Home-host cooperation in resolution
Cooperation is modelled as a repeated game in which each authority weighs local protection against group outcomes, showing which commitments and loss-sharing rules make cooperation credible.
GRA · Financial Regulation Nexus
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Game theory and mechanism design explain the strategic side of regulation: why firms arbitrage rules, why authorities may cooperate in calm and ring-fence in stress, why depositors run, and how rules, guarantees and procedures can be designed so that the intended behaviour is in each party's interest.
Game theory and mechanism design study strategic interaction among decision makers and the design of rules that lead to desired outcomes. They explain cooperation, free riding and incentives in shared-risk settings. In financial stability, governance and institutions and capital markets and investment, game theory clarifies why actors underinvest in shared risk reduction and how agreements can be made self-enforcing. It informs the design of risk pools, treaties and incentive schemes. The canonical description is on the STEM Commons.
Cooperation is modelled as a repeated game in which each authority weighs local protection against group outcomes, showing which commitments and loss-sharing rules make cooperation credible.
Models of competition for financial activity show when jurisdictions relax standards to attract firms, and how minimum standards and peer review change those incentives.
Coordination models of bank runs inform deposit insurance and liquidity rules, while analysis of moral hazard informs coverage limits, risk-based premiums and bail-in design.
The screen a team would use to follow this method: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Financial regulation · Game theory of regulation · Run R-3436
robust standard errors
| Firms under enhanced supervision | −0.29 | 0.06 | [−0.2, 0.2] | Yes |
| Supervisory findings open | 0.72 | 0.13 | [−0.6, 0.8] | Yes |
| Consultations open | 0.05 | 0.16 | [−0.5, 0.7] | No |
| Climate expectations met | 0.05 | 0.08 | [−0.1, 0.5] | Yes |
Datasets and records used by game theory and mechanism design on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in the source register.
| Data | Role | Label |
|---|---|---|
| Cooperation agreements and college records | Rules of the game between authorities | Published statistics |
| Resolution and crisis case histories | Observed strategic behaviour | Published statistics |
| Laboratory and field experiments | Tests of run and cooperation behaviour | OBSERVED |
| Enforcement and whistleblower records | Detection and deterrence evidence | Published statistics |
How three families of instruments change a risk outcome over time with adoption lags, coverage and compliance, the policy scenarios behind transition and physical risk assessments. Scenario: named assumptions about the future, not a forecast.
Controls
Readouts
| Year | Baseline | Regulation | Economic incentive | Information and capacity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 100.0 | 99.5 | 98.8 | 99.1 |
| 1 | 102.0 | 101.2 | 100.1 | 99.8 |
| 2 | 104.0 | 102.5 | 101.1 | 99.9 |
| 3 | 106.1 | 103.5 | 101.6 | 100.0 |
| 4 | 108.2 | 103.7 | 101.8 | 100.7 |
| 5 | 110.4 | 103.2 | 101.7 | 102.1 |
| 6 | 112.6 | 102.0 | 101.6 | 103.9 |
| 7 | 114.9 | 100.4 | 101.6 | 105.9 |
| 8 | 117.2 | 99.2 | 102.1 | 108.0 |
| 9 | 119.5 | 98.6 | 102.9 | 110.1 |
| 10 | 121.9 | 98.9 | 104.2 | 112.3 |
| 11 | 124.3 | 99.7 | 105.7 | 114.5 |
| 12 | 126.8 | 101.1 | 107.4 | 116.8 |
| 13 | 129.4 | 102.7 | 109.4 | 119.2 |
| 14 | 131.9 | 104.5 | 111.4 | 121.6 |
| 15 | 134.6 | 106.5 | 113.5 | 124.0 |
| 16 | 137.3 | 108.5 | 115.7 | 126.5 |
| 17 | 140.0 | 110.7 | 118.0 | 129.0 |
| 18 | 142.8 | 112.9 | 120.4 | 131.6 |
| 19 | 145.7 | 115.1 | 122.8 | 134.2 |
| 20 | 148.6 | 117.4 | 125.2 | 136.9 |
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page's map can draw:
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
Predictions are tested through laboratory and field experiments and comparison with observed behaviour. Mechanism designs are piloted before scaling.
| Check | How it is done |
|---|---|
| Robustness of equilibrium | Conclusions are tested under changes in information, payoffs and the number of players |
| Case history comparison | Predicted behaviour is compared with documented crises and cooperation episodes |
| Assumption transparency | Rationality and information assumptions are stated beside every design recommendation |
Assumptions of rationality and common knowledge often fail. Real settings involve many players and incomplete information.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Where evidence on game theory of regulation fits the disclosure and prudential frameworks institutions report against.
| Pillar | TCFD | ISSB IFRS S2 | Prudential (BCBS, IAIS) | Evidence this page can hold |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Governance | Board oversight of climate-related risks | Governance requirements | Governance and risk appetite principles | Who owns the risk and how it is escalated |
| Strategy | Risks, opportunities and resilience | Scenario analysis and resilience | Strategy and business model principles | Scenario design and transmission paths |
| Risk management | Identify, assess, manage | Risk management processes | Internal control and ICAAP or ORSA | Exposure maps and loss views |
| Metrics and targets | Metrics used and targets set | Cross-industry and industry metrics | Data, metrics and reporting principles | Indicator definitions and units |
Policy Nexus stewards game theory and mechanism design for the Consortium and reviews how it is applied across platforms.
Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
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