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Clearing and settlement: central counterparties, margin and T+1

Clearing and settlement turn a trade into a completed exchange. This foundational guide explains how central counterparties and settlement systems manage risk, what the PFMI require, what margin calls in 2020 and 2022 showed, and how mandatory clearing and T+1 are changing markets.

As of
3 November 2026
পাঠ
14 minutes
প্রমাণ
15 sources, cited in order
উপকরণ
Initial and variation margin, Default fund, Delivery versus payment, Recovery and resolution plans
NEXUS TWIN · WF-1 · CLOUDSEED 591ebeb8A05.CLEARING-AND-SETTLEMENT.FOUNDATIONSxyzSCHEMATIC · CLOUDAGENT TRACK
WF-1 · cloud Schematic wireframe twin (cloud, risk and return). An illustration, not data.

At a glance

উন্মুক্ততা
Clearing members and their clients face margin calls that rise in stress, and losses shared through default funds 3,4.
Protection gap
Liquidity, not solvency, is the pinch point: in March 2020 UK CCP initial margin rose around 31 per cent to GBP 58 billion 4.
প্রস্তুতি
Standards require cover-two resources for some CCPs, segregation and portability, and clear default rules 3,7.
উপকরণWhat it coversWho uses it
Initial and variation marginLosses on cleared positionsClearing members and clients
Default fundLosses beyond a defaulter's marginCCP members
Delivery versus paymentPrincipal risk in settlementSettlement systems and depositories
Recovery and resolution plansContinuity of a failing CCPCCPs and authorities

Not investment advice, a rating or a recommendation.

মান
24
principles for financial market infrastructures, issued in 20123
চাপ
£58bn
initial margin at UK CCPs in March 2020, up around 31 per cent4
Timing
T+1
in the US, and recommended for the EU from 11 October 20275,6

01What clearing and settlement are

What clearing and settlement are

Clearing and settlement turn a trade into a completed exchange. Clearing confirms the terms, calculates what each party owes and, where a central counterparty is used, puts the CCP between buyer and seller. Settlement is the final transfer: securities move to the buyer and cash to the seller. The Bank of England describes a CCP as sitting between buyers and sellers so that both hold a contract with the CCP rather than with each other, which helps ensure obligations are met if one party fails 2.

The firms that do this are called financial market infrastructures. They include payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories 1. Because so much activity flows through a few of them, their failure could spread across the financial system.

The Global Risks Alliance (GRA) publishes this article on its Capital Markets Nexus platform, with the hub page on clearing and settlement, for market participants, supervisors and investors. It explains exposure, instruments and readiness, and does not assess any infrastructure or advise on trading. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) and The Global Risks Forum (GRF) cover the science and governance sides; GRF's capital platform looks at the policy questions.

02Why it matters

Why it matters

Clearing and settlement manage three main risks. Counterparty credit risk is the chance that the other side fails before the trade is complete. Liquidity risk is the chance that cash or securities are not available on time. Operational risk is the chance that systems, processes or people fail. The Principles for financial market infrastructures require each infrastructure to manage legal, credit, liquidity, operational and other risks within a sound framework 1,3.

Central clearing concentrates risk as well as reducing it. A CCP nets many bilateral exposures into one set of obligations, but it becomes a single point through which stress can pass. That is why the standards are demanding. A CCP with a more complex risk profile, or that is systemically important in several jurisdictions, should hold resources to cover the default of the two participants that would cause the largest exposure in extreme but plausible conditions 3.

Stress also moves through margin. When prices swing, CCPs collect more collateral to cover the higher risk. That protects the CCP but drains cash from participants exactly when cash is scarce. The Bank of England's December 2025 Financial Stability Report notes that margin can increase rapidly in stress to match the increase in expected potential losses 4.

