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GRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure

Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition

Retail and wholesale payments

Payment systems carry everything from card purchases to interbank settlements worth large sums each day. Retail systems handle many small payments; wholesale systems settle large-value payments, usually in central bank money. Each concentrates operational and liquidity risk at a few nodes. This page sets out how payment system risk develops and spreads, how it is measured, and the overseers, operators and participants who decide.

01કેનવાસ

કાર્ય કેવી રીતે ચાલે છે.

પ્રણાલીઓ · આ વિષયની આસપાસદૃષ્ટાંતરૂપ

RTGS operations console

Retail and wholesale payments · RTGS system · Business day 126

  • Value settled today
    61local bnActive
  • Payments queued
    2720નજર રાખો
  • Availability, % this month
    100.0સામાન્ય
  • Participants below liquidity floor
    2Alert
Queue building at peakGRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure

Intraday liquidity, system

Incident and failover log

  1. 09:42INCParticipant P-12 message delay
  2. 10:30LSMLiquidity saving cycle released 37 payments
  3. 14:00CUTCustomer payment cut-off
  4. Q3TESTContingency site failover in 63 min
RTGS operations console: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Retail and wholesale payments.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.

Fig.RTGS operations console: example names and illustrative values, not a record or a live system.

02The question

Retail and wholesale payments: how the risk develops.

Payment rails and economic continuity. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

વ્યવસ્થા

Liquidity must flow intraday

Participants need liquidity to send payments before receiving others. If one large participant holds back, others are short and the system can gridlock.

વ્યવસ્થા

Concentration at the core

A few systems and settlement banks process most value. An outage at one stops payments for every participant and their customers.

વ્યવસ્થા

Instant payments run continuously

Round-the-clock instant payments leave no batch window for recovery and move funds before fraud checks finish, changing the risk profile.

વ્યવસ્થા

Settlement asset matters

Settlement in central bank money carries no credit risk; settlement in commercial bank money exposes participants to the settlement bank.

03Stress test

How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.

The equity the system loses after interbank contagion, against the initial hit, as leverage, interconnection and recovery rates change, the core of a macroprudential stress test. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.

નિયંત્રણો

Fall in external assets
2.0%
Leverage (assets over equity)
10 times
Interbank share of assets
10%
Recovery on interbank claims
40%
Banks in the system
20
Core banks
20% of banks

વાચનો

Equity lost to the initial shock
18.0%
Equity lost after contagion
45.0%
Added by contagion (DebtRank)
27.0 points
Banks in default
0
આંકડા, પદ્ધતિઓ અને સ્ત્રોતો
RoundSystem equity lost (%)Banks in default
018.000
128.800
235.280
339.170
441.500
542.900
643.740
744.240
844.550
944.730
1044.840
1144.900
1244.940
1344.960
1444.980
1544.990
1644.990
1745.000
1845.000
1945.000
2045.000
2145.000
2245.000
2345.000
2445.000
2545.000
2645.000
2745.000
2845.000
2945.000
3045.000

પદ્ધતિઓ

  1. DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
  2. Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
  3. Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
  4. Clearing in financial networks Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
  5. Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
  6. One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley

ડેટા

No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.

How a shock to assets becomes a system loss. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: DebtRank (Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541); Differential DebtRank (Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10); Contagion in financial networks (Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466).
04સૂચકો

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeલેબલ
Value and volume of payments by systemcurrency and count per yearannualCPMI Red Book statisticsPublished statistics
System availabilitypercent of scheduled operating timemonthlyOperator disclosuresDECLARED
Intraday liquidity usagepeak use as share of available liquiditydailyParticipant and operator dataનોંધાયેલ
Payment system outagescount and duration in minutesper incidentOperator and overseer reportsPublished statistics
Instant payment share of credit transferspercentannualCentral bank statisticsPublished statistics
Settlement in central bank moneyshare of valueannualCentral bank statisticsPublished statistics
05Exposure, loss and capital

What retail and wholesale payments means for exposure, loss and capital.

The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.

Transmission channels

How a shock in retail and wholesale payments reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.

