GRA · Capital Markets Nexus
Spatial financeWhere capital meets hazard, exposure and transition
شلەمەنیی بازاڕ
Market liquidity is the ability to trade a meaningful amount quickly without moving the price much; funding liquidity is the ability to finance a position or meet a margin call. The two reinforce each other, and when both fail together, markets that are deep in normal times can dislocate within hours. This page sets out how liquidity stress develops and spreads, how it is measured, and who decides when and how to respond.
چۆن کارەکە بەڕێوە دەچێت.
Market liquidity and clearing monitor
Market liquidity · Bond market · Session 2
Bid-ask spread
CCP resources
vs largest two members’ default, illustrative
Settlement and surveillance
| Settlement fails | 66 | ▲ 2 | ئاسایی |
| Margin calls intraday | 8 | ▲ 1 | بەرز |
| Surveillance alerts | 94 | ▲ 29 | ڕیزکردنی گرنگی |
Fig.Market liquidity and clearing monitor: example names and illustrative values, not a record or a live system.
Market liquidity: how the risk develops.
Dislocation and funding stress. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Dealer capacity sets the limit
Dealers absorb order imbalances on their balance sheets. Leverage, capital and risk limits cap how much they can hold, so a surge of one-sided selling meets a hard limit and prices move further than fundamentals alone would explain.
Liquidity spirals
Falling prices raise margins and haircuts, which force leveraged holders to sell, which lowers prices again. Market and funding liquidity drain together, and the assets most used as collateral can be hit first.
The dash for cash
When many investors seek cash at once, even the safest and most liquid assets are sold to raise it. Open-ended funds with daily redemptions, money market funds and leveraged relative value trades can all add selling into the same market.
Contagion across markets
Stress spreads through common holders, shared collateral and funding links: from sovereign bonds to repo, from repo to derivatives margin, and across borders through currency funding markets and the cross-currency basis.
How a shock to assets becomes a system loss.
ئەو سەرمایەیەی سیستەمەکە دوای سەرایەتی نێوان بانکەکان لەدەستی دەدات، بەراورد بە زەبرە سەرەتاییەکە، کاتێک ڕێژەی قەرزکاری، پەیوەندیی نێوانیان و ڕێژەی گەڕانەوە دەگۆڕێن، کە کرۆکی تاقیکردنەوەی فشاری ئیحتیاتیی ماکرۆیە. مۆدێلێکی فێرکارییە بە بەهای نموونەیی دیاریکراو، نەک پێشبینی.
کۆنترۆڵەکان
- Fall in external assets
- 2.0%
- Leverage (assets over equity)
- 10 جار
- Interbank share of assets
- 10%
- Recovery on interbank claims
- 40%
- Banks in the system
- 20
- بانکە سەرەکییەکان
- 20% of banks
خوێندنەوەکان
- Equity lost to the initial shock
- 18.0%
- Equity lost after contagion
- 45.0%
- Added by contagion (DebtRank)
- 27.0 خاڵ
- Banks in default
- 0
ژمارە، ڕێگا و سەرچاوەکان
| خول | System equity lost (%) | Banks in default |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 18.00 | 0 |
| 1 | 28.80 | 0 |
| 2 | 35.28 | 0 |
| 3 | 39.17 | 0 |
| 4 | 41.50 | 0 |
| 5 | 42.90 | 0 |
| 6 | 43.74 | 0 |
| 7 | 44.24 | 0 |
| 8 | 44.55 | 0 |
| 9 | 44.73 | 0 |
| 10 | 44.84 | 0 |
| 11 | 44.90 | 0 |
| 12 | 44.94 | 0 |
| 13 | 44.96 | 0 |
| 14 | 44.98 | 0 |
| 15 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 16 | 44.99 | 0 |
| 17 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 18 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 19 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 20 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 21 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 22 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 23 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 24 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 25 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 26 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 27 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 28 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 29 | 45.00 | 0 |
| 30 | 45.00 | 0 |
ڕێگاکان
- DebtRank Battiston and others (2012), Scientific Reports 2:541
- Differential DebtRank Bardoscia and others (2015), PLOS ONE 10
- Contagion in financial networks Gai and Kapadia (2010), Proc. R. Soc. A 466
- Clearing in financial networks Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Management Science 47
- پەنجەی نادڵنیایی (مۆنتی کارلۆی پارامیتەر) Spiegelhalter, Pearson و Short (2011)، Visualising uncertainty about the future، Science 333
- هەستیاریی یەک-یەک (تۆرناد) Saltelli و ئەوانی دیکە (2008)، Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer، Wiley
داتا
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
لە ناو شەش کۆڵەکەکەدا، بە سەرپەرشتیی Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in Capital Markets Nexus in Foundry
- Tested at Capital Markets Nexus in Universe
- کۆدکراوە لە دارایی، بیمە و ئابووری لە Standards
- Published in Capital Markets Nexus in Reports
- فێرکراو لە کۆلێژی دارایی و ئابووری لە Academy