Fig. 01The 24 principles in nine groups

The 24 principles in nine groups Layers diagram of the nine groups of the Principles for financial market infrastructures, from general organisation and credit and liquidity risk to settlement, default management, operational risk, access, efficiency and transparency. 01General organisationPrinciples 1 to 302Credit and liquidityঝুঁকিPrinciples 4 to 703SettlementPrinciples 8 to 1004Depositories andexchange of valuePrinciples 11 and 1205Default managementPrinciples 13 and 1406Business andoperational riskPrinciples 15 to 1707AccessPrinciples 18 to 2008EfficiencyPrinciples 21 and 2209TransparencyPrinciples 23 and 24
Groups as listed by the CPMI and IOSCO 3.3Sources: CPMI and IOSCO, PFMI. Figure CC BY 4.0. As of 3 November 2026.
Figure 1 in words

Nine stacked layers. General organisation: principles 1 to 3, legal basis, governance and risk framework. Credit and liquidity risk: 4 to 7, including collateral and margin. Settlement: 8 to 10, finality, money settlement and physical delivery. Depositories and exchange of value: 11 and 12. Default management: 13 and 14, default rules and segregation. General business and operational risk: 15 to 17. Access: 18 to 20, including tiered participation and links. Efficiency: 21 and 22. Transparency: 23 and 24. Source: CPMI and IOSCO.

03How central counterparties manage risk

How central counterparties manage risk

A CCP protects itself in layers. First, each member posts initial margin, collateral sized to cover likely losses on its positions over a close-out period. Variation margin is then exchanged as prices move, so losses do not build up. The PFMI require a margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed for all products 3.

If a member defaults, the CCP uses the defaulter's margin first, then other resources set out in its rules, such as a default fund to which members contribute and the CCP's own capital. The PFMI set out default rules and procedures, and require CCPs to allow segregation and portability of positions so that customers of a failed member can be moved to another 3. Liquidity is a separate test: the CCP must be able to pay what it owes on time even after a default 3.

In 2017 the CPMI and IOSCO issued further guidance on CCP resilience, focused on governance, stress testing for credit and liquidity, coverage, margin and the CCP's own contribution of resources 7. The same year, the FSB issued guidance on CCP resolution, setting out powers to keep critical functions running, tools to allocate losses and the role of crisis management groups 8.

04Netting: why clearing shrinks exposures

Netting: why clearing shrinks exposures

Netting is the main reason central clearing reduces risk. Without a CCP, each pair of firms has its own exposure, and a firm with many trading partners has many separate claims. With a CCP, all of a member's trades in a product are netted into one position against the CCP, so offsetting trades cancel out. The Bank of England describes this as reducing counterparty credit risk, because the obligations of a trade can still be met if one party fails 2.

Compression goes a step further. It replaces many offsetting contracts with fewer trades of the same net risk, which cuts the gross notional value of a portfolio without changing its economic exposure 9. Lower gross positions mean less operational work and smaller exposures to manage in a default.

Netting has limits. It works within a CCP and a product set, so exposure split across several CCPs nets less. The PFMI also note that by performing centralised activities, FMIs concentrate risks and create interdependencies between and among FMIs and participating institutions 1.

05How settlement reduces risk

How settlement reduces risk

Settlement risk falls when cash and securities change hands at the same time. Delivery versus payment links the two legs so that neither side gives up its asset without receiving the other. The PFMI ask infrastructures to provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date, and to settle money in central bank money where practical and available 3.

Europe's TARGET2-Securities platform is an example. It lets securities and cash be exchanged simultaneously across Europe in central bank money, on harmonised rules, which the ECB says reduces settlement risk and makes cross-border settlement cheaper and simpler 10. Central securities depositories keep ownership records of individual securities and facilitate their secure transfer between people or entities 2.

Shorter settlement cycles reduce the time during which a trade is exposed to a counterparty failure. They also leave less time to fix errors, arrange funding and handle foreign exchange, so operations must be faster and more automated.

Fig. 02Margin surged in the 2020 dash for cash

Margin surged in the 2020 dash for cash Bar chart of initial margin at UK central counterparties: about GBP 44 billion before the stress, estimated from the reported rise, and GBP 58 billion in March 2020 after a rise of around 31 per cent. Before the stress, estimatedabout 44 GBP billion of initial marginMarch 202058 GBP billion of initial margin
The March 2020 value is reported by the Bank of England; the earlier value is estimated from the reported 31 per cent rise 4.4Sources: Bank of England, December 2025. Figure CC BY 4.0. As of 3 November 2026.
Figure 2 in words

Two bars in GBP billion. Before the March 2020 stress: about 44, estimated by working back from the reported 31 per cent increase. March 2020: 58, highlighted, as reported. Average daily variation margin calls were five times higher than in January and February 2020. Source: Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, December 2025.

