GRA · Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience

Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition

Published scenarios

Operational resilience scenarios must be severe but plausible: a ransomware attack that corrupts backups, the loss of a cloud region, a provider's faulty update, or a regional disaster that stops sites and staff. This page sets out scenario designs and the assumptions that decide whether a test means anything. Values are design values.

01Workspace

The workspace for published scenarios.

Pipeline

Published scenarios · Workspace WS-55 · Example interface, not a record

One stage waitingGRA · Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience

Stages

  1. Ingest4 sources
  2. Validateschema · licence
  3. Transformversioned
  4. ModelCybersecurity
  5. Testheld-out
  6. Releasewith limits

Artefacts

Service mapv2.8To checkPublished statistics
Test resultsv5.7OpenASSESSED
Supplier registerv6.4OpenPublished statistics
Incident historyv3.1To checkREPORTED

Compute quota

share used vs alert level

CPU hours74 used of 80 used limitStorage45 used of 90 used limitGPU hours57 used of 70 used limit
Pipeline.Illustrative interface; not live data.

Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience · Pipeline. Pipeline: example names and illustrative values, not a record.

02Status

Releases appear as they are reviewed.

Analysis runs in Foundry; reviewed releases are listed here.

03Scenario set

Severe but plausible cyber scenarios.

ScenarioSystemic angle
Ransomware at a widely used service providerMany firms lose the same service
Data integrity attack on a payment or ledger systemUncertainty about balances halts activity
Faulty software update pushed to many endpointsNon-malicious, simultaneous outage
Cloud region loss during a heat or flood eventPhysical and cyber resilience meet
04Process

How the process runs.

Process explorer · Process

Published scenarios: How an economic shock propagates

8 steps4 stages

Process

Published scenarios: How an economic shock propagates

Input-output models trace a change in final use or primary input prices through industry linkages, with multipliers for output, income and employment.

  1. 01 Shock and linkages

    1. 01ShockDataset · SupervisorA shock enters as an exogenous change in final uses, or as a change in the price of a primary input.
    2. 02Input-output linkagesModel · SupervisorBackward linkages tie an industry to its suppliers, forward linkages to its buyers. The model assumes fixed technical input coefficients.
  2. 02 Economy

    1. 03Sector outputModel · SupervisorThe quantity model estimates how a change in final uses affects output. Output multipliers give the production needed per unit of final use.
    2. 04PricesModel · SupervisorThe price model simulates cost-driven inflation from changes in primary input prices. It assumes perfect competition.
  3. 03 People

    1. 05JobsDataset · SupervisorEmployment multipliers represent jobs created per unit of currency of additional final use.
    2. 06Household incomeDataset · SupervisorIncome multipliers show how final use changes affect household income. A social accounting matrix shows the circular flow of income.
  4. 04 State

    1. 07Public financesStep · SupervisorEffects on public revenue and spending need government accounts linked to the model, for example in a social accounting matrix.
    2. 08Policy responseDecision · SupervisorThe responsible party decides on a response. The same linkages can be used to test it.

Outline of an external standard or method, from its public sources. It describes what the framework says, not a record of any run. It does not show that Nexus or any partner performs, certifies or approves a step. A gate is a step of the method, never a Nexus approval. The models assume fixed technical coefficients and are not forecasts.

05Spatial finance

Settlement dependencies, and what fails with a node.

Cyber scenarios run on the same design dependency network used for payments, so a provider compromise can be traced to the services and centres it would affect. Topic depth at financial cyber threats.

06Sources

Where this page's references lead.

The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.

07Questions

Questions and answers.

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