GRA · Asset Management Nexus
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Liquidity and redemption
An open-ended fund promises to return investors’ money at short notice while holding assets that may take days, weeks or months to sell without loss. In normal markets the mismatch is managed quietly; in stress, redemptions and forced sales can reinforce each other and spill into the markets the funds hold. This page sets out how liquidity mismatch develops, how funds and supervisors measure it, and the tools that allocate its cost.
چۆن کارەکە بەڕێوە دەچێت.
Liquidity stress test
Liquidity and redemption · Bond fund · Scenario: redemption shock
Liquidity buckets
- 1 day
- 2 to 7 days
- Over 7 days
Redemption scenarios
| Historic worst | 15 | 2.5 | None needed |
| توند | 21 | 1.2 | Swing pricing |
| ئەوپەڕ | 30 | 1.1 | دەروازە |
Fig.Liquidity stress test: example names and illustrative values, not a record or a live system.
Liquidity and redemption: how the risk develops.
Liquidity mismatches and financial stability. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
First-mover advantage
When redeeming investors receive a price that does not reflect the cost of selling the assets, those who stay bear that cost. Investors who see this have a reason to redeem first, which can turn a modest outflow into a run.
Fire sales and price impact
Funds meeting redemptions sell the most liquid assets first or sell into thin markets. Prices fall, other holders mark down, and outflows from similar funds follow. The channel runs through common holdings.
Leverage and margin calls
Derivatives and repo bring collateral calls that must be met in cash within hours. A rapid move in rates or spreads can force sales of unrelated assets, as the UK liability-driven investment episode showed.
Tools allocate the cost
Swing pricing, anti-dilution levies, redemption gates, notice periods and redemptions in kind move the cost of liquidity onto redeeming investors or slow redemptions. Their availability and use differ by jurisdiction and fund.
Assets on the grid, and the portfolio they make.
Where a portfolio’s assets sit, and how much of its value is most exposed. Hypothetical assets, not an assessment.
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| نیشاندەر | یەکە | ڕیتم | Source type | ناونیشان |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assets in each liquidity bucket | percent of net assets by bucket | مانگانە | Fund liquidity classification and regulatory reporting | ڕاپۆرتکراو |
| Redemption coverage ratio | liquid assets over stressed redemptions, ratio | مانگانە | Fund liquidity stress tests | مۆدێلکراو |
| Net flows | percent of net assets per period | weekly or monthly | Fund flow statistics | ئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان |
| Swing factor applied | basis points of net asset value | per dealing day | Fund disclosures | DECLARED |
| Liquidity management tools available | tools by fund | ساڵانە | Prospectuses and supervisory surveys | ڕاپۆرتکراو |
| Gross and commitment leverage | percent of net asset value | وەرزانە | AIFMD and Form PF reporting | ڕاپۆرتکراو |
| Bid-ask spread of portfolio holdings | basis points | daily | Market trade and quote data | چاودێریکراو |
| Weekly liquid assets of money market funds | percent of total assets | مانگانە | Form N-MFP and EU money market fund reporting | ئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان |
How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.
The equity the system loses after interbank contagion, against the initial hit, as leverage, interconnection and recovery rates change, the core of a macroprudential stress test. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows North America; the model itself is not tied to a place.
