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GRA · Financial Stability

Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition

Systemic interconnectedness

Financial institutions are linked by loans, deposits, derivatives, securities holdings, common service providers and shared investors. These links spread risk in calm times and transmit losses in stress. Systemic interconnectedness is the property that lets one failure become many. This page sets out how interconnectedness develops and transmits stress, how it is measured, and which authorities and boards use that evidence.

01رجسٹر

Systemic interconnectedness on the record.

02The question

Systemic interconnectedness: how the risk develops.

Banks, insurers and nonbanks linked through exposures. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

طریقۂ کار

Direct exposures transmit losses

When a counterparty defaults, its creditors lose. Concentrated bilateral exposures, in interbank loans or derivatives, can push a creditor below its capital buffer and start a chain.

طریقۂ کار

Common exposures correlate losses

Institutions that hold the same assets or lend to the same sectors lose together even without direct links. Diversification at firm level can produce uniformity at system level.

طریقۂ کار

Shared infrastructure concentrates

Central counterparties, custodians, cloud providers and payment systems serve many firms. A failure at one node affects all its users at once.

طریقۂ کار

Opacity amplifies doubt

When counterparties cannot see each other's exposures, rumours of losses lead to withdrawal from all suspected firms. Uncertainty about links acts like contagion even where links are small.

03Spatial finance

Settlement dependencies, and what fails with a node.

How a failure at one financial centre can spread through settlement links. Design links, not real dependencies.

Sixteen financial centres, and how a failure at one spreads through settlement links.Design links, not the real dependencies of any infrastructure.
04اشاریے

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeلیبل
Interbank exposurescurrency, by counterparty sectorquarterlySupervisory large exposure returnsPublished statistics
G-SIB interconnectedness scorescore from intra-financial assets and liabilities and securities outstandingannualBCBS G-SIB assessment dataPublished statistics
Network centrality of institutionscentrality measure, dimensionlessquarterlyExposure networksماڈل شدہ
Portfolio overlap between institutionscosine similarity of holdingsquarterlySecurities holdings statisticsتخمینی
Bank claims on nonbank financial institutionscurrencyquarterlyBIS and central bank statisticsPublished statistics
Concentration of critical service providersshare of firms using top providersannualSupervisory surveysرپورٹ شدہ
05نگرانی

Systemic risk dashboard.

وہ اسکرین جو ایک ٹیم اس موضوع کی پیروی کے لیے استعمال کرے گی: اس کے پیمانے، حالتیں اور فیصلے۔ نام مثالیں ہیں اور اقدار توضیحی ہیں۔

Systemic risk dashboard

Systemic interconnectedness · Financial system · Committee meeting 3

Housing vulnerabilities elevatedGRA · Financial Stability

Vulnerabilities heat map

percentile vs history, 0 to 100

Exposure network

red: most connected node

Credit-to-GDP gap

Systemic risk dashboard: the screen's structure, terms and states for Systemic interconnectedness.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
06ماخذات

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

ماخذWhat it givesLicence class
BCBS data on the banks in the G-SIB assessment sampleIndicator values used in the G-SIB methodologyFree, BIS terms
BIS international banking statisticsCross-border bank claims by sector and countryFree, BIS terms
ECB securities holdings statisticsHoldings of securities by sector in the euro areaFree, ECB reuse terms
FFIEC Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports)United States bank balance sheetsعوامی ملکیت
IMF Global Financial Stability ReportAssessment of system-wide vulnerabilitiesFree, IMF terms
Office of Financial Research financial stability monitorIndicators of United States financial stabilityعوامی ملکیت
07Scenario model

Transition and physical risk on a portfolio.

Three scenario families after the NGFS framework move a sector portfolio through carbon costs and warming damages; the transmission view follows the losses to lenders, investors, public finances and households. Scenario: named assumptions about the future, not a forecast. The map on this page shows Europe; the model itself is not tied to a place.

کنٹرولز

Carbon price at the horizon, orderly path
200 per tCO2
Delay before a disorderly transition
50% of horizon
Cost passed to customers
50%
Warming today above pre-industrial
1.30°C
Warming per decade, current policies
0.25°C
Damage coefficient
0.24% per °C²
Years ahead
25 years

ریڈنگز

Worst scenario at the horizon
−33.6% of value
اعداد، طریقے اور ماخذات
سالOrderly transition (% value)Delayed, disorderly transition (% value)Current policies (% value)
0−0.38−0.38−0.38
3−2.87−0.53−0.67
6−5.36−0.68−0.97
9−7.84−0.84−1.27
12−10.33−0.99−1.57
15−12.82−7.12−1.87
18−15.31−15.05−2.17
21−17.80−23.00−2.48
24−20.29−30.94−2.79

