GRA · Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
Operational risk, cyber incidents and interconnected technology dependencies in financial services. Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience is an established platform of The Global Risks Alliance.
- STEM methods
- 4
- Canonical methods this field applies
- Topics
- 8
- Subject pages in the field
- Counterparts
- 10
- Platforms in shared fields across the network
- Report series
- 2
- Reports series it contributes to
The workspace for Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience.
Important business services
Bank B services · Self-assessment 1 · Example interface, not a record
Services vs impact tolerance
| Make a payment | 4 | 2 | Cloud region loss | Outside |
| Access cash | 15 | 8 | Cyber attack | Within |
| Mortgage servicing | 71 | 28 | Data centre loss | Within |
| Claims payment | 33 | 68 | Third-party failure | Outside |
Dependency map
people · process · technology · third parties
Remediation
- R-1Second claims platform supplierExit plan tested113 d
- R-2Immutable backups for paymentsCyber recovery40 d
Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience · Important business services. Important business services: example names and illustrative values, not a record.
What the work is read against.
The platform does not set standards. It reads its evidence against the frameworks that competent bodies have adopted, so a finding can be placed where a decision-maker already works.
| Framework or standard | Body | What it sets |
|---|---|---|
| Principles for Operational Resilience and Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk | Basel Committee on Banking Supervision | Expectations for banks to identify critical operations, set tolerance for disruption, map interconnections and test resilience |
| Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) | European Union | ICT risk management, incident classification and reporting, resilience testing, third-party risk and oversight of critical ICT providers |
| Operational resilience policy for important business services and impact tolerances | Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority | Requirements to identify important business services, set impact tolerances and remain within them in severe but plausible scenarios |
| Recommendations to achieve greater convergence in cyber incident reporting and the Format for Incident Reporting Exchange (FIRE) | Financial Stability Board | Common terms and a common information format for reporting cyber and operational incidents to authorities |
| G7 Fundamental Elements of Cybersecurity for the Financial Sector | G7 Cyber Expert Group | Elements of cybersecurity governance, third-party risk and threat-led testing for financial firms and authorities |
| Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 | US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) | Govern, identify, protect, detect, respond and recover functions for managing cybersecurity risk |
| ISO/IEC 27001 information security management systems | ISO and IEC | Requirements for establishing and improving an information security management system |
| Guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures | CPMI and IOSCO | Cyber resilience expectations for infrastructures, including resumption of critical operations |
How a local shock becomes a system outage.
How much of the networks an operator, insurer or lender depends on stays working after a local shock, and how much the coupling between them amplifies it. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.
Controls
- Assets per layer
- 18
- Hazard footprint
- 8% of area
- Assets that depend on another layer
- 60%
- Spare capacity (tolerance)
- 30%
Readouts
- Assets hit by the hazard
- 9%
- Assets still working
- 31%
- Amplification of the initial damage
- 7.4 times
- Steps to settle
- 6
Numbers, methods and sources
| Step | Data centres working (%) | Networks working (%) | Power working (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 100 | 83 | 89 |
| 1 | 100 | 67 | 61 |
| 2 | 94 | 67 | 22 |
| 3 | 89 | 67 | 22 |
| 4 | 72 | 67 | 17 |
| 5 | 39 | 56 | 17 |
| 6 | 39 | 39 | 17 |
Methods
- Interdependent networks Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464
- Overload cascades Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66
- Betweenness load Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25
- Multilayer networks Kivela and others (2014), Journal of Complex Networks 2
- Infrastructure interdependencies Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001), IEEE Control Systems 21(6)
- Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
- One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Data
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page’s map can draw:
- Major roads Natural Earth
- Railways Natural Earth
- Seaports Natural Earth
- Airports Natural Earth
- Urban extents Natural Earth
- Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band) NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP) · register nasa.gibs.context-live-layers
- Natural events (NASA EONET) NASA EONET · register nasa.eonet.events
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience in Foundry
- Tested at Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience in Universe
- Codified in Digital, Cyber and AI in Standards
- Published in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience in Reports
- Taught in Faculty of Technology and Digital Systems in Academy
The questions this field works on.
Critical business services
Identifying service continuity outcomes.