کۆنترۆڵەکان
- Fall in external assets
- 2.0%
- Leverage (assets over equity)
- 10 جار
- Interbank share of assets
- 10%
- Recovery on interbank claims
- 40%
- Banks in the system
- 20
- بانکە سەرەکییەکان
- 20% of banks
خوێندنەوەکان
- Equity lost to the initial shock
- 18.0%
- Equity lost after contagion
- 45.0%
- Added by contagion (DebtRank)
- 27.0 خاڵ
- Banks in default
- 0
ژمارە، ڕێگا و سەرچاوەکان
| خول | System equity lost (%) | Banks in default |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.00 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.80 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.28 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.17 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.50 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.90 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.74 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.24 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.55 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.73 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.84 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.90 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.94 | 0 |
| 13 | 44.96 | 0 |
| 14 | 44.98 | 0 |
| 15 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 16 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.00 | 0 |
ڕێگاکان
- DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
- Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
- Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
- Clearing in financial networks Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
- پەنجەی نادڵنیایی (مۆنتی کارلۆی پارامیتەر) Spiegelhalter, Pearson و Short (2011)، Visualising uncertainty about the future، Science 333
- هەستیاریی یەک-یەک (تۆرناد) Saltelli و ئەوانی دیکە (2008)، Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer، Wiley
داتا
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
لە ناو شەش کۆڵەکەکەدا، بە سەرپەرشتیی Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in Asset Management Nexus in Foundry
- Tested at Asset Management Nexus in Universe
- کۆدکراوە لە دارایی، بیمە و ئابووری لە Standards
- Published in Asset Management Nexus in Reports
- فێرکراو لە کۆلێژی دارایی و ئابووری لە Academy
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| سەرچاوە | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| FSB and IOSCO policy on liquidity mismatch in open-ended funds | Revised recommendations and anti-dilution tool guidance for open-ended funds | Free to read, attribution |
| ESMA Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities reports | EU fund flows, liquidity and leverage vulnerabilities | Free reuse, attribution |
| SEC Private Funds Statistics from Form PF | Aggregated private fund leverage, liquidity and financing | دۆمەینی گشتی |
| SEC Money Market Fund Statistics from Form N-MFP | Money market fund holdings, liquidity and flows | دۆمەینی گشتی |
| ICI weekly and monthly flow data | US mutual fund, exchange-traded fund and money market flows | Free to read, ICI terms |
| EFAMA Quarterly Statistical Release | European UCITS and AIF net sales by category | Free to read, EFAMA terms |
| FSB Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation | Size, composition and vulnerabilities of non-bank finance | Free to read, attribution |
| Bank of England system-wide exploratory scenario publications | Interactions between banks and non-banks in a market-wide stress | Free reuse, attribution |
Trace a shock in liquidity and redemption to the balance sheet.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Asset owners and asset management: the shocks it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Pick an initiating shock and step through the cascade to see which exposures it reaches and where losses could concentrate. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every weight is a stated assumption. An exercise, not a forecast, a valuation, a rating or investment advice. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
مەترسیدەرەکان
- Windstorm
- Geomagnetic storm
- ڕووخانی بەنداو
- پچڕانی کارەبای فراوان (لە خوارەوە دەستپێدەکات)
- Large forest disturbance (set off downstream)
- ئاگری دارستان (لە خوارەوەی ڕووبار دەستپێدەکات)
- Geomagnetically induced current (set off downstream)
- Ionospheric disturbance (set off downstream)
- Satellite space-environment anomaly (set off downstream)
