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GRA · مخاطر النظام المالي

التمويل المكانيحيث يلتقي رأس المال بالخطر والتعرّض والتحول

السيبراني والتشغيلي

Critical financial services depend on a dense web of cloud platforms, payment networks, data centres, software suppliers and telecommunications. One incident at a shared provider can interrupt many institutions at once. The Global Risks Alliance (GRA) examines how cyber and operational events become industry-wide losses and service failures, and what evidence would show the dependencies before they fail. It reviews no firm’s own controls. Part of Financial-system risk.

02الانتقال

How a cyber or operational event reaches finance.

القناةكيف تصل الصدمة إلى القطاع المالي
Service outagePayments, trading or customer services stop, with direct losses and loss of confidence
تركّز الأطراف الثالثةMany institutions depend on the same cloud, software or network provider
Fraud lossIntrusions enable theft or fraudulent transactions
Insurance accumulationCyber and business-interruption claims arrive across many policies from one event
الخدمات العامةDisrupted payments reach benefits, tax collection and public services

تصف القنوات آليات، لا قوى مقيسة ولا احتمالات.

03الإطار الرقابي

Operational resilience is now law in several markets.

الأداةالهيئةCore requirement
Principles for Operational Resilience (2021)Basel CommitteeIdentify critical operations, map their interconnections and dependencies, and set tolerance for disruption
قانون الصمود التشغيلي الرقمي (⁨DORA⁩)European Union, applying from 17 January 2025ICT risk management, incident reporting, threat-led penetration testing and an oversight regime for critical ICT third-party providers
Third-party risk management toolkit (2023)مجلس الاستقرار الماليCommon terms for critical services and concentration in third-party providers
Cyber Lexicon and FIRE incident reporting formatمجلس الاستقرار الماليShared definitions and a common format so incident reports compare across authorities
Cyber resilience guidance for FMIs (2016)CPMI-IOSCORecovery of critical operations within two hours of a disruption as a planning objective for FMIs
04رسم خرائط الترابطات

From one provider to many institutions.

An operational shock becomes systemic when many firms share the same node: a cloud region, a payment processor, a messaging network, a market-data feed. GRA’s method maps important business services to the third parties and physical sites that support them. Then it reads the map in reverse: which services across the sector fail together if one node fails? Data centres and cable landing stations are also physical assets, so the same map carries flood, heat and power-supply hazard.

The engineering evidence for those dependencies sits at GCRI cloud and third parties and the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) interdependency and cascade; specialist work continues at Financial Cyber Resilience.

05أسئلة

أسئلة مشتركة يعمل عليها GRA.

  1. 01

    Mapping shared providers

    Which providers would interrupt several institutions at once, and for how long, without exposing any firm’s architecture?

  2. 02

    Recovery assumptions

    Are the recovery objectives institutions plan around consistent with what shared providers could deliver in a regional event?

  3. 03

    Cyber accumulation

    How could one incident trigger correlated claims across insurers writing cyber cover?

  4. 04

    Infrastructure dependence

    How do power, communications and data-centre failures combine with cyber events?

06الحدود

Industry evidence, never a security review.

  • GRA does not test, audit or certify any institution’s security controls.
  • Security reports about GRA’s own systems go to the security report form, without exploit details or personal data in a first message.
  • No member’s confidential incident or architecture information is exchanged with another.
  • Related: Payments and market infrastructure.
07متصل

الموضوع ذاته عبر الاتحاد.

منصة ⁨GRA⁩

الصمود السيبراني والتشغيلي المالي

The specialist community: Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience.

العلم

الصمود السيبراني والرقمي

Evidence from The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI): Cyber and Digital Resilience.

الحوكمة

Digital governance

Dialogue convened by The Global Risks Forum (GRF): AI and Digital Governance.

09أسئلة وأجوبة

أسئلة وأجوبة.

Should we report a cyber incident to GRA?
No. GRA is not an incident-response service, a regulator or an emergency service. Report incidents to the authorities and providers your obligations name.
Can institutions share incident data through GRA?
Only in aggregated form, within the rights granted, so that no firm can be identified. Confidential or competitively sensitive information never passes between members.
من يستخدم هذا العمل؟
Banks, insurers, market infrastructure operators and supervisors, each in its own analysis. A supervisor may choose to use published evidence; no participant gains privileged access.
Why treat cyber and operational risk as systemic?
Because the industry’s digital dependencies are shared. When many institutions rely on one provider, a single failure is a correlated loss, not an isolated one. It reaches payments, markets, insurers and public services at the same time.
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⁨Global Risks Alliance⁩
Global Risks Alliance

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