Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Game theory of regulation
Game theory and mechanism design explain the strategic side of regulation: why firms arbitrage rules, why authorities may cooperate in calm and ring-fence in stress, why depositors run, and how rules, guarantees and procedures can be designed so that the intended behaviour is in each party's interest.
Game theory and mechanism design study strategic interaction among decision makers and the design of rules that lead to desired outcomes. They explain cooperation, free riding and incentives in shared-risk settings. In financial stability, governance and institutions and capital markets and investment, game theory clarifies why actors underinvest in shared risk reduction and how agreements can be made self-enforcing. It informs the design of risk pools, treaties and incentive schemes. The canonical description is on the STEM Commons.
Home-host cooperation in resolution
Cooperation is modelled as a repeated game in which each authority weighs local protection against group outcomes, showing which commitments and loss-sharing rules make cooperation credible.
Regulatory competition between jurisdictions
Models of competition for financial activity show when jurisdictions relax standards to attract firms, and how minimum standards and peer review change those incentives.
Runs, guarantees and moral hazard
Coordination models of bank runs inform deposit insurance and liquidity rules, while analysis of moral hazard informs coverage limits, risk-based premiums and bail-in design.
03Monitor
Mechanism design.
The screen a team would use to follow this method: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Mechanism design
Financial regulation · Game theory of regulation · Run R-3436
Estimates stableGRA · Financial Regulation Nexus
Estimates
robust standard errors
Firms under enhanced supervision
−0.29
0.06
[−0.2, 0.2]
Yes
Supervisory findings open
0.72
0.13
[−0.6, 0.8]
Yes
Consultations open
0.05
0.16
[−0.5, 0.7]
No
Climate expectations met
0.05
0.08
[−0.1, 0.5]
Yes
Method card
Method
Game theory and mechanism design
Sample
2474 obs
Design
panel, fixed effects
Label
MODELLED
Residuals by group
Mechanism design: the screen's structure, terms and states for Financial regulation.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
04Data
What the method consumes.
Datasets and records used by game theory and mechanism design on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in the source register.
Data
Role
Label
Cooperation agreements and college records
Rules of the game between authorities
Published statistics
Resolution and crisis case histories
Observed strategic behaviour
Published statistics
Laboratory and field experiments
Tests of run and cooperation behaviour
OBSERVED
Enforcement and whistleblower records
Detection and deterrence evidence
Published statistics
05Scenario model
Policy paths and what they do to the risk.
How three families of instruments change a risk outcome over time with adoption lags, coverage and compliance, the policy scenarios behind transition and physical risk assessments. Scenario: named assumptions about the future, not a forecast.
Controls
Baseline trend of the outcome
2.0% a year
Coverage of the instrument
70%
Compliance
75%
Effect size, against the teaching value
100%
Years ahead
20 years
Readouts
Largest reduction at the horizon
Regulation
Its reduction against the baseline
21%
Numbers, methods and sources
Year
Baseline
Regulation
Economic incentive
Information and capacity
0
100.0
99.5
98.8
99.1
1
102.0
101.2
100.1
99.8
2
104.0
102.5
101.1
99.9
3
106.1
103.5
101.6
100.0
4
108.2
103.7
101.8
100.7
5
110.4
103.2
101.7
102.1
6
112.6
102.0
101.6
103.9
7
114.9
100.4
101.6
105.9
8
117.2
99.2
102.1
108.0
9
119.5
98.6
102.9
110.1
10
121.9
98.9
104.2
112.3
11
124.3
99.7
105.7
114.5
12
126.8
101.1
107.4
116.8
13
129.4
102.7
109.4
119.2
14
131.9
104.5
111.4
121.6
15
134.6
106.5
113.5
124.0
16
137.3
108.5
115.7
126.5
17
140.0
110.7
118.0
129.0
18
142.8
112.9
120.4
131.6
19
145.7
115.1
122.8
134.2
20
148.6
117.4
125.2
136.9
Methods
Tools of government Hood (1983), The Tools of Government, Macmillan
Carrots, sticks and sermons Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (1998), Transaction
Diffusion of innovations Rogers (2003), Diffusion of Innovations, Free Press
Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Data
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page's map can draw:
Borders Natural Earth
Cities Natural Earth
Policy paths and what they do to the risk. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: Tools of government (Hood (1983), The Tools of Government, Macmillan); Carrots, sticks and sermons (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist and Vedung (1998), Transaction); Diffusion of innovations (Rogers (2003), Diffusion of Innovations, Free Press).
Predictions are tested through laboratory and field experiments and comparison with observed behaviour. Mechanism designs are piloted before scaling.
Check
How it is done
Robustness of equilibrium
Conclusions are tested under changes in information, payoffs and the number of players
Case history comparison
Predicted behaviour is compared with documented crises and cooperation episodes
Assumption transparency
Rationality and information assumptions are stated beside every design recommendation
Assumptions of rationality and common knowledge often fail. Real settings involve many players and incomplete information.
07Exposure, loss and capital
What game theory of regulation means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Disclosure crosswalk
Where evidence on game theory of regulation fits the disclosure and prudential frameworks institutions report against.
Pillar
TCFD
ISSB IFRS S2
Prudential (BCBS, IAIS)
Evidence this page can hold
Governance
Board oversight of climate-related risks
Governance requirements
Governance and risk appetite principles
Who owns the risk and how it is escalated
Strategy
Risks, opportunities and resilience
Scenario analysis and resilience
Strategy and business model principles
Scenario design and transmission paths
Risk management
Identify, assess, manage
Risk management processes
Internal control and ICAAP or ORSA
Exposure maps and loss views
Metrics and targets
Metrics used and targets set
Cross-industry and industry metrics
Data, metrics and reporting principles
Indicator definitions and units
Sources: the TCFD recommendations, ISSB IFRS S2 and the BCBS and IAIS principles, cited by name; the framework texts are the authority. A crosswalk by pillar. It is not a compliance assessment.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
What are the limits of game theory and mechanism design in this field?
Assumptions of rationality and common knowledge often fail. Real settings involve many players and incomplete information.
How are results checked?
Predictions are tested through laboratory and field experiments and comparison with observed behaviour. Mechanism designs are piloted before scaling.
Are the values on this page real?
The data names, roles and checks are real descriptions of practice. The canvas shows a design of the method's use, not a run; no result is reported here.
Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
Global Risks AllianceFinancial Regulation NexusFinance and Insurance ReadinessMethods and Technical
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