- River flood (set off downstream)
- Flash flood (set off downstream)
- ئاوارەبوونی بەکۆمەڵ (لە خوارەوە دەستپێدەکات)
- Shoreline ice shove (set off downstream)
- Thermospheric drag surge (set off downstream)
- Radiation-belt electron enhancement (set off downstream)
- Seiche (set off downstream)
- Satellite-navigation disruption (set off downstream)
- Uncontrolled re-entry (set off downstream)
سیستەم و بەستنەوەکان
- خاوەنانی سامان و بەڕێوەبردنی سامان
- بانکداری هاوبەستی
- دامەزراوەکانی وزە و تۆڕەکانی کارەبا هاوبەستی
- بانکە ناوەندییەکان و سەرپەرشتیارانی دارایی هاوبەستی
- کانزاکاری و دەرهێنان هاوبەستی
کۆنترۆڵەکان
NS-0دەستوور و بنەماکانNS-3UNIەکانی تۆماری مەترسی (ڕێزمان، خشتەی گواستنەوەی کۆن، دەسەڵاتی تەرخانکردن)NS-9UNIی ناوەڕۆکی (دامەزراندنەکان، نموونەکان، نموونەکانی پڕۆگرام)NS-11سەلماندن و چاودێری (بەڵگە، گواهییەکان، چاودێریی گونجان لەگەڵ zero-trust)NS-14پابەندبوون و هاوتاکردن لەگەڵ ستانداردی دەرەکیNRS-U1Universe platform profile: Asset Management NexusNRS-H113خێزانی مەترسیدەر: ناسکیی سیستەمی دارایی (NHS-1 soc.financial-system)NRS-N6مەترسی و خۆڕاگریی ژێرخانNRS-C3داتای مەترسیدەر، ڕووبەڕووبوون، لاوازی و تواناNRS-M3تانوپۆی میتۆد: هەواڵگریی ڕووبەڕووبوون و سامانNRS-N5مەترسی و خۆڕاگریی فرەجۆریی زیندەوەری و سروشت
چاودێری
- OECD Data Explorer (incl. Creditor Reporting System, insurance and pension statistics) (listed for reference)
- NGFS Scenario Explorer (listed for reference)
- GLEIF Golden Copy (LEI Level 1 and Level 2 data) (listed for reference)
- World Development Indicators (listed for reference)
- Number of companies publishing sustainability reports
- Market capitalisation of listed domestic companies (% of GDP)
- Total greenhouse gas emissions per year
جوگرافیای نموونە
- ئەوروپای ڕۆژئاوا: 152 خانەی شەشپاڵوو
- ڕێژەی بارین، نیو کاتژمێری ڕابردوو (IMERG)، NASA GIBS
- ڕووناکییەکانی شەو ئەمشەو، پچڕانی کارەبا (VIIRS Day/Night Band)، NASA GIBS
- Vegetation disturbance alerts, 30 m (OPERA DIST-ALERT), NASA GIBS
- Carbon monoxide, smoke transport (AIRS), NASA GIBS
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Asset Management Nexus prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| کێ بڕیار دەدات | پرسیارەکە | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Fund boards and UCITS and AIF management companies | Which liquidity management tools a fund should have, how they are calibrated and when to use them | Liquidity bucket profiles, redemption stress tests and tool calibration practice |
| Securities regulators | Whether a category of fund needs stricter liquidity classification, notice periods or tool requirements | Mismatch measures by category and flow behaviour in past stress episodes |
| Central banks and financial stability authorities | Whether fund outflows and margin calls could impair core markets | System-wide scenarios linking fund flows, leverage and dealer capacity |
| Pension trustees using leveraged liability hedging | What collateral buffer and recapitalisation process a hedging mandate needs | Margin-call scenarios under stressed rate moves, and the time needed to recapitalise |
Outputs this topic produces
- Liquidity mismatch profiles by fund category, with reporting lags and classification methods stated
- Redemption and margin-call scenarios across funds with common holdings
- Comparisons of liquidity management tool availability and use across jurisdictions
- Research on flow, performance and price dynamics in stressed markets
What liquidity and redemption means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Scenario pathways
How liquidity and redemption could be stressed under the scenario families central banks and supervisors use.
| Scenario family | مەترسیی گواستنەوە | مەترسیی فیزیکی | What a stress test asks |
|---|---|---|---|
| ڕێکخراو | Early, gradual policy | نزم | Can the book absorb a steady repricing? |
| نارێک | Late, abrupt policy | Lower to medium | What breaks under a sudden repricing and credit migration? |
| Hot house world | Limited policy | High and rising | Where do physical losses concentrate in collateral and insurance? |
What experts ask about liquidity.
- How large is the gap between redemption terms and the liquidity of fund assets?
- Under what conditions do redemptions become self-reinforcing runs?
- How effective are liquidity management tools such as swing pricing and redemption gates?
- How do leverage and margin calls interact with redemptions?
- How does market liquidity behave in stress, and who provides it?