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| نیشاندەر | یەکە | ڕیتم | Source type | ناونیشان |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quoted and effective bid-ask spread | basis points | intraday | Trading venue and dealer quotes | چاودێریکراو |
| Order book depth at the best prices | currency units | intraday | Exchange and electronic platform order books | چاودێریکراو |
| Price impact per unit traded | basis points per currency unit traded | daily | Trade and quote data | مەزەندەکراو |
| Repo rate spread over the policy rate | basis points | daily | Published repo reference rates | ئامارە بڵاوکراوەکان |
| Cross-currency basis | basis points by currency pair and tenor | daily | FX swap and cross-currency swap prices | چاودێریکراو |
| Money market fund net flows | currency units by fund type | هەفتانە | Regulatory fund filings and industry reports | ڕاپۆرتکراو |
| Variation margin called by central counterparties | currency units | daily, disclosed quarterly | CCP public quantitative disclosures | ڕاپۆرتکراو |
| Financial stress index | index points | daily | Composite indices such as the OFR Financial Stress Index and ECB CISS | مۆدێلکراو |
What market liquidity means for exposure, loss and capital.
The exposure, loss, scenario and capital views a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance would ask for, with the frameworks they report against. Structures follow supervisory and actuarial practice. Values are illustrative: never prices, ratings or advice.
Capital, solvency and fiscal indicators
The indicators a risk officer, supervisor or ministry of finance reads first on market liquidity.
| نیشاندەر | یەکە | Who reads it | چوارچێوە |
|---|---|---|---|
| ڕێژەی CET1 | % of risk-weighted assets | Banks, supervisors | Basel framework |
| ڕێژەی داپۆشینی شلەمەنی | % of stressed outflows | Banks, central banks | Basel framework |
| Solvency ratio | % of solvency capital requirement | Insurers, supervisors | IAIS Insurance Core Principles |
| Combined ratio | % of earned premium | کۆمپانیاکانی بیمە | Actuarial practice |
| بۆشایی پاراستن | uninsured share of economic loss | Insurers, ministries of finance | Published loss statistics |
| قەرزی گشتی | % ی GDP | Ministries of finance, IMF | Debt Sustainability Framework |
| Gross financing needs | % of GDP per year | Ministries of finance, investors | Debt Sustainability Framework |
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| سەرچاوە | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| OFR Financial Stress Index | Daily composite of market-based stress measures across credit, equity valuation, funding, safe assets and volatility | Public domain, US government work |
| OFR Short-term Funding Monitor | Repo and money market rates and volumes, including cleared and bilateral repo | Public domain, US government work |
| ECB Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress | Euro area stress index combining money, bond, equity, foreign exchange and financial intermediary segments | Free, ECB reuse terms with attribution |
| SEC Form N-MFP data | Holdings, flows and liquidity of US money market funds | Public domain, US government records |
| FSB Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation | Size, composition and risk metrics for non-bank financial intermediation across jurisdictions | Free, FSB terms of use |
| BIS Quarterly Review and BIS foreign exchange statistics | Analysis of market functioning, dollar funding and foreign exchange swap markets | Free, BIS terms of use with attribution |
| IMF Global Financial Stability Report | Assessment of market liquidity, leverage and vulnerabilities across the global financial system | Free, IMF copyright and usage terms |
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Capital Markets Nexus prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| کێ بڕیار دەدات | پرسیارەکە | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Central banks | Whether a dislocation warrants a liquidity facility, asset purchases or a change to standing operations | Spread, depth, repo and basis indicators with their sources and timeliness |
| Securities regulators | Whether fund liquidity management tools and redemption terms match the liquidity of fund assets | Fund flow, holdings and liquidity mismatch evidence from regulatory filings |
| Central counterparties | How to set margin models so that calls in stress are predictable and not excessively procyclical | Margin call history and procyclicality measures from public disclosures |
| Finance ministries and debt management offices | Whether government bond market structure needs changes such as wider central clearing | Market depth, dealer capacity and repo market evidence |
Outputs this topic produces
- Definitions that keep market liquidity and funding liquidity measures apart
- Mechanism maps from margin calls and redemptions to forced selling
- Indicator panels for dislocation with sources, cadence and evidence labels
- Reconstructions of past liquidity episodes written as research, not as forecasts
What liquidity researchers ask.