06What stress episodes showed

What stress episodes showed

The March 2020 dash for cash was the largest test of central clearing since the post-2008 reforms. The joint review of margining practices by the Basel Committee, the CPMI and IOSCO found that variation margin calls in March 2020 were large and much higher than in February, in both centrally and non-centrally cleared markets 11. Initial margin for centrally cleared markets rose significantly and varied widely across and within asset classes 11.

In the United Kingdom, initial margin requirements at CCPs increased by around 31 per cent to GBP 58 billion, and average daily variation margin calls were five times higher than in January and February 2020 4. In 2022, very large margin calls in LME nickel futures after very large price increases led the CCP, LME Clear, to suspend trading 4. Both episodes showed that margin protects CCPs but can transfer liquidity stress to participants.

The BCBS, CPMI and IOSCO review identified six areas for further work, including increasing transparency in centrally cleared markets and enhancing the liquidity preparedness of market participants as well as liquidity disclosures 11. The Bank of England's December 2025 Financial Stability Report notes that strategies of leveraged market participants can be vulnerable to increases in margin requirements, which can cause them to reduce risk and potentially amplify volatility during periods of stress 4.

TwinSystem map of clearing and settlement

Interactive · 3D
System map of clearing and settlement
The causal structure of clearing and settlement stress as this article describes it: volatility drives margin calls, margin calls drain liquidity and can force sales or a member default, and margin, default resources, standards, resolution and transparency act back. Every number on the map names its source. Drag to rotate and scroll to zoom; Explore opens the layers, story steps, time bar and charts.
Method and description

Article system map: nodes and signed links are the editorial desk's reading of the cited sources; link strengths are stated judgements on a 0 to 1 scale, not measurements. Node values quote the source named on hover.

The map has thirteen nodes in six kinds. Drivers: price volatility; clearing mandates and shorter cycles. Exposure: concentration of risk in a few CCPs. Hazards: default of a large clearing member; sudden margin calls, with UK CCP initial margin reaching GBP 58 billion in March 2020. Impacts: liquidity stress at participants; forced asset sales; stress on the CCP. Responses: risk-based margin; the default fund and loss waterfall. Levers: the PFMI and cover-two resources; recovery and resolution planning; predictable margin. Three loops: margin calls drain liquidity and force sales that raise volatility and calls; a default stresses the CCP and markets, feeding more calls; volatility raises model margin, which adds calls, sales and more volatility.

  1. The whole system 13 nodes in six columns by kind, 17 signed links and 3 feedback loops: 2 drivers, 2 hazards, 1 exposure nodes, 3 impacts, 2 responses and 3 policy levers. The columns with the heaviest influence out are impacts (1.9) and policy levers (1.8); the heaviest dependence in falls on impacts (3.7) and hazards (2). The next steps add the chain one rank at a time with the sign and strength of every link.
  2. Drivers and hazards 2 drivers on the left push the system: pressures stated without a headline number. 2 hazards follow: sudden margin calls: 58 GBP billion UK CCP initial margin, March 2020 (s15). Link width is the stated strength (0 to 1); red links amplify, green links dampen; links within a column show hazards that feed each other.
  3. Exposure and impacts Hazards meet 1 exposure nodes and produce 3 impacts: . Hover a node for its value, unit and source id.
  4. Feedback loops 3 loops close the graph. R1 (margin spiral): margin calls → liquidity stress → fire sales → volatility → margin calls, loop gain 0.18. R2 (default contagion loop): margin calls → liquidity stress → member default → CCP stress → volatility → margin calls, loop gain 0.04. R3 (procyclical margin loop): margin system → margin calls → liquidity stress → fire sales → volatility → margin system, loop gain 0.04. A reinforcing loop has an even number of dampening links and runs away; a balancing loop has an odd number and self-corrects.
  5. Responses and policy levers 3 levers and 2 responses on the right act back on the chain: resolution dampens CCP stress (−0.4); margin transparency dampens liquidity stress (−0.4). The panel sums link strengths by kind: influence out of a column against dependence into it.

07Mandatory clearing and the post-2008 reforms

Mandatory clearing and the post-2008 reforms

After 2008, the G20 reforms pushed standardised over-the-counter derivatives into central clearing and added reporting and margin rules for the rest. By the FSB's 2019 progress report, 23 of 24 member jurisdictions had comprehensive trade reporting requirements, 18 had standards for deciding when standardised derivatives must be centrally cleared, and 16 had margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives 12.

