrypt laterApplied here
- 04Payment and financial market technologyLiquidity-saving mechanisms · ISO 20022 data quality · Settlement cycle designApplied here
Questions and answers.
What is the two-hour recovery target?
What is endpoint fraud?
Why does post-quantum cryptography matter for payments?
Does the platform share threat intelligence?
What is a cyber recovery objective?
Why does quantum computing matter for payments?
Can the platform help during a cyber incident?
Nikela ngobufakazi kusuka kuleli khasi.
Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
- EmailGateway GW-GRASend it from this pageEvidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen depositDeposit it and submit to the communityPublish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsGlobal Risks AllianceSee every way to contributeThe contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
Ungalokothi uthumele idatha yomuntu siqu, imininingwane ebucayi yengqalasizinda noma noma yini ongenalo ilungelo lokuyabelana ngayo. Umnikelo ubuyekezwa ngaphambi kokusetshenziswa; ukuwuthumela akunikezi ubuqambi noma amalungelo okuhlela, futhi ukusekela akuthengi muphumela.
Bring an exposure or capital question to the Alliance.
Information and enquiries are open today. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.
Legal documents.
Maps, data and figures on this site are shown for context and general information. They are not advice, forecasts or warnings; the limits of the information are set out in the Disclaimers and Data Notices.