Skip to content

GRA · المدفوعات والبنية التحتية للأسواق

التمويل المكانيحيث يلتقي رأس المال بالخطر والتعرّض والتحول

انتقال المخاطر عبر النظام المالي

Disruption in payment and market infrastructure travels in two directions: from real-world shocks such as power outages, cyber attacks and provider failures into the financial system, and from financial stress such as market turmoil into infrastructures and back into the real economy. This page shows the main channels of transmission, at sector level and from published and aggregated evidence.

منهجيات ⁨STEM⁩
6
الأساليب المعيارية التي يطبقها هذا المجال
الموضوعات
8
صفحات الموضوعات في المجال
النظراء
5
المنصات في المجالات المشتركة عبر الشبكة
سلاسل التقارير
2
سلاسل التقارير التي تسهم فيها
01القنوات

How shocks reach the infrastructures.

تشغيلي

Technology and provider failure

Outages at infrastructures, messaging networks, cloud or telecommunications providers halt processing. Science: Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience.

السيولة

Payments that do not arrive

When payments stop, participants that expected incoming funds cannot make outgoing payments, spreading liquidity shortfalls.

Market

Volatility and collateral

Sharp price moves raise margin calls at central counterparties, draining liquidity from members and their clients.

02الرصد

نظرة عامة على المجال.

الشاشة التي قد يستخدمها فريق لمتابعة هذا الموضوع: مقاييسه وحالاته وقراراته. والأسماء أمثلة والقيم توضيحية.

Field overview: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Payments and market infrastructure.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
03التركيز

Why infrastructure transmits rather than absorbs.

  • Gridlock: if one large participant stops paying, others wait for incoming funds and payments queue.
  • Margin spirals: CCP margin calls in volatility drain liquidity from members and their clients.
  • Shared providers: one messaging or cloud outage affects many systems at once.
  • Cross-border links: correspondent and FX settlement chains extend a domestic failure abroad.
04الحوكمة

Cooperative oversight.

Systems used across borders are overseen cooperatively by several central banks. Governance of public infrastructure is discussed at GRF cyber and public infrastructure; topic depth at third-party concentration.

05Into the real economy

How infrastructure stress reaches people and firms.

When retail payments fail, merchants cannot accept cards, employees may not receive wages on time and benefits can be delayed. Households with little cash or savings are most affected. When wholesale systems fail, banks may be unable to settle obligations, affecting interbank markets and the implementation of monetary policy. When securities settlement is disrupted, trades fail, and participants may hold unexpected exposures.

Confidence is a channel in its own right. Visible outages can prompt people to withdraw cash or switch providers, and repeated disruptions can undermine trust in digital payments generally. This is why fallback arrangements and clear public communication are part of infrastructure resilience.

06Transmission paths

Typical sequences.

  1. 01

    Provider outage to payment halt

    A failure at a shared technology provider stops several payment services at once, across institutions that appear independent.

  2. 02

    Cyber attack to data integrity

    Corrupted data in a settlement system force a halt while positions are reconciled, delaying settlement across markets.

  3. 03

    Market shock to margin calls

    Extreme volatility raises initial and variation margin, forcing members to raise liquidity quickly and sometimes sell assets.

  4. 04

    Cross-border link failure

    Disruption at a correspondent or link between systems delays international payments and trade finance.

07التحليل والحدود

Sector-level, aggregated, with stated uncertainty.

Analysis uses aggregated and published data and methods from network science and contagion and reliability and resilience engineering. It does not assess individual infrastructures or firms, recommend transactions or constitute advice. Global Risks Alliance (GRA) does not operate, connect to or test any live payment system, and it assesses no individual institution.

08المصادر

Where this page’s references lead.

الهيئات والوثائق التي تُقرأ هذه الصفحة في ضوئها. وتتغير الحالات والإصدارات؛ ويقود كل رابط إلى الهيئة المُصدِرة.

09أسئلة

أسئلة وأجوبة.

هل تُتبادل بيانات المنافسين؟
No. Any data from firms is aggregated before use, under the safeguards in GRA’s written competition policy. See competition and antitrust.
Can contagion through payment systems be modelled?
Partly. Network and simulation models can explore it, with results labelled as scenarios. See scenarios.
Does this analysis identify weak institutions?
No. It describes channels at system level and assesses no individual institution.
⁨Reports⁩ساهم

ساهم بأدلة من هذه الصفحة.

Reports هي المطبوعة الفصلية للاتحاد. ويمكن لما تعرفه عن هذا الموضوع أن يصبح دليلًا أو حالة أو تصويبًا في الإصدار التالي، يُنسب إليك ويُنشر بموجب CC BY 4.0 حيثما كان من عملك الخاص.

⁨Global Risks Alliance⁩المدفوعات والبنية التحتية للأسواقالنظم الاستراتيجيةالسيناريو واختبار الإجهاد
المدفوعات والبنية التحتية للأسواق

اعرض على التحالف سؤالًا يتعلق بالتعرّض أو رأس المال.

المعلومات والاستفسارات متاحة اليوم. ويحصل الاستفسار على رقم مرجعي ويحدد الخطوة التالية؛ ولا تُفتح الطلبات والمدفوعات وتخصيصات الحوسبة والتسجيلات إلا حين يتوافر فريقها وشروطها وقدرة المراجعة.