Common holdings and fire-sale contagion
Funds and banks are linked by the securities they hold in common. Simulating forced sales by one holder shows the price pressure that reaches others through overlapping portfolios.
GRA · Capital Markets Nexus
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
Network science maps how financial institutions, funds and infrastructures are linked through exposures, common holdings and shared service providers, and how a shock travels along those links. It identifies central nodes and contagion paths while stating how incomplete financial network data are.
Network science and contagion study how the structure of connections among entities shapes the spread of failures, information and disease. It provides tools to analyse interdependent infrastructure, supply chains and financial systems. In capital markets and investment and financial stability, network science identifies critical nodes and pathways through which shocks propagate across sectors. It informs targeted protection and diversification to limit cascades. The canonical description is on the STEM Commons.
Funds and banks are linked by the securities they hold in common. Simulating forced sales by one holder shows the price pressure that reaches others through overlapping portfolios.
Central counterparties and their clearing members form a network of margin and default fund exposures. Mapping common membership shows where one member’s default would reach several infrastructures.
Derivatives, repo, securities lending and payment links are modelled as separate layers, so a channel that is small in one layer but central in another is not missed.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
The indicators a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance reads first on network science for capital markets.
| Nîşane | Yekîne | Who reads it | Çarçove |
|---|---|---|---|
| CET1 ratio | % of risk-weighted assets | Banks, supervisors | Basel framework |
| Rêjeya veşartina lîkîdîteyê | % of stressed outflows | Banks, central banks | Basel framework |
| Solvency ratio | % of solvency capital requirement | Insurers, supervisors | IAIS Insurance Core Principles |
| Combined ratio | % of earned premium | Sîgortekar | Actuarial practice |
| Valahiya parastinê | uninsured share of economic loss | Insurers, ministries of finance | Published loss statistics |
| Public debt | % ji GDP | Ministries of finance, IMF | Debt Sustainability Framework |
| Gross financing needs | % of GDP per year | Ministries of finance, investors | Debt Sustainability Framework |
Datasets and records used by network science and contagion on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in the source register.
| Dane | Rol | Nîşan |
|---|---|---|
| Fund holdings filings | Common holdings networks | HATIYE RAPORKIRIN |
| CCP public quantitative disclosures | Clearing exposure networks | HATIYE RAPORKIRIN |
| BIS international banking statistics | Cross-border exposure networks | Statîstîkên weşandî |
| G-SIB interconnectedness indicators | Bank network calibration | Statîstîkên weşandî |
Process explorer · Process
8 gav·4 qonax
Pêvajo
An initial hazard can trigger later risks and events; this illustration draws one cascade across systems such as energy, water, ICT, health and transport.
Outline of an external standard or method, from its public sources. It describes what the framework says, not a record of any run. It does not show that Nexus or any partner performs, certifies or approves a step. A gate is a step of the method, never a Nexus approval. The dependencies are examples. A dependency survey for the place sets them.
Models are checked by reproducing observed cascades and outbreaks. Robustness of results to missing or uncertain links is tested.
| Kontrol bikin | How it is done |
|---|---|
| Missing link sensitivity | Results are recomputed under different reconstructions of unreported links, such as maximum entropy and sparse methods |
| Episode reproduction | Models are checked against propagation observed in past stress episodes |
| Centrality robustness | Rankings of central nodes are compared across centrality measures and time periods |
Network data are often incomplete or confidential. Static network models may miss adaptive behaviour during cascades.
Systems Science and Modelling stewards network science and contagion for the Consortium and reviews how it is applied across platforms.
Reports weşana sê mehane ya Konsorsiyûmê ye. Tiştê ku tu li ser vê mijarê dizanî dikare di çapa pêş de bibe delîl, dosya an rastkirin, bi navê te û di bin CC BY 4.0 de weşandî li cihê ku karê te bi xwe be.
Tu carî daneyên şexsî, hûrgiliyên binesaza hesas an tiştekî ku mafê we yê parvekirinê tune ne neşînin. Beşdarî berî bikaranînê tê nirxandin; şandina wê nivîskarî an mafên edîtorî nade û sponsorî tu carî encamekê nakire.
Agahî û pirs îro vekirî ne. Pirsek referansekê distîne û gava piştî wê dide nasîn; serlêdan, drav, veqetandina hesabkirinê û tomarkirin tenê dema ku tîm, mercên wê û kapasîteya vekolînê hebin vedibin.
Nexşe, dane û jimarên vê malperê ji bo çarçoveyê û agahiyên giştî têne nîşandan. Ew ne şîret, ne pêşbînî û ne hişyarî ne; sînorên agahiyê di Daxuyaniyên Berpirsiyariyê û Daxuyaniyên Daneyê de hatine diyarkirin.
Ev malper tenê cookieyên bi tevahî pêwîst bikar tîne da ku bixebite û hilbijartinên te yên nepeniyê bi bîr bîne. Tiştek ji şirketên din bar nabe, û em qet agahiyên te yên kesane nafiroşin û parve nakin.
Ev malper tenê cookieyên bi tevahî pêwîst bikar tîne da ku bixebite û hilbijartinên te yên nepeniyê bi bîr bîne. Tiştek ji şirketên din bar nabe, û em qet agahiyên te yên kesane nafiroşin û parve nakin. Em tu reklamê nakin. Tu dikarî her dem bi rêya Hilbijartinên nepeniyê li binê her rûpelê hilbijartinên xwe binirxînî.