TopicFinancial cyber threats
Attack paths and control evidence.
TopicCloud and outsourcing
Concentration and resilience.
TopicIncident and crisis response
Response roles, escalation and recovery.
TopicDigital supply chains
Vendor risks and software dependencies.
TopicData integrity and availability
Confidentiality, integrity and continuity.
TopicOperational resilience testing
Severe but plausible scenario design.
TopicResilience metrics
Tolerances, metrics and measurement limits.
Trace a shock in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience to the balance sheet.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Cyber resilience and digital operational resilience: the shocks it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Pick an initiating shock and step through the cascade to see which exposures it reaches and where losses could concentrate. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every weight is a stated assumption. An exercise, not a forecast, a valuation, a rating or investment advice. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
Hazards
- Dam failure
- River flood (set off downstream)
- Flash flood (set off downstream)
- Mass displacement (set off downstream)
- Widespread power outage (set off downstream)
- Water supply shortfall (set off downstream)
Systems and couplings
Controls
NS-0Constitution and principlesNS-9Contextual UNIs (deployments, instances, programme instances)NS-10Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations: definition, binding, evaluation and enforcement)NS-11Verification and monitoring (evidence, attestations, zero-trust conformance observation)NS-12Software, model and AI/ML artefacts (supply chain, model cards, dataset sheets)NRS-X6Cyber and digital security riskNRS-H54Hazard family: Signal and platform disruption (NHS-1 cyber.platform)NRS-P10Third-party, outsourcing and concentration riskNRS-H107Hazard family: Digital infrastructure concentration and monoculture (NHS-1 tech.digital-concentration)NRS-K31Domain pack profile: Cyber national resilience (DOMAIN-031)NRS-S7System profile: NXS-EOP (Earth observation and digital twins)
Observation
- Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue (listed for reference)
- National Vulnerability Database (CVE enrichment API) (listed for reference)
- OSV open source vulnerability database (listed for reference)
- Proportion of population covered by a mobile network, by technology
Example geography
- North America: 243 hexagonal cells
- Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
- Surface water through cloud, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 radar), NASA GIBS
- Rain rate, last half hour (IMERG), NASA GIBS
- Surface soil moisture (SMAP), NASA GIBS
What Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience does.
Financial cyber and operational resilience is the ability of financial firms to keep critical services running through cyber attacks, technology failures and supplier outages, and to recover correct data. Global Risks Alliance’s platform explains services and tolerances, threats, cloud, incidents, supply chains, testing and metrics. It does not publish intelligence or advise.
Its community
Financial CISOs; operational risk officers; resilience specialists; cyber researchers.
Its methods
Financial operational resilience; third-party mapping; incident evidence.
Its outputs
Resilience playbooks; finance cyber scenario summaries.
Coupled risk, applied response.
The sectors that carry exposure in urban flood and how a loss in one passes to the others, across portfolios and public finances.
Choose a context
Sectors · Urban floodStress
Pillars · Urban floodKPI
In this contextDependence or handoff, heavier is strongerOutside this context
Programme yearAll phases
Context
Urban flood
Flooded streets take out substations, pumping stations and clinic access together; drinking water fails when power does.
W · E · I · F · H · B
Risk
- Sectors
- 4 of 6
- Relations
- 6 of 15
- Coupling
- 0.46 share of total
Hover a corner, a line or a row to trace it across both sides.
Route
Applied to urban flood
L · F · U · S · R · A
Response
- Pillars
- 5 of 6
- Handoffs
- 11 of 18
- Loops
- 8 closed
Expected value
- What is at stake
- $390Ba year at least, in infrastructure disruption costs to households and firms in low- and middle-income countriesWorld Bank, Lifelines, 2019
- Return on resilience
- 4 : 1benefit to costWorld Bank, Lifelines, 2019
- Avoided loss
- 30%less damage with 24 hours’ warning of a storm or heatwaveGlobal Commission on Adaptation, Adapt Now, 2019
Hover a pillar, a line or a row to read how it is applied.