- How deep and resilient are key markets, such as government bonds, corporate bonds and repo, under stress?
- Who provides liquidity in stress, and what limits their capacity?
- How do margin calls and redemptions create sudden demands for cash?
- What role do central bank facilities play, and what are their side effects?
How dislocation develops.
In calm periods, dealers and market makers absorb order imbalances using their balance sheets. Under stress, risk limits, capital requirements and funding costs reduce their willingness to do so just as many investors want to sell. Spreads widen, depth falls and prices can gap.
Demands for cash concentrate in stress: margin calls on derivatives, redemptions from open-ended funds and the need to roll short-term funding. Participants sell their most liquid assets first, which can transmit stress to markets usually considered safe. Liquidity spirals arise when falling prices trigger further margin calls and sales.
Measuring liquidity, with limits.
- 01
Liquidity metrics
Bid-ask spreads, depth, price impact and turnover, using econometrics. Each metric captures one dimension, and calm-period values say little about stress.
- 02
Stress episode studies
Analysing past dislocations to understand drivers. Each episode is partly unique.
- 03
Funding market analysis
Repo rates, haircuts and volumes, with financial economics and macro-finance. Bilateral repo data are partly opaque.
- 04
Scenario analysis
Exploring liquidity demands under shocks, presented under scenarios. Behavioural assumptions dominate results.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Financial economics and macro-financeYield curve and spread decomposition · Leverage and fire-sale channelsApplied here
- 02EconometricsVolatility and regime models · Event studies · Liquidity measurementApplied here
- 03Network science and contagionCommon holdings and fire-sale contagion · Clearing membership networksApplied here
- 04Payment and financial market technologySettlement cycle analysis · Liquidity simulation for infrastructuresApplied here
پرسیار و وەڵام.
What is the difference between market and funding liquidity?
Why can safe government bonds become hard to sell?
Is a financial stress index a forecast?
Does this page advise on trading or funding?
Why do safe assets sometimes become illiquid?
What is a haircut?
Does the platform assess firms’ liquidity?
Can liquidity risk be eliminated?
لەم لاپەڕەیەوە بەڵگە پێشکەش بکە.
Reports بڵاوکراوەی وەرزیی کۆنسۆرتیۆم ـە. ئەوەی تۆ لەسەر ئەم بابەتە دەیزانیت دەتوانێت لە وەشانی داهاتوودا ببێتە بەڵگە، کەیس یان ڕاستکردنەوە، بە ناوی خۆتەوە و لەژێر CC BY 4.0 بڵاو دەکرێتەوە کاتێک کاری خۆتە.
- EmailGateway GW-GRASend it from this pageEvidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen depositDeposit it and submit to the communityPublish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsGlobal Risks AllianceSee every way to contributeThe contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
هەرگیز داتای کەسی، وردەکاریی هەستیاری ژێرخان یان هیچ شتێک مەنێرە کە مافی بڵاوکردنەوەت نییە. بەشدارییەک پێش بەکارهێنان پێداچوونەوەی بۆ دەکرێت؛ ناردنی ماف نابەخشێت بە نووسەرایەتی یان بەڕێوەبردنی ڕاگەیاندن، و پاڵپشتی دارایی هەرگیز دۆزینەوەیەک ناکڕێت.
Bring an exposure or capital question to the Alliance.
زانیاری و پرسیار ئەمڕۆ کراوەن. پرسیارێک ژمارەی ئاماژەی پێدەدرێت و هەنگاوی دواتر دیاری دەکات؛ داواکاری، پارەدان، تەرخانکردنی کۆمپیوتەر و تۆمارکردن تەنیا کاتێک دەکرێنەوە کە تیم، مەرج و توانای پێداچوونەوەیان هەبێت.
بەڵگەنامە یاساییەکان.
نەخشە، داتا و وێنەکانی ئەم ماڵپەڕە بۆ ناوەڕۆک و زانیاریی گشتی پیشان دراون. ئامۆژگاری، پێشبینی یان ئاگادارکردنەوە نین؛ سنوورەکانی زانیارییەکە لە ڕەتکردنەوەی بەرپرسیارێتی و ئاگاداریی داتادا دەستنیشان کراون.