Data on these markets comes from trade repositories and central bank statistics. The BIS publishes statistics on the notional amounts, market values and credit exposures of OTC derivatives, and tracks compression, the replacement of offsetting contracts with fewer trades of the same net risk 9.

The United States is extending central clearing to Treasury securities. A rule published in January 2024 requires direct participants of Treasury clearing agencies to submit eligible secondary market transactions for clearing 13. In March 2025 the compliance dates were extended by one year, to 31 December 2026 for cash transactions and 30 June 2027 for repo 14.

Fig. 03Post-2008 derivatives reforms by 2019

Post-2008 derivatives reforms by 2019 Bar chart of FSB jurisdictions with reforms in force in 2019: 23 of 24 with trade reporting, 18 with central clearing standards and 16 with margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. Trade reporting23 jurisdictions out of 24Central clearing standards18 jurisdictions out of 24Margin for uncleared derivatives16 jurisdictions out of 24
Reported by the FSB in its 2019 progress report 12.12Sources: FSB, October 2019. Figure CC BY 4.0. As of 3 November 2026.
Figure 3 in words

Three horizontal bars counting jurisdictions out of 24. Trade reporting requirements: 23. Standards for determining mandatory central clearing: 18, highlighted. Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives: 16. Source: FSB, OTC derivatives market reforms, 2019 progress report.

08Standards, rules and supervisors

Standards, rules and supervisors

International standards set the baseline and national authorities supervise. In the United States, eight financial market utilities have been designated as systemically important, including clearing agencies supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 15. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England supervises recognised payment systems, central securities depositories and CCPs 2. The table lists the instruments cited here.

উপকরণIssuer and dateএটি কী করে
Principles for financial market infrastructuresCPMI and IOSCO, April 2012 1,324 principles for payment, clearing and settlement systems
Further guidance on CCP resilienceCPMI and IOSCO, July 2017 7Stress testing, coverage, margin and governance for CCPs
Guidance on CCP resolutionFSB, July 2017 8Powers and tools to resolve a failing CCP
Review of margining practicesBCBS, CPMI and IOSCO, September 2022 11Lessons from margin calls in March 2020
T+1 settlement ruleUS SEC, March 2023 5Moves most broker-dealer trades from T+2 to T+1
Treasury clearing ruleUS SEC, January 2024, dates extended March 2025 13,14Central clearing of eligible Treasury cash and repo trades
EU move to T+1ESMA recommendation, target 11 October 2027 6Coordinated transition with the Commission and the ECB
Selected standards and rules on clearing and settlement, as of 3 November 2026.

Fig. 04From the PFMI to T+1

From the PFMI to T+1 Timeline of nine milestones from the PFMI in April 2012 to the EU move to T+1 targeted for October 2027, including CCP guidance, the 2020 and 2022 stress episodes and US rules on T+1 and Treasury clearing. APR 2012PFMI issuedJUL 2017CCP resilience andresolution guidanceMAR 2020Dash for cash2022LME nickel; marginreviewMAR 2023US T+1 ruleJAN 2024US Treasury clearingruleDEC 2026Treasury cashclearingOCT 2027EU T+1
Dates as reported by each issuer 1,7,8,11,4,5,13,14,6.1,7,8,11,4,5,13,14,6Sources: CPMI and IOSCO; FSB; BCBS; Bank of England; SEC; ESMA. Figure CC BY 4.0. As of 3 November 2026.
Figure 4 in words

A horizontal timeline. April 2012: PFMI issued. July 2017: CCP resilience and resolution guidance. March 2020: dash for cash margin surge. 2022: LME nickel suspension; September, review of margining practices. March 2023: US T+1 rule published. January 2024: US Treasury clearing rule. December 2026: Treasury cash clearing compliance. June 2027: Treasury repo clearing compliance. October 2027: EU move to T+1.

09The move to shorter settlement

The move to shorter settlement

The US T+1 rule, published in March 2023, shortens the standard settlement cycle for most broker-dealer transactions from two business days after the trade date to one, and adds rules on how institutional trades are processed 5. The goal is less time exposed to counterparty failure and less margin held against unsettled trades.

Europe is following. ESMA has recommended the fourth quarter of 2027, and 11 October as the optimal date, for the EU move to T+1, and supports coordination with other European jurisdictions 6. A governance structure with the Commission, the ECB and an industry committee coordinates the work 6.