A: a teaching cascade (shock 0.6, gain 0.35, four rounds) over teaching values for a typical city-region, not measurements. B: illustrative applications and the KPI each pillar answers for; values are published benchmarks, cited, not forecasts. Open events: NASA EONET, live.
Finance runs on technology that many firms share.
Payments, trading, lending, insurance and custody are now digital services. They depend on data centres, networks, cloud platforms, software suppliers and market infrastructures, many of which are shared across the industry. A failure in one of these can stop services at many firms at once.
Financial firms are attractive targets for cyber attack because they hold money and data, and because disruption creates leverage for extortion. Ransomware, fraud enabled by intrusion, attacks on payment systems and denial-of-service campaigns are persistent threats. Attackers increasingly target suppliers and software components to reach many firms through a single breach.
Not every disruption is an attack. Faulty software updates, configuration errors, data centre failures and outages at cloud providers have halted financial services without any malicious intent. Operational risk in finance has therefore shifted from a focus on preventing individual failures towards ensuring that important services continue, within tolerances, whatever the cause.
These disruptions can become systemic. A payment system outage stops salaries and supplier payments across an economy. A corrupted dataset at a widely used provider can spread errors to every firm that relies on it. Loss of confidence in a firm’s ability to operate can trigger withdrawals or market stress. Supervisors in several jurisdictions now treat operational resilience as a core prudential concern alongside capital and liquidity.
What Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Transmission channels
How a shock in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.
Scenario pathways
How Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience could be stressed under the scenario families central banks and supervisors use.
| Scenario family | Transition risk | Physical risk | What a stress test asks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Orderly | Early, gradual policy | Lower | Can the book absorb a steady repricing? |
| Disorderly | Late, abrupt policy | Lower to medium | What breaks under a sudden repricing and credit migration? |
| Hot house world | Limited policy | High and rising | Where do physical losses concentrate in collateral and insurance? |
A shared picture of operational and cyber resilience.
The platform works through financial operational resilience analysis, third-party dependency mapping and incident evidence. Its outputs are designed for the industry as a whole, not for any one firm. GRA does not lend, underwrite, rate, invest, advise on or arrange transactions, introduce counterparties or take transaction-based pay, and readiness work is not approval.
Resilience playbooks
Sector-level accounts of how firms identify important services, set tolerances, map dependencies and prepare to respond.
Finance cyber scenario summaries
Severe but plausible scenarios for the sector, published at a level that informs without aiding attackers; see scenario tools.
Third-party mapping methods
Approaches to understanding concentration on shared technology providers across the industry.
Operational resilience in financial services is a distinct professional practice, which is why it has its own platform.
Settlement dependencies, and what fails with a node.
How a failure at one financial centre can spread through settlement links. Design links, not real dependencies.
Grounded in named methods and linked across the Consortium.
The platform draws on cybersecurity and cryptography, reliability and resilience engineering, network science and contagion and software and safety-critical systems engineering, each with a canonical page in the STEM Commons maintained by The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI). Foundry systems serving the field include NXS-NET for connectivity and continuity and NXS-NST, the common operating picture.
At GCRI, Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience and Critical Infrastructure do the science, and Energy Nexus studies the power systems finance depends on. At the Global Risks Forum (GRF), AI and Digital Governance and Disaster and Crisis Governance convene on governance. See all counterparts.
The areas of cyber and digital resilience this platform takes on.
Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience studies how banks, insurers, asset managers and market firms keep critical services running through cyber attacks, technology failures, supplier outages and data corruption. Its pages set out how disruption starts and spreads, how firms map important services and set impact tolerances, how incidents are reported and handled, how resilience is tested and measured, and who decides, with every source labelled. Global Risks Alliance shares industry understanding and does not publish threat intelligence, test systems or give security advice.
Critical business services
Identifying the services whose disruption would harm customers or markets, mapping their dependencies and setting impact tolerances.
Cyber threats to finance
Ransomware, intrusion, fraud-enabling attacks, insider threats and state-linked activity against financial firms.
Cloud and outsourcing
Dependence on cloud platforms and outsourced services, and the governance of material arrangements.
Incident and crisis response
Detection, escalation, reporting to authorities, communication and coordinated sector response.
Digital supply chains
Software, hardware and service supply chains, and the vulnerabilities they import into firms.
