GRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Third party concentration
Payment and market infrastructures and their participants depend on a few technology providers: cloud platforms, messaging networks, software vendors and data centres. A failure at one can disrupt many institutions at once. This page sets out how third-party concentration risk develops, how it is measured, and the authorities and boards who decide.
Third party concentration on the record.
Third party concentration: how the risk develops.
Cloud, identity and outsourced systems. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Many depend on few
Cloud, messaging and core software markets are concentrated. Institutions that diversify individually may still share the same underlying provider.
Visibility is limited
Institutions often do not know their providers’ subcontractors. Authorities lack a sector-wide map of dependencies.
Exit is hard
Migrating away from a core provider takes years. Exit plans exist on paper but may not be executable in a crisis.
Direct oversight is new
Regimes such as DORA designate critical ICT providers for direct oversight. Their effect on resilience is still emerging.
RTGS operations console.
The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
RTGS operations console
Third party concentration · RTGS system · Business day 156
- Value settled today117local bnActive
- Payments queued22969Beka iliso
- Availability, % this month99.9Okuqhelekileyo
- Participants below liquidity floor0Alert
Intraday liquidity, system
Incident and failover log
- 09:10INCParticipant P-12 message delay
- 10:42LSMLiquidity saving cycle released 29 payments
- 14:00CUTCustomer payment cut-off
- Q3TESTContingency site failover in 41 min
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Ileyibhile |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical ICT third-party providers designated | count | annual | European Supervisory Authorities records | Published statistics |
| Share of critical services on top cloud providers | percent | periodic | Supervisory surveys | KUXELIWE |
| Registers of information on ICT arrangements submitted | count | annual | DORA reporting | Published statistics |
| Incidents caused by third parties | count and share of incidents | annual | Incident reports | Published statistics |
| Tested exit plans | share of critical arrangements | periodic | Supervisory reviews | DECLARED |
| Fourth-party dependencies identified | count per critical provider | periodic | Institution mapping | KUXELIWE |
What third party concentration means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Transmission channels
How a shock in third party concentration reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Umthombo | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| FSB toolkit for third-party risk management and oversight | Terminology and tools | Free, FSB terms |
| European Supervisory Authorities DORA oversight records | Designated critical ICT providers | Free, EU reuse terms |
| Bank of England, PRA and FCA critical third parties regime documents | UK regime for critical third parties | Free, Bank of England terms |
| IMF and BIS reports on cloud concentration in finance | Analysis of concentration risk | Free, IMF and BIS terms |
| Public incident reports by providers | Root causes of major outages | Free to read, terms per provider |
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Payments and Market Infrastructure prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Who decides | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Financial authorities | Which providers to designate and oversee | Dependency mapping and incident evidence |
| FMI and institution boards | How much concentration to accept and how to plan exit | Provider dependence and test results |
| Technology providers | How to meet oversight and resilience expectations | Regulatory requirements |
| Procurement functions | Which contract terms protect resilience | Comparable contract practice |
Outputs this topic produces
- Guide to third-party and concentration risk in market infrastructure
- Comparative notes on critical third-party regimes
- Method note on mapping fourth-party dependencies
- Questions for boards on exit planning
What the industry asks.
Outsourcing can improve resilience by giving infrastructures access to providers with strong security and redundancy. But concentration creates a common point of failure that individual firms cannot see or manage alone. Authorities in several jurisdictions have introduced oversight of critical third parties to the financial sector, reflecting the shared nature of the risk.
- Which providers do payment infrastructures and participants depend on, including indirectly through their suppliers?
- How concentrated are these dependencies, and which provider failures would affect several infrastructures at once?
- How substitutable are critical providers, and how long would migration take?
- How can the sector gain visibility of shared dependencies without exposing sensitive information?
How the infrastructure works and fails.
Concentration arises from shared providers, hidden dependencies and limited substitutability.
Hosting and compute
A small number of cloud providers host a growing share of financial services, including some critical functions.
Shared services
Identity providers, financial messaging networks and certificate authorities are used across the sector.
Common vendors
Core banking, payment processing and security software from few vendors creates shared vulnerabilities.
Individual institutions can manage their own provider risk through due diligence, contracts and exit plans, but they cannot see how many others depend on the same provider, or what would happen if it failed for everyone at once. That systemic view requires aggregated information across the sector. Building it in a way that respects confidentiality and competition law is one of the clearest cases for shared industry understanding.
How the evidence is built, and its limits.
- 01
Dependency mapping
Aggregated mapping of provider dependencies across institutions, applying network science and contagion. Requires careful aggregation to protect confidential information.
- 02
Provider incident analysis
Analysis of published provider outages and their effects on financial services.
- 03
Substitutability assessment
Analysis of how quickly and at what cost functions could move between providers.
- 04
Scenario exercises
Exercises simulating the failure of a major provider across several institutions.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Network science and contagionPayment flow networks · Shared provider mapping · CCP membership networksApplied here
- 02Reliability and resilience engineeringImpact tolerance setting · Recovery design · Learning from incidentsApplied here
- 03Cybersecurity and cryptographyEndpoint control frameworks · Threat-led testing · Destructive attack recoveryApplied here
Imibuzo neempendulo.
What is concentration risk from third parties?
What is a critical ICT third-party provider?
What is a fourth party?
Is cloud use a risk for payment systems?
What is critical third-party oversight?
Does GRA assess providers?
How is confidential dependency data protected?
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