How liquidity stress develops.
When a fund faces redemptions, it must sell assets or use cash buffers. If the assets are illiquid, selling can lower prices, and the costs may fall on investors who remain. This creates a first-mover advantage: investors who redeem early may get better terms, which can encourage runs.
Market liquidity is procyclical. In calm markets, assets trade easily; in stress, dealers and other liquidity providers may withdraw, spreads widen and selling becomes costly. Several stress episodes in recent years showed how fund redemptions, margin calls and market illiquidity can reinforce each other.
Leverage adds pressure. Margin calls on derivatives or borrowing can force sales at the worst time.
Methods and their limits.
- 01
Liquidity stress testing
Simulating redemptions and asset sales, using scenario design and stress testing. Behaviour in severe stress is uncertain.
- 02
Market liquidity measures
Bid-ask spreads, price impact and trading volumes. These change rapidly in stress.
- 03
Fund flow analysis
Studying how investors respond to performance and shocks, using econometrics.
- 04
Contagion models
Modelling fire-sale spillovers through common holdings, using financial and risk engineering.
Past stress episodes inform models but may not represent future ones, especially as market structures change.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Financial and risk engineeringLook-through risk decomposition · Liquidity bucketing and redemption testsApplied here
- 02Scenario design and stress testingClimate scenario analysis of portfolios · System-wide redemption and margin scenariosApplied here
- 03EconometricsFlow and price pressure estimation · Event studies of stewardship and disclosureApplied here
- 04Financial economics and macro-financeCommon ownership and fire-sale channels · Pricing of transition riskApplied here
پرسیار و وەڵام.
What is swing pricing?
Why does liquidity disappear in stress?
Are money market funds part of this?
Are funds a source of runs?
Does the platform assess individual funds?
Does the topic cover money market funds?
لەم لاپەڕەیەوە بەڵگە پێشکەش بکە.
Reports بڵاوکراوەی وەرزیی کۆنسۆرتیۆم ـە. ئەوەی تۆ لەسەر ئەم بابەتە دەیزانیت دەتوانێت لە وەشانی داهاتوودا ببێتە بەڵگە، کەیس یان ڕاستکردنەوە، بە ناوی خۆتەوە و لەژێر CC BY 4.0 بڵاو دەکرێتەوە کاتێک کاری خۆتە.
- EmailGateway GW-GRASend it from this pageEvidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen depositDeposit it and submit to the communityPublish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsGlobal Risks AllianceSee every way to contributeThe contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
هەرگیز داتای کەسی، وردەکاریی هەستیاری ژێرخان یان هیچ شتێک مەنێرە کە مافی بڵاوکردنەوەت نییە. بەشدارییەک پێش بەکارهێنان پێداچوونەوەی بۆ دەکرێت؛ ناردنی ماف نابەخشێت بە نووسەرایەتی یان بەڕێوەبردنی ڕاگەیاندن، و پاڵپشتی دارایی هەرگیز دۆزینەوەیەک ناکڕێت.
Bring an exposure or capital question to the Alliance.
زانیاری و پرسیار ئەمڕۆ کراوەن. پرسیارێک ژمارەی ئاماژەی پێدەدرێت و هەنگاوی دواتر دیاری دەکات؛ داواکاری، پارەدان، تەرخانکردنی کۆمپیوتەر و تۆمارکردن تەنیا کاتێک دەکرێنەوە کە تیم، مەرج و توانای پێداچوونەوەیان هەبێت.
بەڵگەنامە یاساییەکان.
نەخشە، داتا و وێنەکانی ئەم ماڵپەڕە بۆ ناوەڕۆک و زانیاریی گشتی پیشان دراون. ئامۆژگاری، پێشبینی یان ئاگادارکردنەوە نین؛ سنوورەکانی زانیارییەکە لە ڕەتکردنەوەی بەرپرسیارێتی و ئاگاداریی داتادا دەستنیشان کراون.