Data integrity and availability
Protecting records of balances, positions and transactions, and recovering correct data after corruption.
Resilience testing
Scenario testing, red-teaming, recovery testing and sector exercises that show whether plans work.
Resilience metrics
Measures of disruption, recovery and control effectiveness, and their limits as evidence.
Built on named science, technology, engineering and mathematics.
Every claim on Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience rests on methods with a canonical page in the STEM Commons, so readers can see what a finding depends on and where its limits lie.
See the STEM foundation of Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
How work moves in this field.
A question becomes evidence, a governed build, an organised community, a controlled test, a reviewed publication and, finally, a decision taken by the competent authority under its own rules.
- Question Universe National, regional or institutional priority. Question in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
- Evidence Foundry STEM foundation of the platform. Evidence in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
- Build Foundry Foundry. Build in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
- Organise Universe Nexus ecosystem. Organise in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
- Test Universe Universe (independent site). Test in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
- Publish Reports Reports. Publish in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
- Decide Competent authority Competent authorities and institutions, through NXS-RLS (participants, agreements and handoffs). Decide in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
- Renew Universe Corrections and the next annual agenda. Renew in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
Each step of the cycle in the pillar it runs in; the decision stays with the competent authority, outside the programme.
- Labs
- Foundry
- Universe
- Nexus Standards
- Reports
- Risk Academy
- Competent authority (outside the programme)
How this works across the six pillars.
Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience works through six pillars of one annual programme, led by the Nexus Consortium, with GCRI, GRF and GRA each contributing in its role: explore, experiment and prototype in Labs, build, simulate and prepare in Foundry, convene and test in Universe, codify, correct and apply in Nexus Standards, publish in every format in Reports, teach in the open in Risk Academy.
handoff in playrecorded handoffno direct handoff
Programme yearAll phases
Route
The whole programme
Every pillar hands its work to another; together they close the year’s feedback loops.
L · F · U · S · R · A
- Pillars
- 6 of 6
- Handoffs
- 18 of 18
- Loops
- 17 closed
Handoffs in play
- F01Universe → Foundry · Admitted mission becomes a cycle project with a decision caseReadiness preparation
- F02Foundry → Universe · Core Build Report and go or no-go evidenceControlled build
- F03Foundry → Reports · Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profileCloseout
- F04Universe → Reports · After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13After-action review
and 14 more
- LabsWhere questions become experiments and prototypes: new methods, data and tools are tried in the open, with their limits on record, before the Foundry builds them, under the Nexus Consortium.Labs
- FoundryWhere exposure and scenario evidence is built so supervisors, insurers and investors can read it.Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience in FoundryFoundry
- UniverseWhere scenarios are tested in controlled exercises, and finance-readiness dialogues read what they mean for capital and cover.Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience in Universeuniverse.nexus
- Nexus StandardsWhere disclosure and data rules are codified so risk evidence is comparable for finance and insurance.Digital, Cyber and AI in Standardsnexustandards.com
- ReportsWhere sector analysis and the finance and insurance readiness series are published, with exposure and limits stated.Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience in ReportsReports
- Risk AcademyWhere finance, insurance and public-finance professionals learn to read risk evidence, on Risk Academy.Faculty of Technology and Digital Systems in Academyrisksacademy.com
The same field, seen three ways.
GCRI studies a field as science, GRF governs it and GRA builds shared financial understanding of it. Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience links to its counterparts so that work on one side is visible on the others.
- Water NexusInstitutionGCRIShared fieldCritical infrastructure
- Energy NexusInstitutionGCRIShared fieldCritical infrastructure
- Critical InfrastructureInstitutionGCRIShared fieldCritical infrastructure
- Cities and Built EnvironmentInstitutionGCRIShared fieldCritical infrastructure
- Cybersecurity and Digital ResilienceInstitutionGCRIShared fieldCyber and digital resilience, Critical infrastructure
- Quantum TechnologiesInstitutionGCRIShared fieldCyber and digital resilience
- Digital Public InfrastructureInstitutionGCRIShared fieldCyber and digital resilience
- Capital NexusInstitutionGRFShared fieldFinancial stability
Pages in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience.
