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GRA · Banking Nexus

التمويل المكانيحيث يلتقي رأس المال بالخطر والتعرّض والتحول

انتقال المخاطر عبر النظام المالي

Risk reaches banks from the real economy and leaves them again into the economy and the financial system. A drought, a cyber incident or a housing downturn can move through borrowers, collateral, funding and operations into bank losses, and from there into tighter credit, lower spending and stress at other institutions. This page shows how real-system and financial vulnerabilities propagate, as studied on Banking Nexus by the Global Risks Alliance (GRA).

منهجيات ⁨STEM⁩
5
الأساليب المعيارية التي يطبقها هذا المجال
الموضوعات
10
صفحات الموضوعات في المجال
النظراء
11
المنصات في المجالات المشتركة عبر الشبكة
سلاسل التقارير
2
سلاسل التقارير التي تسهم فيها
01Inbound

How shocks reach banks.

القناةالآليةمثال
Borrower incomeShocks cut the cash flow that services loansCrop failure reduces farm loan repayments
Collateral valueHazards or price falls impair assets securing loansFlood damage lowers property values in a mortgage book
Sector concentrationExposures cluster in one region or industryA regional bank lending mainly to one exposed economy
التمويلDepositors or markets withdraw on loss of confidenceRapid digital deposit outflows
العملياتOutages at the bank or a shared providerA cloud failure interrupts payments at several banks

تصف القنوات آليات، لا قوى مقيسة ولا احتمالات.

02الرصد

نظرة عامة على المجال.

الشاشة التي قد يستخدمها فريق لمتابعة هذا الموضوع: مقاييسه وحالاته وقراراته. والأسماء أمثلة والقيم توضيحية.

Field overview: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Banking.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
03حلقة التغذية الراجعة

The bank-sovereign-insurance loop after a disaster.

After a large disaster, three balance sheets interact. Uninsured collateral losses raise loan losses; insurers facing claims may sell assets or withdraw cover; the sovereign spends on reconstruction and may face higher borrowing costs, which lowers the value of the government bonds banks hold. The loop is strongest where banks hold much domestic sovereign debt and insurance penetration is low. Sovereign effects continue at Public Finance and Sovereign Debt; insurance effects at Insurance Nexus risk transmission.

04السيولة

Deposits and payments in a regional shock.

Regional disasters also move liquidity: depositors draw cash, firms draw credit lines and payment systems may be disrupted. The BCBS liquidity standards assume stressed outflows but not regional physical disruption to branches, ATMs and power. Operational dependence continues at payment dependencies; infrastructure evidence at GCRI grid disruption and recovery.

05التضخيم

Why losses grow inside the system.

Leverage magnifies losses relative to capital. When capital falls, banks cut lending to protect their ratios, which hurts borrowers and can create further losses, a feedback loop between banks and the real economy. Selling assets to raise liquidity can depress prices and impose losses on other holders.

Interconnection spreads stress. Interbank exposures, common holdings of similar assets and shared dependence on payment systems and technology providers mean that one institution’s problem can become many institutions’ problem. Uncertainty about who is exposed can freeze funding markets even for sound banks.

06Outbound

How bank stress reaches people.

Credit supply

Tighter lending

Households and small firms lose access to credit just when they need it to recover.

المدفوعات

Interrupted services

Outages stop wages, purchases and supplier payments.

المالية العامة

Fiscal costs

Support for banks and lost tax revenue strain public budgets, which can feed back to banks holding government debt.

07How GRA studies it

على مستوى القطاعات، ومجمّعة، مع وجود حدود.

Analysis uses network science and contagion, probability and statistics and scenario methods, with aggregated sector data. It does not assess individual firms, recommend transactions or constitute investment advice. Methods and uncertainty are set out on analysis and uncertainty. The system-wide view is developed on Financial Stability transmission, and the hazard evidence comes from The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for example compound hazards.

08المصادر

Where this page’s references lead.

الهيئات والوثائق التي تُقرأ هذه الصفحة في ضوئها. وتتغير الحالات والإصدارات؛ ويقود كل رابط إلى الهيئة المُصدِرة.

09أسئلة

أسئلة وأجوبة.

Does this page predict a banking crisis?
No. It describes mechanisms. Scenarios are published separately, labelled as such, with their assumptions.
Why include public finances?
Because banks and governments are linked: bank support costs the state, and banks often hold government debt, so stress can loop between them.
Can I use GRA analysis to assess a specific bank?
GRA analysis is aggregated and assesses no firm. Any use for a specific institution is the user’s own responsibility.
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⁨Global Risks Alliance⁩⁨Banking Nexus⁩الجاهزية للتمويل والتأمينالسيناريو واختبار الإجهاد
⁨Banking Nexus⁩

اعرض على التحالف سؤالًا يتعلق بالتعرّض أو رأس المال.

المعلومات والاستفسارات متاحة اليوم. ويحصل الاستفسار على رقم مرجعي ويحدد الخطوة التالية؛ ولا تُفتح الطلبات والمدفوعات وتخصيصات الحوسبة والتسجيلات إلا حين يتوافر فريقها وشروطها وقدرة المراجعة.