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GRA · Capital Markets Nexus

空间金融资本与危害、风险暴露和转型的交汇之处

金融体系传导

Shocks to the real economy and vulnerabilities inside the financial system reach capital markets through identifiable channels: repricing, liquidity and funding, leverage and margin, common exposures and infrastructure. This page shows how those channels work, how they interact and how stress can travel onwards from markets to banks, funds, insurers, governments and the real economy. Most episodes involve several channels at once.

STEM 方法
5
该领域应用的规范方法
主题
8
该领域的主题页面
对口方
1
网络中共享领域的各平台
报告系列
2
它参与的 Reports 系列
01渠道

风险传导至资本市场的途径。

Repricing

从新闻到价格

Changes in expected cash flows or risk premia, from earnings, policy, geopolitics or climate, revalue securities across markets.

流动性与融资

Ability to trade and borrow

Dealers’ balance sheets and funding markets determine whether trades can be absorbed. See Market liquidity.

Leverage and margin

被迫抛售

追加保证金通知和杠杆限制可能迫使在下跌的市场中抛售,从而放大波动。

02监测

领域概览。

团队跟踪该主题时会使用的界面:其指标、状态与决策。名称为示例,数值仅作示意。

Field overview: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Capital markets.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
03空间金融

主权债券与公司债券中的危害地理。

Bond markets transmit physical shocks through issuers’ revenues and assets and through sovereign balance sheets. Mapping issuers’ located assets and countries’ hazard exposure beside their outstanding debt shows which segments of a bond index are exposed to the same event. Design index only, not a rating. Sovereign channels continue at Sovereign Capital Nexus; foresight on geopolitical shocks at GRF geopolitical futures.

04Central clearing

清算所的集中度。

Central clearing reduces bilateral counterparty risk and concentrates it at central counterparties. A CCP’s default waterfall, margin model and recovery tools decide how a member default is absorbed. The CPMI-IOSCO principles set the standards; FSB guidance covers CCP resolution. Topic depth at clearing and settlement.

05放大因素

为何波动可能超出基本面。

  1. 01

    共同风险暴露

    Many investors holding similar assets or following similar strategies sell at the same time. See Market concentration.

  2. 02

    抵押品螺旋

    资产价值下跌会削弱抵押品价值,引发更多追加保证金通知和抛售。

  3. 03

    流动性错配

    Funds offering daily redemption while holding less liquid assets can face run dynamics.

  4. 04

    基础设施压力

    中央对手方的运营问题或顺周期保证金会把压力传导给成员。见 清算与结算.

  5. 05

    信息失灵

    数据质量差或延迟会增加不确定性并扩大利差。参见 市场数据质量.

06后续传播

从市场到更广泛的系统。

Stress in capital markets reaches banks through securities holdings and funding costs, insurers and pension funds through asset values and collateral needs, governments through borrowing costs, and the real economy through the cost and availability of finance. System-wide effects are studied in Financial Stability, and governance dialogue is convened by Capital Nexus at the Global Risks Forum (GRF). A Universe theme for this field is market liquidity under geopolitical shock; see test in Universe.

07分析

行业层面的汇总数据,存在局限。

传导分析使用汇总数据和已发表的研究,不评估单个企业,不推荐交易,也不构成投资建议。方法借鉴 网络科学与传染 及计量经济学,各情景均载明其假设。

Any discussion among firms takes place under GRA’s competition safeguards, set out in a written competition policy: no exchange of prices, positions, client terms or strategies, and data from firms only in aggregated form.

08来源

Where this page’s references lead.

阅读本页时所对照的机构和文件。状态和版本会变化;每个链接都指向发布机构。

09问题

问题与解答。

是否共享竞争对手数据?
No. Any data from firms is aggregated before use, under the safeguards set out in GRA’s written competition policy.
传播图是预测吗?
否。它展示压力可能如何传导。情景均注明为情景,并附有其假设。
哪个渠道最重要?
这取决于冲击的类型。近期的事件表明,流动性、杠杆和保证金动态往往决定初始冲击被放大的程度。
报告贡献

从本页贡献证据。

Reports 是联合体的季刊。您对该主题的了解可以成为下一期中的证据、案例或更正,署名归您,并在属于您本人作品时以 CC BY 4.0 发布。

Global Risks AllianceCapital Markets NexusGlobal Sector Risk and ResilienceScenario and Stress-Test
Capital Markets Nexus

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