Industry scope and publisher
PageFinancial discipline overview
PageProfessional research
PageTechnology and emerging practices
PageResilience and finance readiness
PageResearch and industry programmes
PageAnalytical and data resources
PageProfessional community
PageProfessional learning
PageProfessional meetings
PageReports and sector briefs
PageMembership and research participation
PageContact the industry platform
PageAntitrust, independence and financial perimeter
PageSTEM foundation of Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
PageHow work moves in this field
PageBuild in Foundry
PageTest in Universe
PagePublish in Reports
PageThe same field across the Consortium
PageTopics
Where this page leads across the Consortium.
Questions and answers.
Who publishes Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience?
Is Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience active?
How can I contribute?
Where are findings published?
Which values on this platform are real?
How do I report an error?
Should I report a cyber incident to the platform?
Does the platform test or certify firms’ resilience?
Contribute evidence from this page.
Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
- EmailGateway GW-GRASend it from this pageEvidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen depositDeposit it and submit to the communityPublish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsGlobal Risks AllianceSee every way to contributeThe contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
Never send personal data, sensitive infrastructure detail or anything you have no right to share. A contribution is reviewed before use; sending it confers no authorship or editorial rights, and sponsorship never buys a finding.
How Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience works.
Choose a view and press Play to follow the platform’s process, its programme year, the standards it applies and how its findings are published. The outline shows how the work is designed to run, not the status of any decision.
Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience
How Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience works
Platforms · Programme year · Standards · Reports
A platform joins a field to named methods, labelled evidence and the outputs it publishes, without becoming the authority it serves.
01 Scope
- 01Field and familiesStart · The platform leadThe home states the field, its families and who it serves.
- 02Topic dossiersRecord · Platform authorsTopics explain the subject with labelled evidence.
02 Evidence
- 03Evidence labelsRecord · GCRIEach value is labelled: observed, published statistics, estimated, modelled, scenario or unknown.
- 04MethodsStep · Method ownersMethods come from the STEM Commons, each with one canonical page.
03 Work
- 05Scenarios on the systemsModel · Foundry pillarScenarios run on the Nexus systems, labelled as scenario.
- 06Standards that applyRecord · Nexus StandardsThe platform names the standards that apply. A validator report is evidence for review.
04 Publish
- 07EditionsRecord · ReportsFindings are published through Reports with their limits.
- 08Authority decidesOutcome · The competent authorityDecisions and execution stay with the government, operator or licensed institution.
Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience home · Platforms · Shared methodsAn outline of how the work is designed to run; it does not report the status of any decision or record.
Take part in Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience.
Start from who you are. Answer an open call. Or form and lead a competence cell on the Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience platform.
National institutions
Ministries, statistics offices and agencies: a national desk and chapter, and a seat in the working groups. National chapters
Sectors and professions
Operators, regulators, banks, insurers and professional bodies whose work touches Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience. Participate
Learning
Courses and practice, with a record of every course completed. Free to study. Open learning
Standards
Draft, review and adopt the methods and data standards with the working groups. Working groups
Communities and research
Universities, civil society and individual experts: projects, data and review. Write to the team
| Open call | Seeks | Closes |
|---|---|---|
| Founding call for experts to the working groups CALL-FOUNDING-EXPERTS | expert, editor, chair | 2026-12-15 |
| Open nomination for the three independent expert seats of the Global Standards Council CALL-GSC-IND | council-member | 2026-12-01 |
| Nominations of interim regional members (applies only if the transitional provision is decided) CALL-GSC-REG | council-member | 2026-12-15 |
| Review of the wave-1 risk core outlines (C1, C2, C3, C4, C8, C10, C11) CALL-REVIEW-WAVE1 | contributor | 2027-01-31 |
| Experts for the core standards of risk science: uncertainty and evidence grading, scales, structured expert judgement, tolerability, extremes and compound events, catastrophic and existential risk, ethics and equity, units and measurement (NRS-C17 to NRS-C24) CALL-CORE-SCIENCE | expert, editor, chair | 2027-01-31 |
| Independent reviewers for the families of the hazard atlas, three from at least two regions for each family (NHS2-R19), priority families first CALL-ATLAS-REVIEW | expert | 2027-03-31 |
| Members of the interim Frontier Safety Review Panel and red-team reviewers (biosafety and biosecurity, AI safety and security, critical-infrastructure security); applications treated in confidence CALL-FRONTIER-SAFETY-REVIEW | expert | 2026-11-30 |
| Experts in ontology, metrology, software verification and conformity assessment for the requirement register, the NHS-2 machine representation, the conformance test suites and the conformity assessment scheme CALL-CONFORMANCE-ONTOLOGY | expert, editor | 2027-01-31 |
Calls past their closing date are hidden automatically. Every call, proposal and route: open areas and calls.