The transition shifts risk as well as reducing it. With less time, failed trades, funding gaps and foreign exchange timing become harder to manage. Firms trading across time zones are most affected.

10Operational resilience and access

Operational resilience and access

Clearing and settlement depend on systems running every day. The PFMI ask each infrastructure to identify plausible sources of operational risk, internal and external, and to reduce their impact with appropriate systems, policies, procedures and controls 3. They also require a general business risk buffer: liquid net assets funded by equity so the infrastructure can keep operating if it suffers business losses 3.

Access matters too. The PFMI require objective, risk-based and publicly disclosed participation criteria that permit fair and open access 3. Many firms reach a CCP indirectly, as clients of a clearing member. The principles ask infrastructures to identify and manage risks from these tiered participation arrangements, and from links with other infrastructures 3.

Shorter settlement and new clearing mandates raise the stakes for operations. Under the US T+1 rule, the allocation, confirmation and affirmation process must be completed as soon as technologically practicable and no later than the end of the day on trade date 5. The SEC's March 2025 extension of the Treasury clearing compliance dates followed a request from trade associations, who pointed to the onboarding process that dealers and clients must undertake and to systems and operations upgrades 14.

11Who carries the exposure

Who carries the exposure

Exposure differs by role. Exposure to a CCP runs through its participants. A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants through an effective margin system, and when a participant defaults it may close out or auction the defaulter's positions 1. A CCP should also have rules that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided with respect to those positions 1.

Non-bank users of derivatives and repo carry liquidity exposure even when they do not face the CCP directly. The Bank of England is studying how margin calls affect their liquidity buffers and how they rebuild them, because forced selling to meet calls can spread stress into other markets 4. The 2020 episode showed that variation margin calls, which are payments of real losses, can be very large in a short time 11.

CCPs themselves carry the risk that their own resources prove too small. That is why the standards size resources to extreme but plausible scenarios and why authorities plan for resolution 3,8. Taxpayers sit at the end of this chain only if resolution fails, which is what the post-2008 framework is designed to prevent.

12What participants watch

What participants watch

Market participants judge their exposure to clearing and settlement through a few practical questions. How much margin could a CCP call in a severe but plausible stress, and how quickly? Which assets are accepted as collateral, and can they be mobilised on the day? How are losses shared if a member defaults, and what would a participant owe to the default fund? The PFMI require CCPs to disclose rules, key procedures and market data so participants can understand these risks 3.

Supervisors look at the same questions from the system side. The Bank of England is studying how margin calls affect the liquidity buffers of derivatives and repo users and how they restore those buffers 4. Related pages cover market liquidity and market concentration. This article describes these questions and does not assess any CCP or participant.

13What is changing

What is changing

Shorter settlement. The EU and other European markets are preparing for T+1 in October 2027 6.

Treasury clearing. US Treasury cash and repo trades move into central clearing by December 2026 and June 2027 14.

Margin transparency. Standard setters continue work on how predictable and transparent margin calls are, and on participants' readiness 11,4.

CCP recovery and resolution. Authorities keep building tools and plans so that a failing CCP can keep critical services running 8.

Digital assets and tokenised settlement. New forms of settlement raise questions for the PFMI; see the platform's digital markets page.

14Three faces of clearing and settlement

Three faces of clearing and settlement

For science, led by GCRI, the questions are about system design: how networks of exposures, collateral and time zones behave under stress, and how operational resilience is engineered. For governance, led by GRF, the question is how standards are agreed, how supervisors cooperate across borders and how resolution powers are used, the subject of its capital platform.

For finance, the GRA face, the question is readiness: whether participants can meet margin calls, settle on time and absorb a member default. GRA describes exposure and instruments; it does not assess any infrastructure or advise on trading. The capital markets risk pillar gives the wider context. Readers can browse the platform's topic index and research methods pages for further context.

What this article does not claim: it is an educational summary of public sources as of 3 November 2026. It is not investment, financial, trading or legal advice, and not an assessment of any CCP, depository or market participant. GRA does not lend, underwrite, rate or invest. GCRI does not regulate, certify, license or approve; GRF does not regulate, finance, procure or certify. Naming the CPMI, IOSCO, the FSB, the Basel Committee, the BIS, the SEC, ESMA, the ECB, the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England is not a claim of partnership, endorsement or alignment.

প্রশ্ন

প্রশ্ন ও উত্তর

What is the difference between clearing and settlement?