Channel structure after the Basel Committee’s work on climate-related risk drivers and transmission channels; links shown are typical paths, not estimated exposures.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
06સ્ત્રોતો

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

સ્ત્રોતWhat it givesLicence class
CPMI Red Book statisticsPayment, clearing and settlement statistics by countryFree, BIS terms
ECB payment statisticsEuro area payment volumes and valuesFree, ECB reuse terms
Federal Reserve Financial Services and Fedwire statisticsUnited States wholesale payment volumesસાર્વજનિક ક્ષેત્ર
PFMI disclosure frameworks published by operatorsSelf-assessments against the PFMIPublic records, terms per operator
Bank of England RTGS and CHAPS reportsOperation and resilience of UK high-value paymentsFree, Bank of England terms
07Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Payments and Market Infrastructure prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Central bank overseersWhether systems meet the PFMI and what remediation is neededSelf-assessments, incidents and availability data
System operators’ boardsHow to invest in resilience and liquidity-saving mechanismsIncident history and participant behaviour data
Participant banksHow much intraday liquidity to hold and how to manage payment timingLiquidity usage and stress evidence
Legislators and regulatorsWhether to mandate instant payment access or safeguardsMarket and fraud evidence

Outputs this topic produces

  • Guide to retail, wholesale and instant payment systems and their risks
  • Brief on intraday liquidity and gridlock
  • Method note on payment system availability measures
  • Questions for participants on settlement bank dependence
08Core questions

What the industry asks.

Every economic transaction ends in a payment. When retail rails fail, shops cannot sell and people cannot pay; when wholesale rails fail, banks cannot settle and markets seize. The move to instant, round-the-clock payments improves service but leaves less time to recover from problems. Understanding how rails are built and connected is the starting point for keeping the economy running through disruption.

  • Which payment rails carry which kinds of payments, and how do they connect to each other and to settlement in central bank money?
  • What are the critical functions of each rail, and what is the tolerable period of disruption for each?
  • How do participants manage liquidity in real-time systems, and what happens when expected payments do not arrive?
  • What contingency arrangements exist if a rail is unavailable?
09Mechanisms

How the infrastructure works and fails.

Payment rails differ in speed, value, settlement model and operator.

Retail

High volume, low value

Card schemes, automated clearing houses and instant payment systems, often settling net positions later in central bank money.

Wholesale

Low volume, high value

Real-time gross settlement systems settle each payment individually and with finality, usually operated by central banks.

Liquidity

Funding the flows

Participants need liquidity to make payments before receiving others. Queuing, liquidity-saving mechanisms and central bank credit help.

Retail and wholesale rails are linked. Retail systems typically settle their net positions in the wholesale system, and banks depend on wholesale settlement to fund retail payments. A problem in either can therefore spread to the other. Mapping these links, and the timing of settlement cycles between them, is central to understanding how a disruption would unfold.

10Methods and evidence

How the evidence is built, and its limits.

  1. 01

    System statistics

    Published volumes, values and availability statistics. Detailed operational data are rarely public.

  2. 02

    Incident reports

    Published reports of outages and their causes. Detail varies by jurisdiction and operator.

  3. 03

    Liquidity simulation

    Simulation of payment flows under stress, applying network science and contagion. Requires transaction data usually available only to operators and overseers.

  4. 04

    Architecture analysis

    Analysis of system design and dependencies, applying payment and financial market technology.

11પદ્ધતિઓ

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Payment and financial market technologyLiquidity-saving mechanisms · ISO 20022 data quality · Settlement cycle designApplied here
  2. Network science and contagionPayment flow networks · Shared provider mapping · CCP membership networksApplied here
  3. Reliability and resilience engineeringImpact tolerance setting · Recovery design · Learning from incidentsApplied here
12પ્રશ્નો

પ્રશ્નો અને જવાબો.

What is a real-time gross settlement system?
A system in which large-value payments settle individually and immediately in central bank money, removing settlement credit risk between banks.
Why can payment systems gridlock?
Because each participant waits for incoming payments before sending its own. If enough participants wait, payments stop flowing. Liquidity-saving mechanisms reduce this.
What changes with instant payments?
Payments settle in seconds at any time, which benefits users but removes time for fraud checks and requires continuous operation and liquidity.
What is real-time gross settlement?
A system in which each payment is settled individually and immediately in central bank money, with finality, rather than being netted with others.
Why are instant payments a resilience challenge?
Because they operate continuously, leaving no overnight window for maintenance or recovery, and because errors and fraud move as fast as legitimate payments.
Does GRA operate or oversee payment systems?
No. Operation and oversight belong to operators and central banks.
What is a tolerable period of disruption?
The longest time a critical function can be unavailable before causing serious harm. Infrastructures and authorities define it for each function.
અહેવાલોયોગદાન આપો

આ પૃષ્ઠ પરથી પુરાવાનું યોગદાન આપો.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

Global Risks AlliancePayments and Market InfrastructureStrategic SystemsScenario and Stress-Test

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