طریقے

  1. Climate scenario families NGFS (2023), Climate Scenarios for central banks and supervisors, Phase IV
  2. Climate stress test of the financial system Battiston and others (2017), Nature Climate Change 7
  3. Damage function Nordhaus (2017), Revisiting the social cost of carbon, PNAS 114
  4. Transmission channels BCBS (2021), Climate-related risk drivers and their transmission channels
  5. غیر یقینی کا پنکھا (پیرامیٹر Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter، Pearson and Short (2011)، Visualising uncertainty about the future، Science 333
  6. ایک وقت میں ایک کی حساسیت (ٹورنیڈو) Saltelli and others (2008)، Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer، Wiley

ڈیٹا

ماڈل کنٹرولز سے طے شدہ تدریسی اقدار پر چلتا ہے۔ کسی مقام کے لیے اس کی پیمانہ بندی کرنے کے لیے اسے ان منظور شدہ پرتوں اور سلسلوں کے تناظر میں پڑھیں، جنہیں اس صفحے کا نقشہ دکھا سکتا ہے:

  • Urban extents Natural Earth
  • Seaports Natural Earth
  • Past year, daily temperature (ERA5 via Open-Meteo) Open-Meteo.com (CC BY 4.0), Copernicus ERA5 (C3S/ECMWF) · register open-meteo.public-pages
  • Surface air temperature, daytime (AIRS) NASA AIRS · register nasa.gibs.context-live-layers
Transition and physical risk on a portfolio. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: Climate scenario families (NGFS (2023), Climate Scenarios for central banks and supervisors, Phase IV); Climate stress test of the financial system (Battiston and others (2017), Nature Climate Change 7); Damage function (Nordhaus (2017), Revisiting the social cost of carbon, PNAS 114).
08Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Financial Stability prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

کون فیصلہ کرتا ہےThe questionEvidence this page serves
Prudential supervisorsWhich exposures need large exposure limits or extra capitalExposure data and network measures with sources
Macroprudential authoritiesWhether interconnectedness justifies systemic buffersSystem-wide exposure and overlap measures
Bank and insurer boardsHow much concentration to accept in counterparties and providersCounterparty and provider dependence evidence
The Basel Committee and FSBHow the G-SIB framework and lists are setIndicator data and methodology reviews

Outputs this topic produces

  • Guide to direct, common-exposure and infrastructure channels of contagion
  • Method note on network measures and their data requirements
  • Brief on reading G-SIB indicators without mistaking them for risk forecasts
  • Questions for boards on counterparty and provider concentration
09جڑواں اور سلسلہ وار اثر کا سمیلیٹر

Trace a shock in systemic interconnectedness to the balance sheet.

Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Financial stability and prudential risk: the shocks it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Pick an initiating shock and step through the cascade to see which exposures it reaches and where losses could concentrate. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every weight is a stated assumption. An exercise, not a forecast, a valuation, a rating or investment advice. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.

خطرات

  • Dam failure
  • River flood (set off downstream)
  • Flash flood (set off downstream)
  • بڑے پیمانے پر نقل مکانی (آگے کے شعبوں میں اثر)
  • بجلی کی وسیع بندش (آگے کے شعبوں میں اثر)
  • Water supply shortfall (set off downstream)

کنٹرولز

  • NS-0 آئین اور اصول
  • NS-3 خطرے کے ریکارڈ کے UNIs (قواعد، پرانا تقابلی نقشہ، تخصیص کا اختیار)
  • NS-9 سیاقی UNIs (تعیناتیاں، مثالیں، پروگرام کی مثالیں)
  • NS-10 پالیسیاں اور شقیں (مشین کے پڑھنے کے قابل ذمہ داریاں: تعریف، پابندی، جانچ اور نفاذ)
  • NS-11 تصدیق اور نگرانی (شواہد، تصدیق نامے، zero-trust مطابقت کا مشاہدہ)
  • NS-14 بیرونی معیارات سے مطابقت اور تقابلی نقشہ
  • NRS-H62 خطرات کا خاندان: مرکب اور کثیر خطراتی واقعات (NHS-1 sys.compound)
  • NRS-H113 خطرات کا خاندان: مالیاتی نظام کی کمزوری (NHS-1 soc.financial-system)
  • NRS-H118 خطرات کا خاندان: منظم جرائم اور غیر قانونی معیشتیں (NHS-1 soc.crime)
  • NRS-H79 خطراتی خاندان: ذہنی صحت کے بحران (NHS-1 health.mental)
  • NRS-U9 Universe platform profile: Financial Regulation Nexus
  • NRS-C5 منظرنامے اور دباؤ کی جانچ

مشاہدہ

  • BIS Data Portal (credit, debt service, property prices, banking statistics) (listed for reference)
  • IMF data services (WEO, IFS, FSI via SDMX) (listed for reference)
  • OECD Data Explorer (SDMX API) (listed for reference)
  • Financial Soundness Indicators
  • Macroeconomic Dashboard

مثالی جغرافیہ

  • Western Europe: 152 hexagonal cells
  • آج رات کی روشنیاں، بندشیں (VIIRS Day/Night Band)، NASA GIBS
  • بادلوں کے پار سطحی پانی، 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 ریڈار)، NASA GIBS
  • بارش کی شرح، گزشتہ نصف گھنٹہ (IMERG)، NASA GIBS
  • Surface soil moisture (SMAP), NASA GIBS
10Core questions

Shared questions the industry asks.

