GRA · Banking Nexus
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Financial-system transmission
Risk reaches banks from the real economy and leaves them again into the economy and the financial system. A drought, a cyber incident or a housing downturn can move through borrowers, collateral, funding and operations into bank losses, and from there into tighter credit, lower spending and stress at other institutions. This page shows how real-system and financial vulnerabilities propagate, as studied on Banking Nexus by the Global Risks Alliance (GRA).
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How shocks reach banks.
| Channel | Mekanîzma | Nimûne |
|---|---|---|
| Borrower income | Shocks cut the cash flow that services loans | Crop failure reduces farm loan repayments |
| Collateral value | Hazards or price falls impair assets securing loans | Flood damage lowers property values in a mortgage book |
| Sector concentration | Exposures cluster in one region or industry | A regional bank lending mainly to one exposed economy |
| Fînansekirin | Depositors or markets withdraw on loss of confidence | Rapid digital deposit outflows |
| Xebitandin | Outages at the bank or a shared provider | A cloud failure interrupts payments at several banks |
Channels describe mechanisms, not measured strengths or probabilities.
Nêrîna giştî ya qadê.
Ekrana ku tîmek dê ji bo şopandina vê mijarê bikar bîne: pîvan, rewş û biryarên wê. Nav mînak in û nirx nîşander in.
The bank-sovereign-insurance loop after a disaster.
After a large disaster, three balance sheets interact. Uninsured collateral losses raise loan losses; insurers facing claims may sell assets or withdraw cover; the sovereign spends on reconstruction and may face higher borrowing costs, which lowers the value of the government bonds banks hold. The loop is strongest where banks hold much domestic sovereign debt and insurance penetration is low. Sovereign effects continue at Public Finance and Sovereign Debt; insurance effects at Insurance Nexus risk transmission.
Deposits and payments in a regional shock.
Regional disasters also move liquidity: depositors draw cash, firms draw credit lines and payment systems may be disrupted. The BCBS liquidity standards assume stressed outflows but not regional physical disruption to branches, ATMs and power. Operational dependence continues at payment dependencies; infrastructure evidence at GCRI grid disruption and recovery.
Why losses grow inside the system.
Leverage magnifies losses relative to capital. When capital falls, banks cut lending to protect their ratios, which hurts borrowers and can create further losses, a feedback loop between banks and the real economy. Selling assets to raise liquidity can depress prices and impose losses on other holders.
Interconnection spreads stress. Interbank exposures, common holdings of similar assets and shared dependence on payment systems and technology providers mean that one institution’s problem can become many institutions’ problem. Uncertainty about who is exposed can freeze funding markets even for sound banks.
How bank stress reaches people.
Tighter lending
Households and small firms lose access to credit just when they need it to recover.
Interrupted services
Outages stop wages, purchases and supplier payments.
Fiscal costs
Support for banks and lost tax revenue strain public budgets, which can feed back to banks holding government debt.
Sector-level, aggregated, with limits.
Analysis uses network science and contagion, probability and statistics and scenario methods, with aggregated sector data. It does not assess individual firms, recommend transactions or constitute investment advice. Methods and uncertainty are set out on analysis and uncertainty. The system-wide view is developed on Financial Stability transmission, and the hazard evidence comes from The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for example compound hazards.
Where this page’s references lead.
Sazî û belgeyên ku ev rûpel li hember wan tê xwendin. Rewş û çap diguherin; her girêdan diçe ba saziya derxistinê.
Pirs û bersiv.
Does this page predict a banking crisis?
Why include public finances?
Can I use GRA analysis to assess a specific bank?
Ji vê rûpelê delîl bidin.
Reports weşana sê mehane ya Konsorsiyûmê ye. Tiştê ku tu li ser vê mijarê dizanî dikare di çapa pêş de bibe delîl, dosya an rastkirin, bi navê te û di bin CC BY 4.0 de weşandî li cihê ku karê te bi xwe be.
- EmailGateway GW-GRASend it from this pageEvidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen depositDeposit it and submit to the communityPublish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsGlobal Risks AllianceSee every way to contributeThe contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
Tu carî daneyên şexsî, hûrgiliyên binesaza hesas an tiştekî ku mafê we yê parvekirinê tune ne neşînin. Beşdarî berî bikaranînê tê nirxandin; şandina wê nivîskarî an mafên edîtorî nade û sponsorî tu carî encamekê nakire.
Bring an exposure or capital question to the Alliance.
Agahî û pirs îro vekirî ne. Pirsek referansekê distîne û gava piştî wê dide nasîn; serlêdan, drav, veqetandina hesabkirinê û tomarkirin tenê dema ku tîm, mercên wê û kapasîteya vekolînê hebin vedibin.
Belgeyên hiqûqî.
Nexşe, dane û jimarên vê malperê ji bo çarçoveyê û agahiyên giştî têne nîşandan. Ew ne şîret, ne pêşbînî û ne hişyarî ne; sînorên agahiyê di Daxuyaniyên Berpirsiyariyê û Daxuyaniyên Daneyê de hatine diyarkirin.