Gather the cell
Bring together three to seven people with complementary skills: data, field practice, policy and communication.
Register it
Write to the team with the cell’s name, members, area and region. You receive a reference and a contact. Write to the team
Choose a charter
Pick one focus: research and evidence, data and maps, standards review, or community preparedness.
Learn together
Follow shared study paths at Risk Academy, with practice and a record of every course completed. Hazards and resilience
Lead and report
Hold regular sessions. Publish what the cell learns through Reports. Bring findings to the working groups. Working groups
What a national team or a local community can do on The Global Risks Index (NXS-GRX) today.
Your country’s profile
Open risk profiles for 195 countries, with sources and licences on every value. Open the Index
Correct or reply
Correct a value or reply for your country. The change is logged with its effect. Open the Index
Offer data
Offer a dataset. It enters through the licence gate, with your credit. Open the Index
Every figure on this page is indexed: hazards, climate, conflict, the world.
The Index is the Consortium’s indexing system for risk data. Every indicator, hazard, series and country profile carries its Nexus Standards identifier, its source and its licence, so what this page shows can be traced, corrected and reused.
- 01 · Sources205 registered sourcesEvery value keeps its source and licence; withheld values are counted.Data and licences
- 02 · Nexus StandardsNIS-1 and NHS-1451 indicators, 905 hazards; every record carries a UNI.Nexus Standards
- 03 · The Index54 series, 195 country profilesComputed on the standards; no value is published until an edition is released.The Global Risks Index
- 04 · This pageFinancial Cyber and Operational ResilienceMaps, figures and feeds read the Index in the context of hazards, climate, conflict.Public API
Series in this context hazards, climate, conflict
- GLBGlobal SystemsThe state of interdependent global risk: the twenty domain indices aggregated to the world, the five core systems (water, energy, food, health, biodiversity) and their couplings, the global tail register and the gap…NXS-GRX-AR-000002Hazards · Climate · Conflict
- THDisaster Risk Intelligence (DRI)Signals, observations, event streams, geospatial layers and scenario packs turned into structured risk intelligence for preparedness and planning.NXS-GRX-AR-000111Hazards · Climate · Conflict
- GSGlobal CitiesUrban exposure, heat, flooding, informal settlement, service dependency and the economic weight of cities at risk.NXS-GRX-AR-000068Hazards · Infrastructure · Climate
- GSGlobal ClimateChronic and acute physical climate hazard, transition exposure, adaptation gaps and scenario pathways to 2030, 2050 and 2100.NXS-GRX-AR-000065Climate · Hazards · Finance
Country profiles the world
Every country profile carries the source and licence of each value. Correct a value or reply
Hazard domains NHS-1
- Atmosphere and weatherNXS-GRX-AR-000135
- Solid EarthNXS-GRX-AR-000138
- Systemic and compound eventsNXS-GRX-AR-000148
Geodata and API open
Open layers on an equal-area hexagon grid, shown as densities per km² or as symbols: People · GHSL 2025People · WorldPop 2025Built-up areaPortsAirportsRoadsRailwaysRivers and lake centrelines
/api/v1/public/grix · https://nexustandards.com/uni/{uni}
Developers · Data · Made with Natural Earth, Public domain; GHSL and WorldPop, CC BY 4.0
Snapshot of the Index registries pinned 2026-10-23 · 22c6eed. Research and risk-analytics information: not a rating, an official classification, a warning, a benchmark or advice.
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