In the PFMI glossary, clearing is the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming transactions prior to settlement; settlement is the irrevocable and unconditional transfer of an asset or financial instrument, or the discharge of an obligation, in accordance with the terms of the underlying contract 1.

What does a central counterparty do?

It stands between buyer and seller so that both face the CCP rather than each other, which reduces counterparty credit risk 2.

What are the PFMI?

The Principles for financial market infrastructures, issued by the CPMI and IOSCO in April 2012, are 24 international standards for payment, clearing and settlement systems 1,3.

What happened to margin in March 2020?

Variation margin calls were large and initial margin rose sharply; at UK CCPs initial margin rose by around 31 per cent to GBP 58 billion 11,4.

What is T+1?

Settlement one business day after the trade date. The US adopted it in a 2023 rule, and ESMA recommends 11 October 2027 for the EU 5,6.

What is cover two?

A requirement that some CCPs hold resources to cover the default of the two participants that would cause the largest exposure in extreme but plausible conditions 3.

শর্তাবলি

শব্দকোষ

Central counterparty (CCP)
An infrastructure that becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.
Initial margin
Collateral posted to cover likely losses if a position must be closed out.
Variation margin
Payments exchanged as prices move, so gains and losses are settled regularly.
Default fund
Resources contributed by CCP members to cover losses beyond a defaulter's margin.
Delivery versus payment
A settlement method that links the transfer of securities and cash.
Central securities depository
An infrastructure that keeps ownership records of securities.
Settlement cycle
The time between trade date and settlement, such as T+1.

উৎস

References

15 sources, numbered in the order they are first cited
  1. Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (2012-04-16). Principles for financial market infrastructures. www.bis.org. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  2. Bank of England (current web page). Financial market infrastructure supervision. www.bankofengland.co.uk. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  3. Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (current web page). Principles for financial market infrastructures: list of principles. www.bis.org. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  4. Bank of England, Financial Policy Committee (2025-12-02). Financial Stability Report, December 2025. www.bankofengland.co.uk. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  5. US Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Register (2023-03-06). Shortening the securities transaction settlement cycle (final rule). www.federalregister.gov. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  6. European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (current web page). Shortening the settlement cycle to T+1 in the EU. www.esma.europa.eu. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  7. Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (2017-07-05). Resilience of central counterparties (CCPs): further guidance on the PFMI. www.bis.org. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  8. Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2017-07-05). Guidance on central counterparty resolution and resolution planning. www.fsb.org. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  9. Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (current web page). OTC derivatives statistics: definitions. www.bis.org. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  10. European Central Bank (ECB) (current web page). What is TARGET2-Securities (T2S)?. www.ecb.europa.eu. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  11. BCBS, CPMI and IOSCO (2022-09-29). Review of margining practices. www.bis.org. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  12. Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2019-10-15). OTC derivatives market reforms: 2019 progress report on implementation. www.fsb.org. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  13. US Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Register (2024-01-16). Standards for covered clearing agencies for U.S. Treasury securities (final rule). www.federalregister.gov. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  14. US Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Register (2025-03-04). Extension of compliance dates for standards for covered clearing agencies for U.S. Treasury securities. www.federalregister.gov. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  15. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (current web page). Designated financial market utilities. www.federalreserve.gov. Accessed 2026-11-03.

Record

Editorial record

Facts and policies are stated as of 3 November 2026. This article is reviewed at least every 180 days and whenever a cited policy, standard or dataset changes.

Published by the GRA finance desk on Capital Markets Nexus under the editorial integrity policy. To report an error or request a correction, use the Capital Markets Nexus corrections route; corrections are dated and listed with the article.

Text, figures and data tables are published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 licence (CC BY 4.0): reuse them with credit and a link to this page. Third-party material keeps its own terms, credited where it appears.

Cite this article

GRA finance desk (2026, November 3). Clearing and settlement: CCPs, margin and T+1 explained. Capital Markets Nexus. https://globalriskalliance.com/capital-markets-nexus/clearing-and-settlement/

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Attribution to paste
<p>Clearing and settlement: central counterparties, margin and T+1 — GRA finance desk, Capital Markets Nexus. First published 3 November 2026 at <a href="https://globalriskalliance.com/capital-markets-nexus/clearing-and-settlement/">https://globalriskalliance.com/capital-markets-nexus/clearing-and-settlement/</a>. Republished under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).</p>

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