GRA · Payments and Market Infrastructure
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Clearing and settlement
After a trade, clearing confirms and nets obligations and settlement delivers securities against cash. Central securities depositories, securities settlement systems and settlement agents do this work. Settlement failures, delays and shortened cycles affect liquidity and counterparty risk across markets. This page sets out how clearing and settlement risk arises, how it is measured, and who decides.
How the work runs.
RTGS operations console
Clearing and settlement · RTGS system · Business day 190
- Value settled today81local bnActive
- Payments queued16815Watch
- Availability, % this month100.0Normal
- Participants below liquidity floor2Alert
Intraday liquidity, system
Incident and failover log
- 09:54INCParticipant P-12 message delay
- 10:47LSMLiquidity saving cycle released 53 payments
- 14:00CUTCustomer payment cut-off
- Q2TESTContingency site failover in 78 min
Fig.RTGS operations console: example names and illustrative values, not a record or a live system.
Clearing and settlement: how the risk develops.
Settlement exposures and infrastructure. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Delivery against payment
Delivery-versus-payment ensures securities move only if cash moves. Where it is absent, one party can deliver and not be paid.
Shorter cycles raise intensity
Moving from two days to one day after trade reduces exposure but leaves less time to fix errors, fund trades and handle cross-border time zones.
Fails propagate
A failure to deliver one security can prevent the recipient from delivering onward, creating chains of fails across participants.
Depositories concentrate
Central securities depositories hold record of ownership for whole markets. Their failure would freeze settlement and ownership records.
How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.
The equity the system loses after interbank contagion, against the initial hit, as leverage, interconnection and recovery rates change, the core of a macroprudential stress test. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.
Controls
- Fall in external assets
- 2.0%
- Leverage (assets over equity)
- 10 times
- Interbank share of assets
- 10%
- Recovery on interbank claims
- 40%
- Banks in the system
- 20
- Core banks
- 20% of banks
Readouts
- Equity lost to the initial shock
- 18.0%
- Equity lost after contagion
- 45.0%
- Added by contagion (DebtRank)
- 27.0 points
- Banks in default
- 0
Numbers, methods and sources
| Round | System equity lost (%) | Banks in default |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.00 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.80 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.28 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.17 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.50 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.90 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.74 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.24 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.55 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.73 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.84 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.90 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.94 | 0 |
| 13 | 44.96 | 0 |
| 14 | 44.98 | 0 |
| 15 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 16 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.00 | 0 |
Izindlela
- DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
- Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
- Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
- Clearing in financial networks Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
- Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
- One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Idatha
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in Payments and Market Infrastructure in Foundry
- Tested at Payments and Market Infrastructure in Universe
- Codified in Finance, Insurance and the Economy in Standards
- Published in Payments and Market Infrastructure in Reports
- Taught in Faculty of Finance and Economics in Academy
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Settlement fail rate | share of instructions or value failing on intended date | monthly | CSD and regulator data | Published statistics |
| Settlement cycle length | days after trade date | on change | Market rules | Published statistics |
| Value settled through CSDs | currency per year | annual | CPMI statistics | Published statistics |
| Cash penalties for settlement fails | currency | monthly | CSDR penalty data | Published statistics |
| Straight-through processing rate | share of trades processed without manual intervention | periodic | Industry surveys | REPORTED |
| CSD links | count of interoperable links | annual | CSD disclosures | DECLARED |
What clearing and settlement means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Transmission channels
How a shock in clearing and settlement reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Umthombo | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| ESMA CSDR settlement fails data and reports | EU settlement efficiency and penalties | Free, EU reuse terms |
| SEC and industry reports on the move to T+1 | Implementation and effects of the shorter cycle | Public domain and public reports |
| CPMI Red Book statistics | Securities settlement volumes | Free, BIS terms |
| CSD PFMI disclosure frameworks | Self-assessments of depositories | Public records, terms per CSD |
| ECB TARGET2-Securities reports | Operation of the euro area securities settlement platform | Free, ECB terms |
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Payments and Market Infrastructure prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Ubani onqumayo | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Securities regulators | What settlement cycle and discipline rules apply | Fail data and cycle change evidence |
| CSD and settlement system boards | How to invest in resilience and links | PFMI assessments and incident history |
| Market participants | How to prepare operations and funding for shorter cycles | Industry readiness evidence |
| Central bank overseers | Whether settlement systems meet standards | Disclosure and oversight records |
Outputs this topic produces
- Guide to clearing, settlement and delivery-versus-payment
- Brief on shorter settlement cycles and their trade-offs
- Method note on settlement fail measures
- Questions for boards on settlement readiness
What the industry asks.
Between the moment a trade is agreed and the moment it settles, each party is exposed to the risk that the other fails to deliver. These exposures can be large and can spread across the system if a major participant defaults. Settlement infrastructure is designed to shorten, reduce and control them. Changes such as shorter settlement cycles alter the balance between exposure and operational pressure.
- How large are settlement exposures, and how long do they last between trade and settlement?
- How do delivery-versus-payment and payment-versus-payment arrangements eliminate principal risk?
- What happens operationally and legally if settlement fails or a participant defaults?
- How do shorter settlement cycles change liquidity needs and operational risk?
How the infrastructure works and fails.
Settlement risk combines credit, liquidity, legal and operational elements.
Delivery without payment
The risk of delivering an asset or payment without receiving the counter-value. Delivery-versus-payment designs remove it.
Legal certainty
Settlement finality makes a transfer irrevocable at a defined moment, protecting it from being unwound if a participant fails.
Processing and reconciliation
Settlement depends on accurate data, matching and reconciliation. Errors and outages cause failed settlements.
Tokenisation and distributed ledgers are often presented as ways to settle instantly and atomically. Research suggests that they could reduce some reconciliation burdens and exposures, but they also raise questions about settlement asset, legal finality, interoperability with existing systems and operational resilience of new platforms. These questions are best examined jointly by the industry, before any architecture becomes entrenched.
How the evidence is built, and its limits.
- 01
Settlement statistics
Settlement efficiency and fail rates published by infrastructures. Granularity varies.
- 02
Legal analysis
Review of finality, insolvency and collateral law across jurisdictions.
- 03
Process mapping
Mapping of settlement workflows and dependencies, applying reliability and resilience engineering.
- 04
Distributed ledger research
Study of how ledger-based settlement could change processes and risks, applying distributed ledgers and digital assets. Most applications remain at pilot stage.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Payment and financial market technologyLiquidity-saving mechanisms · ISO 20022 data quality · Settlement cycle designApplied here
- 02Reliability and resilience engineeringImpact tolerance setting · Recovery design · Learning from incidentsApplied here
- 03Network science and contagionPayment flow networks · Shared provider mapping · CCP membership networksApplied here
- 04Distributed ledgers and digital assetsSettlement finality on ledgers · Tokenised settlement experiments · Governance of shared ledgersApplied here
Questions and answers.
What is delivery versus payment?
What is T+1?
What is a central securities depository?
Why does settlement finality matter?
Do shorter settlement cycles reduce risk?
Does GRA assess settlement systems?
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