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GRA · Banking Nexus

Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition

Financial-system transmission

Risk reaches banks from the real economy and leaves them again into the economy and the financial system. A drought, a cyber incident or a housing downturn can move through borrowers, collateral, funding and operations into bank losses, and from there into tighter credit, lower spending and stress at other institutions. This page shows how real-system and financial vulnerabilities propagate, as studied on Banking Nexus by the Global Risks Alliance (GRA).

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01Inbound

How shocks reach banks.

ChannelIndlela yokusebenzaExample
Borrower incomeShocks cut the cash flow that services loansCrop failure reduces farm loan repayments
Collateral valueHazards or price falls impair assets securing loansFlood damage lowers property values in a mortgage book
Sector concentrationExposures cluster in one region or industryA regional bank lending mainly to one exposed economy
Inkxaso-maliDepositors or markets withdraw on loss of confidenceRapid digital deposit outflows
OperationsOutages at the bank or a shared providerA cloud failure interrupts payments at several banks

Channels describe mechanisms, not measured strengths or probabilities.

02Beka iliso

Field overview.

The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.

Field overview: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Banking.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
03Feedback loop

The bank-sovereign-insurance loop after a disaster.

After a large disaster, three balance sheets interact. Uninsured collateral losses raise loan losses; insurers facing claims may sell assets or withdraw cover; the sovereign spends on reconstruction and may face higher borrowing costs, which lowers the value of the government bonds banks hold. The loop is strongest where banks hold much domestic sovereign debt and insurance penetration is low. Sovereign effects continue at Public Finance and Sovereign Debt; insurance effects at Insurance Nexus risk transmission.

04Liquidity

Deposits and payments in a regional shock.

Regional disasters also move liquidity: depositors draw cash, firms draw credit lines and payment systems may be disrupted. The BCBS liquidity standards assume stressed outflows but not regional physical disruption to branches, ATMs and power. Operational dependence continues at payment dependencies; infrastructure evidence at GCRI grid disruption and recovery.

05Amplification

Why losses grow inside the system.

Leverage magnifies losses relative to capital. When capital falls, banks cut lending to protect their ratios, which hurts borrowers and can create further losses, a feedback loop between banks and the real economy. Selling assets to raise liquidity can depress prices and impose losses on other holders.

Interconnection spreads stress. Interbank exposures, common holdings of similar assets and shared dependence on payment systems and technology providers mean that one institution’s problem can become many institutions’ problem. Uncertainty about who is exposed can freeze funding markets even for sound banks.

06Outbound

How bank stress reaches people.

Credit supply

Tighter lending

Households and small firms lose access to credit just when they need it to recover.

Payments

Interrupted services

Outages stop wages, purchases and supplier payments.

Public finances

Fiscal costs

Support for banks and lost tax revenue strain public budgets, which can feed back to banks holding government debt.

07How GRA studies it

Sector-level, aggregated, with limits.

Analysis uses network science and contagion, probability and statistics and scenario methods, with aggregated sector data. It does not assess individual firms, recommend transactions or constitute investment advice. Methods and uncertainty are set out on analysis and uncertainty. The system-wide view is developed on Financial Stability transmission, and the hazard evidence comes from The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for example compound hazards.

08Imithombo

Where this page’s references lead.

Amaqumrhu namaxwebhu eli phepha elifundwa ngokuthelekiswa nawo. Imeko neenguqulelo ziyatshintsha; ikhonkco ngalinye liya kwiqumrhu elikhuphayo.

09Imibuzo

Imibuzo neempendulo.

Does this page predict a banking crisis?
No. It describes mechanisms. Scenarios are published separately, labelled as such, with their assumptions.
Why include public finances?
Because banks and governments are linked: bank support costs the state, and banks often hold government debt, so stress can loop between them.
Can I use GRA analysis to assess a specific bank?
GRA analysis is aggregated and assesses no firm. Any use for a specific institution is the user’s own responsibility.
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Faka ubungqina obuvela kweli phepha.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

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