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GRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure

Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition

Third party concentration

Payment and market infrastructures and their participants depend on a few technology providers: cloud platforms, messaging networks, software vendors and data centres. A failure at one can disrupt many institutions at once. This page sets out how third-party concentration risk develops, how it is measured, and the authorities and boards who decide.

01నమోదు

Third party concentration on the record.

02The question

Third party concentration: how the risk develops.

Cloud, identity and outsourced systems. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

యంత్రాంగం

Many depend on few

Cloud, messaging and core software markets are concentrated. Institutions that diversify individually may still share the same underlying provider.

యంత్రాంగం

Visibility is limited

Institutions often do not know their providers’ subcontractors. Authorities lack a sector-wide map of dependencies.

యంత్రాంగం

Exit is hard

Migrating away from a core provider takes years. Exit plans exist on paper but may not be executable in a crisis.

యంత్రాంగం

Direct oversight is new

Regimes such as DORA designate critical ICT providers for direct oversight. Their effect on resilience is still emerging.

03పర్యవేక్షించండి

RTGS operations console.

The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.

RTGS operations console

Third party concentration · RTGS system · Business day 156

  • Value settled today
    117local bnActive
  • Payments queued
    22969గమనించండి
  • Availability, % this month
    99.9సాధారణం
  • Participants below liquidity floor
    0Alert
Queue building at peakGRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure

Intraday liquidity, system

Incident and failover log

  1. 09:10INCParticipant P-12 message delay
  2. 10:42LSMLiquidity saving cycle released 29 payments
  3. 14:00CUTCustomer payment cut-off
  4. Q3TESTContingency site failover in 41 min
RTGS operations console: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Third party concentration.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
04సూచికలు

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeలేబుల్
Critical ICT third-party providers designatedcountannualEuropean Supervisory Authorities recordsPublished statistics
Share of critical services on top cloud providerspercentperiodicSupervisory surveysనివేదించబడింది
Registers of information on ICT arrangements submittedcountannualDORA reportingPublished statistics
Incidents caused by third partiescount and share of incidentsannualIncident reportsPublished statistics
Tested exit plansshare of critical arrangementsperiodicSupervisory reviewsDECLARED
Fourth-party dependencies identifiedcount per critical providerperiodicInstitution mappingనివేదించబడింది
05Exposure, loss and capital

What third party concentration means for exposure, loss and capital.

The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.

Transmission channels

How a shock in third party concentration reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.

Channel structure after the Basel Committee’s work on climate-related risk drivers and transmission channels; links shown are typical paths, not estimated exposures.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
06మూలాలు

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

మూలంWhat it givesLicence class
FSB toolkit for third-party risk management and oversightTerminology and toolsFree, FSB terms
European Supervisory Authorities DORA oversight recordsDesignated critical ICT providersFree, EU reuse terms
Bank of England, PRA and FCA critical third parties regime documentsUK regime for critical third partiesFree, Bank of England terms
IMF and BIS reports on cloud concentration in financeAnalysis of concentration riskFree, IMF and BIS terms
Public incident reports by providersRoot causes of major outagesFree to read, terms per provider
07Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Payments and Market Infrastructure prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Financial authoritiesWhich providers to designate and overseeDependency mapping and incident evidence
FMI and institution boardsHow much concentration to accept and how to plan exitProvider dependence and test results
Technology providersHow to meet oversight and resilience expectationsRegulatory requirements
Procurement functionsWhich contract terms protect resilienceComparable contract practice

Outputs this topic produces

  • Guide to third-party and concentration risk in market infrastructure
  • Comparative notes on critical third-party regimes
  • Method note on mapping fourth-party dependencies
  • Questions for boards on exit planning
08Core questions

What the industry asks.

Outsourcing can improve resilience by giving infrastructures access to providers with strong security and redundancy. But concentration creates a common point of failure that individual firms cannot see or manage alone. Authorities in several jurisdictions have introduced oversight of critical third parties to the financial sector, reflecting the shared nature of the risk.

  • Which providers do payment infrastructures and participants depend on, including indirectly through their suppliers?
  • How concentrated are these dependencies, and which provider failures would affect several infrastructures at once?
  • How substitutable are critical providers, and how long would migration take?
  • How can the sector gain visibility of shared dependencies without exposing sensitive information?
09Mechanisms

How the infrastructure works and fails.

Concentration arises from shared providers, hidden dependencies and limited substitutability.

Cloud

Hosting and compute

A small number of cloud providers host a growing share of financial services, including some critical functions.

Identity and messaging

Shared services

Identity providers, financial messaging networks and certificate authorities are used across the sector.

Software

Common vendors

Core banking, payment processing and security software from few vendors creates shared vulnerabilities.

Individual institutions can manage their own provider risk through due diligence, contracts and exit plans, but they cannot see how many others depend on the same provider, or what would happen if it failed for everyone at once. That systemic view requires aggregated information across the sector. Building it in a way that respects confidentiality and competition law is one of the clearest cases for shared industry understanding.

10Methods and evidence

How the evidence is built, and its limits.

  1. 01

    Dependency mapping

    Aggregated mapping of provider dependencies across institutions, applying network science and contagion. Requires careful aggregation to protect confidential information.

  2. 02

    Provider incident analysis

    Analysis of published provider outages and their effects on financial services.

  3. 03

    Substitutability assessment

    Analysis of how quickly and at what cost functions could move between providers.

  4. 04

    Scenario exercises

    Exercises simulating the failure of a major provider across several institutions.

11పద్ధతులు

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Network science and contagionPayment flow networks · Shared provider mapping · CCP membership networksApplied here
  2. Reliability and resilience engineeringImpact tolerance setting · Recovery design · Learning from incidentsApplied here
  3. Cybersecurity and cryptographyEndpoint control frameworks · Threat-led testing · Destructive attack recoveryApplied here
12ప్రశ్నలు

ప్రశ్నలు మరియు సమాధానాలు.

What is concentration risk from third parties?
The risk that many institutions depend on the same provider, so a single failure disrupts a large part of the financial system.
What is a critical ICT third-party provider?
Under DORA, a technology provider designated by EU authorities for direct oversight because of its importance to financial entities.
What is a fourth party?
A subcontractor of a direct provider, whose failure can affect the institution even without a direct contract.
Is cloud use a risk for payment systems?
It can improve resilience but creates concentration. The question is how to make provider failure survivable for critical functions.
What is critical third-party oversight?
Regimes in some jurisdictions that give financial authorities direct oversight of technology providers on which many financial firms depend.
Does GRA assess providers?
No. It does not assess, rate or recommend providers.
How is confidential dependency data protected?
Any data from institutions is aggregated before use, under the safeguards designed in GRA’s written competition policy. See competition and antitrust.
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ఈ పేజీ నుండి ఆధారాలను అందించండి.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

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