  1. 01

    What does the network look like?

    Who is exposed to whom, through which instruments, and how concentrated the links are.

  2. 02

    Which institutions are central?

    Which nodes, if they failed, would affect the most others.

  3. 03

    Do connections stabilise or destabilise?

    When links share risk and when they spread it.

  4. 04

    What links are hidden?

    Indirect connections through common holdings, shared providers and correlated strategies.

11Exposure, loss and capital

What systemic interconnectedness means for exposure, loss and capital.

The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.

Transmission channels

How a shock in systemic interconnectedness reaches credit, market, underwriting, liquidity and operational risk, and feeds back.

Channel structure after the Basel Committee's work on climate-related risk drivers and transmission channels; links shown are typical paths, not estimated exposures.
NGFS climate scenarios · Network for Greening the Financial SystemIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures · ISSBTCFD recommendations · Financial Stability Board TCFDPrinciples for the effective management of climate-related financial risks · Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
12Mechanisms

How the risk arises and transmits.

Network research shows that connectivity has two faces. In normal conditions, links diversify risk and absorb small shocks. Beyond a threshold, the same links transmit large shocks widely, a property sometimes described as robust yet fragile.

Central institutions matter disproportionately. Large dealers, clearing houses and major funding providers sit at the core of many networks; their distress affects many counterparties at once.

Indirect links can exceed direct ones. Institutions that hold similar assets are connected through prices even with no bilateral exposure: if one sells, the others lose.

Shared service providers, such as custodians, cloud platforms and data vendors, create operational links that do not appear in financial exposure data.

Networks change in stress. Counterparties cut links precisely when they are needed, which can isolate institutions and accelerate failure.

13Methods and limits

How evidence is gathered, and where it stops.

Method or dataWhat it showsIts limit
Exposure network dataBilateral links between institutionsOften confidential and incomplete
Common holdings analysisOverlap in portfoliosHoldings data may lag
Network metricsCentrality and concentrationMetrics simplify complex behaviour
SimulationContagion under assumed shocksResults depend on behavioural assumptions
14طریقے

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Network science and contagionInterbank contagion simulation · Common exposure networks · Multilayer networksApplied here
  2. Financial economics and macro-financeRun incentives in funds and banks · Leverage cycles · Implicit guaranteesApplied here
  3. Complex systems and agent-based modellingAgent-based market models · Early warning of regime shifts · Feedback loop mappingApplied here
15سوالات

سوالات و جوابات۔

What makes a bank systemically important?
The BCBS methodology scores banks on size, interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity and cross-jurisdictional activity. Banks above thresholds face higher loss absorbency requirements.
Why do common exposures matter if banks are not linked?
Because firms holding similar assets lose together and may sell together, pushing prices down for all. This channel can matter as much as direct lending.
Can network models predict crises?
They show how losses could spread given assumed shocks and links. They depend on data quality and behavioural assumptions and do not predict timing.
Does GRA map any firm's counterparties?
No. It uses aggregated or published data and identifies no institution's positions.
Is more interconnection good or bad?
Both. It shares small risks and can spread large ones. Structure and concentration matter more than the number of links.
Why include service providers?
Because shared operational dependencies can halt many institutions at once, independent of financial exposures.
رپورٹیںحصہ ڈالیں

اس صفحے سے شواہد فراہم کریں۔

Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

Global Risks AllianceFinancial StabilityScenario and Stress-TestGlobal Systems Risk and Resilience

کبھی بھی ذاتی ڈیٹا، حساس بنیادی ڈھانچے کی تفصیل یا کوئی ایسی چیز نہ بھیجیں جسے شیئر کرنے کا آپ کو حق نہ ہو۔ ہر شراکت استعمال سے پہلے جانچی جاتی ہے؛ اسے بھیجنے سے کوئی تصنیفی یا ادارتی حق حاصل نہیں ہوتا، اور سرپرستی کبھی کوئی نتیجہ نہیں خریدتی۔

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Bring an exposure or capital question to the Alliance.

معلومات اور استفسارات آج کھلے ہیں۔ استفسار کو ایک حوالہ نمبر ملتا ہے اور اگلے مرحلے کی نشاندہی ہوتی ہے؛ درخواستیں، ادائیگیاں، کمپیوٹنگ کی تخصیص اور رجسٹریشن صرف اس وقت کھلتی ہیں جب ان کی ٹیم، شرائط اور جائزے کی استعداد موجود ہو۔